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ABSTRACT 
Pakistan came into being i n August, 1947 with the marginal 
characteristics of a developed p o l i t y . Despite the apparent existence 
of disagreeable p o l i t i c a l phenomena a l l the components of Parliamentary 
democracy, and for that matter a developed p o l i t y , were beginning to 
surface i n Pakistan as the year 1958 wore on; and a general election was 
becoming imminent. 
The f i r s t significant index of p o l i t i c a l development was Pakistan's 
achieving a general ideological consensus and resolution of regional 
cleavages i n the country. On the question of integrative i n s t i t u t i o n -
building, the amalgamation of a l l units of West Pakistan into one unified 
province was a p o l i t i c a l landmark. The formula of parity between the two 
wings i n a l l matters and the machineries: for implementing i t were duly 
incorporated i n the constitution. Proper machinery for deciding disputes 
over secular versus Islamic issues were also envisaged by the constitution. 
In sum, the constitution of 1956 l a i d the foundation of Pakistan nationhood. 
The period 1956 - 1958 witnessed fufcther strengthening of i n s t i t u -
tions which were created. The one-unit scheme was further s o l i d i f i e d . The 
edges of centrefugal forces were blunted, and the grievances of the former 
smaller units of West Pakistan were attended to. The regionalism of East 
Pakistan, comparatively speaking, was dwindling. The controversy over the 
defi n i t i o n of the Pakistan state, whether i t would be secular or Islamic 
- 2 - l\ 
\\ 
was also f i n a l l y solved with the ushering of a joint electorate system. :| 
I t can be thus maintained that within the period 1954- i958> "the 
regional and ideological cleavages were greatly resolved paving the way 
i 
for a " Common value orientation H - the desideratum for a developed j 
p o l i t y . 
Also, there occured a significant change i n the p o l i t i c a l system, 
in that the early domination of the Services was on the wane. The Hindus 
which were looked upon with jaundiced eye i n the early period were given 
a sense of partnership with the majority community i n the use of p o l i t i c a l 
power. Similarly, the parliament i n the period 1956-1958 made some f 
headway towards the right direction. What is more, the trend®, were 
identifiable i n that, the two parties namely, the M.L. and A.L. were \ 
emerging as the two major p o l i t i c a l parties of Pakistan. Despite a l l these 
achievements towards p o l i t i c a l development, Pakistan could not retain 
the parliamentary apparatus on the Westminister model, for ; some small 
group of people who happened to have their fingers on the triggers of 
power, had no loyalty to democratic institutions and sabotaged the 
working of the parliamentary government i n Pakistan. 
i 
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PREFACE 
To concur with the proposition that Government i s indispensible, 
independently of a l l accompanying deficiencies, by virtue of the 
very nature of human society, i s not apparently a problem. But there 
involves a judicious judgement, a prggmatic insight i n the hard choice 
of appropriate form of Government which i s i n consonant with the 
genius of a given people and i t s own characteristic social structure. 
The Westminister system of government i s at bottom a democratic 
i n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s both'a form of Government and a way of l i f e ' . 
Normally, i t has functioned smoothly i n an homogeneous environment. 
When Pakistan came into being parliamentary democracy was adopted as 
her form of Government. Since a l l the paraphernalia of parliamentary 
democracy were decreed n u l l and void following the advent of a martial 
law regime i n 1958 an impression has gained ground, at home and 
abroad, that the parliamentary system of government might have essen-
t i a l l y f a i l e d i n Pakistan - a reinforcement i n the belief of the 
so-called a p r i o r i theory that representative institutions are f i s h 
out of water i n the newly independent countries just freed from the 
foreign rule. There are some publications available on Pakistan 
P o l i t i c s including the illuminating studies of Prof. K. Callard and 
Dr. K.B. Sayeed. But the fact remains, that a l l the available studies 
are lopsided i n that they are more prone to discover the debit side 
of Pakistan P o l i t i c s to the exclusion of the credit. A decade 8r 
two i s inadequate for the f u l l development of a nation. 
I l l 
Hitherto, there has been no attempt to decipher the 'dynamics* 
that lay beneath Pakistan's b a f f l i n g p o l i t i c a l events - 1947-1958. 
After four years of hard slogging i n research the author has made 
an attempt i n t h i s thesis to analyse the cumulative effects of events 
and discern the redeeming features of Pakistan's Parliamentary P o l i t i c s . 
Important institutions and great national issues have been analysed 
and t h e i r resultant underlying meanings explained. I t w i l l appear 
at the end of t h i s thesis that a l l the components of parliamentary 
democracy, and for that matter a developed p o l i t y , were beginning to 
surface i n Pakistan despite the apparent existence of disagreeable 
p o l i t i c a l phenomena as the year 1958 wore on and a general election 
was becoming imminent. While surveying the period 1947-1958 the 
author has aimed at giving a panoramic view of Pakistan's p o l i t i c a l 
aspects, and taken reoourse to a broad socio-psychological approach 
towards p o l i t i c a l development. This has necessarily entailed the 
amassing of a considerable amount of d e t a i l . 
In t h i s thesis considerable stress has been l a i d on primary 
sources and published materials. This procedure has been duly supple-
mented by interviews with people who were deeply committed to Pakistan 1 
p o l i t i o s . In t h i s connection the author records his deepest gratitude 
to the late General Meander Mirza who i n a series of interviews 
gave an authoritative account of his p o l i t i c a l experiences i n Pakistan. 
On another count I am equally grateful to the late general for allowing 
me to use some of his secret documents for research purposes, the 
result of which has been to throw new insight on Pakistan p o l i t i c s , 
IV. 
though, unfortunately, inspite of the author*s personal respect 
for the late General, some parts of the documents have not been used 
as he would have wished so as to ensure that t h i s thesis should be 
impersonal• 
The author places on record his gratitude to his teachers and 
friends for providing him with incentives i n many a way, and especially 
has greatly benefitted through contact with Prof. C.H. P h i l l i p , 
Prof. Morris-Jones, Prof. H. Tinker, Mr. C.H. Dodd, Dr. Paris, Mr. D. 
Arundell and Dr. Zaidi. I thank Miss Mary Manuel for the amount of 
labour she has put i n while typing the thesis. Last but not least, 
I register my t r i b u t e to my wife, Shahzadi, who constantly travelled 
between East and West Pakistan to help me get valuable materials as 
a research assistant, and as a wife sustained me during these years 
with encouragements, prayers and love. 
C.S.H. Harun 
London, 
October, 1970. 
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GOVERNMENT 
I t has been emphasised that "since the State i s i n modern times 
the most significant form of organisation of men and. embodies the 
greatest concentration of powers, ••• there should have been, and should 
s t i l l be, a great and revolutionary struggle to secure a coincidence 
between State and n a t i o n " A n y unkind attempt to assess whether 
Pakistan i n fact qualified automatically as a nation-state might have 
seemed to the M.L. leaders a p o l i t i c a l blasphemy, i n 1947• But the fact 
remained that 'Pakistan* as a concept of Muslim nationhood under the 
I.L. leadership with Mr. Jinnah at the apex brought unity of action 
among i t s adherents to create i t ; but i t did not bring unity of mind 
to define i t . In j u r i s t i c parlance i t was understandable that Pakistan 
was to be made a haven for Muslims. But as soon as i t was established, 
i t s social structure offered a different picture. Pakistan was achieved, 
but Pakistanis had to be groomed. There lay Pakistan i n a welter of 
ideology, rel i g i o n , language and regionalism - a national dissension 
2 
which might be termed i n Platonic language as a "greater e v i l " . 
These national cleavages on basic issues had to be integrated into one 
unified p o l i t y ; f o r , the Parliamentary government "to be effective 
depends not merely upon i t s methods; i t depends also upon agreement 
upon the object to which those methods shall be devoted" ."^  
1. Rupert Emerson, "Prom Empire to Nation" (Beacon Press, Boston,1966)p.96. 
2. Plato's Republic, Book V, quoted i n Problems of Parliamentary 
Government i n Colonies, ed. (Hansard Sooiety,London,1953)> p.39» 
3. H.J. Laski, Parliamentary Government i n England. 
(George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1950), p.51» 
2. 
I t i s appropriate to analyse the workings of Pakistan government, 
nay of a l l underdeveloped p o l i t i e s , i n the l i g h t of B r i t i s h or Western 
experience. But, one encounters d i f f i c u l t i e s when the contrasting scale 
i s not made contingent upon one cardinal faotor, namely that those 
former countries are the Planters of in s t i t u t i o n s , not necessarily, 
t h e i r harvesters. The health of a given government i s nourished or 
atrophied largely according to what extent the p o l i t i c a l society i t s e l f 
i s salubrious. In other words, to create a healthy p o l i t i c a l society 
a country, above a l l , needs to have viable institutions of p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and social nature symbolic of people's consensus or deference. 
Certainly, the nation-state concept was not automatically consummated 
i n Pakistan with the dawn of independence; for she was yet to see 
federal strains and ideological angularities resolved into constitutional 
a r t i c l e s . The practical solution lay with the government interacting 
and maintaining a dialogue with the people. As a matter of faot, the 
governmental a c t i v i t i e s of Pakistan were mainly clustered around those 
objects mentioned above. So, we propose to analyse the working of the 
government of Pakistan, the main emphasis of which w i l l be l a i d on the 
gradual emergence of 'national concensus*, as has been revealed through 
the interactions of the government and the governed. 
With the chime of 12 o'clock midnight on 15th August, 1947 
Pakistan set out on her career as an independent Dominion. Section 8(2) 
of the Indian Independence Act l a i d down that the new Dominion "shall 
be governed as nearly as may be i n accordance with the Government of 
India Act, 1935 ••• subject to ... omissions, additions, adaptations 
and modifications •. The Independence Act and the India Act of 
4» Quoted i n G.W. Chowdhury, ed. Documents and Speeches on the Consti-t u t i o n of Pakistan. (Daccas 1967), p .7. - - - - - - - - - - - - -— 
3. 
1935 would, therefore, aot as provisional constitution pending drawing 
up of the permanent constitution by the Constituent Assembly* The 
executive authority of the Federal Government, i n pursuance of the 
India Act, was vested i n the Governor General, who was, also, to be 
assisted by a •Council of Ministers*• There was no provision in the 
India Act requiring the Governor General to accept the advioe of his 
ministers. But i n 1948, a tribunal while t r y i n g a dismissed Chief 
Minister of a Province stated that *aid and advice* of the Ministers 
as mentioned i n the Sections 9 and 15 of the India Act were to bind 
the "Governor General and the Governor i n Federal and Provincial 
a f f a i r s " • The Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order gazetted i n 
September 1947» unlike the Indian Constitution did away with those 
powers of the Governor General and the Governors which were to be exer-
oised on grounds of "speoial responsibility", "individual judgment" 
and personal "discretion". But the Governor General was authorized to 
promulgate ordinances i n cases of emergency. The order did not envisage 
giving powers to the Governors to assume responsibility i n their 
provinces under Section 93 of the 1935 Act, But Section 51 was amended 
to give powers to the Governor General to ensure that Provincial 
Ministries did not exceed t h e i r powers. Some of the important posts, 
e.g. judges of the High Court, Governors of the Provinoes, Chairman of 
the Publio Service Commission, etc., were also to be f i l l e d by the 
Governor General. And interestingly the oath of allegiance required f or 
the judges, legislators, etc., was to be sworn to the (provisional) 
Constitution not to the Crown. But the most important feature of the 
Order was i t s making the "Ministers i n the Centre and Provinces ••• 
5« Report of the Constitution Commission. Pakistan. 1961 (Government 
df Pakistan Press, Karachi:1962), p.6. 
4. 
absolutely responsible to the legislature".** In short, the changes 
which were incorporated i n the India Act, 1935* "to meet "the situation 
obtaining i n Pakistan after independence, resulted i n the introduction 
7 
of Ma type of Government which was undoubtedly Parliamentary"* 
However, despite a provision i n the Independence Act that "the 
g 
same person may be Governor General of both the new Dominions", 
Pakistan chose her founding father, Mr. Jinnah, as the f i r s t Governor 
General. Whether the appointment was p o l i t i c a l l y sagacious or not was 
a matter of some controversy. However, many people were apparently 
i 
disillusioned to f i n d a constitutional j u r i s t of Mr. Jinnah's persuasion 
playing the role of the Governor General under a parliamentary system. 
j The Governor General i n the person of Mr. Jinnah served three purposes. 
] F i r s t l y , he introduced i n the Pakistan government what i n the words of 
9 
Bagehot might be " s e m i - f i l i a l feelings". This f i l i a l appeal of the 
Head of the State as father could be validated both through the mani-
pulation of the body of myth and the cultural values and perceptions of 
the mass of the people. From time immemorial, the Kings always loomed 
larger than l i f e i n the folk-culture of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. 
Even i n ancient Hindu p o l i t i c a l thought kings were regarded as "Kalasya 
Karanam",^ meaning that the king was the maker of the age. And to the 
Muslims of the subcontinent the memories of the 'Delhi Sultanate* were 
s t i l l fresh. Mr. Jinnah combined i n himself t h i s sacred symbol of the 
6. The Times. September 3, 1947• 
7» Loo» oit.« Constitution Commission, p .5. 
8. Doouments and Speeohes on the Constitution of Pakistan, op.oit.. p.5* 
9. W. Bagehot, The English Constitution (London: 1898). p.4« 
10. K.M. Panikkar, The IdeaB of Sovereignty and State i n Indian P o l i t i c a l 
Thought (Bombay: 1963), p.39» "~" 
5 
country's given f o l k - c u l t u r e , and thus could e l i c i t from the people 
deference, devotion and awe toward himself as the source of authority} 
f o r i t was he who was apparently credited w i t h the creation of Pakistan* 
So, the 'Charisma* associated w i t h Mr* Jinnah f o r the Muslim renaissance 
rendered the o f f i c e of the Governor General i n Pakistan, unlike her 
equivalents i n other commonwealth countries, i n t o a mirror which might 
have r e f l e c t e d the people's dormant a t a v i s t i c sentiment f o r a Sultanate. 
The second purpose was supposedly t o confer on Mr. Jinnah the pre-
rogatives of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Head of State, i . e . "the r i g h t t o he 
consulted, the r i g h t t o encourage, the r i g h t to warn"«^ But soon these 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s degenerated i n t o the de facto powers of the 
Governor General. Since the u n i t y of pre-independence days could no 
longer survive the departure of the B r i t i s h , Mr. Jinnah wrapped i n a 
mantle of charisma was the only 'prop' to national s o l i d a r i t y . He was 
s t i l l the president of the M.L. - the party i n power - and was subse-
quently made the President of the Constituent Assembly, the c o n s t i t u t i o n -
making body and also the "sovereign body as the Federal l e g i s l a t u r e of 
12 
Pakistan". He was dubbed by the Constituent Assembly i n the face of 
** 13 opposition from Congress as the Quaid-e-Azam of Pakistan. 
* I n s t i t u t i o n of kingship i n Muslim vocabulary. 
** The great leader. 
11. Bagehot, o p . o i t . . p.75» 
12. Statesman, llAugust, 1947* 
13» See, C.A.D. Vol. 1, 12 August, 1947» P«33. The Prime Minister 
expressed i n the House that people were addressing Mr. Jinnah 
as "Badshah (King) of Pakistan • I b i d . , p.46. 
6 
From t h i s vantage point Mr. Jinnah was able to give leadership to the 
state which had t o he constructed from i t s foundations. Given that 
t e r r i t o r i a l security i s the sine qua non of Statehood, Mr. Jinnah 
preoccupied himself w i t h the problems of the f r o n t i e r s } f o r Pakistan 
i n h e r i t e d one of the world's most s t r a t e g i c a l l y important f r o n t i e r s . 
He made a bold decision i n withdrawing a Brigade of 4,700 troops with ^ 
a l l i t s paraphernalia from the fortresses of t r i b a l zones, i n order t o 
appease the f r o n t i e r tribesmen, and eliminate suspicion i n the brother-
# 
hood of Islam. A loose form of control i n the Khyber, Markard, 
Baluchistan and Waziristan was followed by t r i b a l pledges of f u l l l o y a l t y 
t o the Pakistan government ."^ A series of t r i b a l assemblies comprising 
I f r i d i s , Mohmands, Waziris and Mahsuds were brought together f o r the 
^ 4 r s t time* This was followed by the Governor General's 10-day tour of 
15 
the N.W.F.P. scoring "more than a personal triumph"• J The same r e s u l t 
*#• 
was y i e l d e d through h i s attending the Royal Durbar at S i b i , Baluchistan. 
His immense prestige and a u t h o r i t y were responsible f o r separating Karachi 
from Sind t o make i t the Federal Capital of Pakistan, through a f i a t 
c a l l e d the Pakistan (Establishment of the Federal C a p i t a l ) . The N.W.F.P. 
Mi n i s t r y which was s t i l l not owing allegiance t o Pakistan was dismissed 
* The t r i b a l people were a l l Muslims. 
** Former B r i t i s h Baluchistan. Also, was the exclusive subject of the 
Viceroy. 
14» Scotsman. 18th December 1947* S i r G, Cunningham, the then Governor of 
the N.W.F.P. was a great help t o Mr* Jinnah. 
15. Times. 15 A p r i l , 1948. 
16. Manchester Guardian. February 15, 1948. 
7. 
by Jinnah i n August 1947 > as was the M i n i s t r y of Sind on grounds of 
corruption i n early 1948* To yoke together the c u l t u r a l f i s s i o n of l a s t 
and West Pakistan i n t o one through a common lingua franca , he could 
venture t o say p u b l i c l y that "the State language of Pakistan i s going 
17 
t o be Urdu and no other language". I n short, Mr. Jinnah beoarae 
18 
supreme " a r b i t r a t o r " i n Pakistan a f f a i r s , and some of his pre-emptive 
decisions on issues obviously served the nation well i n the avoidance 
of early embroilment i n c o n f l i c t s . 
The t h i r d purpose was served i n a negative way i n that the p o l i t i c a l 
process began at the wrong end. For p o l i t i c a l power, t o the detriment 
of the Parliamentary system, automatically gravitated towards the o f f i c e 
of the Governor General - the t i t u l a r head of the stat e . I f we postulate 
as a hypothesis t h a t e i t h e r Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Nehru had become the f i r s t 
Governor General of the new Dominion i . e . India, there would have 
ocourred at once an untoward movement of power i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n , 
whether they l i k e d i t or not; f o r , the very stature of t h e i r personali-
t i e s would become a l i a b i l i t y t o the o f f i o e . But t h i s d i d not take 
place i n I n d i a . She was lucky t o have Lord Mountbatten as her f i r s t 
Governor General who, while behaving properly as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l head, 
l e t the o f f i o e of the Prime M i n i s t e r grow i n stature'. Mr. Jinnah would 
have s t i l l wielded the same powers as the Prime Minister of Pakistan 
as he d i d as the Governor General, provided he could brin g about a 
balance between the form and essence of the parliamentary system. 
17. Quaid-e-A^am Mohamed A l i Jinnah. Speeches as Governor general 
of Pakistan 194T-1948. Pakistan Publications, Karachi, n.d. p .86. 
18. Times. 25 A p r i l , 1948. 
8. 
But he s l i t h e r e d on t h i s v i t a l issue. His holding of p o r t f o l i o s , 
presiding over Cabinet meetings and becoming the Chairman of the 
Emergency Committee of the Cabinet were not i n the Parliamentary t r a d i -
t i o n . True, some of Mr, Jinnah*s actions might not be scrupulously 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . But prudence stood him i n good stead where s t r i c t 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l adherence might not have done. On the dismissal of the 
Congress M i n i s t r y from the U.W.F.P, "The Statesman" e d i t o r i a l i s e d 
t h a t "on the methods employed t o eject them there w i l l doubtless be 
l i v e l y controversy ••• But those handling the problem had t o take more 
19 
than t e c h n i c a l i t i e s i n t o account*,," ' S i m i l a r l y , his separating 
20 
Karachi from Sind was debated and passed by the Constituent Assembly, 
On one occasion Mr, Jinnah w i t h e l d his assent t o a Provincial Ordinance; 
21 
f o r , t o him i t amounted t o by-passing the l e g i s l a t u r e . The reason f o r 
mentioning these examples i s to show that Mr, Jinnah also had a sense 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r a i n t . But the main crux of the issue was that 
h i s a c t i v i t i e s as the Quaid-e-Aasam of Pakistan flowed down from the 
o f f i c e of the Governor General instead of from the Cabinet responsible 
t o the l e g i s l a t u r e . Perhaps, a l l h i s ommissions and commissions might 
* F r o n t i e r States, t r i b a l areas, Baluchistan, Kashmir, e t c were his 
exclusive subjects, 
** Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, the Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. t o l d the 
w r i t e r that despite h i s request Mr, Jinnah refused to suggest names 
of Ministers t o h i s Cabinet, 
19• Statesman, 25 August, 1947* apparently a week elapsed without 
the Ministers t a k i n g an oath of allegiance to the new State, and on 
independence day they conspicuously absented themselves from the f l a g -
h o i s t i n g ceremony i n Peshawar ••• po s i t i v e proof of d i s l o y a l t y , . . " 
See, the same issue, 
2 0 * S e e 0*&«P». V o l . I l l , May 22, 1948, 
21, K.B, Sayeed, Pakistan, the Formative Phase (Karachi: 1960), p,265. 
9. 
have been r a t i o n a l i z e d by Pakistan p o l i t i c a l ethics had he been able to 
bequeath t o the nation viable p o l i t i o a l i n s t i t u t i o n s imbued with general 
consensus. Instead, however, he died i n harness d i s i l l u s i o n e d , perhaps, 
unheeded and neglected* 
This l a s t point needs a l i t t l e e l u c i d a t i o n . Mr. Jinnah's 'charisma 1 
had f u n c t i o n a l and operational value up to a p o i n t , i . e . the carving 
out of Pakistan from the subcontinent. And the •charisma* t o continue 
required readjustments to the new values which crept i n t o the body p o l i t i c 
of the new state; f o r , a f t e r a l l leadership i s s i t u a t i o n a l not e t e r n a l . 
On t h i s premise, there i s evidence, contrary t o widespread b e l i e f , t h a t 
there was *something r o t t e n i n the State of Denmark*• Mr. Jinnah was 
not as omnipotent as he appeared t o be. The Governor General's order 
separating Karachi from Sind was followed by the Sind M.L. Council's 
deploring the move. The Council c a l l e d upon the Sindhi Ministers and 
members of the Constituent Assembly t o resign and seek re-election on 
22 
the issue of Karachi. His choice of Premiership i n Sind which "puzzled 
"23 
everyone including h i s own fo l l o w e r s , was sidetracked. His upholding 
of Urdu as the sole state language of Pakistan i n Dacca public meeting 
d i d not go unchallenged, and on the oooasion of his o f f i c i a l birthday 
there were adverse comments on the expense of the il l u m i n a t i o n s when 
* The w r i t e r remembers tha t there were murmurs of protest i n that 
meeting. Years l a t e r the w r i t e r was t o l d by Mr. Youssouf A l i 
Chowdhury, the then General Secretary of East Pakistan M.L. that 
Mr. Jinnah, according t o h i s suggestion, had t o send Mohammad A l i , 
the Chief a g i t a t o r of Bengali language movement, to Burma as ambas-
sador, to contain the movement. 
22, Statesman. 11 *June, 1948. 
23* Manchester Guardian. 3 May, 1948. 
10. 
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400 refugees died of cold and exposure i n Lahore Walton Camp. 
I n i t i a l l y Mr. Jinnah was opposed to the "building of a high wall around 
the Government House where he l i v e d because he was "with 1* his "people", 
but i n e a r l y 1948 he asked hi s m i l i t a r y secretary, Col. Bi r n i e to 
2*5 
" s t a r t b u i l d i n g " the w a l l "immediately"* J Dr. Chowdhury*s judgement 
that party leadership was separated from government leadership only a f t e r 
Mr. Jinnah's death and so long he was a l i v e "he was the f i n a l a u t h o r i t y . . . 
26 
i n the party", i s inaoourate. I n f a o t , Mr. Jinnah resigned from 
the M.L. as i t s President f o l l o w i n g a decision of the party i n March 
1948} a decision which provoked a comment "that Jinnah i s no longer 
27 
the d i o t a t o r that he was when Pakistan was founded". A sense of 
resignation overtook Mr. Jinnah when he confessed t o his doctor at Z i a r a t , 
a month before hi s death that he had "wanted t o l i v e . Now, ... i t does 
"28 
not matter whether I l i v e or d i e . 
However, having o i t e d these instances we wish to suggest that 
though Mr. Jinnah as the Governor General appeared t o be at the ssenith 
of his power, nevertheless h i s leadership was i n practice vulnerable 
since many of his utterances on v i t a l issues tended t o be enigmatic, 
presumably f o r fear of being r e s i s t e d . Perhaps no Pakistanis could 
openly say that t h e i r Quaid at any time was subjected t o severe challenge 
by his people, but one may w e l l bear i n mind, that people of that part 
24. Statesman. 8 January, 1948. 
25. H. B o l i t h o , Jinnah (London: 1954). P»210. 
26. G.W. Chowdhury, Democracy i n Pakistan, (Dacca:1963)» p»43» 
27. "Saturday Evening Post" quoted i n K.L. Gauba, Inside Pakistan 
(Delhi :1948) , p.318. See also, Z.A. S u l e r i . P o l i t i o i a n s and Ayub. 
(Lahore:1964), p .21. 
28. B o l i t h o , o p . c i t . . p.223» * See page 11. 
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of the world have a knack of f i r s t l oving, then worshipping and f i n a l l y 
assassinating t h e i r leaders. The net re s u l t of Mr. Jinnahfs 13-month 
Governor-Generalship was that he gave the country a *glaoial s t a b i l i t y , 
consolidating tempo and a c o n t i n u i t y of purpose, but f a i l e d i n the 
correct i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n process, i . e . the establishment of consensus-
based s o c i o - p o l i t i c o and economic i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The Liaquat Cabinet 
Cabinet Government began t o emerge a f t e r the death of Mr. Jinnah 
on 11 September, 1948. S i r Nazimaddin who was then the Premier of l a s t 
Pakistan became the new Governor General - a sop t o East Pakistanis. 
Though there was no mention of the term Cabinet i n the Constitution 
Act i t was but natural t h a t the Pakistan government was t o be fashioned 
a f t e r the B r i t i s h system since the p o l i t i c i a n s were most f a m i l i a r w i t h 
t h a t system. At the outset the members of the Cabinet were the hold-
overs of the early M.L. nominees who had worked i n the composite 
government of undivided I n d i a . Apparently, the Cabinet gave an impression 
of unobtrusiveness and remoteness, not because what i t was doing but 
i n i t s personnel. The Prime Mini s t e r apart, the Cabinet was composed 
p a r t l y of former outstanding c i v i l i a n administrators and league p o l i t i c i a n s 
Footnote /contd. from the previous page, 
* Raja of Mahraoodabad, one of the closest associates of Mr. Jinnah 
and one-time prominent membef of central executive committee of 
a l l - India M.L., t o l d the w r i t e r that Mr. Jinnah had said t o him 
i n e a r l y 1948 that he was "surrounded by t r a i t o r s " i n Pakistan. 
** The Pakistan Provisional Constitution. 
12. 
* 
of whom only one oould he described as having s i g n i f i c a n t popular 
contaots. This feature could only create among those Muslim Leaguers 
who could not 'get i n ' , a sense of jealousy. 
Now that the p o l i t i c a l process assumed an appearance of p a r l i a -
mentarianism, Mr. Liaquat A l i Khan "who was t o Jinnah what Sir John 
29 
Anderson was to Winston C h u r c h i l l " ^broadened the representativeness o£ 
hie Cabinet by increasing the numbers of Ministers up t o 14 of whom 10 
had Cabinet r a n k . ^ That a movement towards genuine parliamentary 
practice had begun was evident when a government press note was couched 
i n parliamentary language v i z . "on the advice of the Prime Minister, 
His Excellency i s pleased t o appoint", e t c , e t c . ^ A Cabinet Secretar-
i a t was formed to prepare the agenda and c i r c u l a t e memoranda on the 
subjects t o be discussed i n the Cabinet. The Memoranda, though was 
prepared by the M i n i s t r y concerned, were subject t o consultation as 
required w i t h other M i n i s t r i e s . The general pattern followed was i n 
keeping w i t h the B r i t i s h . Because of the small size of the Pakistan 
Cabinet, there was no formal "inner Cabinet". To deal w i t h "various 
specialized subjects", special Cabinet Committees were appointed but, 
u l t i m a t e l y t h e i r reports "were considered by the whole Cabinet". 
* Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. 
** The Prime M i n i s t e r . 
+ Pour were Ministers of State. 
2 9« Times. 19 September, 1948. 
30. Statesman. 23 A p r i l , 1951. 
31 • Pakistan Acts. 22 September, 1948 quoted i n Masud Ahmed Khan, 
The Failure of Parliamentary System of Government i n Pakistan w i t h 
special reference t o the Governor General and the President 
( D i s s e r t a t i o n f o r the Degree of M.A.), Manchester University, 1965, 
p»36. 
13. 
The Ministers of State, though not formally members of the Cabinet were 
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e n t i t l e d t o s i t i n the Cabinet. Bold leadership i n respect of admini-
s t r a t i o n and l e g i s l a t i o n a n t i c i p a t e s a corporate cohesion i n the Cabinet 
which i n t u r n depends l a r g e l y on the potency of the Prime Minister -
the king-pin of Cabinet government. Mr. Liaquat A l i measured up f a i r l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n h i s conduct w i t h the Cabinet, parliament and people. 
His was the great advantage a r i s i n g from his n o n - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with 
# # 
any p a r t i c u l a r province, but i r o n i c a l l y t h i s was his disadvantage, 
as w e l l . For, he had to accomodate t o the demands of p r o v i n c i a l p o l i -
t i c i a n s , i n order to stay i n power. He was very much involved i n gerry-
mandering the e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s of Karachi, so that he could be safely 
returned by the refugees i n el e c t i o n s , when they were properly r e h a b i l i -
t a t e d . Two developments, however, strengthened the Prime Minister's 
hold on the country's p o l i t i c s , j F i r s t , h i s t o r i c a l l y , the subcontinent 
had been subject to strong executive r d l e . This was s t i l l so i n Pakistan, 
since the central government had to deal w i t h problems l i k e refugee, 
Kashmir, her administrative set-up, the organisation of the army, finance, 
etc., e t c . , that came up i n the wake of independence. Added to i t the 
physical remoteness of the two geographical halves of Pakistan, i . e . 
* He basked under the sunshine of Mr. Jinnah's popularity f o r a long time* 
He was the General Secretary of the A l l - I n d i a M.L., representative i n 
the United Province L e g i s l a t i v e Council from 1926 to 1940,member,Indian 
Central Legislature i n 1940 and deputy leader of the M.L. party there 
i n 1943• His budget., during the period of interim government of un-
divided India i n 1947 > known as "a poor man's budget", extorted 
grudging admiration even from Congress members. 
** He came from the U.P., now a part of I n d i a . 
###,This was revealed t o the w r i t e r by the former Premier of the K.W.F.P., 
Khan Aboul Qayyum Khan. 
32. Information based on l e t t e r w r i t t e n to the w r i t e r by a former Prime 
M i n i s t e r of Pakistan, Mr. Mohammad A l i , dated 3*12.68. See Appendix,I. 
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East and West Pakistan, obliged the central government t o undertake 
a c t i o n . This distance also reduced the parliament i n t o an ex post facto 
r a t i f y i n g machine. Furthermore, t o mobilise the scarce resources of 
the country f o r economic development and the creation of social over-
head c a p i t a l - on which p o l i t i c a l development also depends •* central 
executive i n i t i a t i v e was imperative} f o r , the positions of the econo-
mically backward countries "decree that Government must generally play 
33 
an extremely important r o l e " . 
I Second, Mr. Liaquat A l i took the r e i n of the Presidency of the 
M.L. , the party i n power having set aside by an amendment, the former 
rules which p r o h i b i t e d Ministers from holding ranks i n the party. He 
was also made the Chairman, of the M.L. parliamentary party. Now, with 
a strong executive base and the party caucus behind him, the Prime 
Minister was well poised to lead the country. We w i l l f i r s t evaluate 
hi s leadership i n the l i g h t of i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g s . 
Mr. Liaquat A l i f i n a l l y d i s p e l l e d a long suspense by formally 
i n d i c a t i n g the P r i n c i p l e s on which the country's future c o n s t i t u t i o n 
was to be framed, when he presented the Objectives Resolution before 
the Constituent Assembly on 7th March, 1949* The resolution struck a 
non-secular tone i n t h a t i t incorporated i n t o i t few clauses surcharged 
w i t h r e l i g i o u s sentiment. Talk of Islamism was i n the a i r before and 
a f t e r the establishment of Pakistan awaiting an i n c i s i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n . 
* See C.A.D., Vol.V. 7 March, 1949 PP.1-2. 
33. W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Eoonomio Growth (Cambridge:1960), p.25. 
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The Congress members reasoned t h a t "reason and f a i t h " must "grow to i t s 
f u l l e s t m aturity separately", f a i l i n g which p o l i t i c s might res u l t i n 
"the d e i f i c a t i o n of the State t h a t the preamble implies". Mr. B. K. 
Datta thought that had t h i s r e s o l u t i o n been brought before the Constituent 
Assembly " w i t h i n the l i f e t i m e of the great creator of Pakistan, the Quaid-
e-Azam, i t would not have come i n i t s present shape".^ As a matter of 
f a c t , I r . Jinnah while addressing the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan 
on August 11, 1947 c a t e g o r i c a l l y stated that "we are a l l c i t i z e n s and 
equal c i t i z e n s of one state (loud applause). We should keep that i n 
f r o n t of us as our i d e a l that i n the course of time Hindus w i l l cease 
to be Hindus and Muslims w i l l cease t o be Muslims, not i n the r e l i g i o u s 
sense but i n the p o l i t i c a l sense as citizens of the nation. (Loud 
. 3 5 
Applause)." To the m i n o r i t i e s t h i s statement was a Magna Carta. 
The government spokesman, on the other hand, maintained that Quaid-e-
Azam had given pledges t o the m i n o r i t i e s but t h a t Quaid-e-Azam had also 
36 
given pledges to the m a j o r i t y . I n the quest f o r national consensus 
* 
the name of the departed leader was t o be quoted i n v a r i a b l y by the 
— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 — — » — — • » • — — » 
* Mr. Jinnah when he died l e f t behind him an aura of paradoxical 
speeohes r e l a t i n g t o the r o l e of Islam i n Pakistan p o l i t y . At Karachi 
Bar Association he said, "Islamic Principles ... are as applicable 
t o l i f e today as they were 1,300 years ago". At Chittagong Public 
Meeting: "... Pakistan should be based on sure foundations of s o c i a l 
j u s t i c e and Islamic Socialism - not other ism." At the opening 
ceremony of the State Bank of Pakistan: "... an economic system based 
on t r u e Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social j u s t i c e " . 
See:Statesman. 25 January, 1948} i b i d . . 27 Maroh, 1949» and Pawn. 
28 August, 1948. But the v i t a l point was that he spoke on the broad 
p r i n c i p l e s of Islam. No less a person than Shree Prakasha, the f i r s t 
Indian High Commissioner i n Pakistan convinced himself, having studied 
the speech delivered by Jinnah on 31 August 1947 that nowhere i n the 
speech had the word "Islamic State" occurred, though the word "Muslim 
State" was there. See: Shri Prakasha, Pakistan: B i r t h and ear l y Bays 
(Meerat: 1965). p.58. 
34. C.A.D., Vol. V, 8 March, 1949, PP. 14-15. 
35* Statesman. 12 August, 1947 . 36. /Contd. on next page. 
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D i f f e r i n g groups as a matter of r i t u a l . 
Being aware of the minority s e n s i b i l i t i e s Mr. Liaquat deferred 
the r e s o l u t i o n by maintaining t h a t M I n the teohnioal sense, theocracy 
has come t o mean a government ordained by p r i e s t s ... such an idea i s 
e n t i r e l y f o r e i g n t o Islam ... when we use the word 'democracy i n the 
Islamic sense, i t pervades a l l aspects of our l i f e . I t relates to our 
system of Government, t o our society with equal v a l i d i t y , because one 
of the greatest contributions of Islam has been the idea of the equality 
of a l l men."!f The debate, however, continued f o r f i v e days during 
which two p o t e n t i a l s o c i a l i s t s , who were s t i l l members of the government 
party l e n t support t o a congressite argument that the main b a t t l e i n time 
would be "between Hindu have-nots and Muslim have-nots on the one hand 
and Muslim and Hindu upper classes on the other". When the Resolution 
was passed and a committee (usually known as B.P.G.) appointed t o 
report on the f u t u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n based on the objectives res o l u t i o n , 
the Congress members d i d not appear t o be very h o s t i l e . 
The next step towards the making of the c o n s t i t u t i o n took place 
Footnote /Contd. from the previous page. 
36. G.A.D., Vol. V, 10 Maroh, 1949, P.62. 
37. G.A.D., VolV V, 7 Maroh, 1949, P«3. Mr. Liaquat having been brought 
up i n the c u l t u r a l m i l i e u of Lucknow (now i n India) had some Islamic 
obsessions. Mr. M.A.H. Ispahani, a prominent Pakistan diplomat 
p o l i t i c i a n t o l d the w r i t e r t h a t he had warned Mr. Liaquat while 
d i n i n g together t o be aloof from Ulema ( r e l i g i o u s people). I n r e p l y 
he said that he could not eschew Ulema since they were a help t o the 
creation of Pakistan, but he thought that he would be able t o contain 
Ulemacracy. Mr, Liaquat, i n short, was an Islamic Hamlet agonised 
i n the ambivalent attempt t o reconcile his deep s p i r i t u a l urge w i t h 
t h a t of western t r a d i t i o n i n which he was educated. 
38. I b i d . , 10 March, 1949> P»54» The reactions were milder among Congress 
leaders i n East Bengal. See; Statesman. 9 March, 1949• 
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on 28th September, 1950, when the B.P.G. submitted i t s i n t e r i m report 
to the Constituent Assembly. The report sparked controversies. I t 
offended the Ulema as the Islamic controls i n the Report f e l l short 
of t h e i r expectations aroused e a r l i e r i n the Objectives Resolution."^ 
But the main onslaught came from East Pakistan. She thought the Report 
envisaged a strong u n i t a r y government and i f i t s p r i n c i p l e s were adopted 
the p o s i t i o n of East Pakistan would be reduced " i n t o a colony of 
P a k i s t a n " . ^ Under the vanguard of the East Pakistan A.M.L. Party a 
Central Committee of Democratic Federation comprising a l l shades of 
opinion(which included also disenchanted Muslim leaguers) was formed t o 
draw up a l t e r n a t i v e Basic Principles f o r the Constitution of Pakistan. 
I t climaxed i n the observance of 'Protest Day' throughout the Provinoe 
w i t h the Communist Party, on the one hand, discovering i n the B.P.G. 
Report features of " e x p l o i t a t i o n by the Zamindars and the c a p i t a l i s t s " 
and the Prime Minister's immediate issuance of a warning against "these 
a c t i v i t i e s " , ^ on the other. Eventually the Prime Minister dashed to 
East Pakistan and received deputations of A.M.L. and Central Committee 
42 
of Democratic Federation. What r e a l l y angered the East Pakistanis 
were the inclusion of subjects i n the Federal l i s t that could have 
been l e f t t o the Province, the f a i l u r e to ensure representation i n 
the federal l e g i s l a t u r e s on the basis of population and l a s t but not 
39. C.A.D., Vol. V I I I , 21 November 1950, p.184. 
40. I b i d . . p.183. 
41. Dawn. 30 October, 1950. 
42. Hindu. 27 December, 1950. 
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least the imposition of Urdu as the only state language instead of 
"both the main languages, e.g. Urdu and B e n g a l i . ^ Liaquat succumbed 
t o the adverse protest and postponed considering the Report t o enable 
the B.P.G. to consider any " d e f i n i t e suggestions that may be sent by 
the people w i t h regard to the basic principles of the c o n s t i t u t i o n " . ^ 
Meanwhile he had the i n t e r i m report of the Committee on Fundamental Rights 
of the Citiaens of Pakistan and on matters r e l a t i n g to minorities passed 
on October 6, 1950 w i t h the concurrence of the o p p o s i t i o n . ^ 
Turning to other issues the Liaquat Cabinet had had a tough t e s t , 
i n t e r a l i a , i n i t s f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y . When India devalued her currency 
i n 1949 Pakistan d i d not f o l l o w s u i t . Whether t h i s 'non-devaluation* 
decision was unanimous has never been revealed. But the rumour had i t 
t h a t i t was not, and moreover, the Finance Minister stated i n London 
p r i o r t o the meeting of the I.M.F, that t h i s issue should be examined 
" i n a detached s c i e n t i f i c manner" devoid of "sentiments of prestige and 
p o l i t i c s " , whioh was probably meant to help to prepare the public f o r 
devaluation of Pakistan's currency. But whatever his mental reservations 
the Finance Minister did not l e t t h i s i n t e r f e r e w i t h his sense of 
c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Cabinet due to the Parliamentj f o r , 
* B r i t a i n d i d the same. 
43. See Inte r i m Report. Clause 3 0(l) (2); Annexure I I I and Clause 120 
as p r i n t e d i n C.A.D., V o l . I l l , 28 September, 1950, pp.12-57. 
44. I b i d . . V o l . V I I I , & 6, 21 November, 1950, p.181. 
45. I b i d . . V o l . V I I I & 3, 6 October, 1950 p.162. 
46. Times, 6 September, 1950. 
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47 he always defended the non-devaluation policy i n the House, Of course, 
the Finance Minister of East Pakistan, the area which was h i t the hard-
est appeared to be i n disagreement with t h e non-ldevaluation* policy of 
the Central Government and u l t i m a t e l y resigned saying i n the pr o v i n c i a l 
l e g i s l a t u r e that he l e f t the government " d i s i l l u s i o n e d " . ^ Dissensions 
on issues among colleagues i n a Cabinet under a Federal P o l i t i c a l 
49 
System^ have always been, a f t e r a l l , an occupational hazard. But on 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r issue Mr. Liaquat had the backing of the e n t i r e Cabinet 
and could say b o l d l y "that the present value of our rupee i s the r i g h t 
50 
value. We see no reason f o r a l t e r i n g i t . " 
But the aftermath of t h i s p o l i c y was, however, both po s i t i v e 
and negative. I t was po s i t i v e i n the sense that the Pakistan government 
had t o look f o r a l t e r n a t i v e sources, e.g. the U.K., France and Poland, 
f o r coal svipplies when they were stopped by the Indian Government as a 
51 
r e t a l i a t i o n against the Pakistan p o l i c y of non-devaluation. Pakistan 
entered i n t o trade pacts w i t h J^pan, West Germany and Czechoslovakia 
52 
f o r processing her j u t e without sending i t t o I n d i a . F i n a l l y , i t 
might have been the hope of the Central government to solve the problem 
of East Pakistan j u t e by establishing jute m i l l s from the foreign 
exchange as obtained from the export of raw materials supported by non-
devaluation p o l i c y . I n f a c t , the biggest j u t e m i l l i n Asia was set up 
47* Manchester Guardian. 13 March, 1950. 
48. Statesman. 5 December, 1949* 
49* The anti-labour Cabinets of Austral i a during 1939-1941 were anything 
but unit e d . See: L.F. Crisp, The Parliamentary Government of 
Au s t r a l i a . (London: 1949) p.208. 
50. Financial Times, 11 September, 1950. 
51. Pakistan Hews. 27 January,1950. See: Hindu. 15 November, 1949. 
5 2» Scotsman. 7February, 1950. 
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i n Bast Pakistan, i . e . The Adamjee Jute H i l l . 
Prom the negative angle, the developments were uneconomic i n 
that there was a danger of j u t e prices r i s i n g t o a l e v e l when the buyers 
might look f o r a synthetic s u b s t i t u t e - a p o t e n t i a l threat t o the Jute 
trade. A f t e r a l l , India was P a k i s t a n i natural customer f o r Jute. 
Though the Central government i t s e l f entered i n t o the j u t e market as 
a buyer, having f i x e d a minimum pr i c e f o r the j u t e , t h i s proved to be 
inadequate i n the face of India's t o t a l r e f u s a l t o buy j u t e so long as 
the Pakistan currency remained undevalued. As a re s u l t East Pakistan 
53 
was " i n a state of siege", providing ammunition f o r attacks by the 
opposition. Meanwhile Hindu-Muslim r i o t s broke out i n India (Calcutta) 
and the same occurred i n East Pakistan i n February 1950. Causes were, 
as usual, ascribed t o the f a n a t i c utterances of the Communalists, but 
the f a o t remained th a t India's ban on the import of Pakistan j u t e also 
caused huge unemployment i n the communist stronghold of Calcutta, India's 
main centre of j u t e t rade. A subtle communist hand i n the r i o t s was 
a strong p o s s i b i l i t y . The r i o t s , however^ brought the two countries 
54 
" w i t h i n a h a i r breadth of war". Amid murmurs of war cry, Liaquat an 
undertook an audacious journey to India and signed a pact (known as the 
Nehru-Liaquat Pact) w i t h the Indian Prime Minister on 8th A p r i l , 1950 
55 
t o solve inter-Dominion problemso Soon a g i t a t i o n petered out. 
53» Richard Lambert, "Factors i n Bengali Regionalism i n Pakistan", 
Far Eastern Survey. Volume 28 ( A p r i l , 1959), P»50. 
54* Ian Stephens, Horned Moon (London: 1953), p»33« 
55. Dawn, 9 A p r i l , 1950. 
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Having so achieved a stature of statesmanship he immediately 
responded t o an i n v i t a t i o n of President Truman, and v i s i t e d the United 
States and also Canada t o project Pakistan fs image, and of himself, 
on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage. The v i s i t resulted, among others i n Pakistan 
g e t t i n g #600,000 under Truman's Point Four Programme.^ The Pakistan 
Government was very obsessed, from the very beginning with the Kashmir 
problem. I t steered a cautious f o r e i g n p o l i c y without being committed 
i t s e l f f o rmally t o any bloc, t o gain i n t e r n a t i o n a l support f o r Kashmir 
Cause. Embittered on the Kashmir issue Liaquat once threatened that 
"Pakistan must not be taken f o r granted: Pakistan i s not a camp-follower 
57 
of the Commonwealth."^ But beneath the apparent n e u t r a l i t y of fo r e i g n 
p o l i c y Liaquat sought t o forge closer r e l a t i o n s with the Muslim world. 
For he thought that " I f the Western democracies can enter i n t o pacts ... 
i f the Communist countries can form a block ... why cannot the Muslim 
58 
people get together ... they have an ideology and a way of l i f e . " 
This sentiment found eloquent expression i n the support Pakistan held 
out t o a l l and sundry Muslim causes. But none of t h i s solved the 
* The Soviet Russia, had e a r l i e r i n v i t e d him f o r a State V i s i t . He 
was o f f i c i a l l y not committed t o either of the i n v i t a t i o n s f o r a long 
tiraeo 
#* A p r i l , 1950. 
*** Pakistan signed Treaty of Friendship w i t h Iran on 18.2.50j Iraq on 
26.2.50, Syria on 29.8.50} Turkey on 26.7.51 and Egypt on 28.8.51. 
See Chronology of Pakistan. 1947-1957, (Karachi: 1957)* 
+ Kashmir was one of the former major Prinoely States. I t s r u l e r was 
a Hindu king, but a majority of the population was Muslim. Despite 
Pakistan's wishes, the king acceded his State to India. There began 
one of the world's most d i f f i c u l t problems. Both India-and Pakistan 
had fought i n a small soale during '47-'48, p r i o r to the large scale 
war fought i n Kashmir at the end of 1965« Kashmir i s to India and 
Pakistan what B e r l i n , i n a d i f f e r e n t way, has been t o the West and 
Russia. The U.N. has yet t o solve the Kashmir problem. 
++ The government recognised Red China on 4th January, 1950. 
5 6• New York Tfoea. 12 December, 1950 
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Kashmir issue. Meanwhile S i r Owen Dixon - mediator of the Kashmir 
dispute - announced his f a i l u r e to "bring India and Pakistan together 
only t o he followed, l a t e r on, by India's massing of troops on Pakistan 
borders. Suddenly, on the 9tk March, 1951 there was a bo l t from the 
blue. The Prime Minister unearthed a conspiracy (known as the Rawalpindi 
Conspiracy) which p l o t t e d t o shoot him, seize the Governor General 
59 
and f i n a l l y establish "a communist di c t a t o r s h i p ' * ^ i n the country. 
The conspirators included, among others, the Sandhurst-trained Pakistan 
Chief of the General S t a f f , General Akbar Khan (who %ba tfc» D.S.O. 
during the Burma Campaign i n the Seoond World War), Brigadier L a t i f 
(who won M.C. i n the Second World War) and Mr. Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a poet, 
the then e d i t o r of the Pakistan l e f t i s t newspaper, the Pakistan Times. 
He was awarded the O.B.E. during the las t war while serving as a 
Lieutenant-Colonel, and has since been awarded a Lenin Peace Medal. 
Prominent communist workers, progressive w r i t e r s and j o u r n a l i s t s including 
the General Secretary of the Pakistan Communist Party, Mr. Sajjad Zahir 
and 10 more important array and a i r o f f i c e r s were also arrested, along 
w i t h the ringleaders, t o be t r i e d secretly by a special t r i b u n a l con-
s i s t i n g of three High Court judges. The abortive coup brought the 
simmering discontents of a section of the people to the f o r e . An analysis 
57. (see page 21) The Round Table, Vol.XXIX, 1948-49* quoted i n K. 
Call a r d , Pakistani A P o l i t i c a l Study (London: 1957), p.320. 
58. Aslam Siddique, Pakistan Seeks Security (Lahore: I960), p.95» 
59 • T h e Daily Telegraph. 10 March, 1951• 
60. Mew York Times. 15 May, 1951. 
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of -this reveals three d i s t i n c t patterns of p o l i t i c s , e.g. personal 
ambition, regionalism and extreme p a t r i o t i s m , current i n Pakistan. 
F i r s t , General Akbar probably aspired f o r the post of the C-in-C 
considering h i s previous record, plus his recent "exceptional" perfor-
mances i n the Joint Services S t a f f College i n -England.^ I n addition, 
he happened t o be the son-in-law of an i n f l u e n t i a l lady, Begum Shahnewaz, 
M.C.A, belonging t o an equally powerful f a m i l y of Bhagabanpura i n 
* 
the Punjab. But General Ayub was preferred t o General Akbar whioh may 
have aroused personal jealousy. 
Seoondly the pride of the Punjabis l a y i n t h e i r being, formerly, 
the backbone of the Army and administration i n the B r i t i s h period. 
This f a c t also had a boomerang e f f e c t on them when Pakistan emerged. 
Psychologically they d i d not enjoy seeing key posts going to the 
62 #* "foreigners" i . e . the migrants from the U.P. now i n Ind i a . 
The t h i r d p a t t ern probably smacked of diverse motivating forces. 
The Times drew an analogy between the attempted coup i n Pakistan with 
t h a t of the coup which took place i n Syria i n the same year, since i n 
* The w r i t e r was t o l d by General Mirza, the then Defenoe Secretary 
of Pakistan - who conducted the prosecution and went i n t o the 
secret documents, that General Akbar's wife wanted to be the Queen 
of Pakistan. True, there were t h i n l y v e i l e d r i v a l r i e s f o r social 
prestige among Pakistan's two respected ladies, e.g. the wife of 
Liaquat and s i s t e r of Mr. Jinnah. To what extent prominent Pakistani 
ladies were able t o i n j e c t feminine charm i n t o p o l i t i c s i s an 
unknown quan t i t y . But the p o s s i b i l i t y of 'lady Macbeths" on Pakistan 
s o i l cannot be r u l e d out altogether. The w r i t e r , however, wonders 
i f General Mirza's charmingly imperious wife had any extra-conjugal 
influence on him. 
** United Provinces. The Prime Minister himself came from that area. 
61. Scotsman. 13 March, 1951* 
62. Scotsman. 13 March, 1951. 
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both oases the prominent soldiers and i n t e l l e c t u a l s appeared to he 
impatient w i t h the e x i s t i n g government p o l i c i e s v i s-a-vis certain issues 
namely 'Kashmir' i n the former case and i n the l a t t e r " i n the Levant 
over Greater Syria**. General Akbar i n the mask of "General Tariq" 
fought w i t h the help of t r i b a l people i n Kashmir during 1948 and was 
r e s e n t f u l of Liaquat's s o f t e r p o l i c y on Kashmir} f o r , to the General 
wars were not "always determined by s t a t i s t i c s " . ^ Liaquat shunned 
extreme paths and submitted " a l l Pakistan's differences w i t h India i n 
a r b i t r a t i o n ... brought world opinion slowly but surely t o the side of 
Pakistan i n t h i s dispute ... a magnificent achievement"• 7 This a t t i -
tude c e r t a i n l y d i d not f i n d favour with the people of Azad Kashmir's 
movement. S i m i l a r l y , Liaquat scrupled to b r i n g about any drastic 
change i n the land tenure systems of Pakistan beyond speaking abotrb 
i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y . His feudal past and present feudal associates i n 
the rank and f i l e of the M.L. Party halted any action t o that end. 
Then the question of f o r e i g n p o l i c y and p a r t i c u l a r l y of Pakistan's 
remaining w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Commonwealth was controversial with at 
least a section of the people. To t h i s group of people Pakistan's 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y was subservient t o the western bloc and the undefined 
n e u t r a l p o l i c y of the Liaquat government was a camouflage. Sir Firoze, 
a prominent Pakistan member of the Constituent Assembly said i n the 
* He was landlords' representative i n the U.P. Legislative Council 
from 1926-1940. During t h i s period he even went to England t o 
represent landlords. Seei The S t r a i t s Times. May 4, 1950. 
63. Times. March 15, 1951* analogy, however, held on emotional 
grounds only. The claim t o 'Kashmir' had, at l e a s t , a legal basis, 
whereas 'Greater Syria* had none. 
,64* Observe^ March 11, 1951. ' 
6 5» Economist. October 27, 1951. 
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Parliament t h a t he was asked i n America as to why the Pakistan press 
reacted c o l d l y t o Liaquat's accepting Truman's i n v i t a t i o n and conversely 
hailed S t a l i n ' s i n v i t a t i o n to v i s i t Russia, which was turned down. 
Added to t h i s , Liaquat supported the Western Korean p o l i c y contrary 
t o "ninety-nine per cent of Pakistan's newspapers1"*^ views. And 
su r p r i s i n g l y a day before Faiz Ahmed Faiz's a r r e s t , he published an 
e d i t o r i a l f i e r c e l y a t t a c k i n g the "bellicose and anti-peace p o l i c i e s of 
68 
the Anglo-American bloc". These indigenous causes were dovetailed 
i n t o an abortive conspiracy. But i t s f a i l u r e should not preclude us 
from making c e r t a i n implications f o r Pakistan p o l i t i c s . 
F i r s t , l e f t i s t elements were a fact o r from the very beginning i n 
Pakistan p o l i t i c s . They were able t o bring about an uneasy a l l i a n c e 
w i t h the disgruntled soldiers through i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , as many shared 
a common b e l i e f i n f i r m government. That the Pakistan l e f t i s t s were 
not without the support of t h e i r f e l l o w t r a v e l l e r s both home and abroad 
* 
could be ascertained by the amount of sympathy they received. 
* 13 p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and c u l t u r a l associations of Pakistan from 
India ( A l l - I n d i a Trades Union Congress, A l l - I n d i a Students Federation, 
The Progressive Writers' Association, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, e t c . ) } from A u s t r a l i a ( C l e r i c a l & Metal Workers' 
Union) and the Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian delegations attending 
the B e r l i n Youth F e s t i v a l demanded an open t r i a l . Sees Daily Worker, 
dated 11.7.51 and 29.9.51. Also, the Chinese Peoples* Committee 
f o r World Peace and American Aggression, the All-China Federation 
of L i t e r a t u r e and A r t s C i r c l e s , Federation of Labour, Democratic 
Workers' Federation and the Asian and Australaisan Liaison bureau 
of the World Federation of Trade Unions protested. See:Hew China 
News Agencies. 26.9.51} 28.12.51. 
66. C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol.11, January 19, 1950, P.601. 
67. I b i d . . 11 October, 1950, p. 484. 
68. Manchester Guardian. March 9, 1951. 
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Second, Liaquat's i n s u l a t i o n of the M.L. governments, both 
Central and p r o v i n c i a l , from the c r i t i o i s m of opposition parties through 
r e s t r i c t i v e p o l i c i e s , l e d the growth of dark p o l i t i c s . Unwise repres-
sive measures on the part of the government always gave r i s e t o formation 
of p o l i t i c s i n curbs,? not i n s t r a i g h t l i n e s . 
T h i r d , the Pakistan Army, i n essence, was not p o l i t i c i z e d or 
indoctrinated, i n the Middle Eastern s t y l e . So a few prima donnas of 
the Army oould not f r u s t r a t e the greater l o y a l t y of the en t i r e army 
which i t owed t o the nation* 
However, an element of assassination was injected i n the body 
p o l i t i c of Pakistan on October 16, 1951> when during a Rawalpindi 
M.L.-sponsored public meeting Liaquat was s l a i n . To a great extent 
the incident epitomised the p r e v a i l i n g st y l e of underdeveloped p o l i t i c s . 
Both Asia and A f r i c a were i n ferment (as they s t i l l a r e ) ; and what 
happened i n Pakistan had been par a l l e l e d i n Siam, Burma, Palestine, 
69 
The Yemen, Lebanon, I r a n and Jordan. The combination of the u l t r a -
nationalism, r e l i g i o u s fanaticism and brooding hatreds f o r anything 
Western l e d to p o l i t i c a l assassination. And i t was the moderation 
* The assassin, perhaps conveniently, was t o r n to pieces on the spot. 
** Liaquat's assasin was i d e n t i f i e d as a member of the Khaksars move-
ment - a nearer version of the Secret Muslim Brotherhood i n Egypt. 
I t s leader, Allama Mushriqui met H i t l e r during the 1920s. The 
German M i l i t a r y Attache i n London (1939) had f u l l knowledge of t h i s 
Khaksari movement i n the Indian subcontinent. 
See: Manchester Guardian. October 17, 1951. 
69. Johannesburg Star. October I T , 1951* 
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i n Liaquat which was assasinated. I n him Pakistan l o s t what Nehru 
^ 70 characterised|a "great steadying influence" and The Times "one of 
71 
the few statesmen". 
The Liaquat years were not barren. The view that he could not 
give a f i n a l touch t o the i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g when "the i r o n was hot 
72 
t o be struck i n t o any shape",' cannot be substantiated, f o r , i f the 
hot i r o n of public opinion was r e a l l y i n t h i s condition then the founder 
of the n a t i o n , Mr. Jinnah would have struck i t f i r s t . Liaquat offered 
the I n t e r i m Report f o r public discussion - a step towards the formation 
of opinion. He f l a r e d f o r popular endorsement Jbehind h i s p o l i c i e s -
an urge he r e g u l a r l y f u l f i l l e d , i n the absenoe of pervasive mass media, 
by speaking d i r e c t l y t o the people i n public meetings. He t r i e d to 
consolidate his p o s i t i o n f i r s t - the excess of which discouraged the 
growth of opposition - before he could carry the nation w i t h him. 
For, a f t e r a l l , h i s eminence as the Prime Minister could a i d him, 
73 
l i k e any other Prime Minister "up t o a point and only up t o a point" • 
His Cabinet as an offshoot of parliament gave a good account of i t s e l f 
i n the parliamentary t r a d i t i o n unimpeded by the Head of the State, 
S i r Nazimuddin who was always i n h i s element i n the performance of 
t i t u l a r d u t i e s . Cabinet government i n a Federal P o l i t y i s often 
d i f f i c u l t , p a r t i c u l a r l y when strong personalities enter i n t o i t . 
7°* New York Times. October 17, 1951. 
71. Times. October 17, 1951; e d i t o r i a l "Liaquat A l i Khan". 
72. Z.A. S u l e r i , P o l i t i c i a n s and Ayub (Lahore: I964), p.26. 
73» H. Morrison, Government and Parliament (Oxford: 1954), p.38. 
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But the Liaquat Cabinet despite occasional bickerings by the Press 
neither suffered any open s p l i t nor took any decisions by majority 
vote as alleged. A knowledgeable au t h o r i t y maintained t h a t "the 
mode of a r r i v i n g at a decision was one of discussion u n t i l a general 
consensus was reached. I do not remember a single ocoasion when i t 
was necessary to take votes."*^ 
I n the task of converting a stagnant economy i n t o a dynamic one, 
the Liaquat government recognised the importance of planning. Pinanoial 
i n s t i t u t i o n s were created. Early i n 1948 the government declared i t s 
i n d u s t r i a l p o l i c y , r e f l e c t i n g i t s desire of owning enterprises l i k e 
arms, hydro-electric power, railways, communications, industries, etc., 
and g i v i n g the rest t o the care of private enterprise. Foreign c a p i t a l 
was welcome provided t h a t i n a l l major industries 51f° of a l l share 
c a p i t a l and 30$ i n lesser i n d u s t r i e s were owned:.by Pakistan nationals. 
A Development Board was established early i n 1948 with the Economic 
Council under the Presidency of the Prime Minister at the apex to 
examine and oorrelate o f f i c i a l and private schemes. The f i r s t plan 
was o f f i c i a l l y i n i t i a t e d i n July 1951* ^o augment the development 
process f u r t h e r , the government set up a public corporation (P.I.D.C.) 
which provided i n d u s t r i a l leadership and equity financing that resulted 
76 
i n the industries* showing "encouraging" progress. But along with 
* See: Sayeed, o p . c i t . , p.336j Ghowdhury, o p . c i t . . p.43. 
74» Mohammed A l i * s l e t t e r , o p . c i t . 
75 • Observer. A p r i l 9, 1948. 
76* Statesman. February 6, 1951• 
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t h i s went an emotional drive towards Islaraization of Pakistan economies. 
To solve i d e o l o g i c a l problems vi s - a - v i s modern eoonomies a research 
organization with economists versed i n Islamic p r i n c i p l e s was envi-
77 
saged bjr the Pakistan State Bank a u t h o r i t i e s . The I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Islamic Economic Conference consisting of 18 Muslim nations held on 
25th November, 1951 formed an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Federation of Islamic 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry t o evolve a uniform Islamic economic 
7ft 
pattern among the f r a t e r n i s i n g countries. 
The Liaquat period also saw a drive towards Pakistanization. 
By May 1951 f u l l n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the Pakistan Army was complete 
79 
although, not yet t h a t of the Navy and A i r Force, The Gubornotorial 
posts of four provinces out of f i v e held by Britons during Jinnah's 
time were replaced by the Pakistanis. I n short, Liaquat's period was 
notable f o r his remarkable post-natal oare to the nascent state, 
i n i t i a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g , f o l l o w i n g moderate sooio-eoonomic 
and f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , ostensibly Islamic and, f i n a l l y , his being 
disdain f o r the opposition p a r t i e s . 
The Hazimuddin Cabinet 
Statesmen-politicians were a scarce commodity i n Pakistan, p a r t i c u -
l a r l y i n the rank and f i l e of the M.L. party a f t e r the demise of 
Jinnah and Liaquat. Circumscribed by l i m i t e d choices, the ' r u l i n g 
77. Finanoial Times. January 22, 1950 
78. Pakistan Chronology.lloo.oit.. p.51. 
79. Hew York Times. May 2, 1951. 
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group' picked up, rather unconventionally, Nazimuddin, the Governor 
General as the new Prime Mi n i s t e r , and Ghulam Mohammed, the Finance 
Min i s t e r , as Governor General. An i n f l u e n t i a l newspaper hailed the 
* 8a new Prime Minister as "the r i g h t man" c a l l e d " i n t o the breach". 
Apparently, i n a given s i t u a t i o n , he was the automatic choice. I n 
Chu r c h i l l i a n language, however, he might be characterised as a 
"boneless leader". I t was more the a r i s t o o r a t i c concept of "natural 
leaders of the s o i l " whioh helped him s h o r t - c i r c u i t the higher echelons 
of status than any s e l f - i n i t i a t e d struggle from the base upward. Born 
i n the purple of the Nawab fa n t i l y he turned curiously p u r i t a n , p i e t i s t , 
t e e t o t a l l e r , unobstrusive, but accidentally, an appreciator of sumptuous 
dishes. I n short, he was not dynamic. 
No sooner had he beoome the Prime Minister than he addressed a 
mammoth gathering at Karachi de f i n i n g the broad l i n e s of his policy on 
home and forei g n a f f a i r s . The essence of t h i s was that he intended 
to f o l l o w the p o l i c y of his predeoessor - an i n d i r e c t public admission 
that he was not his own man. Liaquat pursued p o l i c i e s with circumspec-
t i o n . The danger was that the same po l i c i e s might evoke disagreeable 
r e s u l t s i f handled rather aggressively. And what was a t e n t a t i v e 
approach i n Liaquat*s time towards Islamisation tended to be a p o s i t i v e 
one during Nazimuddin's. 
* S i r Nazimuddin had a record of nearly 20 Tyears of experience as 
p o l i t i c i a n - a d m i n i s t r a t o r . He was a member i n the Governor's Council 
of Bengal under the dyarchy System i n the 20s, Premier of Bengal, 
1943-1945* most important c r i t e r i o n of his selection as the 
Prime Minister was due to his playing Gasabianca, since 1935, 
t o the father of the l . L . organisation, Mr. Jinnah, and never l e f t 
the ship of the organisation. 
80. Dawn, October 18, 1951. 
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The personnel of the new Cabinet were the same except f o r two 
important additions and one s i g n i f i c a n t omission. Sardar Misht^r, 
the Governor of the Punjab, and Chowdhury Mohammed A l i , the keyman 
of the executive side of the c e a t r a l government were included i n the 
Cabinet. The l a t t e r oase marked the f i r s t departure from the p r i n c i p l e 
l a i d down by Mr. Jinnah "that o f f i c i a l s should not be promoted as 
81 
M i n i s t e r s " . I n the new administration there were four ministers 
from East Pakistan i n a Cabinet of 10 members. They held equally 
important p o r t f o l i o s , v i z . Defence, I n t e r i o r , Commerce, Economic A f f a i r s , 
Education and Labour - a p o t e n t i a l stimulus to Federal jealousies. 
However, having assumed o f f i c e formally Mazimuddin embarked upon a 
countrywide tour t o get himself p o l i t i c a l l y acclimatized. I t was rather 
a drive towards Pakistanization. While speaking at the 'Paltan Maidan', 
the Hyde Park of East Pakistan, i n January 1952, the Prime Minister 
committed the faux pas of stressing the d e s i r a b i l i t y of Urdu being 
82 
the only state language of Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah, as the Quaid-e-
Azam, kept s i l e n t having once pronounced i n i t s favour. Liaquat, as 
the Quaid-e-Millat, s t i p u l a t e d the same i n the Interim Report and 
* Chowdhury Nazir Ahmed, a seo u l a r i s t . But Nishtar was an old leaguer 
and Islamic i n outlook. Ghowdhury Mohammed A l i had a si m i l a r outlook 
on Islam. But h i s strength l a y i n his thorough knowledge of the 
administrative apparatus of the country. I f the l a t e Prime Minister 
"at a l l permitted any single i n d i v i d u a l t o keep his conscience that 
person was Mohammed A l i " . See Dawn. October 24, 1951, " E d i t o r i a l " , 
The Mew Cabinet. 
** Pakistanization would generally mean rendering of the s o c i a l , economic 
and i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s of the majority of the people inh a b i t i n g 
Pakistan i n t o Islam oriented ones. 
*#* He was also honoured wi t h t h i s t i t l e meaning 'leader of the nation'. 
81. Manchester Guardian. October 24, 1951• 
82. Dawn. January 28, 1952. Mazimuddin's own family language was Urdu, 
though he manag4d t o speak pid g i n Bengali. 
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had t o shelve i t . Obviously neither Urdu nor Bengali could replace 
English as the o f f i o i a l language of Pakistan i n the near future, the 
process of which needed an evolutionary spontaneity, 
A common lingua franca provides an all-embracing u n i t y . Blessed 
are those nations who are attuned t o one harmonious mode of communication. 
While the many-tongued countries, though l u x u r i a t e i n a mosaic of 
oultures are vulnerable t o one point when l i n g u i s t i c i d e n t i t y threatens 
a rupture i n the established p o l i t y . I t has happened i n the recent 
years i n Belgium (French vs Flemish), Canada (French vs English, 
Malaysia (Malay, Chinese and Indian Languages), Ceylon (Sinhalese vs 
Tamil), East A f r i c a (Swahili vs Bantu), and i n India ( H i n d i , Bangla, 
Tamil, etc:*). As f a r as Pakistan was concerned the r u l i n g leaders 
laboured under a theory which was a p r i o r i , namely that kinship of 
Islam was at once a cementing and transcending factor between the two 
wings of Pakistan, But they f a i l e d embarrassingly t o appreciate the 
implications of the p o l i t i c a l geography of Pakistan, i . e , the essence 
of "area d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " , Islam did not help the ottomanisation 
process i n the Arab world when the Turkish r u l e r s imposed the Turkish 
language on the Arabs who mutinied during the F i r s t World War against 
t h e i r mentor. S i m i l a r l y , the Persian conversion t o Islam i n early days 
di d not immediately influence i t s r i c h l i t e r a t u r e which was sensuously 
pagan. H i s t o r i c a l l y , a r i c h language has always occupied a unique posi-
t i o n i n the l i v e s of manyipeople, 
83• Saul B, Cohen, Geography and P o l i t i c s i n a Divided World 
(London: 1964), P»6. 
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However, the language issue of Pakistan offered a new dimension 
contrary t o the usual pattern. Usually, i t i s the language of the 
majority that tends t o be f o i s t e d on the minority speaking d i f f e r e n t 
languages. But the reverse was the case i n Pakistan. The spoken Urdu 
was confined mostly to the people who had migrated from India whose 
percentage was i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y small compared to the largest bloc of 
enti r e population of Pakistan, whose mother tongue was Bengali and who 
resided i n the Eastern wing. The rationale of the proposition that 
Urdu was a supra-regional language l a y i n i t s s c r i p t being arabicized 
and not confined t o any p a r t i c u l a r region. But the f a c t remained that 
Urdu could be ea s i l y mastered by the Western h a l f of Pakistan because 
of i t s n a t u r a l i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , s y n t a c tical and semantic nearness to 
these languages, e.g. Punjabi, Sindhi and Pushtoo. However the majority 
of the people l i v i n g i n the East, whose mother tongue was Bengali, 
the s c r i p t of whioh w r i t t e n i n a s l i g h t l y variant form of Deva Nagari, 
would be at a disadvantage. So, the reactions were automatic. 
Musselmans i n general could not be oblivious of the recent past when 
suddenly they became speechless when the Persian language (the then 
o f f i c i a l language) gave way t o English. So, to dispel Bengalees's 
apprehension there deserved considerations of "c e r t a i n f a c t s , as 
85 
d i s t i n c t from the fundamental t r u t h of Islamic oneness". An i n s t i t u -
t i o n a l apparatus grows and fl o u r i s h e s l i k e an organic plant sustained 
* Sanskrit• 
84. W.H. Hunter, Our Indian Musalmans: Are they bound i n conscience t o 
rebel against the Queen "XTondont 1871). p. 53. 
85. Dawn, February 25, 1952, E d i t o r i a l "For Pakistan's i n t e g r a t i o n , 
wanted a brains t r u s t " . 
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and developed by the exigencies and requirements of time and space. 
A purely mechanistic development i n the f i n a l analysis f a i l s i n binding; 
the people to the imposed i n s t i t u t i o n s , unless i t i s steeped i n some 
such 'organismic image' which synthesises and adapts the ideas by 
l i n k i n g them with an indigenous past. This 'image* "tends to stress 
the influence of the past, the environment, and the vast complex and 
slow-changing aspects of the actions and expectations of mi l l i o n s of 
people" 
Arguably, t h i s synthesising process was already there. Apart from 
the people with "pictures i n t h e i r head" who smelt Hinduism i n 
Bengali, there had been a slow but genuine transformation i n the Bengali 
language rendering i t more f l e x i b l e , receptive and n a t u r a l . Despite 
i t s Sanscritic s c r i p t the Bengali language under the aegis of Muslim 
r u l e r s of Bengal received a d i s t i n c t Muslim stamp. The recrudescence 
of modern Bengali owes i t s , o r i g i n greatly t o the patronages of the 
Muslims. What was more, the predominantly Muslim area of East Bengal 
i n contrast to West Bengal developed a Muslim-oriented di a l e c t border-
87 
i n g on " r e l i g i o u s l i t e r a t u r e " . As a r e s u l t , the language has become 
a composite one. And the Islamic context of the language become more 
accentuated as the new forces were introduced following the emergence 
* The term used by Walter Lippman to indicate how men's behaviours 
are conditioned by t h e i r preconceived notions. 
86. Karl W. Deutsch, "Kation-Buildinff, ed. Karl W. Deutsch & William J. 
Fottz (New York: 1966), p.3. 
87. Hunter, op . o i t . . p.152. 
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of Pakistan. We do not suggest th a t t h i s process would have ended i n 
Bengali's being u l t i m a t e l y replaced by Urdu, but at le a s t , other things 
being equal, the former could have erected a s p i r i t u a l bridge with 
the l a t t e r ensuring a workable modus vivendi. Otherwise, how could 
a people possibly - who through centuries l y r i c i s e d , dramatised, novel-
ised, danced, sang, loved and despised through the vehicle of such an 
elegant language as was Bengali - opt for an uncertain mode of communi-
cation? Possible i Only i f there i s a " w i l l " . A f t e r a l l , the 
I s r a e l i t e s have already learnt t o speak Hebrew. 
The monolithic i n t e g r a t i n g formula vras ahead of East Pakistan 
public opinion. A convulsive though spontaneous a g i t a t i o n , engulfed 
every nook and corner of the e n t i r e province. The provincial govern-
ment misjudged the seriousness of the a g i t a t i o n and was s t i l l not 
ready t o aquiesce. Far back i n early 1948 the Gengress opposition i n 
the Constituent Assembly w i t h Mr. Jinnah on the chair, maintained that 
"out of s i x crores and ninety lakhs of people i n h a b i t i n g t h i s state, 
4 crores and 40 lakhs of people speak the Bengali language ••• I 
oonsider t h a t Bengali language i s a lingua franca of our state ... 
88 
I voice the sentiments of the vast m i l l i o n s of our s t a t e . . . 
* The w r i t e r found himself unconsciously, as i t were, among the language-
processionists and spent an uncomfortable night along w i t h h i s 
colleagues i n the Police s t a t i o n . 
** Though 'law and order' was a pr o v i n c i a l subject, nevertheless on a 
substantive issue l i k e t h i s the cfiatral government d i d not deprive 
the p r o v i n c i a l government of i t s d i r e c t i v e s . 
88. C.A.D. Vol . 2 , 1948, p.16. I n the same s i t t i n g Liaquat reacted w i t h 
the f o l l o w i n g words: "Pakistan i s a Muslim State and must have i t s 
lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation", the Urdu. And 
Nazirauddin said, " I am sure t h a t the overwhelming majority of the 
people'are i n favour of ... Urdu as the state language..." pp . l7~20 . 
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This was followed by Congress* demanding the same i n the Legislature 
of East Pakistan i n A p r i l 1948, when Nazimuddin, the then Premier of 
East Pakistan, himself moved a resolution making Bengali the only o f f i c i a l 
89 
language of East Pakistan. ' As a matter of f a c t , the Congress did 
voice the sentiments of the m i l l i o n s minus the r u l i n g j u n t a . An A l l -
Party Language Committee was formed to spearhead the Bengali-language 
cause. The protagonists and sympathisers - r e a l or supposed - of t h i s 
•cause* were duly gaoled. The containment p o l i c y f u r t h e r resulted i n 
the imposition of Section 144 preventing assemblage of more than f i v e 
persons i n the s t r e e t s of the c a p i t a l , Dacca. Meanwhile, public rage 
was already manifest i n many a destructive o u t l e t . I t was not u n t i l 
then when a few k i l l i n g s - transformed i n t o martyrs - due t o police 
90 
f i r i n g s on the 21st February, 1952, drove the government i n t o passing 
a r e s o l u t i o n i n the East Pakistan l e g i s l a t u r e i n favour of Bengali as 
one of the state languages. The Prime Minister himself, beaten by h i s 
own province, recanted saying t h a t the "Bengali language has great 
91 
emotional support of the people of East Pakistan." 
The language issue, however, influenced p o l i t i c s i n three d i r e c t i o n s . 
F i r s t , the prestige of the M.L. government was tarnished a good deal. 
The government had seen i n the language demand only an attempt of the 
opposition and subversive elements to d i s c r e d i t the government and had 
applied coercion. A good many members of the M.L. party decamped and 
joined the opposition. 
890 Statesman, A p r i l 8, 1948. 
90• Dawn. February 22, 1952. 
9 1 » Dawn. A p r i l 12, 1952, E d i t o r i a l "Wise Decision". 
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Having eventually acceded to the demand the provincial M,L. party 
put i t s e l f into an awkward position of lobbying i t s central parlia-
mentary party i n the Constituent Assembly for enacting the Bengali as 
one of the state languages* Worse s t i l l , i t s p l i t opinions of parties 
and associations of both the 'wings* into opposite directions, 
despite the commonness of party a f f i l i a t i o n s . 
Second, the language issue brought an era of p o l i t i c a l socialization 
at a given moment, among East Pakistanis. I t smoothed cleavages among 
Hindu-Muslim parties producing an all-embraoing, united participation 
for a common cause. Nothing could better provide p o l i t i c a l education 
for the masses i n an under-developed polity than the p o l i t i c s of tongue, 
next to food i n importance. Conversely, the country also swung i t s e l f 
back from owing a larger loyalty to a single lingua franca, Urdu. 
Third, Communist elements i n f i l t r a t e d into the language movement 
and t h i s time i n East Pakistan. Originally and essentially the language 
movement was p a t r i o t i c but the turn of events obscured the atmosphere -
a Communist ideal. Usually, the Communists are par excellence 
supporters of 'li n g u i s t i c autonomy*. Theprinciple of a "multinational 
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and hence multilingual state", f i t t e d into the language movement of 
East Pakistan. The communists were there conspicuously identifying 
themselves with the issue and influencing i t accordingly. The Premier 
* See: Dawn. Ap r i l 12, 1952. 
** S e e s ibicU* March 6, 1952; March 23, 1952 and March 31, 1952. 
92• Rupert Emerson, op.oit.. p.135* 
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of East Pakistan, Mr. Nurul Amin, quoted, while speaking i n the legis-
lature, from the 'Swadhinata* - a Calcutta daily and the mouthpiece of 
the Communist Party - dated March 10 & 11, 1952, excerpts indicating 
how the Communist Party i n East Pakistan had assisted i n forming a l l 
party language committees turning the issue into a united mass movement, 
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and i n c i t i n g people against the government on other issues. Worse 
s t i l l , when the government "brooded over the situation, not wholly 
unjustifiably, how "a Mahasabite and Communalist i n India, on arriving 
here, becomes a communist but both work for the same end - the destruc-
94 
t i o n of Muslims and disintegration of Pakistan. 
However, having burnt his fingers i n the language controversy, 
Nazimuddin picked up the thread of institution-building l e f t by his 
predeoessor. The public opinions formulated around the postponed 
Interim Report were duly expressed i n the shape of recommendations 
based on which a comprehensive report (B.P.C.) was finalised. The 
Prime Minister presented the B.P.C. Report to the Constituent Assembly 
on Deoember 22, 1952. The Report was positively committed to giving 
an ideological basis to the State and setting up constitutional 
mechanisms for the governance of the country. The Report envisaged an 
Islamic Democracy where the Muslims would be able to cultivate t h e i r 
* Sees: Memorandum on the Basic Principles Committee (Confidential: 
Governor General *s Press: 1951) and Statement showing consolidation 
of similar suggestions received from the public on the basic 
principles committee report (Confidential: The Times Press: n.d,). 
93. Dawn. March 25, 1952. See also: Dawn, 4.3.52} 5.3.52 and 8.3.52e 
94. The East Pakistan Governor's l e t t e r to the Prime Minister (Top 
Seoret: D. G. No. 101/PS) dated 21st fune, 1954, p.3. 
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f a i t h adequately while remaining consistent with the requirements of 
modern l i f e . The interests of the minorities would be safeguarded. 
The State would he a federal one comprising the existing Provinoes, 
acceeding States, Baluchistan and the Federal areaof Karachi, the 
Federal Captial. A bicameral legislature - an upper House with 120 
members and a House of the People with 400 - was proposed. In the 
composition of the Houses parity was sought between the representatives 
of East and West Pakistan, though some compensating weight was given 
to the smaller provinces. Financial B i l l s would originate only in 
the House of the People. The Head of the State must be a Muslim to be 
elected at a joi n t s i t t i n g of both Houses of the Federal Legislature. 
No legislation should be enacted which was repugnant to the Quran, 
and as a safeguard a Board of Ulema ^ consisting of five persons versed 
i n Islamic law would be appointed to intercept unislamic legislation. 
Albeit the f i n a l authority i f i passing any law was given to the majority 
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of the Muslims s i t t i n g i n the Federal legislature. Ostensibily, 
the Report provided a compromise between those who demanded an unalloyed 
Islamicpolity and those who preferred to see Pakistan fi n d her proper 
place among the modern nations. But could t h i s Report really embody 
an even marriage between modern p o l i t i c a l needs and religious anachro-
nism? What rationale worked for the incorporation of ob80u5?aMi& ideas 
i n the draft constitution? Why was i t that "the s p i r i t soared to the 
l o f t y heights reached i n Omar's time, but eyes are fastened on the 
95» Report of the Basic Principles Committee (Government of Pakistan 
Press: 1952), pp. 2, 3, 5» 7, 11, 14 and C.A.D. Vol.XII, 2,December 22, 
1952, pp.86, 89, 159. 
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Spires of Westminster. 
Obviously, t h i s was an index of p o l i t i c a l schizophrenia - a 
cri s i s of mind and s p i r i t . In historical perspective the Muslims of 
the subcontinent had been subject to an intermittent brooding i.e. 
whether or not they belonged to the s o i l they lived on, hear* and 
soul. The Indo-Islamic p o l i t y of the medieval India had i n i t some 
dyarohic elements i n that the Sultan (Muslim king) had to pay allegiance 
to an i n s t i t u t i o n outside of the subcontinent, Baghdad's Khalifa. 
So prestigious was the i n s t i t u t i o n of the 'Khalafat' that the Indian 
Sultan "to buttress his position ... procured a robe of honour from 
97 / the Khalifa of Baghdad". f h i s e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l commitment both on 
the part of the Delhi sultan and his subjects caused also, psychologi-
cally, a sense of rootlessness despite t h e i r time-honoured inhalation 
of Indian a i r . The t i e s of e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l loyalties were sundered 
by Sher Shah, the founder of the Sur dynasty. The Mughals followed 
suit and during Akbar's rule a sense of belongingness was kindled 
among the Muslims of India through the Emperor's dynamic eclectic 
approach. This process did not continue unhaltingly before the B r i t i s h 
f i n a l l y undertook the reign of the oountry. And after the eclipse of 
Muslim rule i t was the 'Ulema group' (religious doctors) which kept 
the torch of the Islamic heritage burning. When the Turks revived the 
•Kalafat * i n the 18th century Indian Muslims again accepted "the 
* The s p i r i t u a l head of the Muslim World (Amirul Mumanim, the 
Commander of the F a i t h f u l ) . 
96. K. Callard, Pakistan: A P o l i t i c a l Study (Mew York: 1957)> p.201. 
97. H.N. Sinha, The Development of Indian Polity, (London: 1963) p.423. 
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existence of one Caliph for the entire Muslim world". 7 Through the 
vehiole of indigenous religions revivalist movements (both moderate 
and extreme) the national consciousness of the Muslims as a distinot 
entity with a glorious past was being resuscitated."^ the height of 
religious fervour could be discerned when thousands of Muslims l i t e r a l l y 
l e f t the subcontinent i n keeping with a Fatwa (religious decree) which 
described India as Dar-Ul-harb,* 0 0 meaning land of i n f i d e l s . After 
the war Kamal himself drove the last nail i n the coffin of 'Khalafat' 
- an incident that cut the Muslims of India to the quick. 
In the foregoing passages we have t r i e d to silhouette the schism 
of Muslim minds of the subcontinent against a historical background. 
The Islamic zeal was singularly kept alive by the religious group. And 
when the Muslim secular minded politicians of the then India #ere 
yielding less dividends i n the constitutional nerve-war, they oried 
'Islam i n danger', and lUleraa's reactions oame i n the best tra d i t i o n 
of the Pavlovian "condition-reflex" formula. Now that Pakistan was an 
accomplished fact the Ulema wanted to cash i n the Islamic cheque i n 
f u l l . 
Was Islamic Democracy a viable modern proposition? The sense of 
religious values have found ample expressions i n some of the constitu-
98. Hafeez Malik, Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan (Washington 
D.C., Publio Aff a i r s Press: 1963), p.21. 
99. Edward Shils "The intellectuals i n p o l i t i c a l development" i n John 
H. Kantsky, ed., P o l i t i c a l Change i n Underdeveloped Countries. 
PP. 195-234. 
100. Hafeez Malik, op.cit., p.343. This decree was made by no less a 
person than Moulana Abul Kalam Azad, a distinguished Indian nation-
l i s t , when Turkey entered the First World War against the B r i t i s h . 
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t i o n a l government of the modem world. Broadly speaking, the heritage 
of Judeo-Ghristianity has not been swept under the carpet by the govern-
ments of the- Western World. But the fact remained that after the 
Reformation, religion lost i t s d istinct p o l i t i c a l character. Islamic 
Jurisprudence i s steeped i n metaphysics resembling the medieval 
notion of law as "the w i n 0 f God".101 Islam i s vulnerable to higher 
synthesis unless the immutability of the orthodoxy yields to r a t i o n a l i t y . 
102 
I t i s the "embodiment of God's direct government i n the earth". 
This view was maintained by the Board of Talimati-i-Islamia (appointed 
to advise the B.P.G. on Islamic aspects of the constitution) which 
rejected the say of Christ, i.e. "give unto God what i s God's and unto 
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Caesar what i s Caesar's"; f o r , to them God was immanent i n the 
p o l i t y , a l b e i t , transcendent, as well - an admission that the legal 
and p o l i t i c a l sovereignty of the people would operate within the con-
finement of metaphysical determinism. 
In essence, the governing laws of Islam are found mainly i n the 
following sources e.g. the Quran (the revealed sayings of God), Sunna 
(traditions of the prophet Mohammed), Isma (consensus of the religious 
doctors) and Q'iyas (judgments of the Islamic j u r i s t s ) . And controversy 
crept i n when these laws threatened to claim "immutability and eternal 
* Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Greesse, Argentina, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, etc. 
101. H. J. Laski, The State i n theory and -practice (London:1950)» P«32. 
102. Windrow Sweetman "Viewpoints i n Pakistan", The Muslim World. 
Vol. XLVII (April 1957), p.112. 
103. Quoted i n i b i d . . p.117* 
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applicability"',''' 0^ regardless of time and space. True, the early Islam 
promulgated laws that were more advanced and more humane that i t s 
contemporary world. And i n modern times when " Christians have been 
talking i n terras of a social gospel5 Islam has been a social gospel 
105 
from the beginning". ^ Those laws were implemented to the lette r i n 
the early, formative Islamic days of Halcyon but i n modern times thei r 
wholesale recrudescences would be anything but Quixotic. That is one 
of the reasons that "Islamic history has never been Islamic i n the ideal 
sense - l i f e i s too complex for that"."*'0^ 
However, dogmaticism resulted i n the emergence of l i b e r a l , rational; 
and democratic shools of the thought viz. Mutazilites, Mawandi, Kharistes, 
107 
etc. Which emphasised the role of Iztihad (reason) i n interpreting 
Islamic laws. As a result, from 800 to 1100, maintains Horten, 
Professor of Semitic philosophy at the University of Bonn, there arose 
nearly one hundred systems of theology.*1*0^ In the same vein, further 
testimonies oan be cited to prove the e l a s t i c i t y of Islamic thought* 
So Islam was put to the test of a •choice' i.e. a choice between reason 
and slavish adherence to dogma. And as far as the subcontinent was 
concerned i t was Shah Waliullah of the 18th century W&9,first, set i n 
104. Leonard Birder, Religion and Politics i n Pakistan (University 
of California Press, 1961), p.23. 
105* W.C. Smith, Pakistan as an Islamic State (Lahore: 1951)> P»23» 
106. I b i d . , p.33 
107. A.K. Sen, The Islamic State (Calcutta: 1950), pp.20-35. 
108. For details, see: A.K. Brohi, "Thoughts on the future constitution", 
Dawn, September 21, 1952. 
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the reorientation process of Islam and made himself "to Pakistan what 
Martin Luther is to Germany".109 His s p i r i t u a l heirs were Sir Syed 
Ahmed Khan and Dr. Iqbal i n the recent past. Sir Igbal - the sp i r i t u a l 
dreamer of Pakistan just as Jinnah was i t s p o l i t i c a l architect - attacked 
the orthodox Uleraas for holding out a false reverence to an archaic 
past and thwarting the inner impulses of Is l a m . 1 1 0 I t was his school 
of thought which stressed the need of Iztihad (reason) and Izma (con-
sensus) being i n s t i t u t e d i n the modern legislature, so that Islam 
could be recreated through dynamic elaboration. Hence, the v i a b i l i t y 
of Islamic democracy would be less anathematic i f those two (mentioned 
above) institutions are recognised fervently. 
However, presenting the draft constitution i n an enlarged edition 
of Liaquat*s Objectives Resolution as he did, the Prime Minister turned 
apologist for the proposed Islamic democraoy and claimed to have brought 
"about a synthesis" of Islamic fundamentals "and the requirements of 
progressive democracy ... of the 20th century 1 1. 1 1 1 I t came under heavy 
f i r e both from within the Constituent Assembly and without. The Congress 
opposition subjected the Report to searching oriticism on intellectual 
and ethical grounds. The provision making the Head of the State oora-
pulsoriiy a Muslim seemed to make a mockery of democracy. This was 
tantamount to rendering non-Muslim minorities permanently disabled for 
109. Malik Hafeez, op.cit., p.139* 
110. g i r Iqballs Book, "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought i n 
Islam" (London:l§34) quoted i n the Manchester Guardian. E d i t o r i a l , 
"Mullah Raj", January 13, 1953. 
111. Documents and speeches on the constitution of Pakistan, loo.oit.. 
p.62. 
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the highest post of the state. Moreover, other d i s a b i l i t y provisions 
viz . the i n s t i t u t i o n of separate electorates, Ulema Board, etc., would 
go a long way to reducing minorities to a perennial status of p o l i t i c a l 
minorities. That t h i s practice was maintained among "some of the 
112 
foremost democracies of the world" could be explained on historical 
ground. After a l l , the European monarchs have been by and large, reduced 
to a position of reigning rather than ruling. Even the personal laws 
of the minorities might incur repugnancy for the i r being either divergent 
from or opposed to Quranic injunctions. What was more, Macaulay's penal 
code would have to be revised, i f punishments for, say, t h e f t , adultery, 
etc., were to be awarded as stipulated i n the Quran. 
The Congress members apart, t h i r t y nine Muslim leaguers spoke in 
support, rather apologetically, of the Islamic provisions, with the 
A.P.P. group denouncing the government for hoodwinking the people i n 
113 
the name of Islam. Similarly, the Press and outside public with 
secular orientation reaoted vigorously to Islamic provisions. 1 1^ 
The situation was now pregnant. The opinions relating to Islamic state 
had now been formed broadly into two groups, e.g. Modernist-Islamist -
who would pin f a i t h i n 'Iztihad' and democratise 'Izma' by i n s t i t u t i o n -
115 
a l i s i n g i t i n the popular legislature ^ - and the more holier groups — 
* laulana Osraani, known as the Archbishop of Pakistan, declared i n the 
Constituent Assembly that non-believers under an Islamic p o l i t y could 
not be "entrusted with the responsibility of framing the general 
policy of the state". See: C.A.D. Vol.V, 9 March, 1949, pp.44-46. 
l l B * Documents and speeches, ioc. o i t . . p.64 
11,3• See C.A.D., Vol.XII, 22 Deoember, 1952, Also, Manchester Guardian 
December 23, 1952, Hindu, Deoember, 23, 1952 o 
114. Statesman., Decemfeer 23, 1952. See: Dawn (Editorial) "Hlemacracy", 
January 24, 1953. 
46* 
who would entrust the religious expertise (Ulema and Mujtkhids} alone 
to discover the t r u t h "that l i e s i n the Holy Book and the hooks of 
Hadith".'''''"^  The Ulemas were not appeased with the provisions provided 
i n the draft constitution and hungered for more, the results of which 
was the submission of amendments to the draft constitution by a group 
of 33-strong Ulema t o t a l l y give&to the idea of an Islamic state. Having 
done so the Ulema betrayed t h e i r inner impulse of intolerance in that 
they suggested that Qadianis (a Protestant group af Muslims who d i f f e r 
from the predominantly Sunni group i n some tangible ways) be declared 
117 
"a minority altogether". What was more, i n the so-called convention 
of All-Muslim Parties, a decision to launch 'direct action' was taken 
to force the government to ostracize Qadianis from the Sunni oomraunity 
and dismiss Sir Zafrullah (a Qadiani), the Foreign Minister from the 
118 
Cabinet. A reign of fanaticism with i t s corollary attendants was 
l e t loose i n Karachi to bend further an already-bent Prime Minister, 
religious to his gingertips before the demands. The general expectations 
were, from the beginning, that the government "would be prepared to face 
119 
a showdown with the Mullahs". ' (Contd. from page 44)• 
Leonard Binder "Pakistan and Modern Islamic-Nationalist Theory", 
Middle East Jougnal , Vol. 12, 1958, p.53« See also: Dr. I.H. 
Qureshi, Pakistan. An Islamic Democracy. (Lahore:n.d«), p.27« 
116. Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Pun.jab Disturbances of 
195^ 3.. (Lahore: 1954). p«208. (Usually' known as "the Munir Report). 
117« Documents and speeches, l o c . c i t . , p.997* See: Dawn . 27.12.1952. 
118. Dawn. February 27, 1953. 
119. Manchester Guardian. December 23, 1952. 
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This was a situation that raised a v i t a l question i.e. the 
Summum bonum of public administration and public policy. Was i t 
advisable that a consequential movement l i k e religion - s t i l l , i n many 
a form a part and parcel of Pakistan lives - ought to be dealt with 
from the p o l i t i c a l platform as contemplated under a parliamentary form 
of government or l e f t entirely to the oare of the services? Away i n 
the Ministry of Defence (the Prime Minister held the Defence portfolio) 
General Mirza, the Defence Secretary - a personage coming from the 
early British p o l i t i c a l services soon to become progressively the most 
powerful man i n Pakistan p o l i t i c s - found his patience and administrative 
restraints wearing t h i n i n the face of p o l i t i c a l maelstrom. Passionately 
for c e f u l l y , Mirza wrote to the Prime Ministers 
"the problems created by your personal 
enemies including Mullahs, i f not dealt 
with firml y and now w i l l destroy the 
administration and the country ... the 
prestige of the government in Karachi i s 
at i t s lowest ebb ... w i l l be the feeling 
i n the whole country tomorrow ... I am 
not a very religious man, I have the great-
est respect for your religious beliefs and 
realize your hesitation ... for vigorous 
action ... No administration can exist on 
basis of fear specially i f i t has got to 
rule Muslims... There are people who w i l l 
stand by you t i l l the last. I guarantee 
the Armed Forces w i l l carry out any directive 
you may ohoose to give. For God's sake become 
a courageous leader and take decisive action. 
Once you do t h i s , the whole country with the 
exception of rascals w i l l r a l l y round you and 
the prestige of Pakistan w i l l go up ..."120 
120. Letter to the Prime Minister (Government of Pakistan, Ministry 
of Defence) Top Secret Personal P.O. No. 52/PS. dated Karachi 26 
February, 1953. See Appendix I I , General Mirza held the religious 
leaders i n the highest contempt. He reminisced before the 
writer how, during the Second World tfer.j he extraoted a religious 
decree i n favour of B r i t i s h i n lieu of money. 
48, 
The Prime Minister was s t i l l i n a quandary. When the Karachi 
agitation was contained with the arrests of Ulema, Lahore became the 
bastion of this movement manifesting i t s e l f i n the slaughter of police, 
public and the conversion of Mosques (religious temples) into crime 
121 
c e l l s . In an eleventh hour cabinet meeting including also provincial 
122 
representatives i t was decided that the "challenge must be mat", 
and martial law was promulgated i n Lahore on March 6, 1953* Peace was 
restored. 
But why was i t that the anti-Qadiani movement could not be fought 
from the parliamentary platforms despite the fact that the majority of. 
the ruling members of both central and provincial governments and 
legislatures were modernist-Islamist? Because, the Prime Minister's 
weakness apart, some of the prominent politicians used the movement 
however contrary to t h e i r convictions, as a lever against regional 
interests. I t i s to be recalled how the Interim Report was rejected 
by East Pakistan. Now i t was the turn of the West Punjab. The present 
Report brought i n a parity of representation between East and West 
Pakistan i n the parliaments. But the Punjab (West) thought the pro-
posed parity heralded a Balkanization process in West Pakistan ; for, 
* The soft corner Nazimuddin had for Ulema was s t i l l not waning even 
after the religious storm. He observed i n the Parliaments " I will,' 
be the last person to impute any motives to any Ulema ..." See 
C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. 1, 19th March, 1953, p.374. 
121.See: Dawn. March 5, 1953 and March 16, 1953. 
122.Dawn, March 21, 1953 (Editorial) "Only half way". 
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nine units had been carved out of the western part and representation 
# 
was assigned according to size and population of the respective units. 
Apparently, there was logic i n the arguments. East Pakistan would 
always come as a compact hloc i n the parliaments whereas the West would 
123 
be i n "perpetual inequality and discord to confront the solid east". 
But behind the arguments, perhaps, lay the Punjabi fear of being 
dominated by East Pakistan. Since any alliance with any units of 
West Pakistan would give East Pakistan parliamentary superiority on 
numerical grounds. The Chief Minister of the West Punjab, Murataz 
Daultana,minced no words i n showing his disfavour to the Federal pro-
posals. The Punjab press was mobilised f u l l y to discredit the B.P.C. 
Report while the Punjab provincial M.L. was growing restive. The Prime 
Minister rushed to Lahore to attend an extraordinary meeting of the 
Punjab Provincial M.L. and was t o l d to postpone consideration of the 
Report ,"^4 
I t was ironic, however, that the other units of West Pakistan e.g. 
Sind, W.W.F.P., Baluchistan, etc. were committed to the constitutional 
proposals, i n t h e i r entirety. Gomradeless, the Punjabi politicians, 
no lovers of extreme Holier groups, found i n the anti-Qadiani movement 
* Sees B.P.C. Report, loo, o i t . . pp.11*14. 
** See: Times. January 21, (Editorial) "Karachi and Lahore". 
*** East Pakistan was not happy either, for the language issue was 
hushed up. But she kept quiet, relatively. 
123. Suleri, op. o i t . . p.48 
124. Dawn. January 16, 1953. 
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a welcome weapon to avenge provincial grudges upon the central 
government. The premier of the West Punjab, Mr. Daultana, came in 
125 
the best t r a d i t i o n of Machiavellianism, J when his words and deeds were 
126 
analysed i n juxtaposition, vis-a-vis the movement. As a result, 
the 'issue* could not be tackled i n terms of p o l i t i c s because the p o l i -
ticians f a i l e d to meet the challenge. Steeped i n regionalism the 
politicians were oblivious to wider considerations and unwittingly 
paved i n a short army rule i n one of the premier provinces of Pakistan 
which could be s«}f-defeating on larger parliamentary considerations. 
Was not the hitherto unpublished l e t t e r , that tunneled beneath the 
parliamentary earth to the desk of the Prime Minister where the Defence 
Secretary was guaranteeing army support to his boss, the Defence 
Minister - also an omen? 
However, simultaneously with these events was a deterioration 
of the national economy. Granted that a policy of non-devaluation 
presupposes a planned economy, the government given to temporary 
complacency f a i l e d i n that direction, for i n the absence of any pre-
cautions an overrated 'Rupee' led to reckless buying spree i n foreign 
markets. The irony was that the mass of consumers were deprived of 
127 
the benefit of the " f u l l value of the Pakistan rupee", 1 by the 
* There were politicians and intellectuals who were suspicious of 
army rule i n the West Punjab. See Dawn, March 16, 1953» May 14, 
1953 and G.A.D. (Leg) Vol. 1, March 28, 1953, p.901. 
125. Munir Report, op.cit.. p.235» 
126. Shawkat Hyat Khan, a Punjabi M.C.A. (APP Group) stated i n Parliament 
that Qadiani movement was finanoed by the Punjab government and 
fSanned by the highly placed persons. People arrested i n Karachi 
i n t h i s connection vras sent by. Daultana. I t was not a l l done by . 
"the Ulema. Sees Dawn. March 18, 1953 • 
127. Financial Times. March 13, 1953 (Article) Sir Percival G r i f f i t h s 
"Pakistan's Economy". 
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speculators and commercial tycoons. Pakistan's economic and financial 
health was dependent upon two export commodities, i.e. jute and cotton, 
and the heavy f a l l s i n the prices of those commodities (the Korean boom 
was over) i n foreign markets affected the economy which seemed to have 
been "well entrenched behind steady demand for jute and cotton". 
On top of i t , the government f r i t t e r e d away foreign exchange under the 
heading of "Government Accounts". As a result, the gold, dollar and 
sterling reserves were severely depleted. And government cash balances 
were augmented through advances from the State Bank of Pakistan.*2'* 
The position was further exacerbated when shortage of food threathened 
near-famine conditions i n certain areas of the country. And pressure 
was brought to bear upon the already severely strained financial 
resources when the Defence Services, alone, were allotted Rs.60.10 crores 
out of the t o t a l revenues of Rs.98.6O crores of the 1953-54 budget. 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Food strenuously looked for money to buy 
food. For, after a l l , the Finance Minister sought to go down to history 
for maintaining an unbroken pattern of balanced budgets and, at the 
same time, mark the "transition from a wholly agricultural eoonomy to 
a partfer industrialised economy",no matter i f that meant borrowing 
* I t was a (historic) p i t y that whenever Sir Nazimuddin assumed 
power some unforeseen disagreeable events were always there to 
discredit him. To mention one, his assumption of Bengal's Premier-
ship i n 1943 saw the tragic stalking of famine a l l over the 
Province. His name, unfortunately, prompted a sense of foreboding; 
among the people. This, however, was carefully nurtured by the 
opposition. 
128. Tiraes, October 13, 1952. See also: New York Times. March 18, 1953 
(Editorial) "Pakistan's d i f f i c u l t i e s " . 
129. "State Bank's Weekly Statements" quoted i n Dawn, December 21,1952 
([Article), Hussain Imam "The Economic Crisis". 
130. C.A.D. (Leg) Vol. 1, March 19, 1953, p.392. 
foreign capital or robbing Peter to pay Paul. Nervously, the govern-
ment t o t a l l y cancelled the O.G.L. (Open General License) Policy to halt 
the drainage of foreign exchange and appointed an Economic Appraisal 
131 
Gjbmmittee to enquire into the economic malaise, whioh resulted 
only i n unsettling the market i n the former case and pigeon-holing 
the report i n the l a t t e r . 
True, the government had no control over some factors, v i z . the 
state of the foreign markets, the stoppage of canal water by India, 
drought, etc., but the capacity of the Cabinet had also something to 
do with i t . I t s constitutional position apart, the Cabinet also was 
a functional team - an organisation that was to unite efforts to a 
1V 
common purpose. I f we are to view "coordination, the f i r s t principle" 
of any organised body, then the Cabinet from a s t r i c t l y functional point 
of view must organise i t s e l f through orderly distribution of portfolios 
and the arrangement of group e f f o r t for the seeking of common goals. 
There was never an oocasion when portfolios were assigned to ministers 
i n terms of proper workability any more than federal p o l i t i c s would 
allow Ministers to hold the minimum possible portfolios. There were 
* The Pakistan Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industries i n 
an extraordinarily written memorandum to the Prime Minister analysed 
the productive capacity of the t o t a l food grain areas against the 
t o t a l consuming populace i n terms of percapita consumption. 
Taking everything together, the memorandum maintained that instead 
of shortage of food there ought to have been surplus to the tune 
of 24,77,034 tons of grain. See:Dawn March 20, 1953. 
131. Dawn. March 13, 1953. 
132. Joseph A. Littererer, Organizations: Structure and Behaviour 
(London: I963), p.39-
51* 
overworked Ministers responsible for more than one important subject. 
After a l l , even genius i s defined as f90 per cent perspiration and 
10 per cent inspiration*. In t r y i n g to maintain "a mathematical 
133 
balance between East and West" i n the Cabinet Nazimuddin also i n t r o -
duced a coordinating imbalance. While the country was facing an 
economic c r i s i s several v i t a l and interrelated subjects e.g. commerce, 
industries, economio a f f a i r s , food and agriculture were separately 
held by individual Ministers making prompt coordination i n an i n t r a -
l i n i s t e r i a l level much more d i f f i c u l t . Obviously the Finance Minister 
was not comfortable without the portfolio of Economic Affairs, which 
was held by the Commerce Minister, who was also the Education Minister. 
The Finance Minister was not, psychologically, able to take the i n i t i -
ative when he was not, responsible for the economy as a whole nor would 
Mr. Fazlul Rahman part with his prestige p o r t f o l i o , Economic Affairs. 
The Food Minister - a very distinct person i n food crises - was at a 
loss to discover the appropriate sources of funds. And a blinding 
situation arose when various subjects pressed the respective Ministers 
f o r immediate attention. Simultaneously the Commerce and Economic 
Affairs Minister was now also to give an account of his being an 
* Sir Winston Churchill once defended the retention of a l l i e d 
subjects under one Ministry by having w i t t i l y replied that, after 
a l l , "Fish and Chips" had historic l i n k s , to a question i n the 
House of Commons which asked separation of the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture from the Fisheries. 
133. H. Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Short P o l i t i c a l Guide. 
(London: 1966), p.78. 
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Education Minister, Students i n t h e i r thousands dinned the a i r of 
Karachi with their demand for the reduction of student fees which resulted 
i n the I n t e r i o r Minister's Cadillac being burnt, a number of students 
being k i l l e d and injured by police f i r i n g and f i n a l l y the army's taking 
over the troubled areas of the Capital. The humble Prime Minister came 
to the rescue of his colleague and addressed himself to the students 
as t h e i r "loving fat her", Perhaps one might sympathise with the 
economic d i f f i c u l t i e s of the Nazimuddin government when i t was faced 
by a world-wide economic recession. But equally j u s t i f i a b l y , Nazimuddin 
could be held responsible for organising his Cabinet unwisely, and pursuing 
135 
"a wholly unrealistic polioy", ^ i n respect of food and economic policies. 
I t was understandable that he was compelled to follow public opinion 
vis-a-vis constitution-making. But i n matters of policy affecting the 
every day lives of millions of people he could bind the Cabinet to a policy 
# 
having pre-emtively declared e a r l i e r . But he certainly lacked the 
1 ^fi 
stature of na Sun around which planets revolve". On the contrary, some 
# # 
of his colleagues were much more i n the limelight. The best proof of t h i s 
* As a matter of fact his predecessor did on Korean a f f a i r s . 
** Sir Zafrullah, Chowdhury Md. A l i , Pazlul Rahman, Sardar Nishtar 
and K. Shahabuddin. The l a t t e r was his cousin - a proverbial 
clever p o l i t i c i a n , more by instinct than education, who survived 
a l l regimes, including the present one. He was to Nazimuddin what 
Chowdhury Md. A l i had been to Liaquat. 
134» Pawn, January 9> 1953* 
135. Financial Times. A p r i l 20, 1953. 
136, Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridgei 1959)» P»200, 
was that despite failures of policies in respect of certain Ministries 
(Food, Economics, Home), no Ministers or officers were required to 
relinquish their jobs. In short, the Nazimuddin government was i n 
the midst of a p o l i t i c a l and economic cr i s i s of the f i r s t magnitude. 
Suddenly, the Governor General's satrapy moved. The whole nation 
was taken aback when the Governor General claiming as he did as the 
last residual power of the State sent the Nazimuddin government packing 
on account of i t s inadequate grappling "with the d i f f i c u l t i e s facing 
1^ 7 * the oountry" and asked Mohammed A l i to form a new Cabinet. Was 
the Governor General's action j u s t i f i a b l e constitutionally? Had he 
the right to dismiss the Cabinet when i t was s t i l l enjoying the con-
fidence of the Parliament? Was not the I.L. Parliamentary - the major 
party - body the right parliamentary forum for bringing i n changes 
i n the leadership? How could the Governor General adduce that the 
economic policy of the dismissed government was the heal of Achilles 
when he had characterised the economic c r i s i s as merely "pangs of 
growth" and had himself been associated with the country's economic 
policy right from the beginning? Ostensibly, the Governor General 
based his action on the provisions of Section 10 of the Government of 
India Act, 1935» as adapted i n Pakistan by the Provisional Constitut-
* The same person who was sent to Burma in Mr. Jinnah's time, as 
ambassador. Since then he gardually rose to the position of Pakistan' 
ambassador to the U.S.; and retained t h i s post u n t i l he was called 
upon to form a new Ministry. He vias a former M.C.A. and had worked 
under Sahrawardy's Cabinet of undivided Bengal (1946-47) as 
Finance Minister. 
137 • Press Communique quoted i n Pawn, April 18, 1953 
138. Dawn. April 10, 1953(Editorial) "Pangs of Growth". 
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ional Order of 1947• The Governor General was no doubt to be aided 
by a council of Ministers under Section 9 J but under SSofiofislQ*.Ministers 
were chosen and summoned by him and held office during his pleasure. 
In fact'f the Cabinet under the Pakistan Provisional Constitution did 
* 
not occupy a j u r i s t i c position And the contention that the Governor 
General could not dismiss except by the advice of his Ministry could 
not be defended even i n the courts of law. Because, under Section 10 
(4) of the Act maintaimed that advice tendered by the Ministers to 
the Governor General could not be enquired into by any court 
A mechanistic interpretation - albeit debatable - of the l e t t e r 
of the Constitution might lend some support to the Governor General's 
actions but surely i t was not i n the s p i r i t of the Constitution. 
Pakistanis had to consider whether the Parliamentary ethos was a means 
towards an end or an end i n i t s e l f ? To fi n d an answer to thi s question 
a pure formal - l e g a l i s t i c approach would be unrealistic - this i s 
an approach which i s meaningful i n a society where consensus-based 
in s t i t u t i o n s have taken deep root allowing a degree of the luxury of 
disagreement - i n the plane of a developing p o l i t y such as Pakistan, 
"for , the transitional socio~politico-economic institutions were an 
inconstant 'variable' unlike the Western onee"*?"^ The violation of 
* The B r i t i s h Cabinet's legal position was also not clear at the 
outset. The conventions developed into legalism. 
139• Pawn. Ap r i l 19, 1953. 
140. D.A. Rostow, "New Horizons i n the Study of Comparative P o l i t i c s " , 
World Politics IX (1956-57) P.531. 
the constitutional s p i r i t tras , no doubt, costly i n terms of parlia-
mentarianism but a dogged adherence to i t would have threatened the 
very parliamentary system i t s e l f i n Pakistan. The way i n which the 
Prime Minister was influenced by the religious groups whose aggressive 
designs found eloquent expression i n the anti-Qadiani Movement made i t 
doubtful i f the country could have been ever emancipated from the 
clutches of the extreme Ulema, short of the Governor General's contro-
versial action. The Ulema - i n i t i a t e d religious renaissance i n 
Pakistan found the Hazimuddin government permissive enough to carry the 
movement further into other Muslim states crying for the revival of 
"Khilafat"'*'^'1* - the vanished i n s t i t u t i o n . And, from Pakistan's point 
of view i f the anti-Qadiani movement succeeded i n reducing the Quadianis 
to minority, the 'Shias*, another dissident sect of Muslim, would have 
142 
been the next target. That was why the Economist's characterisation 
of the Governor General's action as "courageous, timely ... dramatic ... 
143 
r e a l i s t i c " < found similar echoes i n Pakistan. 
Are we then to suppose that the Governor General's action was 
solely inspired by secular impulses? Obviously no 1 The action ingenu-
ously f u l f i l l e d a number of objectives, namely (a) regional, (b) opposi-
* No less a person that Maulana Maudoodi, the most i n f l u e n t i a l 
religious leader, characterised the Governor General's action, 
during an interview with the writer, as "Ek Bandook se dou shikar 
hui" meaning, k i l l i n g both religion and democracy with one gun shot. 
141. See: Dawn. May 13, 1953 (Editorial) "Sloganism vs. Realism". 
142. See: Percival Spear, "The P o l i t i c a l Evolution of Pakistan: A study 
i n Analysis", i n Saul Rose (e&) Politics i n Southern Asia 
(London: 1963), p. 40. 
143. Economist. May 8, 1953. 
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t i o n , (c) oentrepetal, (d) 'modernist-Islamist' and (e) positive 
foreign policy. Thus, the constitutional shock received by the people 
was cushioned by the thought of finding new alternatives worth tr y i n g , 
For, essentially the country was i n a process of winnowing. The parlia-
mentary institutions i n which the country was brought up under Brit i s h 
supervision could not be taken for granted; f o r , they had to be tested 
by the new indigenous forces born of Pakistan. To what ©xt.e^ indigenous 
( -
forces and particularly religious fanaticism were to be allowed parlia-
mentary hospitality to be determined not to the negleot of the country's 
given social anthropology or psychology. Bid not the opposition group 
of the Weimar Republic conveniently employ freedom and l i b e r t y to 
sabotage the very Republic? So, the Pakistani Governor General's action 
was a classic piece of astuteness where under the camouflage of the 
general approval of his performance he also lent himself to be an accom-
plice to certain deeds the p o l i t i c a l effects of which were disagreeable, 
eventually. 
We now examine the purposes served by the dismissal. 
(a) I t has been mentioned earlier how the Punjabis were opposed 
to the B.P.C. Report. They used the anti-^uadiani movement as a lever, 
but could not oust the central government. On the contrary the Punjabi 
premier had to go out of office at the behest of Hazimuddin."1'^ The 
last hope was the Governor General alone, who happedned to hail from 
the Punjab. He watched carefully how Nazimuddin's popularity ebbed 
144. Times. larch 26, 1953. 
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away i n the language controversy, and the submission of the B.P.O. Report. 
In the performance of what Sir Ivor thought of Prime Minister's 
145 
"extra-parliamentary" H J role, Mazimuddin, unlike his predecessor 
fa i l e d u t t e r l y . He made enemies i n the ruling party hierarchy and 
quarreled with some prominent provincial p o l i t i c i a n s . Added to i t was 
the entry of Youssuf Haroon i n Pakistan p o l i t i c s who was lately the 
High Commissioner of Pakistan i n Australia. The Prime Minister did 
not want him to resign the post, but to no purpose.1'*6 He came back 
to become the vice-president of the M.L. Party whose president was the 
Prime Minister himself, and remained invisibly important i n Pakistan 
p o l i t i c s (particularly i n Karachi pol i t i c s ) causing anxiety to the 
Nazirauddin government. Besides, what the Defence Secretary wrote to 
the Prime Minister saying that "such a thing as loyalty and team work 
14' 
does not exist i n your government, both i n the centre and the provinces", 
- a fact that was not beyond the intelligence of the Governor General. 
Thus the f i n a l blow was struck by the Governor General with the f u l l 
knowledge of Nazimuddin's weakness and f u l l consent of the Punjabi 
* Marataz Daultana (Punjab), I . I . Khuhro and Kazi Pazlullah (Sind). 
Here i s a type of p o l i t i c i a n that does not lend an easy classi-
f i c a t i o n ; for, he always has acted i n the ambuscade of p o l i t i c s . 
The writer was t o l d by a prominent Pakistan p o l i t i c i a n that Mr. Y. 
Haroon (a Sindhi) brought about a clash between the Prime Minister 
and the ex-premier of Sind, Mr. Khuhro, for the purpose of staging;: 
a come-back to Sind p o l i t i c s as i t s Premier, which he had done 
during Liaquat's time for a few months. (See: Daily Express, 
February 18, 1949)• 
145. Jennings, op.cit.. p.188. 
146. Prime Minister's l e t t e r to Youssouf Haroon. dated Karachi 22nd 
January, 1952 (See Appendix I I I ) 
147"Defence Secretary's l e t t e r , l o c . o i t . 
politicians - Firoz Khan Noon, Mamtaz Daultana and Khan of Mamdot -
who happened to he i n Karachi conferring with h i n u " ^ This ended 
am "era ••• of a wider patriotism" which "had only just begun to 
emerge", because of "regional jealousies •*• the long-standing grudge 
149 
of Lahore", ' Capital of the Punjab. 
(b) The dismissal caused euphoria among the opposition partiesj 
for, any action humiliating the M.L. governments - central or pro-
vincial - meant an additional feather in t h e i r caps. For, were they 
not demanding wholesale resignations of M.L. Ministries and dissolution 
of legislatures (including the Constituent Assembly) for the holding 
of general elections? Mr. Sahrawardy, the r i s i n g opposition leader, 
epitomised the mixed feelings of the opposition parties when he commented 
on the dismissal by saying that " t h i s small but welcome encroaohment 
on s t r i c t democratic proprieties seems to have opened the floodgate 
150 
of undemocratic procedure". J 
(c) The assassination of Liaquat witnessed a sliding of the 
r e a l i t y of power into centrifugal directions. The all-Pakistan leader-
ship could not be handily symbolised i n one person after the exit of 
Jinnah and Liaquat. Hence, the provincial politicians flourished on 
the issues of language, religion and regionalism. To augment pentral 
powers and divert issues the central government used to 'cry w o l f i.e. 
148. Hindu, April 18, 1953. 
149. See: Times. A p r i l 20, 1953 (Editorial) "Pakistan". 
150. Hindu. May 28, 1953. 
•the menace of the Indian threat. But, i n r e a l i t y the central power 
was weakening. The Governor General dammed up the tide by making the 
central government reflect the substance of p o l i t i c a l power in the 
country. The abortive Rawalpindi conspiracy, the communist act i v i t i e s 
as reflected i n the language movement and the prospect of their 
further involvement i n the coming general elections of last Pakistan, 
and, f i n a l l y the anti Quadiani flare-up were, perhaps, some imponderables 
which received the Governor General's immediate attention. Having 
aohieved the centrepetal goal, the Governor General, coming as he did 
from the early Audit and Accounts Services, i n s t i l l e d a new trend, 
recognisably bureaucratic, i n the Cabinet. The accent was on the depre-
ciation of p o l i t i c s . We note i n the new Prime Minister's broadcast 
a significant passage which emphasised his "foremost endeavour to en-
sure a clean and e f f i c i e n t administration which would serve the 
people of Pakistan with devotion."'^ The Prime Minister did not 
aspire for 'clean p o l i t i e s ' , 
(d) The Governor General's action gave a direction towards 
centrally-focussed p o l i t i c s , i n that the modernist-Islamist group came 
i n sharp contrast with that of the Rightists (Ulema) and l e f t i s t s 
( s e cularist). Since that period, religious railitanoy petered out with 
Suhrawardy: " I f i n d that the old technique of bringing to the fore 
our dispute with India i n trenchant terms i s again being u t i l i s e d 
to arouse a sense of fear, i n the hope that this w i l l induce them 
to r a l l y round the government". See: Dawn. February 21, 1953* 
Far back i n 1948 there was a Conference held i n Karachi including 
Pakistan Home Ministers, Directors of Information and Inspeotor-
Generals of Police to formulate policy i n respect of communists who 
were reportedly arriving i n Pakistan from India. See: Statesman. 
May 16, 1948. 
Writer's underlining. 
Dawn, April 18, 1953. 
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corresponding strength i n the rank of the modernist. The new 
Ministry rebuffed the Mullaha (same as Ulema) by keeping Sir Zafrullah, 
a Qadiani, i n the Ministry. What was more, the newly-sworn law 
Minister, Mr. A.K. Brohi - "an intellectual and a modernist"^ 2 -
challenged the Ulema to come out with a formula of a state based on 
the Quran. 
(e) Hitherto, Pakistan had been pursuing an undefined neutral 
foreign policy with an implied pro-western tendency which was now to 
receive i t s quietus at the hand of the new Ministry and to be replaced 
by a positively committed one of whose effects on p o l i t i c s persisted 
t i l l 1958, even beyond. The analysis begins under the heading, the 
Mohammad A l i Cabinet. 
The Mohammad A l i Cabinet 
The dynamics of today's international p o l i t i c s have linked 
nations with varying role-status to operate globally, The po l i t i c s 
of the early nineteen f i f t i e s i n the international arena were bipolarised. 
In essence, the battle of p o l i t i c s was fought by the American and 
Russian gladiators i n defence of their respective ideologies e.g. 
Western democracy and Communism. Against th i s background we would 
analyse how the Mohammad A l i Government committed Pakistan to a 
positive foreign policy by associating her with the Western bloc 
and i n particular America. Why did the alignment take place? 
152, Manchester Guardian, A p r i l 23» 1953* 
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Reflecting on the present global p o l i t i c s Morton Kaplan main-
tained tha,t " i n the 'balance of Power' system, groupings w i l l depend 
153 
primarily upon the interests of nations i n particular situations". u 
As far as Amerioa was concerned her transcending objective was to 
contain the potential oommunist threat which was both mil i t a r y and 
ideological i n nature. As NATO was set up to deter Soviet expansion 
i n the western world, corresponding arrangements were warranted i n the 
the Asian defence perimeter. Strategically, both India and Japan were 
key centred of importance i n Asia, and the loss of either country to 
the communist bloc would be a "threat to the American interest ... 
154 
to the Free World". The long term foreign policy rationale of 
American, after a l l , was "to preserve a world environment within which 
i t s chosen form of democratic society can persist", and to match the 
ideological and p o l i t i c a l balance of power i n Eurasia with "the mil i t a r y 
155 
balance of power" J J i n the same area. This 'balance of power' 
manifesting i t s e l f within a multiple-state system took a perceptible 
shape i n the direction of alliances} for "alliances are a necessary 
156 
function" y of the system. 
153. Morton Kaplan, "System and Process i n International P o l i t i c s " , 
i n Stanley H. Hoffmann (ed.), Contemporary Theory i n International 
Relations (Prentice-Hall, Inc., N.J. 1960), p.107• 
154. W.W. Rostow, "The United States in the World Arena", i n Harry 
Howe Ransom (ed.) An American Foreign Policy Reader 
(New York: 1966), p.69. """"*"' 
155. I b i d . , p.69. 
156. Hans J. Morgenthau, Pol i t i c s among Nations (New York: 1966), 
p.181 
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Before the advent of the Korean war (,1950 ) American interests 
were mainly Europe-oriented. The communist proselytisation process 
olaimed China entirely, sparked a war i n Korea, and i n f l i c t e d a Dien 
Bien Phu on the French i n Indo-China. These events jolted the U.S. 
into an awareness of the danger of communist expansionism i n Asia. 
The 'containment policy* of the U.S. in Asia was pronounced when the 
Republican Party came to power i n 1953* The new administration suc-
ceeded i n entering into b i l a t e r a l defence pacts and organising regional 
defence arrangements with the newly emerged independent countries of 
Asia. This resulted i n the welding of a large part of the world into 
a closely knit system of interlocking military treaties. 
How did Pakistan appeal to America? The Trumann administration 
was neutral vis-a-vis Indo-Pakistan disputes. I t was not overenthusi-
astic about Pakistan. The U.S., at the outset, looked at the subcon-
tinent as "a unit not as two separate states i n the game of world 
p o l i t i c s . No interest was shown i n developing Pakistan's strength, 
nor was i t regarded as a factor to be reckoned with i n world p o l i t i c s . " 
The sudden importance of Pakistan f e l t by the U.S. was matched by her 
equally sudden feeling of urgenoy vis-a-vis communism. No less 
responsible was Nehru's fastidious foreign policy which prevented 
America from taking India for granted. Nehru's policy was an i r r i t a n t 
157* J.W. Spain, "M i l i t a r y Assistance", American P o l i t i c a l Science 
Review;. September, 1954» p»748. 
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•to the State Department, instead. g 0 ) i t was the best of a bad 
bargain for America to work with an eager Pakistan rather than with a 
coy India. Karachi's seaport and airport, which was the largest i n 
Asia serving 15 international a i r l i n e s , was a strategic factor i n 
American considerations. For, i t was the closest of a l l the air bases 
158 
of the free Asian countries to the Russian border. J Considering 
the geographic halves of Pakistan and their respective approximation 
to Middle East and South last Asia, Pakistan appeared to be an ideal 
eastern bastion of the American defence li n e against communism. Then, 
what was the motivating force of Pakistan relating to alliances? 
Modern history has witnessed a manoeuvring of states, great or small 
alike, f or the attainment of appropriate places i n the distribution of 
world power. This process i s further determined by a country's given 
'stresses and strains'. When Pakistan sought the U.S. alliance three 
considerations were uppermost i n her mind. 
F i r s t , the geographical looation of Pakistan offered a tempting 
proposition to potential aggressors. West Pakistan had a common boundary 
with Iran, Afghanistan and Russia and China from the Pakistan side of 
Kashmir. Similarly, East Pakistan was surrounded on three sides by 
India and had a common border with Burma. As a matter of fact, the 
* "A new U.S. policy, treating Nehru as India's spokesman but not 
Asia's i s called for . America's a l l i e s w i l l be asked to support 
the U.S. i n t h i s stand. American aid to Pakistan can be the f i r s t 
i n t h i s policy". Source: U.S. News and World Report. December 25, 
1953. 
158. New York Times. Apr i l 19, 1953. 
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safety of the whole subcontinent "depends i n a frightening degree on 
the s t a b i l i t y of Pakistan", because Pakistan confronted "the f i r s t 
impact of a l l North West Defence problems of the Old I n d i a " . l ^ 
In the early days, Pakistan government looked upon India and Afghani-
stan with suspicion. Russian threat was implied, though real on 
his t o r i c a l perspectives. "For Russian i n the 20th century an outlet 
i n the Indian Ocean was the sole s t i l l untried p o s s i b i l i t y , was not 
Karachi a tempting bait to dangle before the eager Russian eyes". 
Afghanistan was inimical to Pakistan right from the beginning. She 
neither voted i n favour of Pakistan's admission to the U.N, nor recog-
nised the Durand line as the international boundary between Pakistan 
and Afghanisatn. On the contrary, Afghanistan fueled the agitation 
for the creation of Pakhtoonistan on the Pakistan side of the border, 
The very issue of Pakhtoonistan was, to a great extent, responsible 
for driving the provincial government of the N.W.F.P. to curb parlia-
mentary expressions. 
As f a r as India was concerned, according to the o f f i c i a l version 
Pakistan had been smarting under a constant fear of Indian aggression. 
Both India and Pakistan had already a brief round of fighting on 
159» Sir Olaf Caroe$ former Governor of I.W.F.P. said i n London, 
Source: Statesman. Apr i l 6, 1949* 
160. A. Toynbee, A Study of History (London*. 1954), P.69I. 
One s t i l l remembers how Stalin i n the Yalta Conference t r i e d 
to grab Maritime Provinces i n the search for warm waters. 
Kashmir i n late 1947 and early 1948. So, fear had i t s functional 
value for Pakistan i n tha,t she had the drive for overcoming her 
deficiencies. The p a r t i t i o n arrangements did not favour Pakistan to 
receive her due share of mil i t a r y equipments. The Pakistan army did 
not have modern equipment. Similar was the plight of the Pakistan 
Navy and Air Force. Despite financial limitations, the defence of 
Pakistan claimed the hest attention even at the expense of other pressing 
requirements. But the efforts to build up a fighting machinery exerted 
l6 l 
"a heavy strain on Pakistan's economy", and the ready alternative 
was found i n the United States* willingness to grant m i l i t a r y aid. 
This was thought to be the available course for Pakistan i n her quest 
for security to obtain a position i n the alliances (or balance of 
power system) under the aegis of America. For, Pakistan being one of 
the small states could not individually hope to erect a bulwark of 
defence "to balance, much less overbalance" her "great power neigh-
bours". 1 6 2 
No less was the desire for economic assistance associated with 
the m i l i t a r y . At independence Pakistan was one of the poorest countries 
i n the world shorn of significant mineral and industrial resources. 
I t was a pastoral economy where investment of private capital both 
* They fought on Kashmir fi e r c e l y in late 1965. 
161. Aslam Siddique, Pakistan Seeks Security (Lahore: ,960), p.56. 
162. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations 
(New York: I962), p.89. 
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internal and external were at a low level. The urge for rising 
expectations was not suppressed by poverty. By 1953> Pakistan was 
put i n a quandry of meeting defence requirements, an acute food short-
age, consumer waste and the growing economy's need for capital goods 
and industrial raw materials. So, an alliance with the United States 
meant a short-circuiting of economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , for Pakistan. 
Second, practising the parliamentary type of democracy as she 
did, i t was but natural that Pakistan chose to associate with those 
countries whose p o l i t i c a l and intellectual values she shared. Par 
back i n 1947 Mr. Jinnah, while receiving the f i r s t U.S. ambassador to 
Pakistan, eulogised the Pakistan-American l i n k : "The historic fight 
for self-government by your people and i t s achievement by the constant 
teaching and practice of democracy i n your country has acted as a 
beacon l i g h t and has i n no snail measure served to give inspiration to 
nations ... l i k e us,"^^^ Obviously, i t was a deliberate choice made 
by the Pakistan government. Otherwise, was not Russia geographically 
close enough to deliver 'aids' to Pakistan more quickly? 
Third, fear of clandestine communist a c t i v i t i e s i n Pakistan 
expedited her decision to jo i n the alliances. The burgeoning influence 
of communists i n Calcutta and other areas of India and neighbouring 
countries was a premonitor to East Pakistan p o l i t i c s . Nature made 
East Pakistan a Gangetic delta, but man also made i t a delta of 
163. Montague, George L., "The Pakistan-Afghan Debate", Asian Survey, 
( V o l , I I I , No.12, December 1963), p.520. 
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problems the e x p l o i t a t i o n or so l u t i o n of which was a challenge to 
both communist andnsn-communist adherents. With the prospect of general 
elections i n East Pakistan drawing an apaoe, the. M.L. government was 
apprehensive at the growing a c t i v i t i e s of the opposition parties 
ranging from centre l e f t t o f a r l e f t . The central government was 
i n need of strength. 
However, when the contributing? oauses of Pakistan American 
Alliance are analysed, they w i l l reveal, s t r i c t l y speaking, that 
there were no i d e n t i c a l i n t e r e s t s between Pakistan and America i n the 
sense of the Anglo-American a l l i a n c e . At best i t was an alliance 
"serving complementary interestB".'*'^' For America the oontainment of 
communism was the essential feature of the en t i r e arrangements, whereas 
to Pakistan p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic considerations were no 
less important. The seeds of c o n f l i c t were already there awaiting 
t e s t s . Foreign p o l i c y added a new dimension to the parliamentary 
p o l i t i e s of Pakistan. Mohammad A l i , a journeyman pro-American, now 
i n his capacity as the new Prime Minister of Pakistan "touched on 
plans f o r the early implementation of American p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l 
165 
ideas". ^ The Americanization of the Prime Minister symbolised i n 
his loud a t t i r e matched with b r i g h t necktie, the idea of introducing 
a deoimal currency system, a r i g h t hand t r a f f i c rule of the road, 
* One knows how for e i g n p o l i c y dominates the i n t e r n a i i p o l i t i c s of 
West Germany, p a r t i c u l a r l y the extent i n which i t has determined; 
the r e l a t i v e strengths and weaknesses of the two main p a r t i e s , 
i . e . C.D.U., S.P.D. 
I64. Morgenthau, o p . o i t p . l 8 4 » 
165• Hew York Times. A p r i l 19, 1953. 
t e l e v i s i o n and his Roosevelt-style f i r e s i d e ohats through radio broad-
casts were facts rather too early f o r the people and p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
p o l i t i c i a n s who were more f a m i l i a r with B r i t i s h reticence. The Prime 
Minister formed a Cabinet of 11 men of whom s i x were hold-overs of 
the previous government. The government's immediate task was the t i d y -
ing up of the economic c r i s i s . As a part of the Colombo Plan Canada 
and A u s t r a l i a granted 100,000 and 45>O0O tons of wheat respectively 
to Pakistan. A f u r t h e r huge grant of wheat came from America 
to the tune of 1,000,000 tons t o overcome food c r i s i s , and a B r i t i s h 
loan of £10,000,000 was used t o buy c a p i t a l goods to modernise and 
expand Pakistan's agriculture.'*'^ As a r e s u l t of American foreign a i d 
the Pakistan government was able to transform the shortage of food 
i n t o a surplus, and the for e i g n exchange thus released could be channel-
ised i n t o developmental areas. By May 1954, the Prime Minister was 
able t o broadcast t o the nation that Pakistan had gained an overall 
16' 
recovery of Rs. 99 crores i n balance of payments with other countries. 
* This again proves that the Governor General's aotion was aimed 
at c e r t a i n persons of the previous Cabinet not the e n t i r e M i n i s t r y . 
A l l ministers coming from the Punjab were retained. And the 
Economic A f f a i r s p o r t f o l i o , formerly retained by an East Pakistani, 
was given to the Finance Minister, a Punjabi. 
** The r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g on the U.S. government to send wheat to 
Pakistan was introduced i n the House of Representatives w i t h i n 
48 hours a f t e r the appointment of Mohammad A l i as the Prime 
Mi n i s t e r . See: Hindu. A p r i l 30, 1953. 
166. Prime Minister's disclosure at the Press Conference: Dawn. 
May 22, 19539 
167* C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor, October 8, 1953. 
168. Dawn. May 1, 1954. 
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On top of t h i s , the Prime M i n i s t e r , having a r r i v e d back from the U.S. ( 
to Pakistan, declared that economic aid to the tune of $105,000,000 
had been successfully negotiated w i t h the U.S. government ."^ 
Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t t u r n took place i n the planning of 
economic development. A new Planning Board was established replacing 
the e a r l i e r Development Board which was working on a 6-year developmental 
plan as embodied i n the Colombo Plan f o r cooperative economic develop-
ment i n South and South-east Asia, to assess the resources of Pakistan 
and prepare a 5-year national p l a n i o f development beginning A p r i l 1, 
170 
1954* The newly constituted Planning Board was d i f f e r e n t from i t s 
predecessor i n that i t was given powers to advise on a l l aspects of 
eoonomic development. The Ford Foundation was to provide experts to 
assist the Planning Board i n i t s t a s k . 1 ^ 1 And, by August 1953, the 
Pakistan Economic Council, the supreme sanctioning a u t h o r i t y under the 
chairmanship of the Prime M i n i s t e r approved 30 schemes aiming at the 
172 
o v e r a l l development of the country. While the American aid stood 
Mohammad A l i government i n good stead i n g i v i n g a new lease of l i f e t o 
the Pakistan economy, i t d i d not ensure p o l i t i c a l prosperity. The 
opposition forces were warming up to the f r a y the consequence of which 
would be an ushering of a new era of parliamentary l i f e i n Pakistan. 
The t e s t i n g ground was the ensuing general election i n Bast Pakistan 
f i x e d f o r early 1954 - a p r o v i n c i a l electoral exercise that would 
169. New York Times, October 24, 1954* 
I b i d . . July 19. 1953. 
171• Financial Times. July 20, 1953. 
172. I b i d . . August 27, 1953. 
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challenge the status quo of national p o l i t i c s . The electioneering 
fever gripped the M.L» parliamentary party which postponed c o n s t i t u t i o n -
making and adjourned the Constituent Assembly u n t i l the general el e c t i o n 
17^ 
was over i n l a s t Pakistan. 1 
Professor Ludwig Erhard once remarked that "A true democracy 
presupposes i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n a l i t i e s , who remain conscious of t h e i r 
174 
p o l i t i c a l and human freedom". 1 Nowhere had t h i s remark more r e l e -
vancy than i n an under-developed p o l i t y l i k e Pakistan whose p o l i t i c a l 
consciousness was not solely dependent upon ove r a l l mass l i t e r a c y . 
Hence per s o n a l i t i e s were an essential feature of Pakistan p o l i t i c s . 
The t r i u m v i r a t e of Mr. A.K. Fazlul Huq, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy and Maulana 
Abdul Hamid Bhasani dominated the elections of East Pakistan. The octo-
generian Huq, i n the p r e p a r t i t i o n days, was twice the Premier of Bengal, 
the President of the M.L. and General Secretary of the Congress 
simultaneously i n the twenties, and the mover of the Lahore Resolution 
(1940) which earned him the t i t l e of Sher-e-Bangla meaning the t i g e r 
of Bengal. I n short, he was an A l l - I n d i a f i g u r e i n those days. 
Professor Couplasd thought Haq to be a •resourceful' p o l i t i c i a n . 
A substantial number of people i n Indo-Pakistan subcontinent thought 
Haq had the tongue of an Edmund Burke, the courage of a Napoleon and 
the pen of a Macaulay. These ascriptions were not exactly ipse d i x i t . 
* Lord Zetland on Haq: "... the youthful vigour of P i t t , the eagle 
f l i g h t of Gladstone, the e n t h r a l l i n g magic of D i s r a e l i and the 
moral grandeur of John Br i g h t . " Quoted i n A.8.M. Abdul Rab, 
A.K. Pazlul Haq, (Lahore: 1966)t p.196. 
1T3. New York Times. November 16, 1953. 
174* Quoted i n Richard Hiscocks, Democracy i n Western Germaav 
(London: 1957)> P.139» 
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His s p i r i t of parliamentarianism and independence of mind were amply 
manifest when i n 1943, as the Prime Minister of Bengal, he said i n 
reply t o the Governor's l e t t e r that " I owe you no explanation what-
ever i n respect of my conduct" foxf "My colleagues and I are responsibl 
t o the l e g i s l a t u r e " . He refused to see the Governor "unless s u f f i c i e n t 
amends are made f o r the language used" i n his " l e t t e r under reply" •'^ 
Haq himself was a legend - an i n s t i t u t i o n where many a p o l i t i c i a n had 
t h e i r e a r l y lesson. His occasional but f a t a l emotionalism many a 
time signalled his emergence as a p o l i t i c a l turncoat. But everything 
boiled down to one t h i n g that his magic name i . e . Haq; Shahib was 
a f f e c t i o n a t e l y and r e v e r e n t i a l l y stuck to the l i p s of Bengali underdogs 
who were immensely b e n e f i t t e d by his social measure^ A p o l i t i c i a n 
of Haq's persuasion could always sway mass p o l i t i c s . 
Now that Mr. Jinnah was dead and the M.L. ru l e had f a l l e n from the 
path of parliamentary r e c t i t u d e , Haq - who incurred Jinnah's wrath 
and suffered an 11-year p o l i t i c a l eclipse - rose from his o l d ashes 
l i k e a Phoenix. 
Suhrawardy, equally bold, dashing and enterprising but unlike 
Haq he was discreet and c a l c u l a t i n g . Himself a lawyer of repute l i k e 
Haq, Suhrawardy had the ad d i t i o n a l benefit of going t o Oxford and Gray' 
Inn. Suhrawardy's was the approach of channelling popular movement 
* S i r John Herbert. 
+ The Bengal Debt-Settlement Board, a Money-lending Act, and a 
Tenancy Aot were cases i n p o i n t . 
175. L e t t e r quoted i n the Observer Supplement on "Shera Bangla", 
A p r i l 27, 1963. 
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through the path of con s t i t u t i o n a l i s m . He upheld the preeminence 
of the r u l e of law and parliamentarianism t o the l a s t . His p o l i t i c a l 
career was one of gradual adaptation i n that he entered p o l i t i c s 
w ith urbane sop h i s t i c a t i o n dressed i n a S a v i l l e Row s u i t , but ended 
up successfully as a 'people's man' by having merged himself i n the 
landscape of Pakistan multitude. I t was widely believed that Suhrawardy's 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the creation of Pakistan was large. But his one-time 
championing of the concept of undivided Bengal plus convenient!: devotion 
to Gandhi a f t e r p a r t i t i o n offered a welcome pretext t o the r u l i n g 
coterie t o t r e a t him as a persona non grata t o Pakistan. Mow that 
his A.M.L. Party - the only opposition party that was b u i l t up i n an 
otherwise oppositionless state - was viable the ele c t o r a l duel with 
the E.L. party became i n e v i t a b l e . 
I f Haq and Suhrawardy were t o be viewed as the l o c a l Mossaqdeks 
of East Pakistan, then Bhasani had also some force of (4jKassani. ^ 
Though Bhasani's r e l i g i o u s appeals were confined t o the barest minimum. 
His personal sway extended to the r u r a l peasantry because he yapped 
w i t h the underdogs f o r t h e i r good. His r o l e i n the referendum which 
resulted i n the Sylhet d i s t r i c t being incorporated i n t o Pakistan was 
recognised by Pakistanis. But he soon f e l l out with the M.L. government 
i n East Pakistan, and f o r that matter with the central government also;, 
on issues l i k e language, economic deprivation of East Pakistanis, etc., 
etc., He was gaoled by the government f o r a long time, 
* I n East Pakistan Bhasani was also ca l l e d Qhaid-e-Muzloom, meaning 
leader of the underdog. 
** Bhasani was prisoner 17 times during B r i t i s h regime - a t o t a l of 
more than 15 years. See: New York Times. January 9, 1954. 
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But he was set free i n consideration of popular demands and the ensuing 
elections. 
A coalescence of Haq-led K.S.P, and Suhrawardy - Bhasani-led 
A.M.L, took place on 4th December, 1953 on the basis of minimum 
programme. But they were w i l l i n g to "contact a l l parties opposed to 
the Muslim League and forge a broader united f r o n t ... with a l l the 
p a r t i e s " A s a r e s u l t a broad-based U.F. (United Front) was formed! 
consisting of four p a r t i e s e.g. A.M.L., K.S.P., Nizam-i-Islam and 
Ganatartri Dal on the basis of 21-point programme. But the emergence 
of U.F. had a more complex o r i e n t a t i o n than appeared on the surface. 
The government took note, and r i g h t l y so, of the Bast Pakistan 
Communist Party's desire of fo r g i n g a United Democratic Front as mani-
fest i n i t s party programme of June 1951> on the basis of "anti-feudal 
177 
and a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t outlook". The CP. (Communist Party) emboldened 
by the support of Haq (K.S.P.), Atawr Rahman (A.M.L.) and Abul Hasheem 
(Khilafate-Rabbani Party) f o r i t s a n t i M.L. stand successfully held 
178 
a b i g meeting i n Dacca, f o r the f i r s t time, on 30th October, 1953* 
I n a conference held at Dacca from November 10 to 12, 1953, the CP. 
passed a re s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r active p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the coming 
+ Democratic Party. 
•H- See Appendix IV. 
176. Dawn. December 5» 1953• 
177. Governor's l e t t e r , l o c . c i t . , (Top Secret), D.O. No. 127/PS, 
26. 7.1954. 
178. New York Times. October 31, 1953. 
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e l e c t i o n s . A manifesto (22-point programme) f o r the campaign was 
approved, and a committee was appointed to establish a U.F. of a l l 
179 
democratic p a r t i e s . i y This urge f o r U.F. was immediately echoed! 
i n the council meetings of the A.M.L. on 16th November, 1953, and G.D. 
(Ganatantri Dal) on 28th November, 1953 respectively. But as a 
piece of sumpreme e l e c t i o n strategy the CP. was o f f i c i a l l y d i s a f f i l -
i a t e d when the 'Front* came i n t o being. Suhrawardy declared that the 
U.F. candidates were campaigning against the communists whose proferred 
181 
support had been refused. As a matter of fa c t the r i g h t i s t elements 
i n the U.F. f a r outweighed the l e f t i s t ones. And, under pressure of 
Haq and Suhrawardy - who were r i g h t i s t s t o the very marrow of t h e i r 
bones - extreme e l e c t i o n planks such as leaving the Commonwealth, a n t i -
m i l i t a r y pacts, confiscation of foreign c a p i t a l s were deleted from the 
o f f i c i a l manifesto of the U.F. Though the U.F. dared not associate 
with the communists openly, i n r e a l i t y , i t was they, as had been 
c o r r e c t l y observed by the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, who bore 
the main brunt of the organisational work of the campaign which ipso 
facto boosted the U.F, cause. Why did the communists support the 
pa r t i e s forming U.F.? The best answer was Lenin's dictum that 'The 
Bolshevik supports other p a r t i e s , the way a rope supports a hanging 
man. * * See Appendix V. 
** The term ' r i g h t i s t ' used not i n the r e l i g i o u s sense but i n the 
s o c i o - p o l i t i c o and economic sense. 
179* New China News Agency. December 14, 1953* 
180. See: Dawn. November 17 and 29, 1953. 
181. New York Times. January 19, 1954* 
182. Dawn. March 15, 1954. 
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The ubiquitous nature of the CP, i n the elections arena found 
expression i n the f o l l o w i n g way. Given t h a t the r e s p e c t a b i l i t y of a 
p o l i t i c a l party depends on i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the normal p o l i t i c s of 
the country, the CP. of Pakistan was i n l i n e with the oommunist strategy 
as adopted at the 19th Congress held i n Russia i n October 1952* Accord-
i n g l y , i t took a 'national* p o s i t i o n i n u n i t i n g d i f f e r e n t parties on 
the basis of grievances against the r u l i n g party i . e . the M.L. And 
i n the b i d f o r seizure of power, t h e i r strategy was l i k e that of other 
communists to smuggle themselves inside the established organizations 
wi#h the aim of " t a k i n g power 'from w i t h i n * " . 
I n the agonising task of b u i l d i n g an opposition at an i n i t i a l 
period, the A.M.L. was la x i n i t s recruitment process. Some notable 
communists i n f i l t r a t e d i n t o the rank and f i l e of the A.M.L. What was 
more they found an a l l y i n the person of Bhasani, the President of the 
A.M.L. who was i n t r i g u e d by the C.P.'s 'economic f r o n t ' . The G.D., 
one of the components of the U.P., was, according to the government, 
•the Communist Party under a d i f f e r e n t name'. There was no doubt that 
many of i t s members were also members of the C.P. There was a Youth 
Convention held i n January, 1951 > which resulted i n the creation of 
the Y.L. (Youth League). And the C.P.'s i n f i l t r a t i o n i n i t was complete 
i n t h a t by December, 1953 i t occupied the main o f f i c e s of the Y.L, -
183» Bernard S. Morris, "Recent Shifts i n Communist Strategy", i n 
Kantsky (ed.), P o l i t i c a l Change i n Underdeveloped Countries, 
p. 301. 
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'the Second Front' of the CP. The E.P.S.U. (East Pakistan Students' 
Union) which had been r e g u l a r l y a g i t a t i n g against commonwealth t i e s , 
m i l i t a r y pacts, the Rosenburgs' t r i a l , etc., was under the clutches of 
the CP. through the instrumentalities; of the CD, and Y.L. with which 
the E.P.S.U. rubbed shoulders. I n the educational i n s t i t u t i o n s , such 
as the University of Dacca, Colleges and High Schools of the province, 
there were 'extreme communists'. The subtlety of communist i n d o c t r i -
nation found expression i n a G i r l s ' High School when an English passage 
was asked t o be rendered i n t o Bengalee, during an examination! "Now 
comrades, what i s the nature of t h i s l i f e of ours? Let us facte i t : 
our l i v e s are miserable, laborious and short. We are born, we are 
given j u s t so much food as w i l l keep the breath i n our bodies ... We 
are slaughtered w i t h hideous c r u e l t y " . S i m i l a r l y , the Trade Union 
Movement was not free from communist influence. Bhasani's soft corner 
f o r the working class made him e l i g i b l e f o r the Presidency of some 
labour unions sponsored by the CP. Bhasani was the president of two 
important labour organisations e.g. the Adamjee M i l l s Mazdoor Union 
and the East Pakistan Railways Employees' League. Besides, the 
Communist hold i n the rank and f i l e of the Home Transport Workers' 
Union, P r i n t i n g Press Workers' Union and M i l l s Workers* Union was 
dominant. 
I n December, 1953, the CP. i n a document:^.g. Election A f f a i r s 
* As a matter of f a c t , communists penetrated i n the labour force long 
before the creation of the U.F. Mr. Karim who managed m i l l s i n 
Calcutta before p a r t i t i o n recognised many communist elements i n the 
labour force and warned the administration. See: Times. December, 29 
1954. 
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and Our Immediate Task, devised a plan of forming an A l l - P a r t i e s 
anti-M.L. Workers' Gamp, Accordingly, the communist o e l l s at the 
d i s t r i c t , sub-division and Thana levels were asked t o work i n that 
d i r e c t i o n . Again, a w i l l i n g Bhasani was tempted by the CP, to form 
the so-called 'Karmi S i b i r * meaning Workers' Camp comprising a l l p a r t i e s 
t o f i g h t the M.L, i n the el e c t i o n s , This was on 9th January, 1954, 
The A,P.P. of the West Pakistan joined t h i s 'camp* as workers. I n 
short, the workers of the K.S. (Karmi S i b i r ) i . e . vigorous young 
people, students, j o u r n a l i s t s , teachers, etc., were i n a d i f f e r e n t way, 
the 'storm troopers' of electioneering who criss-crossed the entire 
province w i t h the sole purpose of popularising the U.F. and i t s pro-
grammes. Heedless to add, that communists were there, too."*"^ And 
the i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g was, t h a t through these various 'oovers' the 
oommunists were able to circumvent the U.F.'s o f f i c i a l stand by l e t t i n g 
a few t r o j a n horses pass over the hurdle of nomination mechanism of 
the U.F. Furthermore, two cardinal communist purposes were served i n 
th a t the two component parties of the U.F., e.g. A.M.L. and G.D. had 
s p e c i f i c planks i n t l t e i r respective party manifestos i n favour of a 
185 
neutral f o r e i g n p o l i c y and against j o i n i n g "any m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e " , J 
And the t h e o r e t i c a l silence of the U.F. vis-a-vis foreign policy degene-
* See: Dawn,, June 3, 1954* 
184* Governor's l e t t e r , l o o . c i t . The w r i t e r ' s findings based on other 
sources, are i n substantial agreement wi t h that of the findings 
of General Mirza, the then Governor of the Province. 
185« See: Dawn 17 November, 1953; 2°. November, 1953 and Christian 
Science Monitor, February 3» 1954} Pawn. January 10, 1954* 
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rated i n t o electioneering eloquence; f o r , a considerable number of 
the U.F. candidates minced no tfords i n portraaying the aftermath of 
m i l i t a r y pacts, i n terms of Japanese Hiroshima t o t h e i r dazed audience, 
as the p o l i t i c a l a i r became heavier at the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of m i l i t a r y 
a i d t o Pakistan. 
Under the Separate Electorates system there were 72 reserved seats 
f o r the non-Muslims, e.g. Caste Hindus, Scheduled Caste Hindus, Budd-
h i s t s and Christians i n a l e g i s l a t u r e of 309 seats. The National 
Congress* attempt t o create an agreed minority f r o n t was abortive. 
Instead among the m i n o r i t i e s a U.F. was forged consisting of the Gana 
Samity (a s p l i n t e r group of the o l d Congress), the S o c i a l i s t Party, 
1 or 
Abhoy Ashram and Independents t o contest the elections. 
Unwisely, the Central Government undertook some negative measures 
i n t h a t the p o l l i n g date was s h i f t e d from early February 1954 to 
March 8, 1954 to the f i n a n c i a l disadvantage of the opposition, arrests 
of more than 200 people, inc l u d i n g a number of alleged communists were 
macfe under the Public Safety Ordinance and f i n a l l y a desperate o f f e r 
of the Governorship of Bengal to Haq was made i n v a i n , " ^ And to crown 
everything the central government sanctioned $80^000 f o r financing the 
188 
M.L. elections i n East Pakistan. Then, followed the traversing of 
the luminaries of the M.L. incl u d i n g Jinnah's s i s t e r , Miss Fatima 
186. Dawn, February 2, 1954 
187. See: Dawn, February 2, and February 25, 1954* Also, Times, 
l a r c h 3, 1954 and New York Times. February 20, 1954. 
188. New York Times. January 9» 1954* 
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JInnah across the country to b r i n g home to the people the indispen-
s i b i l i t y of the M.L. Quite a large section of Ulema also supported 
the M.L., f o r they thought they had s t i l l something t o milk from the 
old organization. Unlike i t s opponents the M.L. had no challenging 
•planks* save a r i d i c u l o u s one, v i z . "Vote us out and India w i l l swallow 
the divided halves of our country."^"^ The Prime Minister warned the 
electorate t h a t a vote against the M.L. would be a vote against Pakistan 
190 
interests*' ' This i n d i r e o t muckrakingcampaign of the M.L. against 
the opposition, and precisely the U.P. of whose leaders were not less 
p a t r i o t before the public eyes, d i d not work any more than Churchill's 
warning t o the B r i t i s h electorate against the labour party did i n 1945* 
On the 8th of March, 1954> the majority of the country's popu-
l a t i o n r e s i d i n g i n the Eastern wing was poised to f u l f i l l democracy's 
f i r s t t e s t of exercising v o t i n g r i g h t s based on universal adult s u f f -
rage, the f i r s t of i t s kind. As many as 23,020 p o l l i n g booths w^ r'e 
catered f o r the benefit of 1,96,77,013 voters of whom 1,05,71,949 
were men t o elect t h e i r 309 members out of 1,284 contesting candidates. 
More than 50 symbols such as boat, hurricane, camel, bi c y c l e , crescent, 
* She had her t i t l e too, namely 'Mother-e-Millat* meaning the 
Mother of the nation. 
** 986 men contested the 228 (male) seats and 32 Muslim women 
fought f o r 9 seats. Scheduled caste candidates ( l 5 l ) contested 
36 seats. 3 scheduled caste women contested f o r one woman seat. 
28 caste Hindu seats were contested by 101 candidates, while 12 
Buddhists fought f o r 2 seats. And 2 contested f o r 1 Christian 
seat. See; Dawn March 11, 1954* The communist party i n i t s 
i n d i v i d u a l capacity put up 10 candidates - 1 in Hindu d i s t r i c t s 
and 3 i n Muslim areas. See: Mew York Herald Tribune. March 8,1954* 
189• Sunday Observer, l a r c h 6, 1954* 
190« Pawn, January 16, 1954* 
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hammer, saw, r i c e , wheat, automobile and flower were pressed on the 
b a l l o t boxes to help the unsophisticated electorate to i d e n t i f y t h e i r 
choices of candidates with that of the symbols. 1^ 1 The East Pakistan 
elections were a refreshing contrast to the ones held e a r l i e r i n the 
Western wing of Pakistan - an electioneering model f o r any underdeveloped 
p o l i t y i n that i t demonstrated how a given people la r g e l y unenlightened, 
t e c h n i c a l l y speaking, could, on the one hand, use the b a l l o t box as an 
input side of t h e i r c o l l e c t i v e power unsmirched by bloodshed or coercion 
and get across the e l e c t i o n messages among themselves through the vehicle 
of an ingenuous communication process i n a country lacking modern mass 
media, on the other. Constituencies were swarming w i t h dedicated workers 
whose strategy of p o l i t i c a l communication was designed to make the 
un f a m i l i a r , the incomprehensible and the unconventional issue appear 
understandable to the masses. The entertainment function of communi-
cation was emphasised, i n that p o l i t i c a l messages were transmitted 
through both o r a l and physically demonstrable communications. I n the 
former case they were f o l k songs, people's dramatic songs, l y r i c a l 
plays; and the l a t t e r , shadow play, one-act play, dance, mock-heroic 
play and farce. I t was a solo performance by the U.F. group. A l l these 
media i n v a r i a b l y portrayed the e a r l i e r r i s i n g hopes of the people at 
the dawn of independence and t h e i r gradual disillusionment at the hands 
of the M.L. governments t i l l men beheld the march of the U.F. on the 
scene which revived t h e i r hopes i n the 21-point programme. The rhythm 
191. Times. March 9, 1954? Mew York Times. February 7, 1954. 
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and music of p o l i t i c a l communication minimised resistance and maximised 
the cognitive grasp of the voting people, and precisely the stoic 
c i t i z e n s , namely boatmen, fishermen, rickshawpuller, t a x i d r i v e r , labourers, 
postman, peon and c u l t i v a t o r , who suddenly experienced new ripples of 
hope i n t h e i r boggy minds, and sensation of p o l i t i c s . I n short, i t was 
more than an e l e c t i o n . 
R eflecting on the inadequate growth of parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s 
* 
and imposing of 'leadership from outside* i n Pakistan Professor Morris-
Jones thought the holding of elections might "break the pattern and l e t 
192 
i n a cleansing breath of r e a l reform" ' As a matter of f a c t , the 
East Pakistan elections d i d have 'a cleansing breath* whose effect was 
i n v i g o r a t i n g i n an otherwise monolithic state of p o l i t i c s . The ballot 
boxes produced not only a 'landslide but an avalanche', i n that the 
r u l i n g M.L. party, credited f o r the achievement of Pakistan, was ignobly 
ejected - a rare e l e c t o r a l feat i n Asia. 
The r e s u l t s were the f o l l o w i n g : The U.F. and i t s Supporters 
• • M i n o r i t y : 
A.M.L. (U.F.) 140 Scheduled Caste 
K.S.P. (U.F.) 34 Federations 27 
Nizam-e-Islam (U.F.) 12 Pakistan National 
1. L. 9 Congress 24 
Independents 12 *U.F. (Minority) 10 
* Such as Mohammad A l i himself, who was not a member of the Consti-
tuent Assembly when he was c a l l e d upon to assume Premiership. And 
the membership of the Constituent Assembly (leg.) followed the 
Premiership not preceded. 
** Even the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Nural Arain was defeated 
by an 18-year o l d student by 7,000 votes. 65 per cent voters went 
to the p o l l i n g booth. This would have been more i f women were less 
shy. See: Times, March 17, 1954* See also, Keesing's Contemporary 
Archives (1954)which also maintains that out of 19,677,013 voters 
65fo turned up t o the p o l l i n g booth. P.13,514A. 
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Khilafat-e-Rabbani 1 *G.D. (Minority) 2 
*T.L. 15 *G.P. 5 
*G.D. (U.F.) 10 Buddhist 2 
+C.P. 4 Christian 1 
Independent (Caste Hindu)1 
237 72 1 9 3 ' 
The el e c t o r a l r e s u l t s at once aoquired an all-Pakistan s i g n i f i -
cance. The i n f l u e n t i a l newspaper Dawn (usually known as the o f f i c i a l 
organ of the M.L. government) acclaimed the e l e c t o r a l r e s u l t s with an 
epithet e.g. "the awful majesty of the people's w i l l " , and warned 
Mohammad A l i of i t s consequences on the ol i g a r c h i c nature of the I . L , 
of which he was a member. The e d i t o r i a l cautioned the central leader-
ship not t o allow " i t s e l f t o be swayed by the false propaganda that the 
people who have been returned to power i n East Pakistan are less 
p a t r i o t i c than those who s i t i n power i n Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and; 
194 
elsewhere i n the western wing," y Evaluating the reactions of the 
masses of the people i n West Pakistan, Dawn remarked that the people's 
e l a t i o n was 'phenomenal*, but also noted that high placed persons 
(Muslim leaguers) vrere t r y i n g t o work up a f e e l i n g as though the U.F. 
195 
v i c t o r y i n East Pakistan was a "threat t o West Pakistan". y j An index 
Footnote + continued from previous page. 
+ Though the CP. won 9 seats o f f i c i a l l y i t s u n o f f i c i a l alleged 
f r o n t s e.g. Y.L,, G.D., U.F, ( M i n o r i t y ) , G.D. (Minority) gained 
37 seats. Besides, there were more unmarked C.P, sympathisers i n 
the A.M,L, and i n the category of Independents, That meant l e f t i s t 
elements had t h e i r numbers i n the l e g i s l a t u r e exceeding 46 i n 
a house of 309 seats. 
192. W.H. Morris-Jones, "Experience of Independence - India and Pakistan", 
P o l i t i c a l Quarterly (29,1958), p.237. 
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of the common people's f e e l i n g i n West Pakistan was amply demonstrated 
when Suhrawardy r i d i n g on the crest of triumphal rwave a r r i v e d i n 
Karachi, People regardless of party hue with waving plaoards with 
i n s c r i p t i o n s such as "Long l i v e Suhrawardy", "Long l i v e Pazhul Haq", 
"Long l i v e the U,F,", "Down w i t h d i c t a t o r s h i p " , "Down with Imperialism" 
and Dissolve Constituent Assembly", gave Suhrawardy a hero's welcome, 
196 
"the biggest ever seen i n Karachi", 7 I t was not ju s t a courtesy 
th a t miles-long crowds owed to a winning leader. I t was an effusion 
of West Pakistan people's aspirations as symbolised i n the U.F. v i c t o r y , 
There was a school of thought who opined that U,P, v i c t o r y was negative 
i n that the people j u s t wanted t o get r i d of the M.L. government. 
And, a f t e r a l l , the 'general w i l l * as revealed through the ballot-box 
was uneducated. While the d e s i r a b i l i t y of an enlightened electorate 
i s always unquestionable, one should bear i n mind what Professor Morris-
Jones observed i n connection w i t h the Indian general elections, the 
197 
implied overestimation of the " r a t i o n a l character" of an educated 
e l e c t o r a t e . And, as f a r as the East Pakistan people were concerned, 
they were not just robots voting mechanically i n favour of the magic 
name c a l l e d 'Haq1. For, i t was the same electorate which had not 
Footnote continued from previous page, 
193* R.L. Park, "Pakistan's Troubled Province", Far Eastern Survey 
(May 1954), pp.71-72, According to the Dawn, the U.F. won 222 
seats: A.M.L., 142 j K.S.P.,48; Nizam-e~Islam, 19 and Ganatantri 
Dal, 13. See: Dawn, October 19, 1954. 
194. Dawn, March 10, 1954> "The awful majesty of the people's w i l l " , 
( E d i t o r i a l ) • 
195» I b i d , , March 18, 1954} Also see: Manchester Guardian. A p r i l 5,1954. 
196. Dawn, March 19, 1954. 
197, W.H. Morris-Jones, Parliament i n India (London: 1957)> p.328. 
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scrupled t o re j e c t his leadership i n the elections of 1946. 
The people of East Pakistan had received unsullied p o l i t i c a l 
education i n the school of recently held general elections; f o r , 
unlike West Pakistan, there were neither the so-called 'vote hanks' nor 
the feudal incubus, worth mentioning at whose bade people voted. I t 
was, on balance, 'a p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d vote* cast against what M i l l might 
198 
c a l l "the monster e v i l , the overruling influence ofoligarchy". 
For, was i t not the M.L. government which alienated the people by having 
repressed the growth of opposition, incarcerated people under so-called 
Security Acts, mishandled the language issue, stumbled on the c o n s t i t u t i o n ^ 
making, and sent the pri c e of s a l t beyond the reach of the common people? 
I t was a movement of the f i r s t magnitude i n that the el e c t o r a l mandate 
emphasized a re t h i n k i n g of the basic postulates of Pakistan's p o l i t i c a l 
ideology and governmental structure (See Appendix: 21-Point Programme). 
The main streams of the movement were twofold namely, s o c i a l i s t i c and 
democratic with t r i b u t a r i e s of l o c a l nationalism. The U.F. registered 
the sapling of a so c i a l democratic movement i n Pakistan. I t did not 
undermine l i b e r a l i s m . On the contrary, i t upheld the rule of law and 
parliamentarianism. As a matter of f a c t , as many as 14 'planks* out 
of 21 had all-Pakistan bearings - a pointer to the b r i e f but spontaneous 
repercussions that were evident i n West Pakistan. This simultaneous 
growth of l i b e r a l i s t i c and s o c i a l i s t i c ideas were the portents of 
p o l i t i c s of moderation i n Pakistan which have been, since then, hard 
198. J. S. M i l l , On L i b e r t y , J ^ ^ , S l ? J t k 9 j ^ J ^ J i 9 J ^ . . J S f 1 , Representative_ 
government, {Oxford: 1948) ,~ p.234 " — — -
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pressed i n t h e i r proper development. Certainly, the U.F. was not an 
organisation of extremism. I t was neither "communist nor fel l o w -
199 
t r a v e l l i n g " . > y I t fought and won the elections on a s o c i a l i s t -
democratic platform. Indeed, communist elements were there, but that 
consideration was not a fac t o r f o r the powerful r i g h t wing leader and 
one of the arc h i t e c t s of the U.F., Suhrawardy t o say categ o r i c a l l y : 
" I t h i n k progressive capitalism i s ideal f o r Pakistan. I t i s time t o 
p r i c k the communist bubble" •^ > 0 Essentially, the U.F. v i c t o r y was tte 
v i c t o r y of a movement which received an el e c t o r a l sanction of Pakistan*s 
•Cinderella Province', East Pakistan. Alas, the v i c t o r y was destined 
to be a py r r h i c one. 
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Haq "coming wi t h i r r e p r e s s i b l e Churchillian high s p i r i t s " 
(he was 83) formed the U.F. government i n East Pakistan i n A p r i l , 1954* 
The Pakistan National Congress, second biggest party i n the l e g i s l a t u r e 
pledged i t s support f o r the new government i n i t s pursuit of progressive 
and popular measures. The f i r s t gesture of the new government was 
the immediate release of 210 p o l i t i c a l prisoners out of 276 imprisoned 
202 
e a r l i e r by the M.L. government <, But before the new parliamentary 
government could get on i t s work properly, the quicksands of two con-
t r o v e r s i a l issues, namely, (a) the dissolution of the Constituent 
199. Sunday Observer, March 20, 1954* See alsos Journal de Geneve as 
quoted i n Dawn. March 31> 1954* 
200. C h r i s t i a n Science Monitor. A p r i l 5, 1954• 
201. Manchester Guardian. July 19, 1954. 
202. Dawn. A p r i l 5, 1954. 
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Assembly, and (b) f o r e i g n p o l i c y , buried i t altogether* 
(a) Now that elections had been won the U.F. and i t s components-
both c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y , demanded the di s s o l u t i o n of the 
Constituent Assembly, since the people of East Pakistan had no confid&nce, 
as had been revealed i n the recently held eleotions, i n the members 
representing, at the moment, East Pakistan i n the Constituent Assembly.**^ 
This disturbed the c e n t r a l government, f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Con-
s t i t u e n t Assembly by any suitable l e g i s l a t i o n would mean also the d i s -
s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly as the parliament to which the 
central government owed i t s existence. The p o l i t i c s of pragmatism 
confronted the l e g a l i s t i c - m o r a l i s t i c aspects of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l laws. 
The Prime M i n i s t e r , on the other hand, maintained i n the parliament 
t h a t he knew "no p a r a l l e l i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l h i s t o r y of any federa-
t i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t when the composition of a province or a u n i t 
changes the representatives of that province or u n i t i n the Federal 
Government must also change at the same t i m e . " ^ ^ Obviously, the 
Prime M i n i s t e r was speaking as though Pakistan had already s e t t l e d 
her problems of i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g and was at comparable t o other 
f e d e r a l l y structured parliamentary governments such as Canada or 
A u s t r a l i a . The Prime M i n i s t e r might have scored a technical point, but 
203. See:Dawn. A p r i l 2, 1954? A p r i l 4, 1954, and A p r i l 8, 1954. 
204. C.A.B. (Leg.) Vol. 1, Maroh 20, 1954, p.286. The A.P.P. i n the 
parliament strongly urged f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Constituent 
Assembly. One M.L. M.C.A. of East Pakistan, Azizuddin Ahmed, i n 
response to the U.F. demands already resigned saying MWe are not 
t r u e representatives of the people. We were elected by a party 
which has gone down". Sees Mew York Times. March 19, 1954* 
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the analogies d i d not hold much water i n the context of Pakistan 
p o l i t i c s , and precisely, when the pos i t i o n of East Pakistan as a un i t 
v i s - a - v i s Federal Government was unusual. For there was no federal 
p o l i t y i n the community of the commonwealth countries or beyond where 
a single u n i t contained a population f a r exceeding the sum t o t a l 
numbers of other u n i t s l i k e t h a t of East Pakistan. Again, i t was 
equally unthinkable t h a t a r u l i n g party - to which the central govern-
ment owed i t s l i f e - having been severely defeated i n the country's 
biggest e l e c t o r a l constituency i . e . East Pakistan would rob the new 
balance of forces, released i n the elections, of t h e i r proper s i g n i f i -
cance by i t s intransigence. Even i f i t should be granted that the 
Constituent Assembly was e n t i t l e d t o go ahead with constitution-making 
as envisaged by the Independence Act, further complications would arise 
when the Constituent Assembly was t o s i t as the federal l e g i s l a t u r e , 
as w e l l . I n other words, Pakistan was to be t h e o r e t i c a l l y prepared 
to adhere t o unstinted central leadership so long as the c o n s t i t u t i o n -
making remained incomplete, even at the expense of the people's w i l l . 
The l o g i c s implied the creation of a ve r i t a b l e oligarchic body i n 
pe r p e t u i t y . 
However, the U.F. demand f o r the dissolution of the Constituent 
Assembly was simultaneously accompanied by demands f o r p r o v i n c i a l 
There were 45 members representing East Pakistan i n the Constituent 
Assembly. 
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autonomy (one of the main 'planks' of the U.F.) as envisaged i n the 
Lahore Resolution of 1940 (usually termed as Pakistan Resolution, 
see Appendix) and recognition of Bengalee as one of the State languages. 
This was a s i t u a t i o n that at once called f o r a s p i r i t of compromise 
and accommodation. But p o l i t i c s wrenched i n t o negative directions i n 
that there started "a malicious campaign to create the impression that 
the people whom the East Pakistan electorate have fo resoundingly 
205 
voted i n t o power are anti-Pakistan elements". Hooked by the popular 
demand the central government was on the look-out f o r an appropriate 
* 
pretext t o clamp down the a g i t a t i o n . 
(b) As we have shown e a r l i e r the communists had t h e i r incar-
nation i n various forms i n the body p o l i t i c of Pakistan. They were 
c e r t a i n l y not an overwhelming for c e . But they were s t i l l a force to 
be reckoned w i t h . The communist influence had an e r r a t i c snowballing 
e f f e c t . I t grew i n stature when the moderate populist movement 
foundered on the shoals of p o l i t i c a l intransigenoe. Moderates i n 
t h e i r f r u s t r a t i o n found refuge i n the communist f o l d with shoulder-
shrugging pessimism. Young people and students i n t h e i r d i s i l l u s i o n -
ment developed a 'tr a g i c hobby* i n the cu l t of communism and scurried 
along innumerable roads, lanes and by-lanes, dishevelled, unkempt 
and greasy. But when the course of p o l i t i c s became less r e f r a c t o r y 
* The demand f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n i n East Pakistan was also re-echoed 
i n the Western wing as w e l l . 
205. Dawn. March 22, 1954 ( E d i t o r i a l ) , "Sorting out the Si t u a t i o n " . 
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•there was a corresponding waning of the communist hold. I n sura, 
communism i n Pakistan was not a self-perpetrating creed, a p r i o r i . 
I t s strength was derived from the weakness of the country's p o l i t i c a l 
leadership. 
Remorselessly, the Mohammad A l i government pursued the foreign 
p o l i c y of which the people had no i n k l i n g whatever. What the Prime 
Minister ought t o have done was eit h e r to have the grave issues of 
fo r e i g n p o l i c y and i t s various commitments debated and considered on 
the f l o o r of the Parliament or l e f t them under a moratorium t i l l such 
time as might be convenient f o r the government to convince the people 
concerning the u t i l i t y of the pacts and refute the charge that the 
government was entering pacts clandestinely at the back of the people. 
This was more appropriate p a r t i c u l a r l y when the M.L's democratic cre-
d e n t i a l s were challenged i n the East Pakistan elections. Instead, the 
Mohammad A l i government committed Pakistan i n the East-West cold war 
wi t h such a zeal that " s o c i a l i s t countries", oommented Pakistan Times, 
"are viewed w i t h unreasoning h o s t i l i t y * ' . ' ^ The 'hush hush' manner 
of handling foreign p o l i c y evoked widespread c r i t i c i s m . The U.S. 
government granted m i l i t a r y a i d to Pakistan i n February 1954 and i n 
the f o l l o w i n g month Pakistan entered into a pact of mutual assistance 
wi t h Turkey - an i n d i r e c t l i n k w i t h N.A.T.O. These were the " s i g n i -
207 
f i c a n t developments" of the year - the Prime Minister t o l d the nation 
206. Pakistan Times quoted i n Hindu, October 8, 1954» 
207. See: Dawn. May 1, 1954; Manchester Guardian. A p r i l 5, 1954. 
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i n a •broadcast. The communist a c t i v i t i e s doubled through reinforce-
ments from India; f o r , East Pakistan, as usual, served as "a bolthole 
f o r communists on the run from West Bengal". 2 0^ They found i n U.F. 
a ready-made platform and i n Bhasani a g u l l i b l e a l l y . The hyperboles 
of communist vocabularies leaked through the l i p s of Bhasani what could 
be described as post-election comment: "The bloodless revolution 
which the people of East Pakistan have brought about by crushing the 
stronghold of imperalist agents has no p a r a l l e l i n p o l i t i c a l h i story 
209 
of the world". ' This was followed by an observance of 'Thanksgiving 
Day', organised by U.F. which i n a resolution asked the Mohammad A l i 
210 
government to q u i t and r e j e c t U.S. m i l i t a r y a i d . Then, the "popular 
211 
demonstrations" continued throughout East Pakistan against U.S. 
m i l i t a r y a i d with unabated f u r y . General Mirza's assessing l e t t e r t o 
the Prime Minister contained a l i n e : "American m i l i t a r y a i d i s attacked 
211 
day i n and day out". 
I n h i s book Professor Morgenthau warned (as Machiavelli did) 
weak nations against "making alliances with strong ones", since "a 
great power has a good chance to have i t s way with a weak a l l y as 
213 
concerns benefits and p o l i c i e s " . Mr. H i l d r e t h , joined the p o l i t i c a l 
208. Times. A p r i l 19, 1954 (This was possible because communists i n 
India were outmanoeuvred by Nehru's non-aligned foreign p o l i c y . 
I n a given s i t u a t i o n , Pakistan was ideal place f o r them.) 
209. Pawn. March 20, 1959. 
210. I b i d . . March 26, 1954 
2 1 1 • New York Times. May 31, 1954} A p r i l 4, 1954 • 
212. Governor's l e t t e r , loo, c i t . . (Top Secret), dated 21st June, 1954* 
213. Morgenthau. o p . c i t . , p.185. 
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fraoas, rather i n d i s c r e e t l y by having r e f l e c t e d on the U.F. demands and 
i t s loous standi. This exacerbated the s i t u a t i o n f u r t h e r , i n that the 
U.F. could, as a proof of t h e i r arguments, point t o the alleged state-
214 
ment of the ambassador as a piece of foreign interference. A t h i n l y 
v e i l e d semblance of East West, cold war was also introduced when the 
central government abruptly cancelled, to the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of East 
it 
Pakistan, a proposed v i s i t of the soviet c u l t u r a l mission to the 
215 
Eastern p a r t . Matters went up t o the parliament i n the shape of 
adjournment motions, but t o ho purpose. Although, the members of the 
Congress and A.P.P. under appropriate cutmotions were able to give 
vent t o t h e i r ideas. The burden of t h e i r arguments was t h i s , that the 
British-sponsored; "Subsidiary A l l i a n c e " , once succeeded i n converting 
the subcontinent t o slavery, and the present tendency of alignment 
would, p a r i passu, end up i n nea-colonialism. And the protagonists 
of the alliances were, argument at i v e l y , put at par with the stock 
21 
t r a i t o r s of the f o l k l o r e , such as 'Omichand*, 'Mirzaffar*, etc., etc. 
As luck would have i t , the Mohammad A i i government tended to be 
* Perhaps the cen t r a l government found some p a r a l l e l between the 
events of 1954 w i t h that of Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951. The 
Russian ambassador Mr. M. Stentensko had paid an unscheduled 
v i s i t t o Lahore i n 1951 j u s t p r i o r to the abortive 'coup'. This 
was explained to have been i n connection with establishing a 
soviet c u l t u r a l college there. This was followed by a Russian 
economic delegation at the head of 1, Nemtchina who stayed at 
the House of Faiz Ahmed Faiz, one of the main leaders of the 
Rawalpindi Conspiracy. See: Daily Telegraph, March 18, 1951• 
214. New,York Times, A p r i l 5, 1954. 
215. Dawn, A p r i l 4, 1954. 
216. C.A.D. (Leg) Vol.1, March 29, 1954, pp.898-905. • 
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so squeamish about U.F. because of i t s alleged communist undertones, 
to the point where any matter i n which the U.F. was involved was 
dismissed as though i t s composing elements were a l l personae non grata* 
But the crux lay elsewhere i n that amid, the din and bustle of the 
U.P.*s anti-pact slogans there was a hidden message to be deciphered 
i . e . that the U.S. was negotiating pacts w i t h a wrong government. 
At a post-elections conference, Suhrawardy r e f l e c t e d on the foreign 
p o l i c y saying that " l o t s of things have t o be considered which people 
outside the government d i d not know". And on the issue of m i l i t a r y 
a i d he appeared evasive but added "by and large I am i n favour of Pak-
idta n remaining neutral i n a world war". I n November of the same year 
217 
he t o l d h i s London audience t h a t Pakistan "could have done better" 
on the a i d issue. Mr. Ataur Rahman, one of the prominent leaders of 
the U.F. (and l a t e r t o become Chief Minister of East Pakistan) rather 
b l u n t l y admitted t h a t he was not opposed to m i l i t a r y a i d but was 
sore about the f a c t that the pacts were not signed by the r e a l repre-
213 
sentatives of the people. I n regard to the so-called 'Red Mullah', 
the Times found "no evidence that Bhasani i s a communist". I n a 
l e t t e r t o the e d i t o r of the Times Bhasani maintained: "Islam enjoins 
on me t o work f o r the amelioration of the down-trodden and exploited 
217. Dawn, March 18, 1954? November 12, 1954. 
218. I b i d . . October 15, 1954. 
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Muslims and, indeed, a l l other peoples of the w o r l d . " 2 1 ^ But the fact 
remained t h a t perhaps due to his long imprisonment during B r i t i s h 
regime and subsequent f r u s t r a t i o n s at the hand of his own national 
government, which, to Bhasani, was growing increasingly pro-Anglo-
American, chose to be a dedicated anti-Western, Asfar as Haq was 
concerned he delayed the '.-.formation of a f u l l Cabinet as his r e c r u i t s 
220 
had t o be clear of supposed communist elements. 
Despite the r i g h t wing preponderance i n the U.F. and i t s t a c i t 
adherence t o a new f o r e i g n p o l i c y the central government f e l l short 
of statesmanship, i n t h a t i t s unyielding a t t i t u d e drove the rightwingers 
i n t o a p o s i t i o n where they could neither eulogise m i l i t a r y aid i n 
public nor discourage t h e i r motley associates, both o f f i c i a l and un-
o f f i c i a l , hovering i n and around the U.F., from decrying m i l i t a r y a i d . 
So, the bandwagon of protests against m i l i t a r y a i d begun to r o l l i n 
d e f a u l t . This appeared to Karachi ( l i k e the so-called 'peasants' 
march of death' of March I969) as the projection of a red movement 
i n East Pakistan - a much more i n f l a t e d estimate of communists than 
t h e i r actual numbers and strength would have e n t i t l e d them t o . Then 
came labour troubles which were coeval to the U.F. election v i c t o r y . 
An outbreak of a small f i r e i n the Adamjee Jute M i l l resulted i n what 
* A labour force which had been experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 
v e n t i l a t i n g i t s grievances c o l l e c t i v e l y , saw i n the U.F. a hope. 
An excessive hope found i t s expression i n an i n t r i c a t e socio-
economic plane i n violence. For, the labour movement was not w e l l -
organized any more than i t s supposed beneficiaries had control on 
t h e i r emotion. 
2 19« Circes. December 5, 1954? November 1, 1954. 
220. C.A.D. (Leg) V o l . l , March 18, 1954, p.172. 
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was c a l l e d the "worst i n the h i s t o r y of Pakistan's labour troubles"• 
More than 500 labourers were s l a i n . This was on May 15, 1954, fowr 
days before the Mutual Defence Assistance Pact was to be signed formally 
by the governments of the U.S» and Pakistan. 
Now, the c e n t r a l government had an appropriate opportunity to 
s t r i k e back. Already Haq had incurred the wrath of the 'centre' when 
on May 4 he v i s i t e d Calcutta - a place w i t h nostalgic memories where 
he had l i v e d w i t h d i s t i n c t i o n f o r more than 50 years - and fulminated 
i n emotional utterances which according t o the central government smaoked 
222 
of d i s l o y a l t y t o the nation. Haq rejoined*, with the taunt 'that 
budding p o l i t i c i a n s do not understand English*. The Prime Minister l o s t 
22 
no time i n holding "communists and other elements i n i m i c a l t o Pakistan" ' 
responsible f o r the massacre. The Prime Minister's diagnosis was not 
altogether f a l l i b l e . I t could have been due i n part to the a n t i -
# 
labour a t t i t u d e of the M i l l owners. Or, there might be a degree 
of jealousy among the Bengali labourers against t h e i r West Pakistani 
and non-Bengali refugee counterparts who outnumbered them i n the M i l l s 
and f a c t o r i e s . The chances were that the oommunists might have 
* A month before the Adamjee calamity two prominent leaders of 
trade unions were murdered. Sees Dawn, March 27, 1954* 
221. Times. May 16, 1954* The i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g was that when the 
r i o t s broke out the new ministers were j u s t sworn-in. Even the 
preceding labour troubles occured before the U.F. M i n i s t r y 
came in t o being. I n short, the U.F. M i n i s t r y oould hardly 
s e t t l e down before i t was faced w i t h problems. 
222. Dawn, May 5, 1954. 
223. Manchester Guardian, May 17, 1954« 
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poured t h e i r puckish minds i n t o i t . Thesmost important t h i n g was to 
bear i n mind that Pakistan was t r y i n g to telescope economic development 
which had been achieved only gradually i n Western countries. In t h i s 
process of rapid, i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n there appeared i n Pakistan what 
Lipset would c a l l "sharp d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s between the p r e - i n d u s t r i a l 
and i n d u s t r i a l s i t u a t i o n " , that caused the emergence of an "extremist 
224 
working class" A l l these lava of melted factors were erupted just 
by k i n d l i n g a small f i r e . Hence, there was as much t r u t h i n the saying 
that the m i l l - r i o t s were e n t i r e l y due to communist machinations as 
there was i n the hypothesis that the small f i r e of Adamjee Jute M i l l 
was d e l i b e r a t e l y made to be the *Reichstag F i r e 1 , t o enable the central 
government t o make an end of parliamentary r u l e i n East Pakistan.; 
Since a popular government w i t h a welfare bias was not a welcome 
proposition t o a business community which t h r i v e d well i n the unrestrained 
pr i v a t e sector of the economy f they seized t h i s opportunity and asked 
the government to take recourse to drastic measures even to the extent 
i n i ntroducing m a r t i a l law. Drawing tyQfo of i t s c a p i t a l from West 
Pakistan as i t d i d , the East Pakistan industries were extremely v u l -
nerable t o the progressive depression i n the share markets and a f l i g h t 
225 
of c a p i t a l from East t o West Pakistan. J What was more, p o l i t i c s now 
224. S.M. Lipset, " P o l i t i c a l Man" i n H. Eckstein & D.E. Apter (Ed 0) 
Comparative P o l i t i c s (New York: 1963), p. 206. 
225* Financial Times. May 21, 1954» Following troubles i n East 
Pakistan i n d u s t r i a l i s t s t r a n sferred more thatn $50,000,000 t o 
Banks i n Karachi. See: New York Times, June 19, 1954* 
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took to p r o v i n c i a l f a c t i o n a l i s m . As the non-Bengalis were among the 
r i o t v i c t i m s , even f r a t e r n a l bodies l i k e the West Pakistan Federation 
of Labour, Central United Refugee Council, Karachi Bar Association, 
etc., etc., asked c e n t r a l government to impose martial law i n East 
Pakistan,f?f Even the West Pakistan press (mostly) which was once 
a l l praise f o r the U.F, movement suddenly recanted, A$ t h i s juncture, 
Pakistan p o l i t i c s resembled an almost c l a s s i c a l example of what 
A r i s t o t l e c a l l e d 'stasis* - the f a c t i o n a l unrest which was to eat i n t o 
the very v i t a l s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government, 
Haq was immediately summoned to Karachi (as was Dubcek to Moscow) 
with some of his colleagues. I n the course of his dialogue with the 
central government Haq happened to grant an interview to P, Callahan, 
the New York Times correspondent f o r whose benefit Haq r e c i t e d a 
Bengali poem. Translated versions of l i t e r a t u r e are not always true 
to t h e i r o r i g i n a l i n matters of form and s p i r i t . I t transpired that 
Callahan saw i n t h i s poem a demand f o r the complete independence to 
227 
East Pakistan. The g r a v i t y of Haq's offence was f u r t h e r compounded 
when the correspondent t o l d the world i n spite of Haq's protests, 
that Pakistan was bidding f o r independence. Haq refused to be the 
* The r i o t - t e r r i b l e as i t was - did not l a s t beyond a day nor 
di d i t spread elsewhere. Bhasani threatened to fast unto death 
unless peace was restored. The Peace Committee was formed and 
everything was under c o n t r o l . See: Dawn, May 21, 1954. 
226, Dawn. May 17, 1954. 
227. Manotiester Guardian, July 19, 1954, "East Bengal Looks f o r 
Autonomy, not Independence", 
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pawn of the central government 0 
Mohammad A l i , w i t h the obsession of communism uppermost i n his 
mind, perpetrated the worst character assassination by branding Haq 
as " t r a i t o r " , and imposed Governor's r u l e , i n place of parliamentary, 
i n East Pakistan, under Section 92A of the India Act, 1935. The 
governor's r u l e i n East Pakistan was v i r t u a l l y a state of siege. The 
central government sent 10,000 troops t o East Pakistan only to be 
f u r t h e r reinforced by more troops, arms and ammunition. More than 
100,000 l e a f l e t s eulogising the Prime Minister's decision were dropped 
00 fK 
i n and around the country by Pakistan A i r Force planes. 
The central government's decision came to appear t o be the least 
perceptive one. For i t was not an isolated issue of a federal unit 
being knocked back i n t o i t s senses. The U.F. was a movement that 
developed on the national scene. I t did not operate i n a vacuum but 
* Many years l a t e r , Haq, i n one of his expansive moods t o l d the 
w r i t e r how he had r e t o r t e d t o Mohammad A l i ' s sneer at the U.F. 
wi t h t h i s sayings I had the p r i v i l e g e of showing my mettle t o 
those who came across the seas, and am not prepared to play 
second f i d d l e t o those urchins of s e l f - s t y l e d p o l i t i c i a n s who 
have j u s t crossed the Megna (a r i v e r ) . " 
** H i s t o r y has repeated i t s e l f even a f t e r 15 years. I n 1969, we 
f i n d the same movement ( t h i s time all~Pakistan) towards p a r l i a -
mentary democracy, the same r i o t s with an addition of peasants' 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n . But the r i o t s were not as macabre as they were 
made t o appear t o be. The same discomfort of the business community 
matched with a f l i g h t of c a p i t a l . But,above a l l the same loss 
of the people's freedom. The difference was then i n 1954 was 
the Frankenstein-politicians who sabotaged the parliamentary 
democracy, what t h e i r monsters have done i n 1969. 
228. Mew York Times? Hew York Herald Tribune; Dawn, dated May 31, 
1954. 
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i n a l i v i n g community of men and women. The U.F.'s greatest con-
t r i b u t i o n was i t s l a y i n g the foundation of a parliamentary opposition, 
e l e c t o r a l l y chosen, i n an otherwise oppositionless parliamentary 
system of government. I t was a movement par excellance, i n that i t 
challenged the status quo. The movement provided Pakistan with a 
t e s t i n g ground f o r a parliamentarianism which was dying of atrophy. 
The small o l i g a r c h i c base of the central government d i d not l i k e to 
see the waves of Bay of Bengal: reach the Arabian Coast of West Pakistan. 
There was no trace of M.L. i n East Pakistan which could i n any way 
boost the morale of the central government. There was no reason f o r 
granting autonomy t o East Pakistan which the central government could 
not give t o Sind or the N.W.F.P. There was no change of ge t t i n g a i d , 
m i l i t a r y or economic, from the U.S. unless the central government, 
could produce some evidence that i t was t o t a l l y committed to the 
rou t i n g of communists from Pakistan. A l l these factors were dovetailed 
i n t o one almighty decision, i . e . that the central government could 
not a f f o r d t o allow parliamentary government to continue i n East Pakis-
t a n . And the most immediately motivating impulse f o r imposing 
Governor's rul e i n East Pakistan was the central government's desperate 
desire t o give a d r a s t i c demonstration of i t s new foreign p o l i c y 
at the expense of parliamentarianism. 
* The United Front represented the second round i n the agrarian 
r e v o l u t i o n . I t i s c e r t a i n l y not the l a s t . Bengali leadership 
may yet play a major r o l e i n carrying the agrarian revolution 
to the whole of Pakistan". See: Stanley Maron, "The Problem of 
East Pakistan", P a c i f i c A f f a i r s (June, 1955), p.144. 
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There was an o r a c u l a r touch, i n the warning given by Professor 
Morris-Jones t h a t unless P a k i s t a n was able t o f o s t e r l e a d e r s h i p from 
w i t h i n t h e framework o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s , reforms might take* 
place " w i t h a vengeance from w i t h o u t " , , 2 2 ^ This oacured l a t e r , but 
t h e seeds were sown i n 30th May, 1954, i n t h e unusual appointment 
o f General M i r z a , t h e Defence Secr e t a r y , as t h e Governor o f East 
P a k i s t a n , 
We would t r y t o show how t h e c e n t r a l government caused enormous 
harm t o p a r l i a m e n t a r y p o l i t i c s i n i t s remorseless p u r s u i t o f the cause 
o f t h e *containment p o l i c y ' . Indeed i f t h e containment p o l i c y was t o 
be a success i n Southern and South East As i a , the p o s i t i o n of Bast 
P a k i s t a n deserved a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t was a b r i d g e between 
t h e subcontinent and South East A s i a - a f l a n k t h a t c o u l d be used as 
l a n d communications f o r subersive movement. As e a r l y as 1948 t h e r e 
was an o r g a n i z i n g oommittee o f communists formed i n C a l c u t t a t o r a i s e 
i s u r r e c t i o n s i n I n d i a , Malaya, Indonesia and Burmao An I n d i a n Communist 
leader was k i l l e d f i g h t i n g w i t h t h e communist i n s u r g e n t s and a number 
of Burmese communists lirere a r r e s t e d i n East P a k i s t a n . The s o - c a l l e d 
* I t i s t o be n o t i c e d how w i t h i n a few months a f t e r he had w r i t t e n 
a l e t t e r t o Nazimuddin, t h e former Prime M i n i s t e r , p l e d g i n g army 
support t o curb r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c s , t h a t General M i r z a came i n t o 
t h e p o l i t i c a l l i m e l i g h t . No wonder t h a t he was s e l e c t e d as t h e 
Governor o f l a s t P a k i s t a n f o r i t was he who n e g o t i a t e d arms deals 
w i t h t h e U.S. Now, t h i s t i m e he was t o curb down t h e extreme 
l e f t i s t s . 
229. Morris-Jones, oflp.oit.., "Experience of Independence - I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n " , p. 237. 
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'Free T h a i * movement s p i l l e d over t h e whole area. The I n d i a n side of 
T r i p u r a D i s t r i c t , n o r t h o f East P a k i s t a n , and t h e H i l l areas o f Assam 
were supposed t o be stro n g - h o l d s o f armed communist bands. Considering 
t h e g e o p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l i t y o f East Pakistan t h e panicky statesmen 
presumably thought t h a t t h e onrush o f the communist movement might 
convert East P a k i s t a n i n t o one arm o f the s o - c a l l e d " p i n c e r movement" 
- t h e o t h e r arm was t h e V i e t Minh i n Indo-Ghina - t o p i n c h o f f Burma, 
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T h a i l a n d and t h e r e s t o f South A s i a . 
But whatever t h e s i z e o f t h e communist t h r e a t , t h e s o l u t i o n ought 
t o have been sought Ttfithin t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y framework. General Mirza 
p e r c e i v e d t h e s i t u a t i o n i n simple terms i . e . 
" I f P a k i s t a n has decided t o l i n e up w i t h 
t h e anti-communist forces and t h i s i s t h e 
o n l y l o g i c a l c o r o l l a r y t o a c c e p t i n g American 
M i l i t a r y A i d and Turko-Pakistan Pact,** 
t h e n t h e o n l y safe course i s t o ban t h e 
communist p a r t y ..• We cannot t i n k e r w i t h 
t h e problem nor p l a y p o l i t i c s w i t h t h e 
communist."231 
* There were some i n t e r e s t i n g l i n k s between Pakistan's i n c r e a s i n g 
t r o o p c o n c e n t r a t i o n along t h e borders o f East P a k i s t a n w i t h t h a t 
o f t h e French de f e a t i n M e n Bien Phu (May, 1954) which preceded 
t h e o u s t i n g o f t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y government of East Pakistan by 
o n l y a few days. See: New York Times, May 28, 1954* 
** W r i t e r ' s u n d e r l i n i n g . 
230. See: Times, December 29, 1954; New York Herald Tribune, August 10, 
1954. 
231. Governor's l e t t e r t o Prime M i n i s t e r , l o c . o i t . , (Top Secret: 
dated 21st June, 1954). 
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I t was a p i t y t h a t t h e c e n t r a l government s u f f e r e d from t h e ambivalence 
of communist p o l i c y . Although a telegram from t h e Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t 
t o l d General Mirza t h a t t h e Cabinet regarded communism "as a major 
p o l i t i c a l problem" t h i s g r a s p i n g o f the t r u t h was evanescent. For, 
p o l i t i c s succumbed t o b u r e a u c r a t i c pressures i n t h a t General Mirza 
thought o f i t "as p u r e l y a law and order problem". So, p o l i t i c s 
were a d m i n i s t e r e d . I n s t e a d of harnessing i t s own i n t e r n a l l e adership 
j u s t r e l e a s e d from t h e p a r l i a m e n t a r y e l e c t i o n s , t o the t a s k o f f i g h t i n g 
communism on p o l i t i c a l p l a t f o r m s , t h e c e n t r a l government subjected 
t h e c o u n t r y t o an e x t e r n a l l e a d e r s h i p w i t h which the people had no 
communicating l i n k . The c r e d i b i l i t y value o f Haq and Suhrawardy i n t h e 
eyes o f t h e p u b l i c would have beer|tnuch g r e a t e r than t h e sound and f u r y 
of a q u a s i - m i l i t a r y r u l e dedicated t o the f i g h t against communism. 
Even t h e c e n t r a l government had i n i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e r e v i v a l o f 
M.L. i n East Pa k i s t a n under t h e cl o a k of Governor's r u l e - indeed t h i s 
was one o f t h e c l e a r e s t pui'poses; f o r i n General Mirza'S very f i r s t 
l e t t e r t o t h e Governor General these l i n e s occured t w i c e e.g. "You 
may be able t o r e s u s c i t a t e t h e Muslim League some time i n f u t u r e but 
233 
not e a r l y . " - i t c o u l d have made a d i f f e r e n t choice. For, a f t e r a l l , 
General M i r z a was not d e s t i n e d t o be a s i n e c u r i s t . This was an act 
o f s u i c i d e committed by t h e c e n t r a l government. 
232. Governor's l e t t e r t o t h e Governor-General, l o c . c i t . , (Top Sec r e t : 
D.O. No. I l l / P S ) dated 10th J u l y , 1954f 
233. Ibid.« Governor's l e t t e r t o the Governor-General (Top Secret: 
14th June, 1954)• 
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The day was won f o r the administration of law and order. 
General Mirza t o l d h i s press audiences " I hope to i n s p i r e confidence 
i n the minds of a d m i n i s t r a t o r s " ^ ^ (not the confidence of the people). 
The parliament recorded a 14-hour marathon debate i n which the Congress 
and A.P.P. fought h e r o i c a l l y f o r the restoration of parliamentary 
government i n East Pakistan only to evoke a comment from the Prime 
M i n i s t e r : "The present government i s determined to crack down on a l l 
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oomraunists". ^ Then followed an anti-communist drive throughout 
Pakistan which was so suggestive of the Moarthy witchhunt, Pakistan 
s t y l e . A. so - c a l l e d •screening committee 1 was established to purge 
subversive elements from the administration, u n i v e r s i t y , press, trade 
unions, m i l l s and other organisations. The r e a l red round-up started 
a f t e r the Pentagon had announced on 21st J u l y , 1954» that i t was 
s h o r t l y sending to Pakistan an American M i l i t a r y Advisory Group. 
Under Section 3 of the Pakistan Security Act the communist party 
was banned i n Jul y 1954 a l l over Pakistan ( i n Bast Pakistan a ban 
oame into operation two weeks e a r l i e r ) . An Order was passed r e s t r i c t -
i n g the members of the Soviet Enbassy to a 35-^16 radius from the 
centre of the Federal C a p i t a l . Among the a r r e s t s of suspected 
communists made a l l over Pakistan were students, l e c t u r e r s , professors, 
* The Moscow-Chinese radio and newspapers joined the East-West 
cold war drama as enaoted i n Pakistan. See: Daily Worker. Ju l y 23, 
1954? New China News Agency. July 27, 1954; Daily Worker. May 31, 
1954; I g v e s t i a quoted i n Dawn. June 4» 1954. 
234. Dawn. June 9, 1954. 
235. I b i d . . June 17, 1954; See a l s o : New York Times. June 28, 1954. 
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J o u r n a l i s t s , trade-unionists and p o l i t i c i a n s . A l l organisations 
suspect of communist a c t i v i t i e s were sealed o f f . A month long ban on 
the assembly of more than f i v e persons was ordered i n Karachi. More 
than 500 red suspects i n West Pakistan were sentenced to 1-year impri-
sonment without t r i a l , i n addition to the 1293 alleged communists and 
fellow t r a v e l l e r s who had been arrested i n East Pakistan. 
I n h i s enthusiasm f o r t a c k l i n g the communist problem, General 
Mirza suggested to the Governor General: MIn America there i s the P.B.I., 
i n England there i s the M.f.(5)» We must waste no time i n creating an 
organisation ... f i r s t c l a s s men ... must be sent to Amerioa to study 
methods of anti-communist operations... the Amerioans have promised 
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to plaoe a l l t h e i r knowledge and research at our disposal." ' The 
stop-communism s o c i e t y , the Pakistan-American Cultu r a l Association -
government patronised organisations that worked i n conjunction with 
the U.S.I.S. - were set into motion for the anti-communist d r i v e . 2 ^ 
Then, i n a mighty plunge, the c e n t r a l government committed Pakistan to 
anti-communist pacts e.g. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement 
(with the U.S.), S.E.A.T.O. (South East A s i a Treaty Organisation) and 
* Writer's underlinings. 
236. General Mirza remarked: " T h i s , to my mind, i s not a large number 
i n a population of 42 m i l l i o n . " Source: Governor's l e t t e r to 
Prime Minister (Top Secret) 21st June, 1954. For more d e t a i l s 
of the oommunist round-up see: New York Times. June 2, 1954? 
J u l y 24, 1954? Hindu. June 13, 1954? Dawn. June 2, 1954? July 26, 
1954? J u l y 29, 1954? J u l y 25, 1954? and Richard L. Park and 
Richard S. Wheeler, "East Bengal under Governor's Rule", Far 
Easte r n Survey (September. 1954), p. 133. 
237* Governor's l e t t e r to the Governor General, loo. oit..(Top Secret: 
D.O. No. 185/PS), 16th September, 1954. 
238. Dawn. June 8, 1954. 
106* 
Baghdad Pact ( l a t e r known as Central Treaty Organisation a f t e r Iraq's 
withdrawal) i n a 'hush Hush' manner having unwisely d i s c r e d i t e d the 
r i g h t wingers and sent communists underground only to reappear l a t e r 
on, on the surface under the tutelage of the r i g h t i s t s ! f o r , a f t e r a l l , 
the r i g h t i s t s i n t h e i r resentment against the p o l i t i c a l c a r t e l - the 
c e n t r a l government - would always weloome w i l l i n g partners. In sum, 
the r e c e s s i o n of self-government with i t s c l e a r predominance of r i g h t -
wing elements to the "background i n East Pakistan and the f o i s t i n g of 
s o - c a l l e d 'good government* i n i t s plaoe indicated one faot, i n t e r 
a l i a , that foreign polioy was going to be a 'variable' i n the p a r l i a -
mentary p o l i t i c s of Pakistan. Moreover as f a r as the e c l i p s e of 
parliamentary government i n East Pakistan was concerned i t was not 
u n l i k e l y that the U.S. i n i t s pragmatism supported by a huge investment 
of men, money and equipment f o r the promotion of i t s containment p o l i c y 
would have counselled 'good government' rather than a return to the 
r i s k s involved i n ' s e l f government', Westminster s t y l e * 
Now that the East P a k i s t a n i c r i e s for the d i s s o l u t i o n of the 
Constituent Assembly had been taken care of, Mohammad A l i switched 
h i s a t t e n t i o n towards constitution-making. The draft c o n s t i t u t i o n of 
1954 (B»P.C. Report) was adopted on the 21st September. We have 
already shown rhow the previous B.P.C. reports had come to nothing. 
* "Even b e n e f i c i a l contact with East and West always c a r r i e d with it 
i n t e n s i v e exposures to the American or the communist way of l i f e . 
These external pressures probably formaa greater threat to the 
evolution of an indigenous democraoy than do the i n t e r n a l 
t e n s i o n s . " See Hugh Tinker, B a l l o t Bax and Bayonet (Oxford:1966), 
p.126. 
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But the t h i r d draft c o n s t i t u t i o n appeared to have "been the product of 
the government*s responsiveness and r e c e p t i v i t y to public opinion. 
On the question of the ideology of the sta t e the draft struck a moderate 
note, i n that i t annulled the erstwhile provision of the s 6 ~ c a l l e d 
• t h i r d l e g i s l a t u r e * i . e . the "board of Ulema, as was envisaged by 
Nazimuddin*s d r a f t . I n i t s place, the Supreme Court was given the 
f u l l authority to determine "whether or not a p a r t i c u l a r law i s regug-
239 
nant to the Holy Quran and Sunnah". ' With the exception of ce r t a i n 
Glauses ( p a r t i c u l a r l y the mandatory provision making the Head of the 
stat e a Muslim) which reaffirmed the aim of ensuring the Islamic 
character of the State, the 292 draft a r t i c l e s were a code of secular 
laws *for the administration of a democratic parliamentary form of 
government*. They guaranteed the right of a l l c i t i z e n s , inoluding the 
min o r i t i e s , to apply to the Supreme Court f o r the enforcement of 
fundamental r i g h t s . * ^ 0 iThe Islamio aspects i n the draft c o n s t i t u t i o n 
were s u p e r f i c i a l , which, by implication, pointed to the inadequacy 
of the M.L. leadership i n i t s endeavour to t r a n s l a t e Islam into what 
2 
an Islamologist thought, "an e f f e c t i v e , r e a l i s t i c , meaningful ideology", 
capable of f u l f i l l i n g Pakistan's needs i n her s i t u a t i o n . 
* 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l entanglement on the language question was 
ex t r i c a t e d i n that the draft constitution s t i p u l a t e d that "The o f f i c i a l 
* Nazimuddin*s draft c o n s t i t u t i o n did not mention language at a l l . 
239» Report of the^ B a s i c P r i n c i p l e s Committee (Government of 
Pakistan Press, Karachi* 1954), p. 4» Clause ( 6 ) . 
240. New York Times. October 16, 1954. 
241. tH»3l. Smith, Islam i n Modern History (Princeton: 1959), P»229. 
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languages of the Republic should be Urdu and B e n g a l i " 2 ^ 2 - the 
f u l f i l m e n t of the very f i r s t item of the 2Jivpoint programme of the U.F. 
Having regard to the e a r l y Punjabi opposition to Nazimuddin's federal 
schemes, Mohammad A l i devised a co n s t i t u t i o n a l plan nicknamed the 
'Mohammad A l i formula*. Five u n i t s were hewed out for the federal 
struc t u r e e.g. ( l ) l a s t Pakistan, (2) Punjab, (3) N.W.F.P., Frontier 
States and t r i b a l areas, (4) Sind and the State of Khainpur and (5) 
Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union, Karachi ( Federal C a p i t a l ) 
and the State of Bahawalpur. I n a bicameral l e g i s l a t u r e , the House 
of Units would contain an equal number of seats regardless of s i z e f o r 
each of the federating u n i t s . The House of the People (lower House) 
would be composed of members the d i s t r i b u t i o n of whose seats was to be 
made i n terms of the t o t a l population of the respective u n i t s . Both 
the Houses were granted equal powers. A j o i n t session of the two 
Houses was envisaged to iron out t h e i r respective difference on any 
matters, where necessary, but i n any case a "matter should not be deemed 
to have passed unless the majority supporting the motion inoludeek at 
24.3 
l e a s t 30 per cent of the t o t a l number of members from each zone" 
This was done to a l l a y f e a r s of any unit being dominated by another. 
Despite an e a r l i e r Congress r e s o l u t i o n asking f o r broad p r o v i n c i a l 
autonomy (which was l o s t to v o t i n g ) , the Constituent Assembly chose 
242. B a s i c P r i n c i p l e s Committee, loo, o i t . , p.72, Clause (276) ( l ) . 
243. I b i d . , pp.10-19, Clauses 41 ( l ) and 65. 
to strengthen the Federal government. 244 Three l i s t s of subjects e.g. 
Federal, Unit and Concurrent, were delineated (they were i n fact taken 
from the I n d i a Act of 1935) i n which the fe d e r a l government retained 
66 s u b j e c t s , including defence, foreign a f f a i r s and currency, whereas 
the provinces were l e f t with 48 subjects with a d i f f i c u l t chance of 
sharing concurrent l i s t (38 subjeots) along with the federal government. 
I n addition, the r e s i d u a l powers whioh were given to the Federation 
by the 1953 draft c o n s t i t u t i o n were now vested i n the person of the 
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President, as head of the s t a t e : J - thus r e s i d u a l powers were proposed 
to be t r a n s f e r r e d from an i n s t i t u t i o n , the federal l e g i s l a t u r e to an 
in d i v i d u a l person, the President. 
But as the Constitution was on the verge of being produced the 
Punjabi group became s t i f f - n e c k e d . Instead of p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l debates i n the Constituent Assembly the Punjabi M.C.A. 
gulped teas i n the room of Chow/Mohammad A l i , the Punjabi Finance 
Mohammad A l i formula, the Punjabis refused to budge from t h e i r dogged 
opposition to the p o t e n t i a l ascendenoy of the Bengalis i n federal 
p o l i t i c s . The v i c t o r y of the U.F. i n East Pakistan and i t s c o l l e c t i v e 
stand on p r o v i n c i a l autonomy was a threat to the Punjabi supremacy; f o r 
244« New York Times. September 15, 1954* 
245. B.P.C. 1952, l o c . o i t . . p.38, Clause 133 ( l ) and B.P.C. Report, 
1954, p.39, Clause 147 (l)» the members of the B.P.C. of 1952, 
The Chieft M i n i s t e r s of the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and East Pakistan 
dissented from the recommendation as to the residuary power. They 
were always f o * r e s i d u a l powers being given to the provinces. 
See: B.P.C. Report of 1952, p.38. 
246. C.A.D., Vol . 1 , September 9, 1954, p.630. 
246 M i n i s t e r . Whatever compromises and improvements were made i n the 
the p o l i t i c a l l y divided units of West Pakistan of which the Punjab 
was one, would have to confront i n national p o l i t i c s an l a s t Pakistan 
which would be numerically superior and p o l i t i c a l l y u n i f i e d e n t i t y . 
Added to t h i s was another apprehension. After the discomfiture of the 
M.L. from East Pakistan the l a s t v estige of i t s prestige and power 
resided with the Western p a r t . . Now things oame to suoh a pass that 
the oentral government, the M.L. Parliamentary Party; and the Constituent 
Assembly were a l l made to serve as an entrenched base f o r the f a s t 
decaying M.L. And i f the Mohammad A l i government backed by the Consti-
tuent Assembly with i t s s t i l l c l e a r majority of East P a k i s t a n i members, 
succeeded i n drawing up the co n s t i t u t i o n by the end o f 1954, the control 
of the country would pass on to the hands other than the Punjabis. 
For, a f t e r the passing of the Republican Constitution, the Constituent 
Assembly would e l e c t the new Head of the State who i n turn would appoint 
a p r o v i s i o n a l government f o r the administration of the country t i l l 
the f i r s t general e l e c t i o n s could be held. I n other words, i n the 
e x i s t i n g parliamentary ascendancy of the Bengali group, the chances were 
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that the next President might be Nazimuddin n i - a contingency not 
to the l i k i n g of the Punjabis. 
I t was stated above, that i n the dismissal of Nazimuddin's 
Cabinet, the Governor General was also motivated by a desire to thwart 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals so unpopular to the Punjabis. Since 
* Who happens to be a Punjabi. 
247. Sunday Times. October 17, 1954* 
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Mohammad A l i owed h i s premiership to the Governor General's wishes, i t 
was but natural for the l a t t e r to expect an eager ear from the former. 
The Governor General wanted the amalgamation of a l l Western units into 
one, so that the partnership of the two zones, e.g. East and West P a k i s -
tan, could be based on an equal footing. Chow Mohammad A l i with h i s 
Punjabi colleagues i n the o»frtral Cabinet urged upon the Prime Minister 
to have t h i s scheme implemented. Perhaps the Prime Minister i n the 
course of h i s s u c c e s s f u l negotiation for American a i d and h i s involve-
ment i n country's administration and p o l i t i c s , had developed a degree 
of personal confidence, and a sense of noblesse oblige. Understandably, 
the Prime Minister had an entente with the Bengali group l e d by Nazi-
muddin and the p r o v i n c i a l leaders (except the Punjabis) of West Pakistan 
who were committed to h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l formula. The Punjabi members 
of the sub-committee on a l l o c a t i o n of powers between centre and provinces 
overstepped the terms of reference of the Committee by r a i s i n g the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of one-unit idea. Noon, the Premier of the Punjab, said 
i n the Committee: " I am one of the supporters of one unit",2^® but 
Pirzada, the Premier of Sind, was "dead s e t " against the one unit move. 
The Premier of the N.W.F.P. was al s o opposed to the plan. Spasmodi-
c a l l y , t a l k s veered around the one unit plan or a l t e r n a t i v e l y the zonal 
federation of West Pak i s t a n . Meanwhile, the Prime Minister was committed 
to h i s scheme of federation, which was, of course, adopted on the 21st 
September. 
248. Dawn, August 30, 1954 and Jul y 24, 1954. 
H2« 
But the r e a l cold war s t a r t e d when on the 15th September, cont-
r a r y to the d e c i s i o n of the M.L. Parliamentary Party, Noon suddenly <: 
dropped a bombshell i n the Constituent Assembly by demanding "Zonal 
Federation"? and on a point of verbal violence he i n s i s t e d on having 
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i t "now and here". ^ Nazimuddin characterized i t as an attempt to 
delay the framing of the c o n s t i t u t i o n "at the l a s t minute". The other 
prominent members of the West Pakistan (except the Punjabis) were also 
unsympathetic to the idea of Zonal Federation. A showdown was, now, 
i n the o f f i n g . On the one side, there was the a x i s of Bengali-Sindhi-
Pathan and on the other was the Punjabi group drawing sustenance from 
the Governor General - a man of deteriorating health, but s t i l l 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a resolute mind as prominent as was h i s s c u l p t u r a l 
nose. The Governor General summoned a l l the prominent leaders of West 
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Pakistan and bid them to bring about Zonal Federation J f a i l i n g which 
they would be rendered p o l i t i c a l l y impotent by the P.R.O.D.A. 
Endangered, the anti-zonal federation group hastened a B i l l through the 
Constituent Assembly on 20th September, 1954 f o r the repeal of the P.R.-
O.D.A. Act. An epitaph was given by the mover - M.H. Gazdere - to the 
* This Act was passed i n 1949 to bring holders of public o f f i c e s to 
book on charges of corruption, Tammanyism, etc., e t c . The mover of 
the B i l l , Liaquat s a i d i n the Constituent Assembly: "... to pur i f y 
our p u b l i c l i f e and to see that Pakistan i s founded on sound foundation 
..." See: C.A.D., Vol.17, January 6, 1949, p.44. 
** The irony was that f i v e years ago the same person, while welcoming 
the P.R.O.D.A. had maintained: "The Nazis did not t r y people. They 
shot them. I do think, sometimes, in my moments of weakness, that 
the Government should o c c a s i o n a l l y shoot a person or two". See: 
C.A.D., Vol•IP, January 6,1949* P»49» 
249. I b i d . . September 16, 1954. 
250. Sayeed, op.oit. p.420. 
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repealed Act that i t had already outlived i t s u t i l i t y . J This was 
not considered enough. For the ghost of Nazimuddin's dismissal was 
s t i l l walking. I t was resolved that the Governor General's wings of 
power must he clipped. To that end they perpetrated a constitutional 
P e a r l Harbour upon the Governor General. Flouting the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Constituent Assembly, they s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y introduced an 
amending B i l l i n the Assembly at an unusual hour ( 9.a.m. The usual 
time had never previously been before 10. a.m.) of the 21st September, 
252 
1954. A f a r reaching change was made i n the India Act of 1935 i n 
that the o f f i c e of the Prime Minister was s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned for 
the f i r s t time. From now onward the co n s t i t u t i o n a l position of the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers of the ce n t r a l government would be 
analogous to those p r a c t i s i n g parliamentary democracies of the Common-
wealth countries. I t was parliament which would make or unmake-the 
minis t r y , not the Governor General. This was done by amending 
Section 9 and replacing Sections 10, 10A and 10B of the India Act by 
253 
a new Section, 10 comprising seven clauses. J • Thus, with Governor 
General's powers n e u t r a l i s e d , the Prime Minister embarked upon a 
scheduled journey to the U.S. leaving a message to the nation that 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n would be ready by December, 1954* 
251* Dawn, September 21, 1954» 
252. G.W. Ghowdhury, Const i t u t i o n a l Development i n Pakistan. 
(Longmans: 1959)» P«43« 
253. Times. September 22, 1954. 
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Th i s was an occasion which evoked alloyed feelings*' The cur-
tailment of the Governor General's a r b i t r a r y powers viewed from the 
parliamentary angle was, no doubt, a welcome a c t . For t h i s would i n 
any case be a feature of the new co n s t i t u t i o n . But the action was taken 
i n dubious circumstances. Had t h i s parliamentary t r u t h suddenly f l a s h e d 
aocross the minds of members of the Constituent Assembly a f t e r being 
previously hidden from them? Was not Mohammad A l i ' s premiership born 
of t h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l power?; Was not Mohammad A l i ' s parliamentary 
morality contingent? When the l a r g e s t section of the people of Pakistan 
had already questioned the representative character of the Constituent 
Assembly was i t democratic to add another cubit to i t s height? Indeed, 
the extent of the Governor General's powers needed to be c u r t a i l e d i n 
a parliamentary p o l i t y . But the Prime Minister's action was of the so-
c a l l e d penny-wise pound-foolish nature. While the Prime Minister had 
brusquely declined the U.F. i n the share of power how could he expect 
the U.F. to back h i s a c t i o n , however desirable, when t h i s would mean 
giving longevity to the Constituent Assembly f o r whose death the U.F. 
had been praying* I n these oircurastances, the U.F. would t r y to f i n d 
an a l l y i n the Governor General, as Suhrawardy once remarked that 'my 
enemy's enemy i s my f r i e n d * . 
I n quashing the U.F. the Prime Minister downgraded the p a r l i a -
mentary cause, but s u r e l y he had the support of the majority of the 
Constituent Assembly and 'power e l i t e s * . I n curbing the Governor 
General's powers which were anachronistic i n a Westminster system, he, 
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no doubt p o t e n t i a l l y upgraded the parliamentary cause, but, i r o n i c a l l y , 
he would f a i l to e n l i s t the support of the l a r g e s t section of the people, 
because of h i s own myopic approach towards v i t a l i s s u e s . And para-
d o x i c a l l y , despotio powers grew i n Pakistan within a democratic frame-
work when a party i n power i n i t s intransigence compelled the p a r t i e s 
outside of power to c a l l upon the Head of the State to act as Deus 
ex Machina. 
Suddenly, the Governor General's support for the cause begun to 
grow. He remembered Suhrawardy's comment on h i s dismissal of the 
Nazimuddin Cabinet, and was not taking stock of the widespread demand 
f o r the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly. His r e f l e x e s were 
fu r t h e r enlivened by the l a t e s t t o n i c administered from Zurich Hospital, 
Geneva, where Suhrawardy - who was receiving treatment for h i s damaged 
l i v e r - i n a statement demanded "the di s s o l u t i o n of the present 
254 
Constituent Assembly and i t s replacement by a representative body'J ^ 
Fr u s t r a t e d i n i t s purpose, the Punjabi group now came down on bended 
knees before the U.F. i n order to harness the l a t t e r ' s support to blow 
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up the c o n s t i t u t i o n . ^ 
Now the Governor General was to give an account of h i s p o l i t i c a l 
* "The Governor General i s the guardian of public opinion,} he gauged 
i t c o r r e c t l y when he dismissed Khawya Nazimuddinj he must guage 
i t c o r r e c t l y so f a r as the Constitutent Assembly and the p r o v i n c i a l 
l e g i s l a t u r e s are concerned ... he (Governor General) has handed 
back power to the same g u i l t y Muslim league, and has placed himself 
at i t s mercy". See: Hindu, June 21, 1953. 
254« Dawn. October 8, 1954» 
255. Dawn. October 7, 1954 ( E d i t o r i a l ) "The Madding Crowds* Ignoble 
S t r i f e " . 
Jamesbondship. He summoned the touring Prime Minister from Washington, 
E a r l i e r , he had l i f t e d the ©aS&ea? against M.A. Khuhro, K. F a z l u l l a h , 
A.6. Nabi, H. Haq Chowdhury which prohibited them holding public 
o f f i c e s . He also cancelled P.R.O.D.A. proceedings to d i s q u a l i f y 
Daultana. The whole purpose was "to release into the p o l i t i c a l arena 
a group of i n f l u e n t i a l men who may unseat Mr. Mohammad A l i and h i s 
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administration", unless the Prime Minister could challenge the 
l e g a l i t y of the Governor General's r u l i n g . The p a l p i t a t i n g Prime 
Minister, on h i s way to Pakistan, stopped at London land had an a i r c r a f t 
chartered to accommodate h i s growing retinue and shrink the distance'!? 
The next s t o r y was w e l l - r e l a t e d by Russel Spurn, correspondent of the 
Daily Express who flew to London to avoid censorship: 
" Troops poured into Karachi. .. Telephone l i n e s to 
p o l i t i c i a n s * houses were cut. Mohammad A l i flew 
Home from an American tour on Saturday. ... drove 
off f o r an urgent interview i n the Governor General's 
palace. He emerged four house l a t e r i n t e a r s . " 
Iron man"Golum Mohammad and the army generals had 
threatened him with a r r e s t . He was given u n t i l 
yesterday's morning to meet t h e i r demands ... ? t- 7 
'reorganise your Cabinet and bring i n the army*." ">* 
* These people were p r o v i n c i a l Ministers and prominent M^C.A.'s 
They were already P.R.O.D.A.-stricken. When the Sonstituent 
Assembly repealed the P.R.O.D.A., i t did not give retrospective 
e f f e c t to i t . 
** The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s accompanying p e r s o n a l i t i e s - Chow. Mohammad! 
A l i the C-in-G, Gen. Ayub were already with the Prime Minister 
i n Washington to help him negotiate economic and m i l i t a r y a i d and 
Gen. Mirza who was rec e i v i n g treatment to h i s injured back i n 
London, joined the caravan along with I.H. Ispahani, the Pakistan 
High Commissioner i n London. However coincidental, these circum-
stances lent an a i r of suspicion. 
+ This cost Pakistan public exohequer £10,000. Gen. Mirza t o l d the 
w r i t e r . 
256. New York Times. October 21, 1954. 
257 • D a i l y Sxpress. October 25, 1954. 
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The Governor General declared a state of emergency throughout Pakistan 
and performed the coup de grace by dissolving the Constituent Assembly 
which, t o him, had " l o s t the confidence of the people". New eleotions 
were to f o l l o w . The Prime M i n i s t e r , i n the t r a d i t i o n of a Quisling, 
backed the Governor General*s ac t i o n and t o l d the nation unabashed 
th a t " c o n s t i t u t i o n making i s important. But more important by f a r i s 
the s e c u r i t y and s t a b i l i t y of our country." 2-^ 
The Governor General could f i n d solace i n a Cromwellian remark 
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t h a t "not a dog barked" J J when he dissolved the long parliament. 
His sense of timing was astute. The M,L. had long ceased to be an 
assertive parliamentary body. I t was a l l f a c t i o n . A l b e i t , the name 
M.L. was ceremoniously retained, as i t was s t i l l thought t o be capable 
of commanding veneration and a f f e c t i o n from the people. By 1954, the 
M.L. had degenerated i n t o a condition reserapling that of the not-too-
d i s t a n t Egyptian Wafd party before i t s knock-out at the hands of the 
army. Then, there was the question of the U.F. on whose support the 
Governor General could confidently count i n h i s b i d f o r grand slam. 
Thus, the Governor General's Sandstone Palace was inundated by con-
g r a t u l a t o r y notes f o r his p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d a c t i o n . But i t was an 
acoident of complex circumstances that the Governor General was (mistak-
enly) h a i l e d as the custodian of public opinion. His sense of p o l i t i c a l 
m o r a l i t y was i n no way higher t h a t that of the Prime Mi n i s t e r . For, 
258© New; York Times. October 25, 1954» See also: Times: Manchester 
Guardian and Daily Herald. October 25, 1954« 
259. Jennings, op.cit.« "Cabinet Government". p.510. 
260. Dawn, October 25, 1954. 
d i d he not suspend parliamentary government i n East Pakistan and send 
General Mirza there t o r e v i t a l i s e the M.L. - whose coup de grace he 
had j u s t performed - as a part of a great plan? Where was his public 
s p i r i t when the U.F. demanded di s s o l u t i o n of the C.A.? I t was only 
through a p r o v i n c i a l lens that he could v i s u a l i s e greater issues 
This was a d i s t i n c t l i n e of hi s action. And the most redeeming feature 
was that the action of the head of the State however tendentious i n 
i t s o r i g i n , d i d at least score i n some respects, some points a n c i l l a r y 
t o popular demands. 
This period, 1947-1954* was a period of unusual tension and 
strains which bent many a r u l e of the Westminster system, hut surely 
d i d not break i t altogether. True, Jinnah as the founder of Pakistan 
nation had f a i l e d t o f o s t e r l i b e r a l forces. What was more, l i k e Bismarck 
of Germany, Jinnah's credentials as the fath e r of the nation prompted 
him to indulge i n c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s i n no way conducive to the growth 
of l i b e r a l i s m . Although, c e r t a i n discretionary powers were taken away 
from the Governor General, under Section 17 of the adapted Aot he had 
the rule-making power by di n t of which he could determine the business 
of the Central government and alloc a t e p o r t f o l i o s among ministers* 
Some temporary powers were f u r t h e r bestowed upon the Governor General. 
* P r i o r t o the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly, the Punjabi 
leaders, namely Noon, Daultana, Chow. Nazir Ahmed, Sheikh Sadiq 
Hasan, Malik Shawkat A l i , etc., etc., had been i n constant touch 
w i t h the Governor General. The same lobbying of the Punjabi 
leaders presaged Nazimuddin's dismissal. Sees Dawn1 October, 
17, 1954 and October 25, 1954. 
261. Sayeed, o p . c i t . . p .2?0. 
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The Governors General i n the i n i t i a l period of Pakistan d i d not much 
resemble t h e i r prototypes i n the Commonwealth oountries. Because of 
c e r t a i n powers given to the Governor General to f a c i l i t a t e government 
a c t i v i t i e s pending the fu t u r e c o n s t i t u t i o n , the Governor General's 
o f f i c e resembled, i n some respects, the American Presidency. There was 
thus a p o t e n t i a l c o n f l i c t between the o f f i c e of the Governor General 
and the Cabinet sustained by the Constituent Assembly, i n that the former, 
devoid of dynastic i n t e r e s t , but f u l l of personal ambitions propped up 
by regional sentiment, could always create a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s , 
when the l a t t e r was not prepared to cooperate. I n a d d i t i o n , the 
o f f i c e of the Governor General was very conspicuous since the dawn of 
the B r i t i s h r u l e when the incumbent was regarded "as de facto Bnperor 
of India surrounded w i t h some of the outer trappings associated w i t h 
Moghul r u l e " . 2 6 2 
But, equally c o r r e c t l y , i t could not be maintained that the post-
p a r t i t i o n Governors General had t h e i r s a i l s untrimmed. I n Jinnah's 
case he had a r e l a t i v e l y u n i f i e d country, government and parliament 
behind him. Mazimuddin, as the Governor General, had no issue on 
which he could display his mettle. I t was only i n Gulam Mohammad's 
* The d i s s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly was a case i n p o i n t . 
The attempted curtailment of the Governor General's power by the 
Constituent Assembly could be likened to the U.S. Congress* t r y i n g 
t o impeach the President Andrew Jackson i n vain. 
262# K. J. Hewmann, "Pakistan's Preventive Autocracy and i t s Causes", 
P a c i f i c ^ A f f a i r s . (March: 1959) P«54« 
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tenure t h a t great issues threatened the country. I t was doubtful i f 
he would a f t e r a l l , have dismissed lazirauddin had there not been such 
widespread discontent against the M i n i s t r y . Was i t the powerhouse of 
the Governor General's o f f i c e or the U.F. that was responsible f o r 
the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly? I t was always the majority 
of the people that made the Governor General's Office respond. The only 
v i t a l snag was that the Governor General's cheque was cashed i n imper-
ceptively along w i t h the people's. 
Then, what were the legacies of t h i s period, 1947 - 1954? "Five 
important milestones" v i z . ( i ) the objectives res o l u t i o n ! (,ii) the 
Interim Report} ( i i i ) the B.P.O. r e p o r t f ( i v ) compromise on the deadlock 
over the structure of the federal l e g i s l a t u r e ; (v) the f i n a l adoption 
of the B.P.G. report, "marked the road of Progress", towards making 
consensus-based i n s t i t u t i o n s . I n the ensuing chapters, i t w i l l be seen 
how the experiences gained throughout t h i s period i . e . 1947-1954 would 
act as launching pad towards a sol u t i o n of national prosperity. The 
government and the governed i n the course of t h e i r dialogue i n regards 
to i n s t i t u t i o n - b u i l d i n g understood one v i t a l points that i n the State 
of Pakistan no p a r t i c u l a r area or f o r that matter, any group of people, 
were going to be dominant at the expense of the r e s t . Compromise through 
reasoning and moderation had to be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . One imperative 
r e s u l t t h a t stood out of the labours of the Constituent Assembly was 
263. Grace J. Calder, "Constitution Debates i n Pakistan", The Muslim 
World. (January: 1956), p.41• 
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that "there should he p a r i t y i n representation between East and West 
Pakistan". S i m i l a r l y , on the ideological f r o n t , Pakistan a f t e r 
having t r a v e l l e d a long way was able to intonate Islam moderately. 
I n sum, the working of the parliamentary government during the 
period 1947-1954* viewed from the l e g a l i s t i c - m o r a l i s t i c point of par-
liamentarianism was, no doubt, an inadequate performance. But there 
was at le a s t a s i l v e r l i n e , i n tha t the government of the country and 
the quest f o r i n t e g r a t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s were made, on balance, w i t h i n 
the ambit of parliamentary system. What was more, an image of v i a b i l -
i t y was attached t o the State of Pakistan d i s t i n c t from the pos i t i o n 
at the beginning i n 1947 when the central government could not o f f e r 
i t s a dministrative o f f i c i a l s chairs t o s i t on, desks to put t h e i r 
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papers on, papers t o w r i t e on or pens and ink t o w r i t e w i t h . 
264. P. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan (London: 1962), 
P.139. 
265« S i r Zafrullah's address at the Pakistan I n s t i t u t e of Int e r n a t i o n a l 
A f f a i r s , on August 18, 1951 (Ferozsons: Karachi, 1951)» P»3» 
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PARLIAMENT 
THE STRUCTURE AND MEMBERSHIP PATTERN OF PARLIAMENT 
The Constitution of the Parliament of Pakistan contained ce r t a i n 
anomalies. I t was unicameral i n structure i n a Federal P o l i t y . The 
members of Parliament were elected i n d i r e c t l y . An element of nomination 
was also added, l a t e r on. But the most uninvigorating aspect was i t s 
dual character. This i n s t i t u t i o n , usually termed the Constituent 
Assembly, owed i t s o r i g i n t o the B r i t i s h Cabinet Mission Plan of May 15, 
1946"» I t was, thus, c o n s t i t u t e d i n July 1946". The Muslim representatives 
of the P r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s of Bengal, Sind, the N.W.F.P. and the 
Punjab elected i n the same year on a basis of one representative f o r 
each m i l l i o n population, then elected the members of the Constituent 
Assembly. S i m i l a r l y , the non-Muslim members of these l e g i s l a t u r e s 
elected t h e i r s . 
But the r e a l portent f o r the parliament l a y i n i t s being impro-
vised i n t o an organ whose members* energies and terms of reference were 
e n l i s t e d elsewhere, namely drawing up a Constitution f o r the oountry. 
With the subcontinent carved out i n t o two states i . e . India and Pakistan, 
neither had any centr a l l e g i s l a t u r e t o sustain the executive. The 
so l u t i o n incorporated i n the Indian Independence Act, 1947» was t o give 
the Constituent Assembly - i n a d d i t i o n to i t s substantive job of framing 
a c o n s t i t u t i o n - the task of ac t i n g as a Federal l e g i s l a t u r e u n t i l a 
new one was constituted,''' through general elections under the new 
1. The Indian Independence Act, 1947» Seotion 8, sub-seotion 2(e). 
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c o n s t i t u t i o n * 
The members tended t o emphasise the r o l e of the Constituent 
Assembly as a oonstitution-raaking body, which was to them a sovereign 
organ. No less a person than the leader of the opposition Mr. S.C. 
Chakravarty while speaking on the Finanoe B i l l observed "We i n t h i s 
House were elected f o r the purpose of framing a c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r Pakistan. 
* 
We have also acted as a l e g i s l a t u r e but that has been an additional work."' 
This frame of mind had a harmful e f f e c t on the a t t i t u d e of members while 
acting as l e g i s l a t o r s . 
The membership of the House t o t a l l e d 69 at the beginning. Even-
t u a l l y , i t s strength was increased t o 79. The mode of f i l l i n g vacancies 
was both nomination and cooption. On the recommendations of both the 
States Negotiating Committee and the Committee on Addition and R e d i s t r i -
bution of Seats a number of the seats of the Constituent Assembly were 
d i s t r i b u t e d t o the Provinces of the Punjab, Sind and some states acceding 
t o Pakistan. The method of e l e c t i n g members to the Assembly was 
resented by the members (both opposition and some government backbenchers) 
but t o no purpose. The ru l e r s were given a free hand i n nominating 
t h e i r representatives regardless of the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of the intending 
members - a gesture t o placate the restiv e Prinoely States. Since the 
M.L. (Government Party) was dominant i n a l l the Provinces, g e t t i n g 
people elected t o the Constituent Assembly as M.L. members from p r o v i n c i a l 
* Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. States. See C.A.D., 
Vol. IV. 1949, P.22. 
2 . C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. 1. 27 March, 1954, p .723. 
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l e g i s l a t u r e s created no d i f f i c u l t y . Besides, the government party 
having amended the Government of India Aot f o r the f i f t h time arrogated 
to i t s e l f the power of nominating members of the p r o v i n c i a l Assemblies 
t o the Constituent Assembly during the period of exodus. A member, 
re s e n t f u l of t h i s measure, commented that *'..• i t aims at making t h i s 
Constituent Assembly a mere t o o l i n the hands of the executive, u t t e r l y 
disregarding the f a c t t h a t t h i s House i s meant t o control the government 
3 
... not i t s instrument". Vacancies to the Constituent Assembly 
d i d not hold out any promise t o t h a t class of people h i t h e r t o unrepresented 
t o the House. Proportional representation - a p r i n c i p l e of f i l l i n g s i n 
the vacanoies - was "subordinated t o the dictates of p o l i t i c a l exped-
iency" .4 Even the i n i t i a l 69 members before being elected t o the Consti-
tuent Assembly were judged l a r g e l y by t h e i r l o y a l t y t o the concept of 
Pakistan. Some were elected under d i f f e r e n t t e s t s , namely how f a r they 
would be able to throw down the gauntlet v i s - a - v i s Congressites i n 
Co n s t i t u t i o n a l d i a l e c t i c s . While speaking on a cut motion, Mian 
I f t i k h a r u d d i n , r i g h t l y observed t h a t " i t was thought that we were going 
t o have a c o n s t i t u t i o n and we may have to s i t w i t h the Indian represen-
t a t i v e s of the Constituent Assembly so some economists ... some pro-
5 
fessors were taken - j u s t f o r technical job". 
I t i s generally d i f f i c u l t t o determine members* occupational 
backgrounds, through t h e i r scant biographical d e t a i l s } and t h i s f a c t 
3. C.A.D. Vol. V I . 18 January, 1950, p.62. 
4. Keith Callard, Pakistan: A P o l i t i c a l Study. (London: 1957), p»82. 
5 . C.A.D. (Leg.) Vol. 1. 26 March, 1952, p .517. 
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i s more aoute i n Pakistan, where, hy t r a d i t i o n , a man's personal chronicle 
has "been a matter of memory rather than documentation. Thus the Speaker 
himself, while f i l i n g s u i t against the Federal Government f o r d i s -
s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly, f a i l e d to f u r n i s h the court w i t h 
the names of the fathers of some of the M i n i s t e r s . 
I t i s , however, discernible that the complexion of the Assembly, 
t i l l Ootober, 1954> was palpably dominated by Zaminders, and the upper 
middle olasses. The lower middle class, labourers and peasantry were 
unrepresented i n the Assembly, although t h e i r grievances featured i n the 
Pakistan Hansard, w i t h varying degrees of motives* This was the natural 
c o r o l l a r y of the Constituent Assembly's being i n d i r e o t l y elected from 
the same franchise as the p r o v i n c i a l assemblies which elected i t , i . e . 
a r e s t r i c t e d property or educational franohise. So, the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of iopinion inside the House d i d not correspond t o outside public opinion, 
7 
An analysis of the members' occupational pattern i s given belows 
Lawyers 28 Business men 4 
Doctors 2 Educationists 12 
Engineer 1 Landlords 26 
Judge 1 C i v i l Servant 5 
79 
* Landlords. 
6. Dawn. 8 November, 1954» 
7« Iqbal Riza, "The f i r s t Constituent Assembly of Pakistan", (An 
unpublished d i s s e r t a t i o n , the Punjab University, Lahore, 1955)> 
p . 15 . 
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However h e l p f u l the analysis of the membership pattern mentioned 
above one cannot be sure of the neatness of the d i v i s i o n ; f o r , interests 
of the members and occupational bias overlapped and i n some cases 
clashed. For instance, a mention i n the above chart of refugees as a 
separate category of occupation f o r members might be embarrassing f o r 
a Pakistani researcher, but the f a c t remained th a t the refugees were, 
by and l a r g e , a p o l i t i c i z e d community. Should our analysis of members1 
occupational variables consist i n t r y i n g to f i n d some c o r r e l a t i o n 
between members* s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s and l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i v i t i e s , then i t 
i s r e a l i s t i c t o look at those l e g i s l a t o r s who happened t o cross the 
Rubicon along w i t h the p a r t i t i o n and Independence of the subcontinent, 
i n 1947* The t e r r i t o r i a l representation of constituencies was brushed 
aside and instead, a r u l e was followed whereby people of one province 
ootild get elected to the Constituent Assembly by another - a concession 
t o the refugees. The formal occupational labels of those refugee MftC.A.s 
would not be an adequate guide t o read t h e i r mind} f o r , they always looked 
upon In d i a w i t h a jaundiced eye and t h e i r problems with eager ones. 
S i m i l a r l y , conscientious r e l i g i o u s bias could be located i n the 
persons of a few members. P a r t i c u l a r l y , two M.C.A.s namely Moulana S. 
Ahmed Usmani and Moulana Akram Khan incarnated i n themselves the extreme 
• • W W M W W ^ W > « W W W W B M W M W » I W IH ' I I III l»m MWI H W H W I M U I llll II llia.MWM.KWKIirWtt-.MWIMlUIMIW IIIIIM II, r i l i a m B H t n U I W l i BHUPMWI IJIII ••MiHHCJM»»l»MWll—•IN*—WWW—Wm*m 
* S t r i c t l y speaking, the w r i t e r does not equate the term 'refugee* 
w i t h an occupation. But, when a group, such as 'refugees', chooses 
t o employ t h i s magic term t o enhance i t s p o l i t i c a l and economic 
i n t e r e s t s , i t deserves a d i f f e r e n t treatment of analysis. 
** The former was a scholar i n Muslim r e l i g i o n , known as the "Archbishop 
of Pakistan". The l a t t e r , was a veteran j o u r n a l i s t besides being 
an expert i n Muslim c l a s s i c s . 
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r e l i g i o u s forces. Apart from t h i s , there were a few members, though 
not "by t r a i n i n g and d i s c i p l i n e h i g h l y r e l i g i o u s but by i n c l i n a t i o n and 
propensity, who would i n v a r i a b l y seek to give an impression of i t . At 
le a s t , the names of the two members were s u f f i x e d by ,Moulvi', meaning 
learned i n r e l i g i o n . One of them was the President of the Constituent 
Assembly himself. 
Again, on the reverse side of t h i s r i g h t wing element of the 
M.L. group l a y the l e f t . The Chief protagonist was Mian Sb., (Saheb), 
Q 
who showed h i s leanings, more by words than deeds, towards sooialism. 
His was a case which defied c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . By education he was an 
Oxford graduate w i t h an added Baohelor of law degree, by occupation he 
was a b i g landlord possessing a imost sumptuous house, by p o l i t i c a l pro-
nouncements a flamboyant l e f t i s t who knew " i n h i s heart of hearts that 
9 
no property i s going t o be confiscated i n Pakistan".' Another member -
Dr. Malik - catalogued as a medical p r a o t i t i o n e r , had always been i n 
the f o r e f r o n t of the labour movement i n the subcontinent. I n short, 
the members * area of i n t e r e s t s were i n practice f a r more complex than 
the above chart shows. For one reason the occupational pattern was not 
mainly shaped by inexorable economic foroes l i k e western countries} f o r , 
a wealthy person could s t i l l acquire professional degrees which sounded 
s o c i a l l y p r e s t i g i o u s . Also, they became the "monomorphic" leaders g i v i n g 
8. M. A. Chowdhury "Pakistan, India and the U.S.A.", Pakistan 
Horizon (December 1953> Vol. V I ) , p.173. 
9 . CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 29 March, 1950, p .493. 
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opinions on a l l a f f a i r s because of t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the social structure* 
This was more true of West Pakistan than East Pakistan. For the members 
from East Pakistan were mostly middle class by o r i g i n and professional 
p r a c t i c e ; whereas i n West Pakistan the accent was on feudalism. 
Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of most of the members was a high standard 
of eduoation. There were members whose Alma Maters were Oxford, 
Cambridge, L.S.E. and the Inns of Court. As many as 50 members, i n one 
capacity or another, had served i n pr o v i n c i a l M i n i s t r i e s and Legislatures, 
the Governor General*s Council and the Central Legislature, under the 
Government of India Acts, 1919 and 1935. Mr. F. Haq had entered the 
Bengal P r o v i n c i a l Council i n 1913.*^ Besides, the indigenous l o c a l 
self-government systems, i n which most of the members were involved, 
had i n s t i l l e d i n them a sense of l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . There was 
another category of members w i t h Congressites at the top whose p o l i t i c a l 
frame of mind was p a r t i a l l y gaol-bred, i n that the members who where 
incarcerated under the B r i t i s h regime f o r a f a i r l y long time, developed 
a consistent habit of viewing a u t h o r i t y with suspicion - an acquired 
a t t i t u d e t h a t boomeranged. 
The composition of the House was less v i b r a t i n g . I t was a l l 
sober and s t a i d i n keeping with the autumnal mellowness of the ageing 
* Among the 48 o f f i o i a l biographies of members which xirere available, 
45 were graduates, including some post-graduates, as w e l l . Loc.cit.. 
Riza, (unpublished t h e s i s ) . 
** Calculations based on the personal f i l e s kept i n the Chatham House 
and interviews. 
*** See H. Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government i n India. 
Pakistan and Burma (London? 1968). 
10. A.S.M. Abdul Rab A.K. Fazlul Haq (Ferozsons: Lahore, 1966), p»17« 
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members whose youths were harnessed i n the days of pre-independence 
yore. On average the members were i n t h e i r l a t e f i f t i e s . By 1954 
Mr. Haq was 81, Mr. N. Ahmed and the leader of the opposition were i n 
t h e i r l a t e seventies;** while the youngest members were i n t h e i r l a t e 
t h i r t i e s by 1954 . 1 2 
Women had been enfranchised l a t e l y . Besides the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
purdah always acted as an impediment towards the emancipation of women. 
The Indian Statutory Commission had encouraging words f o r them* though 
progress had always been at snail's pace,. The House had two women 
members, e.g. Begum Shahisawaz and Begum Ikraraullah. The former had 
always been an active parliamentarian while the l a t t e r - also a w r i t e r -
represented Pakistan i n the U.N.O. on many an occasion. The differences 
i n members* background, ta s t e and outlook were r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r apparel 
which might have l e n t an extra colour to the House. The Hindu members 
would appear draped i n white sheeting with shawls wrapped around t h e i r 
necks, while among the M.L. members some would prefer wearing Sherwanis 
and t i g h t ankle length breeches, the others would don themselves with 
western clothes. The women members were elegantly wrapped up i n t h e i r 
t r a d i t i o n a l s a r i s . 
* A v e i l t h a t oovers the e n t i r e body of a woman. 
** The East Pakistan Legislature had two distinguished l a d i e s , Mrs. Nelie 
Sen Gupta and Begum Anwara. The Punjab had two and the N.W.F.P. 
and Sind had none. 
*** Frock-like coat. 
Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, Vol. 1, p.53 
11. GAD (Leg.) Vol.V. 9 March, 1949, P»94. 
1 2 • Da-wn« 26 June, 1954. 
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Salaries and Privileges 
Regardless of countries, s o c i a l aphorisms had always influenced 
people t o look upon payments f o r public services w i t h furrowed brows. 
Now t h a t the social and p o l i t i c a l ecology have changed the subject has 
been found comparatively less offensive. On both questions of emoluments 
and p r i v i l e g e s the Pakistan members' s i t u a t i o n was an unenviable one. 
The M.C.A.s were sanctioned a meagre amount of Rs .45/- eaoh f o r a day's 
expenditure - no f i x e d s a l a r i e s . The expenses of the journeys members? 
had undertaken from t h e i r constituencies t o the venue of the parliament 
and vice-versa, were, of course, borne by the government. F a c i l i t i e s 
existed f o r members t o reserve r a i l accommodation up to 30 days i n 
advance oompared t o the maximum period of 10 days allowed t o the p u b l i c 
The members were issued f i r s t or seoond olass t i c k e t s f o r themselves and J 
13 
t h i r d olass f o r t h e i r servants. 
I f we are to regard members' emoluments as an inducement t o devote 
themselves t o t h e i r parliamentary works, then the prescribed allowances 
were not adequate to generate t h a t f e e l i n g . This was more t r u e of the 
East Pakistan members who had a journey of 1200 miles t o the c a p i t a l . 
Monetary considerations might have discouraged an otherwise p o l i t i c a l l y 
motivated member from performing h i s duties adequately. The l e v e l of 
attendance of members at the House which on average ranged from 37 t o 
57 had some bearings on the f i n a n c i a l aspect. I t was equally sad that 
+ The P r o v i n c i a l Legislators had no salaries e i t h e r , but a d i f f e r e n t 
scale of allowances. 
13. Dawn. 4 March, 1953» 
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while the r u l i n g party could not make the members, who were already i n 
the oountry, a l i t t l e more mobile by assuaging t h e i r monetary handicap, 
i t found i t wise t o allow members who were s t i l l r e t a i n i n g seats i n 
the House and also serving as ambassadors outside to enjoy sessional 
allowances, by having c l e v e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d the diplomatic convention 
that Pakistan Foreign Embassies and Missions were Pakistan t e r r i t o r i e s . * ^ 
P r i v i l e g e s accorded to the members are not ends i n themselves, 
f o r they are granted only t o ensure unimpeded parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s . 
A country should be on i t s guard l e s t members* p r i v i l e g e s degenerate 
i n t o extra-special r i g h t s at the expense of the notion of equality of 
man before the law. Pri v i l e g e s are safe i n the hands of those members 
whose countries* democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s and c i v i c sense have, at l e a s t , 
gained some v i a b i l i t y . What the House of Commons enjoys as pri v i l e g e s 
and immunities could not have formed part of Indian l e g i s l a t i v e bodies 
despite some unsuooessful attempts t h a t had been made p r i o r t o indepen-
15 
denoe, ^  The advent of independence did not s i g n i f i c a n t l y a l t e r the 
s i t u a t i o n . Unlike the Indian Central Legislature, the Pakistan p a r l i a -
ment d i d not esta b l i s h a Committee on Pr i v i l e g e s . Also, i t d i d not 
possess any rules of procedure dealing with p r i v i l e g e motions. The House 
* Immunities are granted i n the constitutions of some countries. 
Members of Parliament are exempt from j u r y services i n France, U,K. 
and Burma, from compulsory m i l i t a r y service i n I s r a e l ; from g i v i n g 
evidenoe i n the court of law, i f they choose, i n West Germany. See 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, Parliaments (Gassell & Co., London, 1962), 
p.56. 
14* I b i d . . 23 September, 1953. 
15. W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament i n India (London: 1957)> pp.245-246. 
132. 
r e l i e d on the Section 28 (Also on Sections 20 and 22, Clause ( l ) ) of 
the India Aot of 1935 as adapted. 
Three p r i v i l e g e s existed e.g. freedom of speech i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , 
immunity from courts' proceedings f o r anything said i n the House and 
n o n - l i a b i l i t y of any members f o r reports, papers or proceedings as 
published under the a u t h o r i t y of the House. Much had been l e f t f o r a 
fut u r e Federal Act f o r f u r t h e r additions t o the e x i s t i n g p r i v i l e g e s . 
The Prime M i n i s t e r b l u n t l y t o l d the House on the question of Gaffar 
Khan's incarceration t h a t members had no p a r t i c u l a r p r i v i l e g e s e n t i t l i n g 
them t o d i f f e r e n t treatment under the law. But, he added that " i t would 
be d i f f e r e n t proposition i f t h i s House passes c e r t a i n l e g i s l a t i o n g i v i n g 
c e r t a i n p r i v i l e g e s t o the ... members".*** 
Since then, c e r t a i n precedents of p r i v i l e g e s had been, by con-
vention, established, v i z . the government's supplying the members with 
17 
a l l documents and n o t i f i c a t i o n s t h a t had been gazetted, 1 replying t o 
/ 
members' questions as early as possible or ensuring a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
18 
papers, st a t i o n e r y and l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s t o the members, etc., etc. 
But, members' p r i v i l e g e s d i d not make any headway beyond the threshold 
of the House. Members on various occasions took recourse t o minor 
complaints, as they had experienced interceptions by the Police on duty, 
on t h e i r way t o the House. Also, a f a l s e sense of p r i v i l e g e s l e d a 
member drawing the Speaker's a t t e n t i o n as to why his name had been 
16. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1 . , 16 December, 1948, p.68. 
1T« I b i d . . Vol. 1. , 10th A p r i l , 1950, p .55« 
18. I b i d . . Vol. I I . , 16 December, 1948, p. 7. 
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erroneously dropped from the Select Committee.^ 
But the real threat came from some conservative newspapers cast-
ing "both direct and indireot aspersions on members* behaviour. I t was 
more true of "Dawn", the Russian prototype of "Pakistan Pravda", who 
would even go so far as to involve the Congress members i n a "Master 
20 
Plan" opening a "fron t " i n Pakistan for India. Perhaps the patience 
of the members was at the end of i t s tether, when the "Dawn" came up 
again with an e d i t o r i a l headed "Serpent of Freedom" lashing the opposition* 
The House thought that a prima facie case of breach of privilege had 
been established and immediately appointed for the f i r s t time an ad hoc 
21 
committee to consider the matter. But the House did not l i v e long 
enough to see i t s privileges guaranteed when the ad hoc oommittee had 
long been drowned i n the debris of events. 
The S i t t i n g of Members 
The building that houses the parliament and i t s seating arrange-
ment-, indicate, i n part, the p o l i t i c a l behaviour of a given nation* 
Sir W. Churchill, who himself crossed the floor couple of times, at 
length commented, "We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings 
22 
shape us." Unlike the House of Oommons, whose shape i s rectangular, 
Pakistan's parliament was the conventionally semicircular type. Even 
* Also provincial legislatures. Some buildings were originally not 
meant for the housing of the legislatures - they were just converted. 
19. I b i d . . Vol.11, 18 December, 1949, p.155. 
20. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 13 larch, 1950, p . l . 
21. I b i d . , Vol. I I , 20 November, 1952, p.444« 
22. K.C. Wheare, Legislatures (London* I963), p.12. 
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the proposed new one was to have been semi-circular. Compared to the 
number of members the size of the building was large. By the passage 
of time small isles of members were dotted across the f l o o r , forming 
parties. The assigned seats with writing desks for members were marked 
permanently - a departure from the House of Commons practice. On a 
number of occasions, members who rose to participate i n the debates, 
were declared out of order by the Speaker, as they were not at their 
23 
seats. 
According to the Rules of the House, the government sat by the 
right hand side of the Speaker, while the opposition on his l e f t . 
Usually, the Speaker would a l l o t seats to the p o l i t i c a l parties i n order 
of t h e i r strength and then consult with the leader of the House and 
opposition leaders about seating the individual members belonging to 
th e i r respective parties. 
Parliamentary Authority 
In a parliamentary democraoy of the Westminster type the sovereignty 
of the people i s manifest i n the legislature. While the making of laws 
i s synonymous with the name of legislature, the parliamentary type of 
government moves one significant step further, despite certain common 
grounds with i t s other prototypes, i n thcit i t holds the executive 
accountable. 
Now that Pakistan was independent, i t s legislature was to function 
independently of, from any strings attached to i t . The Government of 
23. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 26 May, 1948, p.875. 
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India Act, 1935 would, mutatis mutandis, act as the provisional consti-
t u t i o n of Pakistan. Besides, the Indian Independence Act of 1947 and 
the Pakistan Provisional Constitution Order, 1947 removed the li m i t i n g 
clauses of the Act of 1935 on the legislature. But the fact remained, 
the Constituent Assembly as a sovereign "body could always remove hind-
rances i n the way of the legislature fey making or unmaking laws. I t 
clipped the Governor General*s powers exercised i n his "individual judg-
ment" and " i n his discretion". Repugnancy to the Br i t i s h laws would not 
act upon the laws passed by the Pakistan Federal Legislature. 2^ On money 
B i l l s alone warranted the prior sanction of the Governor General. He 
would assent to B i l l s passed by the legislature. He would£ no longer, 
restore a grant or refuse legislation passed by the legislature, but 
could ask the l a t t e r f o r reconsideration. But one significant allowance 
was given to the Governor General i n that he ©ould decree when the 
Parliament was not s i t t i n g , 
^ The Seventh Schedule of the India Act of 1935 contained three well 
defined l i s t s v i z , the Central, the Provincial and the Concurrent, of 
subjects to be administered by the Central Government and the federating 
unit s . However, subsequent developments blurred the lines of distinction 
between l i s t s of subjectsj f o r , on grounds of public interest, efficiency 
and emergency more provincial subjects glided into the federal l i s t . 
Notably, the Government of India (Amendment) Act, 1948, too& the 
* The term federal legislature and parliament has been used as 
interchangeable• 
24, Government of India Act, 1947» Section 6, Subsection 1, 
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responsibility of collection of sales tax from the provincial govern-
ments. The Government of India (Second Amendment) Act, 1950, 2^ empowered 
the parliament to hold the central government responsible for the admini-
stration of the federal area, Karaohi. Similarly, succession duties on 
estates, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, and very many 
lig h t and heavy industries f a l l i n g under the provincial category, came 
under parliamentary control. Until 1954» there were as many as 44 Acts 
passed by the Constituent Assembly as a constituent body, which resulted 
i n the increase^of the power of the parliament. Most of those Acts 
passed were amendments to the Government of India Aot, 1935. The irony 
was that the Government of India Act 1935, once thought (before inde-
—' 
pendence) to be inadequate became subservient to the ruling politicians 
after independence. A wry comment came from Prof. Chakravarty: "... the 
Government pf India Act, 1935 which i s sought to be amended has been 
said to be too wooden, too inelastio and antedeluvian and i t i s regretted 
that we are s t i l l governed by the Government of India Act." 2^ 
However, the element of centralism ingrained i n the India Act of 
1935 was a l l the more accentuated i n that special powers were given to 
the Governor General under Rule 9 of "the Indian Independence Act, 1947 
"that the Governor General by Order shall make such provisions as appears 
to him to be necessary or expedient for bringing the provisions of t h i s 
28 
Act into effective operation." Above a l l , the Governor General was 
25. Sectidn 8 amended 290A of the Government of India Aot, 1935» with 
effect from 22nd day of July, 1948. 
26. Dawn. 5 May, 1955. 
2 ? . CAD Vol. VI, 18.January, 1950, p . 3 . 
28. CAD Vol. I l l , 2 March, 1949» P. 42. 
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i n the person of Mr. Jinnah, the founder of the nation. Circumstances 
l i k e the burgeoning wave of refugees across the border with i t s attendant 
problems prompted oonoentration of power i n the central government 
through the parliament. Whether the power of the federal legislature 
as a corporate body was genuine or a neo-facade Assembly, Pakistan style -
which i s subject to analysis - but i n legal parlance the Constituent 
Assembly as federal legislature was much more powerful that the Indian 
central legislature. 
Procedure 
Parliament should be free from any undue outside interference i n 
the conduct of i t s business. Procedural independence must be ensured. 
Rules of Prooedure of business, Standing Orders i n the shape of resolu-
tions serve as guidelines to the unfettered way of running business 
within the House} and what i s more they inculcate i n the members 
the art of going into the rhythm of their parliamentary works. But what 
i s even more expected of the members i s t h e i r thorough awareness of 
the rules of the game and the inner mechanism of parliament. The Rules 
of Procedure, when made, tend to shape the inner workings of the House 
i n a coherent manner. Thus a continuity of purpose i s handed down from 
one generation to the next. 
Erskine May's "Parliamentary Procedure" has always been a Bible 
both to the i n i t i a t e d and uninitiated parliamentary politioans of the 
Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. Broadly speaking, the Rules and Standing 
Orders of the Indian central legislature were i n line with the s p i r i t 
of ErSkine May, At the outset, the Pakistan parliament followed, i n 
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the words of i t s own President "the Indian Central Assembly rules...". y 
However, the Constituent Assembly as the constitution-making body passed 
30 
a complete set of rules for i t s own conduct. A Committee on Rules of 
Procedure was appointed on August 11, 1947 » and submitted i t s report on 
February 24, 1948; and the new Rules were made on March 2, 1948.^" 
Subsequent amendments were incorporated from time to time. One conten-
tious amendment whioh disqualified Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy from the member-
ship of Parliament had an import of great p o l i t i c a l significance. 
Probably, the whole oourse of parliamentary p o l i t i c s would otherwise 
have been very diff e r e n t . Speaking on the amendment, Mr. Suhrawardy 
i n an apparently sardonic fcein observed that i t i s not given to 
everyone i n t h i s l i f e to be present at one's obsequies, or to p a r t i o i -
32 
pate i n an oration at i t s own funeral". 
However, the Rules of Procedure were, also, i n part determined 
33 
by the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935* salient 
features, i n t e r a l i a , of the Rules of Procedure of the parliament were 
the following: The Parliament was to hold at least one session i n every 
year. A gap of 12 months between the last s i t t i n g of one session and 
f i r s t s i t t i n g of the next was to be avoided. The Governor General had 
both the power of addressing and sending messages to the House. I t 
heard i t s f i r s t Governor General on the 11th August, 1947* The addresB 
29. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 10, 1948, p.462. 
30. Statesman, Maroh 12, 1948. 
31. CAD (Leg.) Vol.11, March 2, 1948, p.40. 
32. CAD, Vol. I l l , 18 May, 1948, p.31. 
33. The Indian Independence Act, 1947* Seotion 8, subsection 2. 
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was of a more po n t i f i c a l nature than the ones delivered by the Queen 
i n Great B r i t a i n and the President of India at the opening of the f i r s t 
session, which set out governmental policy. The next address made on 
August 19, 1949 "by the Governor General to the Parliament augured well, 
i n that i t contained the general policy of the government and was 
it 
followed by full-dress debate on the floor of the House. This convention 
f i n a l l y died of atrophy. 
Karachi was the seat of the legislature, which used to meet 
either i n the later part of February or early i n March to present the 
Budget showing estimates of annual income and expenditure*^ The 
Second Session usually began around August or September to be adjourned 
shortly afterwards having disposed of a few items of legislative 
business. At the commencement of each session the President was to 
nominate a panel of not more than four Chairmen to preside over the 
35 
s i t t i n g s i n his absence. ^  Besides, i n matters of procedures governing 
debates, questions, adjournment motions and the l i k e , the House drew 
on the experiences of the House of Commons and Indian legislature i f 
not covered by i t s own* 
The Of f i c i a l s of Parliament, 
There emerges a distinct establishment inside the House to ensure 
i t s maintenance both administrative and otherwise. The way t h i s 
Establishment i s peopled also determines the power structure of the 
Parliament. The question i s who i s pulling the strings? I n the pa r l i a -
* During the period 1947-1954» no other addresses were made. 
34. The Government of India Act, 1935» Section 36. 
35* CAD (Leg.) of Pakistan, Rules of Procedure and Standing Orders, 
Rule Ho. 4. 
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mentary Secretariat of Pakistan the President (or the Speaker), albeit, 
was the Head, but he had no overall control i n the recruitment of 
executive s t a f f save minor ones. For there was no independent cadre 
of parliamentary services. The Secretary (Pakistan version of the House 
of Commons Clerk), two Deputy Secretaries and one Assistant Seoretary 
were appointed by the Cabinet, Below t h i s , there were other staffs namely, 
librarians, research officers, government reporters, shorthand typists, 
e t c , whose main job was, by and large, to record verbatim the speeches 
of the members, publish them, keep informative materials i n the archives, 
compile orders of business of the day, assemble questions, and last but 
certainly not least, to cater to the needs of the members i n the discharge 
of t h e i r parliamentary duties. The Secretary was the key figure and 
was supposed to be adept i n parliamentary procedure so as to help the 
Speaker dispose of issues arising out of procedural tangles. 
Apparently, the Secretary of the Pakistan parliament was well-
qualified. His name occurred i n the Hansard only a few times when he 
was required to announce the B i l l s which had received assent from the 
Governor General, His seat was i n front and right below the President's 
dais. Usually, the Secretariat bore mild criticism from the members when 
i t s annual budget was submitted for sanotion. On one occasion a 
government backbencher grudged the Secretary his fat salary, despite the 
contrary recommendation of the Pay Commission, He also questioned the 
* Mr, B.M. Ahmed, M.A. ( A l i g , ) , M.Litt. (Cantab). He had been the 
Secretary from 1947 to 1958, 
36. CAD (Leg.) Index CAP (L) Index Vol.11 48/770, 1948. 
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existence of three Research Officers whose output was n i l * During 
t h i s long period, 1947 - 1954* there was a single complaint from an 
opposition member that the o f f i c i a l s of the Secretariat were partial 
to the Ministers and t h e i r yes-men i n giving assistance i n respect of 
Rules of Procedure and previous ruling of the Indian legislature. The 
President promptly refuted the charge and said that "...such assistance, 
i s available to every member of th i s House whether he i s Minister or 
not ...« 3 8 
However, what i s meant by the expression i»e. the independence 
of parliamentary Secretariat - a desideratum of the parliamentary form 
of government - was not i n the ascendancy i n Pakistan. The President 
could not assert himself vis-a-vis the government, particularly i n the 
question of appointments^ The Secretary, though subordinate to the 
President, happened to be a member of the G.S.P. cadre, whose tenure 
of service was controlled by the establishment department of the Cabinet 
Secretariat, the government of Pakistan. 
The Speaker 
The expression that the Speaker is the "Member of Parliament No.l"^ 
or one who seldom speaks i n the House have more profound meanings than 
the l i t e r a l ones. The No. 1 parliamentarian ensures the flow of parlia-
mentary ' l i f e blood' i . e . debates, without participating i n them. His 
* Par back i n 1957, on one occasion, the conduct of the Secretary 
was questioned i n the parliament for alleged discovery of Indian 
ourrency i n his limousine. 
37. CAD Vol. V I I I , 28 November 1950, p.198. 
38. CAD Vol. I , 31st July, 1954, p.1582. 
39* H. Morrison, Government and Parliament (London5 1954), p.204. 
comparative silence i n the House tends to be eloquent enough to put the 
entire business of the House i n order - a display of seeming verbal 
incongruity that have been wrapped i n papers of history and traditions 
of the B r i t i s h going f a r back as 1377• Denuded of t h i s t r a d i t i o n , 
Pakistan had to emulate the office of the B r i t i s h speaker as close as 
her politico-social strains would permit* 
Implications aside:, the f i r s t election to the office of the 
Speaker of a member belonging to the scheduled caste, though temporary, 
was a salutary example. Mr. Jinnah came next, and was succeeded later, 
by Mr. Tamizzuddin Khan i n 1948, who oontinued i n the office t i l l i t s 
dissolution. In a l l cases i t was the House which elected the Speaker 
and elected him unanimously. I t i s generally assumed that once elected 
the Speaker should be p o l i t i c a l l y colour-blind, so that, i n the larger 
interest, he can dispense justice evenhandedly among different sections* 
of the House. 
No sooner elected than the leader of the opposition, Mr. Chakra-
varty acclaimed the Speaker with f l u t t e r i n g references to his part when 
he was Deputy Speaker of the House i n the undivided India and did things 
"very e f f i c i e n t l y and even without any discrimination} and hoped that 
he would, with the added knowledge gathered from his recent v i s i t s to 
the House of Commons, consider himself "no longer a party man",^ 
Probably Mr. Khan began with the hardest job of neutralising his own 
* In Pakistan parliament he was addressed as "Mr. President". 
40. GAD, V o l , I I , 16 December, 1948, p.69. 
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values when the country's national values were i n a process of being 
sorted out. 
Notwithstanding the personal strains, he was deeply involved, as 
the President of the Constituent Assembly, i n the making of the country's 
constitution and took part actively i n various committees of i t . 
What Sir Ivor Jennings thought of "the Speaker's authority", i n the 
House of Commons, " i s greater than his power",^ was i n the Pakistan 
situation only p a r t i a l l y true. This was largely due to the linkage of 
the Speaker's office with the Constituent Assembly as a constitution-
* 
making body - a sovereign one - whose President he was. Besides, the 
Presidentship was the erstwhile saddle of Mr, Jinnah. In other words, 
the prestige of the o f f i c e was associated, contrary to parliamentary 
t r a d i t i o n , more with extrinsic factors than with i n t r i n s i c . 
Mr, Khan rose to the occasion quite reasonably i n the conduct of 
parliamentary business. Beings- a veteran Muslim leaguer and a nominee 
of that party he neither prevented the individual members from p a r t i c i -
pating i n the proceedings, i f they were on good grounds, nor sought to 
muffle the voice of the small opposition. As a matter of fact, he, i n 
the i n i t i a l f l u i d i t y of situation, improvised rules that went i n favour 
of the opposition - a desired end. In the very f i r s t meeting of the 
House he stretohed a procedural point permitting members to ask more than 
* This sounds true that after the dissolution of the Constituent 
Assembly i n 1954> the position of the Speakers, regardless of central 
or provincial legislatures had been anything but f l a t t e r i n g . 
41. Sir I . Jennings, Parliament (Cambridge: 1961), p.63. 
144. 
one question on a particular subject i n addition to suppleraentaries 
which was "a slight strategic set back the Government suffered". 4 2 
In the same session he salvaged the opposition cut motions unrestrained 
to specific grievance, which otherwise would have deprived opposition's 
"privilege of moving cut motions", 4^ His i n i t i a l concessions made to the 
opposition members were contingent i n that he wanted the members to be 
cautious and conversant enough i n regard to parliamentary procedure 
i n future. 
The antennae of the Speaker must be attuned to the sensitivity 
of the House as a whole - a secret of his success. To make the House 
productive and successful his tact should be geared to the d i f f i c u l t 
job of giving the majority a green l i g h t i n the affairs of the State's 
business i n the House without signalling an inappropriate red l i g h t to 
the Opposition. This job was harder and more delicate i n the Pakistan 
parliament. For the Speaker was called upon to preside over two main 
groups of parties, one of which had won the State and now formed i t s 
government, while the other which was once opposed to i t s very b i r t h 
had become, technically, a potential government i.e. the opposition. 
For instance, when the Budget of the year 1950-51 was presented under 
the shadow of the East Pakistan communal r i o t s , the Speaker had to 
grudgingly acoommodate, at the expense of the Rule No. 46 of the House, 
a Congressite reading out a set speech, t o t a l l y outside the scope of the 
Budget. 4 4 
42. Statesman. March 12, 1948. 
43. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 4 March, 1948, p.173. 
44. I b i d . . Vol. 1, 16 March, 1950, pp.58-64. 
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Members might have on occasions, misread the Speaker's i n c l i -
nation to accept the suggestions of the leader of the House? but that 
was a normal courtesy he owed to the Prime Minister. But that did not 
make him an easy accomplice to the government's over-hasty legislative 
programmes. On one occasion he embarrassed the goverment by postponing 
a controversial B i l l "to some day";^ for proper notice had not been 
given. He did not soruple to goad the government for not f i x i n g a pro-
gramme of business "for the entire session"^ of 1954. He would occas-
ionally come to the resoue of a nervous opposition member, who got 
netted by a Ministerial point of order for indulging i n arguments unre-
lated to central government, by saying that, to his mind, the member 
was t r y i n g to show the i n e v i t a b i l i t y "of the policy of control at the 
centre".^ The way adjouxnxraent motions were disposed of was, as usual, 
psychologically susoeptible to opposition unhappiness. But the Standing 
Order Ho. 23 only allowed the Speaker to determine i f a particular 
matter proposed to be discussed was i n order or not. The authority to 
allow a motion to be discussed f i n a l l y lay with the House. The adjourn-
ment motion on 'abnormal rise i n prioes*, despite government opposition, 
was d i r e c t l y put to the vote of the House and carried through by the 
AO 
Speaker. 
There was one big difference between the Speaker of the House of 
Commons and his equivalent i n Pakistan, i n that the former intervened 
45. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 27 A p r i l , 1954, p.1275. 
46. I b i d . . Vol. 1, 18 September, 1954, p. 1782. 
47. I b i d . . Vol. 1, 10 Maroh, 1948, p. 457* 
48. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 23 September, 1953, P.56. 
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less i n the proceedings of the House, while the contrary was the case 
with the l a t t e r . In Pakistan the Speaker had an implied role of incul-
cating a sense of parliamentary propriety, procedure and decorum. He 
might draw a Minister's attention to his not "reading the rules care-
f u l l y " , on the one hand, and wonder at an old member's mistake i n not 
putting down the date i n which time "the report" from the Select Commit-
tee " w i l l have to "be submitted" to the House, on the other.^ These 
were among others, the common expressions v i z . "Please address the 
Chair", "No cross t a l k " , "Does th i s come under t h i s head?",- "No repeti-
t i o n please", etc., etc., the Speaker had to give, else proceedings 
might have d r i f t e d on and on, to an irrelevant area. In the performance 
of duties he had always been unassuming but resolute, fl e x i b l e but 
cautious, simple i n a t t i r e but neatly dignified. Only on one occasion 
he had to silence a vociferous opposition member by saying tbat " I con-
50 
demn your action and I hope i t w i l l not be repeated."^ Despite his 
deep sense of Islamic values he managed not to l e t i t interfere with 
the proceedings of the House, unlike his junior colleague of the 
N.W.P.P. who asked the House point blank i f Shariat (religious injunction) 
51 
was to be the law of the country. The point was that the Speakers of 
* Br Shuzauddin, the Speaker of the Punjab L.A. used to wear gown and 
wig, unlike the national Speaker. Having returned from an American 
goodwill tour, he boastfully t o l d the House that he was going to 
use a hundred-year-old wooden gavel - a White House present - to 
c a l l the House i n order. See Dawn. 1 Deoember, 1953. 
49. CAD (Leg.) Vol.11, p.54 and Vol. 1, 21 February, 1949, p.8l. 
50. I b i d . . Vol. 1, 19 March, 1953, p. 378. 
51. Dawn. March 13, 1952. 
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Pakistan, national or provincial alike, were pol i t i c i s e d i n varying 
degrees and the differences were ones of level and deepness not of 
* 
quality* 
Of course, i n Mr. Khan's case, his long p o l i t i c a l career inter-
spersed with legal practice stood hira i n good stead i n the nick of time. 
He succeeded i n establishing a rapport of mutual respectability with 
the leader of the opposition, and guided the House i n the same direction 
whioh paid him well i n achieving an agreed time table of business, which* 
sometimes threatened the fringe relationship between the government and 
52 
the opposition. 
He was not a l l gruff and s t i f f , but would be found indulging 
i n innocent fun with the members. For instance, he would tease a oru-
sading member of a l l corruption, who spoke of banning sex-ridden western 
films unworthy of being "witnessed by a son together with his parents 
or by any junior with his senior" with a passing remark* "Are you speak-
ing from your personal experience?", only to be followed by an appreciable 
answer: "Yes Sir, to a oertain extent."^ 
Inside the House, he had been irapecoably f a i r both to his 'Chair1 
and to the individual members. Once the Speaker had anticipated a 
remark a t t r i b u t i v e to the 'Chair' and intercepted i t , scarcely had the 
* Mr. Talpur became the Speaker of the Sind legislature after having 
served the House as leader of the l . L . party. Mr. S. Shaw, a former 
speaker, became minister under Mr. I . Haroon's Cabinet i n Sind. See 
Dawn. 15 September, 1953 and Daily Express. 18 February, 1949. 
52. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 17 July, 1954, p.149? Vol.11, 24 November, 
1952, p.593. 
53. I b i d . . Vol. 1, 3 A p r i l , 1951> p. 791. 
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leader of the opposition uttered "Sir, I am sorry that the President • 
by saying that "You cannot c r i t i c i z e the Chair i n this way."*^ Similarly, 
he boldly guarded the privileges of Mr» Suhrawardy, when the government 
party on a point of order challenged his membership on grounds of being 
an Indian ci t i z e n . His ruling was that Mr. Suhrawardy " i s a member of 
t h i s House and he has a right to speak". 
But where he was found most inadequate was i n paving the way for 
the growth of healthy parliamentary practices and conventions. The 
holding of the Speaker's Conference to evaluate doubts and d i f f i c u l t i e s 
arising out of the working of various legislatures had been a routine 
a f f a i r i n some of the Commonwealth countries. But the holding of the 
Speaker's Conference i n Pakistan was irregular. The f i r s t Speaker's 
Conference was held i n 1950* ?Eough the Speaker showed anxiety as to 
the status and position of the future legislatures of the Federation of 
Pakistan as well as of the Secretariats of those legislatures, never-
theless his main preoccupation was the framing of the constitution 
rather than the "consideration of procedural matters alone"; f o r, 
to him, the conference took plaoe "at a psychological moment i n the 
56 
history of t h e i r country" • His status as the President of the Con-
stituent Assembly as oonstitution-making body got the better of his 
role as Speaker of the parliament. Here he raised a controversial point 
i n respect of the Speaker's remaining p o l i t i c a l l y neutral, qualified or 
54. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 29 March, 1954, p. 898. 
55o I b i d . . Vol. 1, 6 March, 1948, p. 260. 
56. Pakistan News. 2^ May, 1950 
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u n q u a l i f i e d . He claimed to have been able t o maintain the compatibility 
*57 
of h i s party allegiance w i t h t h a t of parliamentary i m p a r t i a l i t y . 
Side by Bide w i t h t h i s , what he gained i n h i s a b i l i t y t o protect the 
r i g h t s of the members wifchiithe House was matohed by his i n a b i l i t y t o 
do the same from without. % e n a Congressite sought the protection of 
the •Chair 1 against a Daily English language newspaper, The Times of 
Karachi, which had e a r l i e r oaptioned a news as "Chakravarty assails 
Islam", the Chair, while admitting that there was nothing "objectionable*' 
i n Prof. Chakravarty , !s speech, m i l d l y cautioned the paper "not t o give 
•58 
misleading headlines" and "hoped t h i s warning would serve the purpose". 
I t seemed l i k e l y that h i s subjective yardstick of judging members' p r i v i -
leges coincided w i t h h i s non-assertive nature vis-a-vis outside powers. 
To h i s c r e d i t , however, he c e r t a i n l y had oneironumental instance 
t o his score, i n t h a t , alone i n the gusty c o n s t i t u t i o n a l breeze, he 
bravely fought the Governor^General against his dissolving the Constituent 
Assembly i n October 1954* H» was a s o l i t a r y example of a great p a r l i a -
mentary occasion of the highest magnitude that has so f a r ever occured 
i n Pakistan h i s t o r y . No amount of arguments can water down, at l e a s t , 
i t s symbolic values, i f they have any meaning to p o s t e r i t y . An apt 
* The w r i t e r thinks t h a t the withdrawal of the Speaker from p o l i t i c s , 
however desirable, was a d i f f i c u l t matter i n Pakistan. The Speaker 
might have sought not t o l e t h i s constituency remain disenfranchised -
a temptation t h a t could a r i s e i n the absence of varied organized 
groups. However, t h i s outside p o l i t i k i n g on the part of the speaker, 
the scope of which i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y recognised i n the U.S.A., 
Ire l a n d , France or I s r a e l , developed e x t r a - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n Pakistan. 
** A point t h a t has been hardly stressed by Pakistan w r i t e r s , f o r t h e i r 
arguments are usually wrenched i n t o a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n . 
57. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I I , 16 December, 1948, p .70. 
58. Dawn, 11 October, 1953* 
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remark th a t i t was "unique i n the le g a l h i s t o r y of the commonwealth", ^ 
hag "been featured i n the very preface of an expert c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t ' s 
"book. There i s an i r o n i c touch i n that the message of h i s t o r y has been 
unconsciously t o l d reoently by a self-conscious President, ,an avowed 
non-believer of parliamentary government i n Pakistan. President Ayub 
recal l e d h i s interview w i t h Mr. Khan and observed i n his book that he 
"admired h i s courage ... genuine conviction" f o r demanding "to have a 
parliamentary government". Again, he noted his own reactions: " I n 
f r u s t r a t i o n and exhaustion I r e p l i e d i n strong terms. The o l d man took 
60 
i t w e l l " . F i n a l l y , there was a paradox: The dedicated believer i n 
a parliamentary system of the B r i t i s h type was elected i n t o the d f f i c e 
of the Speaker i n 1962 t o preside over a parliament which i n no way 
approximated t o his b e l i e f . He died i n harness seeing an opposition 
demand i . e . the fundamental r i g h t s t o be made j u s t i c i a b l e , acoepted by 
the government. 
The Deputy Speaker 
To unload some of the burdens of the Speaker or t o f a c i l i t a t e 
#* 
parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s more e f f i c i e n t l y , the o f f i c e of the Deputy 
Speaker i s created. A Statutory Provision f o r t h i s o f f i c e was made i n 
* The w r i t e r had the opportunity of knowing him from close quarters. 
He believed t h a t h i s entry i n t o the present parliament would act as 
thaw to the frozen b e l i e f of those people who had s t i l l f a i t h i n 
Westminster system. 
#* The o f f i c e i s also susceptible t o spoils system or group p l a c a b i l i t y . 
I n France, there are quite a few Deputy Speakers. 
59» S i r I . Jennings, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Problems i n Pakistan (Cambridge: 
1957), P. v i i i . 
60. M. Ayub Khan. Friends not Masters (Karachi: 1967), p.206. 
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the Pakistan parliament as f a r back as 9th June, 1948, but i t came i n t o 
e f f e c t only on the 28th March, 1953. Obviously, there was no outward 
evidence of any reason f o r the belated provision f o r t h i s o f f i c e , The 
•Panel of Chairmen*, w i t h m i n o r i t y representation i n i t , had been quite 
e f f i c a c i o u s . I n f a c t , the new Deputy Speaker could preside over the 
House only f o r a few days. 
Mr. M.H. Gazder, the new Deputy Speaker, was "the l o r d of Golimar 
Colony",^ 1 Karachi, the c a p i t a l of the federation. On many an issue, 
he, though a Muslim leaguer, joined issue w i t h the government. He boldly 
served notice i n t o the l e g i s l a t u r e f o r the repeal of that controversial 
62 
B.R.O.D.iU Act. His passionate demand f o r the return of Karaohi or 
the grant of adequate compensation to the p r o v i n c i a l government of Sind 
had always been a source of embarrassment to the r u l i n g party. The b a i t 
of o f f i c e was dangled before him and was swallowed. What was more hi s 
status was made s i m i l a r t o that of a State M i n i s t e r , drawing 2,000 rupees 
a month plus an o f f i c i a l residence. A Congressite could only exclaim 
t h a t " a f t e r a l l Deputy Speaker i s only a part-time o f f i c e r " • J 
The Deputy Speaker could not command the same respect of the 
House as h i s superior d i d , presumably due to his well-known partisan 
approach. His st r i d e n t reminder t o a member, who was on his f e e t , that 
he had one minute l e f t , produced a s i m i l a r one: " I t h i n k whenever I 
speak your watch runs very f a s t . " I n Pakistan the o f f i c e of the Deputy 
61. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 28 March, 1953, p. 902. 
62. Dawn. October 9, 1951. 
63. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 21 September, 1954, P« I829. 
6 4 » I b i d . . V ol. 1, March 23, 1954, P. 442. 
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Speaker could v i e w i t h that of the ogvernment whips, f o r , both positions 
i n varying degrees, were the i n i t i a l ladders towards higher o f f i c e . 
The Whips 
Parliament i s an i n t r i c a t e personality. I t s abstract c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
e d i f i c e i s also b u i l t w i t h the concrete bricks of mundane business. 
Parliament t o be productive of works should be free from problems of 
co-operation and coordination, among i t s p a r t s . What keeps smooth p a r l i a -
mentary business going i s that clincher known as 'Whips' i n parliamentary 
language. Whips are, by and large, trouble shooters. The process of 
•whipping* consists i n keeping the conscience of the parties and t h e i r 
members. However par t i s a n are the characters of the Whips t h e i r ultimate 
e f f o r t s help parliamentary programmes to progress smoothly. I n the 
performance of duties the chief stock i n trade i s the a r t of persuasion -
a weapon whose e f f e c t i v e use empowers the Whips to exert control over 
the members without applying any apparent power. 
I n Pakistan s i t u a t i o n the job of the Whips, however increasingly 
important, was less painstaking and engaging. The party p o s i t i o n i n 
the parliament was not complex, nor was there any large number of members. 
And, i n the absence of too many divisions and "goats" i n the herd of 
••sheeplike" members s t i f l i n g whipping was not constantly i n vogue. The 
Congress had no o f f i c i a l l y designated Whips - only the Party Secretary. 
The work of the government Whips appeared to have been admirable, since 
the Speaker and opposition members were on record i n admitting t h a t . 
* Sees CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 25 March, 1951, p.305? Vol. 1, 25 l a r c h , 
1953, p. 693. 
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To the c r e d i t of the Whips, there had "been no serious complaints about 
the programme of business: of the House, which used t o be an agreed one. 
I f an unintending error of the Whip angered a member he would " o f f e r 
sincere regret and a p o l o g i s e " , ^ or would be w i l l i n g to persuade the 
leader of the oppesition to agree t o a parliamentary time apparently 
inconvenient f o r him at the cost of swallowing " a l l the angry p i l l s " 
66 
of his "venerable o l d f r i e n d " . 
The government Chief Whip was a l l o t t e d an o f f i c e i n the parliament. 
I t was not elaborately maintained. I t received notices of amendments 
to the B i l l s from the government party members f o r v e t t i n g and adjourn-
ment motions from the opposition members t o be delivered t o the Ministers 
67 
concerned. Whips were issued t o members i n persuance of the decisions 
reached by the I . L . Parliamentary Party which had always been held on 
the eve of each parliamentary session, or s i t t i n g s as the case might be. 
The success of the o f f i c e of the Whip i n t r a n s l a t i n g the party decisions 
i n t o a c t i o n was r e l a t e d to the extent that the members* feelings on 
issues were at f l a s h p o i n t . For instance, no Bengali members of the 
M.L. Party were present i n the House on 18th March, 1953? f o r , the M.L. 
Parliamentary Party had decided on retrenchment of Bengali employees 
without f i x i n g a proper quota f o r Bengalis i n a l l services. And the 
* Information gathered from an exolusive interview w i t h I r . Y. Haroon -
one time Chief Whip of the M.L. party - by the w r i t e r . 
65. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 18 December, 1948, p. 154. 
66. CAD (Leg.) Vol .11 24 November, 1952, p. 596. 
67• Hindu, December 30, 1952. 
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Chief Whip was found v a i n l y patching up the differences. S i m i l a r l y , 
a demand f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y action arose, when Whipping f a i l e d t o ensure 
attendance i n the House of some of the M.L. "rebel" members and Cabinet 
69 
Ministers on the language issue. 7 But on an equally controversial 
matter but less sentimental, Mr. Gazder and Mr. Azizuddin Ahmed were 
whipped i n t o recanting t h e i r e a r l i e r intentions of moving B i l l s t o 
repeal the Pakistan Safety Ordinanoe and to f o r f e i t properties i l l e g a l l y 
70 
acquired.' (Eventually, the former became the Deputy Speaker and the 
l a t t e r M i n i s t e r of State.) 
With the increase of the volume of parliamentary work, the govern-
ment Chief Whip, however, f e l t some d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n as to the nature of 
h i s job, and maintained correspondences f o r guidance w i t h his counter-
part i n I n d i a . As a r e s u l t , by 1952 the M i n i s t r y of Parliamentary 
A f f a i r s was created g i v i n g the M i n i s t r y the status of a Cabinet M i n i s t e r . 
Among the duties of the M i n i s t r y were the f o l l o w i n g : to receive 
complaints from the public as regards M i n i s t r i e s , arrange parliamentary 
s i t t i n g s , maintain l i a i s o n between M i n i s t r i e s and members i n r e l a t i o n 
t o o f f i c i a l and n o n - o f f i c i a l business of the House, advise the selection 
t o anser questions i n the House and advise M i n i s t r i e s i n regard t o 
t h e i r parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s and keep them informed of the progress 
71 
of the business of the House, etc., e t c For one t h i n g , apart from 
68. Ibid..March 18, 1953. 
6 9» Times. 8 May, 1954. 
70. Statesman. January 5» 1950* 
71. GAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 25 March, 1953, p. 697. 
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the r e l a t i v e value of the o f f i c e of the Whip vis-a-vis parliamentary-
a c t i v i t i e s , the o f f i c e d e f i n i t e l y appeared t o have served as a t r a i n i n g 
ground f o r would-be M i n i s t e r s . A l l the three Whips who were appointed 
w i t h i n the span of 7 years ended up as Deputy Minister, M i n i s t e r of 
State and f u l l - f l e d g e d Minister respectively. 
The Parliament at Work? the Budget 
Parliamentary co n t r o l over the S&ate Purse i s the pivot round 
which a l l democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s t u r n . Monarchs were purged of un-
b r i d l e d 'purse c o n t r o l * paving the way f o r vox populi t o be represented 
i n the parliament. The levying of taxation and the expenditure of 
money from the State Coffer require parliamentary approval. Beneath 
the dry f i g u r e s of the Budget l i e s the economic and o v e r a l l state p o l i c y . 
Hence, parliament must have a mjaor voice i n the matter. Given that 
the preparation of the Budget implies i n t r i c a t e and expert work the 
executive w i t h i t s huge machinery i s well placed to do the work. 
In Pakistan i t was the M i n i s t r y of Finance which, under the 
guidance of the Finance Minister, prepared the Budget. The f i n a n c i a l 
year was to commence on the f i r s t of A p r i l and would end on the 31st 
March, the f o l l o w i n g year. I n the f i r s t session of the parliament 
the Finance Minister would submit the Budget showing separately (a) the 
* Sardar Bahadur Khan, Dr. Mahmood Hussain and. Mr. Giasuddin Pattan. 
** I n the U.S.A. the Budget Bureau - an adjunct t o the White House -
prepares the Budget. Some countries have; permanent l e g i s l a t i v e 
committees to do the compilation of the Budget. 
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sums required to meet the expenditure as charged upon the revenues of 
the Federation! (b) the sums required t o meet the expenditure proposed 
t o be made from the revenues of the Federation.^ 2 (Provision f o r a 
Supplementary Budget, i f required, was made*) I n other words the Budget 
was divided i n t o two e.g. the Capital Budget and the Revenue Budget. 
The receipt p o r t i o n of the Revenue Budget included taxation while r e -
c u r r i n g a c t i v i t i e s of government i n the administrative sphere, defence, 
etc., were on the expenditure. I t had been the p o l i c y of the government 
t o incur expenditure year a f t e r year on the normal funotions of government 
covered by t a x a t i o n . The Capital Budget contained expenditure on 
development, railways, ordnance f a c t o r i e s , grant-in-aid t o the provinces 
and the l i k e . Capital on t h a t score had t o be procured through borrow-
ings i f surplus revenues oould not be siphoned o f f from any revenue 
y i e l d i n g area to the Capital Budget. Here a r i s k of d e f i c i t financing 
was involved. 
However, the submitting of the Budget was followed by a speech 
of the Finance Min i s t e r elaborating the salient features of the Budget 
and i t s p o l i c y . A Finance B i l l w i t h proposals f o r taxation was to be 
introduced as a matter of course. The House then embarked upon a course 
of g i v i n g i t s approval or disapproval to the Budget. The procedures 
adopted by the Pakistan parliament, i n common w i t h most Commonwealth 
countries t o deal w i t h the Budget, were broad discussions on the 
Budgetary proposals and the p o l i c i e s contained t h e r e i n , cut motions on 
s p e c i f i c demands f o r grants and f i n a l l y consideration of the Finanoe B i l l . 
72. The Government of India Act (Amended), Part I I | Seotion 33(2), p . l 6 . 
We w i l l now examine t o what extent the members of the parliament could 
use those methods, and w i t h what r e s u l t s . A deta i l e d analysis of the 
Budget, i n the f i r s t place, requires ample time t o be placed at the 
disposal of the members so that they can make meaningful and construc-
t i v e suggestions p e r t a i n i n g t o the issues of the State, l e t alone t h e i r 
a b i l i t y t o do so. The f i r s t Budget was presented i n the parliament on 
the 28th March, 1948. I t s form was p o l i t i c a l l y o f greater import, i n 
th a t i t addressed i t s e l f - though t e c h n i c a l l y t o the House - astutely 
t o the outside audience. A Gongressite c u r t l y remarked, " S i r , I con-
gratulate the Honourable Finance Minister on hi s p o l i t i c a l Budget pre-
7-1 
f i x e d and s u f f i x e d by two p o l i t i c a l speeches."' The foroe of opposition 
t o the Budget was watered down by one s o l i t a r y consideration, namely 
the symbolic Budget boosted the morale of the people and t o a majority 
of the members i t was a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i s a t i o n of "cogito ergo sum". 
Members were disarmed f u r t h e r when the Prime Minister w i t h a Churchi.llian 
touch said, " I t i s j u s t s i x months since t h i s new State came i n t o 
existence ... But what s i x months 1 The months of blood, t e a r s , t o i l 
and sweat,"^ 
However, the passing of the Budget was not without a note of 
dissent. The members of the Congress, and government backbenchers had 
had t h e i r disagreements*registered. The Congress l i n e of attack was 
73. CAD (Leg.), Vol.1, 1st March, 1948, p.74. 
74. I b i d . . 2 March, 1948, p.135. 
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reminiscent of e a r l i e r days when Prof. Ghakravarty maintained that "..o 
the Budget ... follows the o l d bureaucratic method. He (Finance Minister) 
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has merely cut the t ' s and dotted the i ' s . " ' ^ The a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Congress members on the f l o o r of the House had nuances. They would 
hardly give vent to t h e i r f e e l i n g s on issues save a few ones. They 
turned well-meaning i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of the Budget. Their main stress 
was on the nati o n - b u i l d i n g subjects l i k e education, health, unemployment 
insurance, etc., and they wondered why d e f i o i t financing was not resorted 
t o , t o feed the nation-building departments. On that point, whatever 
might be the vot i n g behaviour of members, there was c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n 
of ideas, i n that the a t t i t u d e of cer t a i n opposition members was si m i l a r 
76 
t o that of government backbenchers. The creation of social overhead 
c a p i t a l through the Budget as one of the instruments, had a l l along been 
emphasized by the Congress. However, i n dealing with the Budget the 
Congress members had one eye on t h e i r interests as a minority. I n the 
very f i r s t Budget a cut motion was moved to ascertain the r a t i o n of 
77 
Hindu appointments i n the administrative services.' 1 I n a l l 16 cut 
motions were moved by the opposition out of 64 demands f o r grants during 
the f i r s t Budget session. The pungency of attack could be gauged i n 
t h a t as many as 4 d r a s t i c out motions (demand be reduced t o Re.l) were 
moved on the subjects of railways, post and telegraph, pay commission 
* Unlike India, Pakistan had no spearate budget on the railways. 
75. I b i d o . 1st March, 1948, p.52. 
76. CAD (Leg.) Vol . 1 , 2 March 1948, p.119. 
77. I b i d . . 5 March 1948, p.236. 
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and i r r i g a t i o n . I n a l l 24 members pa r t i c i p a t e d i n the Budget discussion, 
spread i n t o 7 days, the break-up of which was 2 days f o r general discus-
sion^ 3 days f o r demand f o r grants and f i n a l l y 2 days f o r the Finanoe 
B i l l . This famine of time prompted a Congressite to remark that "... 
t h i s i s without any preoedent i n the his t o r y of any le g i s l a t u r e s i n 
In d i a , p r o v i n c i a l or c e n t r a l . " ^ 
The Finance M i n i s t e r , representing the government side, beneath 
the p l a i n - f o l k technique of speech l i k e " S i r , I am son of a poor man, 
and the grandson of a poor man ... I know what i s hunger",^ l a i d down 
the country's economic p o l i o y , i n which the accent was on a mixed 
economy w i t h p r i v a t e enterprise on the p r e f e r e n t i a l side, and heavy 
expenditure on the Defence department. That p o l i c y has b a s i c a l l y ' 
remained unaltered. The general pattern of re p l y of the Finance Mini s t e r 
t o opposition c r i t i c i s m , though sometimes cautious, was also f o r c e f u l 
and i n f o r m a t i v e ^ A prestige newspaper commented that "a b r i l l i a n t 
f i n a n c i e r ••• provided some of the few speeches at t h i s session that 
80 
were not almost humdrum". 
However, as the years passed by c r i t i c i s m of the Budget became 
less unmeaningful, but more vooiferous. The number of days a l l o t t e d 
(though s t i l l i n s i g n i f i c a n t ) , the cut motions moved and the debate-
p a r t i c i p a n t s , were i n t e r m i t t e n t l y on the increase. From 1947-1951, 
78. CAD (Leg.) Vol . 1 , 1st March, 1948, p .52. 
79. I b i d . . 2 March, 1948, p. 142. 
80. Statesman. March 12, 1948. 
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the Budget p o s i t i o n had been progressively healthy defying a l l f o r e -
bodings. "Happy Pakistan" - was the oorament on the 1951-52 Budget, 
The Korean war catapulted P a k i s t a n i export of primary products. 
This growth of exports was r e l a t e d t o Pakistan's decision not t o devalue 
her rupee i n l i n e w i t h s t e r l i n g and the Indian rupee. Whatever the 
economic considerations, the non-devaluation p o l i c y of Pakistan was, i n 
p a r t , ostensibly to show her econoraio independence of In d i a , I t happens 
tha t Congress members took a deli c a t e po s i t i o n i n that they urged the 
government to devalue the rupee i n order to save the j u t e growers of 
East Pakistan, whose main customer was India, who refused to buy jute 
unless Pakistan devalued her currency. Throughout t h i s period, the 
congress members availed themselves of every opportunity out motions 
on customs and excise duty could o f f e r , to b r i n g home to the government 
the wisdom of devaluation. The government ascribed motives to Congress 
members. I t was a s i t u a t i o n that beggared description. On the one hand, 
the government inwardly appreciated the Congressman's argument vis-a-vis 
j u t e growers' p l i g h t (the government created a Jute Board to look in t o 
the matter, which bungled), on the other hand the government supporters 
coming from East Pakistan, though wholly i n agreement on p r i n c i p l e w i t h 
the Congress concerning j u t e growers, would not vote against the govern-
ment. Things were not pushed to t h e i r l o g i c a l ends because of party 
l o y a l t y and t o r t u r e d minds. 
I n the course of evaluation of the Budget two d i s t i n c t patterns 
81• Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1951, 
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of o r i t i c i s m emerged. The Congress view of the Budget was that the frame-
work i n which the Budget was cast could be improved by emphasizing items.-
here and t h e r e . The Congress c r i t i c i s m epitomised the urge of a nascent 
country t o t h i n away i t s already small c a p i t a l to the growth of welfare 
i n s t i t u t i o n s without ensuring the country's productive f u t u r e . The 
second p a t t e r n of c r i t i c i s m coming from the A.P.P. was at once radical 
and a f f e c t e d . I t urged complete r e j e c t i o n of the present structure of . 
the Budget. Most of the members, irrespective of group a f f i l i a t i o n s , 
had three things i n common i n dealing with the Budget. F i r s t l y , they 
soratched the surface of the Budget alone without going deep .into i t . 
I n t h e i r world two categories of Budget existed i . e . the r i c h man's or 
poor man's Budget. This was an o l d c l i c h e . I f taxes were l e v i e d on 
c e r t a i n things having a bearing, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , on the masses, 
the Budget would be r e a d i l y dismissed as a "Rich man's Budget". So would 
82 
some remissions i n t a x a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e a "Poor man's Budget". Because 
of the c l i n g i n g nature of opposition t o any type of taxation however j u s t i -
f i e d , the out motions moved l o s t too much of t h e i r force. A s a l t tax 
was imposed i n 1949 and out motions w i t h same arguments bordering on 
tautology were moved t i l l the l e g i s l a t u r e was dissolved i n October 1954» 
Secondly, the members very often committed the error of oonfusing the 
sphere of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s between the central and p r o v i n c i a l governments 
i n that they held the ce n t r a l government responsible f o r lapses i n the 
area of eduoation, a g r i c u l t u r e , health, etc., which were p r o v i n c i a l 
82. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 16 March, 1950, p .73. 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . T h i r d l y , the members would hardly deal with the 
Capital Budget save f o r a few stray comments. The creation of national 
wealth, and how best i t could be achieved the suggestions of whioh were 
contained i n the Capital Budget. Granted that t h i s was one of the main 
yardsticks on which a Budget should be judged, the Pakistan parliament 
f a i l e d . The members were more concerned w i t h the revenue side of the 
Budget at the expense of the other, Capital. As the Statesman r i g h t l y 
remarked t h a t "the d e t a i l e d discussion on the Budget was almost devoid 
of i n t e r e s t " . No doubt the Finanoe Minister himself construed the 
absence of c r i t i c i s m as a sign of "eloquent a p p r o v a l " . ^ Though some 
of the serious members, p a r t i c u l a r l y of Congress, voiced the importance 
85 
of evolving an economic structure productive of national wealth. This; 
was, t o a great extent, a refuge of ignorance on the part of the members, 
so f a r as the technical aspeots of economics were concerned. 
The microscopic r a d i c a l group i . e . the A.P.I., had a passion f o r 
a t t a c k i n g the Budget, year i n and year out, w i t h the patent tone that 
the Budget was "a Colonial Budget prepared and presented by His Majesty's 
86 
Finance M i n i s t e r of Pakistan". One could see immediately the i r r e c o n -
* Here one might sympathise w i t h the members f o r the precarious 
p o s i t i o n i n which they were placed; f o r , some valuable sources 
of p r o v i n c i a l revenues were taken by the oentral government. Though 
on procedural grounds they were not i n order. 
83* Statesman. l a r c h 24, 1951* 
84. CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 30 March, 1954, p.1049. 
85. Dawn, 19 March, 1952 and CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 3 March, 1949, p.309. 
86. Statesman. March 29, 1951J Also see: CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 
24 March, 1951, p.213. 
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o i l a b l e c o n t r a d i c t i o n of terms i n the statement. They advocated the 
a b o l i t i o n of Imperial preferences. The main aurguraent was that the 
world needed Pakistan's exportable commodities which should not be 
confined t o B r i t a i n alone. This argument was equally v a l i d i n regards 
to import p o l i c y - they maintained. Mian Sb. thought that i t was a shame 
"that t h i s country i s s t i l l bound up with the s t e r l i n g bloc and that 
gives you the key t o the ... f i n a n o i a l ••• p o l i c y of Pakistan".^ This 
idea stemmed from a mistaken preconceived notion. Because the s t e r l i n g 
bloc i s not a p o l i t i c a l onej moreover, Pakistan, short of foreign 
ex&hange, always f e l l upon the reserves held i n the Bank of England t o 
finance development schemes - an advantage of being a member of that 
t r a d i n g community. Mo wonder, the Finance Minister, while winding up 
the debate on the Finance B i l l , made a quip saying that Mian Sb. should! 
88 
read a book on "elementary public finance". On the question of form-
a t i o n of c a p i t a l and i t s productive investments, the panacea lay, 
aocording t o t h i s group, i n the confiscation of a l l lands from the zam-
inders. The incomes from those confiscated lands could amply take care 
89 
of the country's development programme. ^  This was the essential nature? 
of the members i n dealing w i t h the Budget. 
The Finance M i n i s t e r s , coming as they did from the early Indian 
Audit and Accounts Services "had no d i f f i c u l t y i n e f f e c t i v e l y shattering 
* Canada i s not a member. Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n t h i s m u l t i l a t e r a l t r a d i n g area. 
87. Dawn. March 20, 1952. 
88. I b i d . , March 19, 1953. 
89. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 18 March, 1950, p.138. 
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the few c r i t i c i s m t h a t had. been l e v e l l e d against the Budget".^° Besides, 
members were circumscribed by the pauoity of time, an important factor 
i n examining the Budget. They achieved something i n narrowing down 
t h e i r focus of attack on c e r t a i n areas what they had l o s t i n the wider 
glimpse of the Budget. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of time i s charted belowj 
$able I 
Year Presentation 
of Budget 
General 
discussion 
Demands f o r 
Grants 
1948-49 1 day 2 days 3 days 
1949-50 1 " 3 " 5 " 
1950-51 1 " 3 f 5 " 
1951-52 1 " 4 " 5 n 
1952-53 1 " 3 n 5 n 
1953-54 1 " 5 " 6 " 
1954-55 1 " 4 " 4 " 
Table I I 
Year No.of Demands 
f o r Grants 
Gut motions 
moved 
No. of Part 
pants 
1948-49 64 16 24 
1949-50 74 16 
? 
24 
1950-51 80 22 
1951-52 84 23 36 
1952-53 87 12 31 
1953-54 85 31 28 
1954-55 86 32 24 
* Figures were calculated by the w r i t e r from the Hansard. 
** No:t formal out motions were moved by the Congress as a protest against 
fiommunal r i o t s . Though, 20 demands f o r grants were discussed informally. 
90. Statesman. March 19, 1950. 
An analysis of the types of cut motions moved would reveal, i n 
order of emphasis, how the members' minds were working. During the 
Assembly's l i f e t i m e there were, i n a l l , 45 cut motions including 7 d r a s t i c 
ones (meaning ref u s a l of t o t a l supply) moved r e l a t i n g to customs, cen t r a l 
excise, s a l t , j u t e and income and corporation t a x . Two divisions were 
forced i n the 1954 session on account of the s a l t tax and excise duties 
on betel nuts, hoofcka tobacco, the railways, the commercial department 
of state, shared exclusively 29 cut motions. The rest were d i s t r i b u t e d 
i n the f o l l o w i n g manner: Cabinet 10f Post and Telegraph (another com-
mercial concern of the government) 8, one being d r a s t i c ; the Ministr y 
of Foreign A f f a i r s and Commonwealth Relations 8, 4 being d r a s t i c ; 
labour 4} "the M i n i s t r i e s of I n t e r i o r , Commerce, Education and Industries 
2 each and the M i n i s t r i e s of States and Frontier Regions and Parliamentary 
A f f a i r s each shared one. The cut motions apart, amendments to the 
Finance B i l l were usually sought f o r . I n 1950* Kr. Datta moved 20 amend-
ments opposing import duties on kerosene, tea and cycles, which to the 
91 
members were " e i t h e r essential commodities or the poor man's luxury". 
Members also discussed demands f o r grants, shorn of cut motions and on 
some occasion motions were withdrawn on assurances given by the Treasury 
benches. 
The presentation of Supplementary budgets, was an almost regular 
fe a t u r e . The demands f o r grants were usually huge-* For instance, 
i n 1949 38 supplementary grants involving a sum of about Rs.32,78,00,000 
91. Hindu. March 29, 1950. 
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i n c l u d i n g Rs.12,85,00,000 on c a p i t a l outlay i n the Defence Services and 
Hs»10,48,91jOOO on c a p i t a l outlay on pensions were sought to he approved 
92 
hy the House.' The irony was tha t the members were i n a procedural 
trap } f o r , according t o the standing rule "no grievances can he made 
i n respect of a demand f o r supplementary grant} nor can the policy he 
c r i t i c i s e d " ' J - a damper on e f f e o t i v e c r i t i c i s m . The most consistent 
p a t t e r n of the Pakistan Budget was i t s beiiag e i t h e r a balanced or a 
s l i g h t l y surplus one* And the usual technique was t o raise the l e v e l 
of t a x a t i o n i n order to cover the revenue d e f i c i t . For instance, a 
d e f i c i t of 1 crore 90 lakhs of 1950-51 Budget was converted in t o a sur~ 
94 
plus of 10 lakhs by a d d i t i o n a l t a x a t i o n . The next biggest feature of 
the Budget was i t s granting of huge amounts f o r the Defence Department*^ 
Compared t o i t , the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s witnessed a series of d e f i c i t 
budgets', w i t h lopsided grants on the na/tion-building departments. This* 
was more t r u e of East Pakistan. Despite a f i f t h successive presentation 
of a d e f i c i t budget, the East Pakistan government earmarked as much 
, ## 96 as 205© of the e n t i r e revenue on education at a l l l e v e l . 
Impressive s t a t i s t i c s cannot be reeled o f f t o show the opposition 
stand, but a continuing urge f o r e f f e c t i v e c r i t i c i s m was, no doubt, 
noticeable. What was most conspicuous by i t s absence was the thorough 
* The estimates f o r 1949-50* Revenue Rs.66*66 crores and Expenditure 
65*66} 1950-51s Revenue Rs.115*64 orores and Expenditure Rs . l l5»54 
crores; 1951-52: Revenue Rs.159*85 crores and Expenditure Rs . l39»H 
crores. Source; "Shatham House Papers", Far Eastern Dept., Ho. 2. 
* * 300$> r i s e of budgetary grants on education i n the N.itf.F.P. See 
Statesman. January 2, 1951* 
92. Statesman. March 10, 1949. 
93. CAD (Leg.) Vol . 1 , 31 March, 1952, P.859. 
Footnote /contd. on next page. 
discussion of the Budget and out motions on the Defence Services, which 
used to chew the largest s l i c e of the Budget, every year. The government 
p o l i c y was t o "build the Defence Establishment as a scarecrow f o r the 
p o t e n t i a l aggressors. I n each Budget, session, the members would be 
h o r r i f i e d , as a matter of routine, at the Defence p r o d i g a l i t y , but would 
predictably, withdraw i n t o sullen acquiescence. For the Congress members, 
i t was r i s k y t o dwell on ttte matter very hard. I t was only the l a s t 
Pakistan members (&.L.) who consistently urged f o r the d i f f u s i o n of 
Defence expenditure evenly on both side of the wings. 
L e g i s l a t i o n 
The passing of laws i s one of the fundamental functions of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e i n that i t lays down a framework of rules making a l l the 
organs of the State and the c i t i z e n r y subject t o obedience. I n the 
parliamentary systems obtaining w i t h i n the Commonwealth, l e g i s l a t i v e 
leadership has become, by and large, an exeoutive monopoly. Increasing 
party d i s c i p l i n e coupled with the i n t r i c a c i e s of a modern l e g i s l a t i v e 
programme have been, i n t e r a l i a , responsible f o r t h i s development. 
With the inherent l i m i t a t i o n s of a Federal l e g i s l a t u r e Pakistan*s 
output of l e g i s l a t i o n , during seven years, was 283 Acts. A group of 
Footnote contd, from previous page. 
94, Financial Times, March 13, 1950* 
95, Daily Herald. March 20, 1951 and Guardian 10 Maroh, 1951, The t o t a l 
Budget amount of 1947-48 was 66 crores and defence claimed 34 crores; 
1949-50 claimed 67$ of the Budget on the Defence; 1950-51: 75 crores. 
See? CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 1 March, 1948, p.74? Vol. I , 2 March, 1949, 
p.267 and Vol. I , 18 March, 1950, p . 3 9 L 
96, Dawn, l a r c h 6, 1953 ( E d i t o r i a l ) . 
* Even i n the Montesquian environment of p o l i t i c s l i k e the U.S.A. 
the executive i n i t i a t i v e of l e g i s l a t i o n has been on the upper hand. 
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subjects consisting of Communications, Finance, Commerce, Industry, 
Insurance, Banking, Currency and r e l a t e d subjects were dealt with by 
130 Acts of Parliament. The rest of the Acts dealth with refugees, 
97 
c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s and the Federal Capital. However, the l e g i s l a t i v e 
process i n Pakistan was an example of "hurried s c u t t l e " . Hosts of 
Acts were passed so quickly which otherwise should have been subjected 
t o p r otracted discussions i n the parliament. In the very f i r s t 
session of the parliament w i t h i n the span of 12 s i t t i n g s , i t passed 
the Budget, hustled through 6 government B i l l s , appointed 17 Committees 
and asked 218 questions. The B i l l s were passed i n t o laws w i t h i n 
20 minutes. Only once d i d the House divide i n t o the lobbies "otherwise 
98 
almost i n v a r i a b l y the 'ayes' had i t . , , y The House continued to be 
over-burdened w i t h the onrush of l e g i s l a t i v e programmes i n each 
session which produced extempore and inadequate discussions i n them 
leading to half-baked laws unchecked by public opinion. _ 99 The Ordinances of the Governor General were 06 i n number. 
I n answering a question the law Minister admitted t h a t there were 12 
Ordinances promulgated since the termination of the l a s t session of the 
parliament and the commencement of the new one."*^ l o s t of the Ordinances 
97» M. Ahmed, Government and P o l i t i c s of Pakistan (Karachi: 1959)> 
P.99. 
98. Statesman. March 12, 1948. 
99* Th© A l l Pakistan Legal Decisions (PLD), Lahore n.d. 
100. CAD (Leg.) V o l , I I , 29 December, 1948, p.419. 14 Ordinances were 
promulgated when the East Pakistan l e g i s l a t u r e was i n recess. 
Statesman. 15 February, 1951* ' 
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were non-controversial. Some, of course, were of great significance 
needing c a r e f u l consideration i n the House. But they would a l l appear 
as f a i t accoraplis "before the parliament. This extra-parliamentary 
method was designed t o meet an extraordinary s i t u a t i o n a r i s i n g from 
the d i v i s i o n of the subcontinent. Later on, Section 42 of the India Act, 
1935 was amended, shrinking the period of the Governor General's Ordi-
nances up t o 6 weeks only a f t e r the re-assembly of the House, which also 
oould be n u l l i f i e d by a r e s o l u t i o n of the House.*'*0"'" However, the number 
of Ordinances were progressively onithe wane. 
The f i r s t Budget presented, contained a proposal to set up an 
I n d u s t r i a l Finance Corporation to assist i n d u s t r i e s . With the B i l l 
was associated a Select Committee (on to which two non-offical members 
representing public views were also coopted) which submitted i t s report 
102 
xn the House on 14 February, 1949* The debate could not be prolonged 
since the Select Committee i t s e l f d i d not propose any substantive change 
i n the o r i g i n a l B i l l . The general accord of the House could be seen i n 
t h a t during two-day discussion on the B i l l , there were only 7 minor 
amendments of which the government accepted 4 w i t h the rest withdrawn. 
However, the members had t h e i r views. One member being aware of the 
r u r a l base of Pakistan's economy, suggested a broadening of the B i l l ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n , so that a g r i c u l t u r e could be b e n e f i t t e d . . . . 
101. GAD Vol. V I , 6 January, 1950, p.36. 
102. I b i d . . Vol. I , 14 February, 1949, P.15. 
103. I b i d . . Vol. I , 16 February, 1949, p. 30. 
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This d i d not f i n d favour i n the Housej f o r , the members were more con-
cerned w i t h the production of essential consumer goods through rapid 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . * 0 ^ On the side of the administration of the policy-
two valuable suggestions, one from the leader of the opposition, the 
other from a government backbencher, were accepted by the Finance 
Mi n i s t e r . He agreed t o appoint one committee t o go i n t o the reason 
as t o why Country's Capital was shy and a Technical Committee to evaluate 
105 
genuine cases of applicants f o r loans. ^ A well-meaning suggestion 
from a Congressite t h a t industries to be financed should be f i r s t placed? 
i n order of preference, f a i l e d to e l i c i t a categorical assurance. 
One s o l i t a r y piece of l e g i s l a t ion, The Estate Duty B i l l , met an 
i d e a l process of enactment i n the whole l i f e of the l e g i s l a t u r e . The 
B i l l was introduced on May 18, 1948. Having been ci r c u l a t e d f o r e l i c i t -
i n g public opinion, the B i l l was referred to the Select Committee of 
which 3 were Congress members out of five.. The Select Committee report 
107 
was one of "complete unanimity" 1 - declared the Finance Minis t e r . 
Despite the agreed report of the Select Committee, the House as a whole 
contributed t o the improvement of the B i l l , at i t s f i n a l reading. 
Sixteen amendments of which 11 were of significance were moved. Three 
Congress amendments were accepted by the government with appreciation, 
the rest were negatived save 5 minor ones from government backbenchers. 
104. I b i d . . 17 February, 1949. P«50. 
105. I b i d . . 16 February, 1949, P»33-
106. I b i d . . p.53. 
107. I b i d . , Vol. I I , 24 December, 1949, P. 70. 
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Well thought out arguments were brought forward, p a r t i c u l a r l y by an 
A.P.P. man who pointed out a snag th a t the average l i f e expectancy i n 
Pakistan was 27 years compared to B r i t a i n * s nearly 65 and unless that 
provision of the B i l l were well-defined "the people here w i l l pay death 
duties t w i c e " . Mr, K,K. Datta - a Congress man - sought an amendment 
i n the B i l l l e s t i t should operate i n a manner which would discourage 
the Estate owners from making g i f t s f o r the welfare of the people. The 
Congress scored a parliamentary point when i t suggested that taxable 
property should be i n the neighbourhood of 50»000 instead of one lakh 
rupees. This point was very a s t u t e l y advanced i n the hope of i n s t i l l i n g 
109 
habit of insurance among the reluctant people. ' This proposed amend-
ment spr i n k l e d s a l t on the wounds of the governments vested i n t e r e s t } 
f o r , the M.L. government drew i t s support mainly from the Estate owning 
people. Needless to say, i t was p o l i t e l y turned down."'""'-^ 
The A g r i c u l t u r a l Development Finance Corporation Act - a very 
s i g n i f i c a n t pieoe of l e g i s l a t i o n - augured well from i t s reference to 
the Select Committee down t o the passing. The Act would advance c a p i t a l 
on easy terms t o thosewho were engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r e , w i t h the sole 
objeot of augmenting a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y . Despite the nature 
of the B i l l , members regardless of party strains or regions could not 
confine t h e i r debates w i t h i n t h e i r precise soope. To regard the 
108. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 29 March, 1950, p. 495. -
109. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 3 January, 1950, p. 259. 
110. I b i d . , p. 265. 
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corporation as a money-lending i n s t i t u t i o n would v i t i a t e the s p i r i t 
of ithe B i l l . The a g r i c u l t u r a l problems i n a l l developing countries are 
wrapped up onionwise. The trend of the debate was wrenched i n t o a 
d i f f e r e n t but not t o an altogether i r r e l e v a n t d i r e c t i o n . How oould 
loans alone increase p r o d u c t i v i t y i n the presence of "fragmented holdings"' 
on the one hand and no holdings on the other, l e t alone the non-availa-
b i l i t y of the ingredients of meohanised a g r i c u l t u r e . The debates 
would appear r e a l i s t i c when considered that they were representative 
of s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l problems of the country, else they would be 
regarded outside the precise scope of the B i l l . No doubt, the Minister 
had t o console the House and himself with the w i l l "to tackle each 
112 
object separately"* 
However, not a l l the important B i l l s were processed through the 
Select Committees. An important B i l l l i k e the P.I.D.C. was enacted 
without reference t o a Select Committee. The House was prone to l e g i s -
l a t e upon m o r a l i t y . I n almost every session the government would come 
forward w i t h such B i l l s and members had had t h e i r moral catharsis i n 
enacting them. The party i n power beguiled the time i n t h i n k i n g that 
i t s government was 'doing something* • The series of laws, on that score, 
passed were apparently s i m i l a r , sometimes overlapping. The Hoarding 
and Black Market Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, The Prevention 
of Hoarding Aot, the East Bengal ^ (Smuggling and Poodgrains) Act, The 
111. GAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 3 A p r i l , 1952, pp.1019-1030. 
112. I b i d . , p.1034. 
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Karachi Essential A r t i o l e s (Price Control and Anti-Hoarding) Act, 
Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, among others, were cases i n 
p o i n t . A c l a s s i c example of l e g i s l a t i v e muddle and f a u l t y draftsman-
ship could he found, i n the Security B i l l introduced i n 1952. The B i l l 
sought "special measures t o deal w i t h persons acting i n a manner pre-
j u d i c a l to the defence, external a f f a i r s and seourity of Pakistan, and 
i n 
the maintenance of supplies and services essential f o r the . community*'• 
While dealing w i t h the maintenance of supplies and services the govern-
ment would he u l t i m a t e l y confronted with the hoarders and black-marketeers 
on the one hand and the trade unions on the other. I n determining 
p r e j u d i c i a l acts r e l a t i n g t o the defence, external a f f a i r s and security 
of Pakistan the government might be dealing with d i f f e r e n t categories 
of people - supposedly p o l i t i c i a n s - from w i t h i n or outside the country. 
As a r e s u l t , a v a r i e t y of subjects a f f e c t i n g various types of people 
were huddled i n t o the ambit of one B i l l - rather an omnibus measure -
whereas separate B i l l s f o r them would have been j u s t i f i e d . 
S i m i l a r l y , the d r a f t i n g of the B i l l - a very important aspect 
which helps t o produce a clear i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the statute before the 
court of law or elsewhere-— was haphazard i n t h a t i t could not precisely 
define what would c o n s t i t u t e p r e j u d i c i a l acts vis-a-vis the security 
of Pakistan and external a f f a i r s . A c r i t i c i s m of foreign p o l i c y might 
come w i t h i n the scope of the Act. What was more the int r o d u c t i o n of the 
B i l l v i o l a t e d one important p r i n c i p l e v i z . the B i l l was submitted at 
113. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 21 A p r i l , 1952, p.1542. 
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the fag-end of the session when the House was growing r e s t i v e . An 
unhappy Congressman protested t h a t "a momentous B i l l l i k e t h i s i s going 
to be passed i n t h i s state of things?*, when the members were "about t o 
d i s p e r s e " . 1 1 ^ 
Implementation of laws, p a r t i c u l a r l y of a n t i - s o c i a l measure, 
presupposes a w i l l i n g and cooperating community. Leg i s l a t i o n alone 
cannot stamp out corruption unless people are made receptive of them 
through extra-governmental methods or social movements. Independence, 
as i t s by-product, brought i n i t s wake some lapses on the social plane 
of Pakistan as the English r e s t o r a t i o n ^ period witnessed a f t e r 1660, 
115 
"Ticketless t r a v e l l i n g " ^ was f o r some time ooeval with the dawn of 
independence. I n s p i t e of a number of laws passed t o curb hoarding, 
black marketing and c o n t r o l the prices of commodities, the prices, 
according t o a member, "are r i s i n g i n the e n t i r e country". Some of 
the M i n i s t r i e s were not properly streamlined f o r t h e i r tasks. For 
example, the departments of commeroe and industries were working sepa* 
r a t e l y . As a r e s u l t of a l l these factors laws remained i n the Statute 
Book as reminders of l e g i s l a t i v e myopia. Also, there was an i n t e r e s t i n g 
aspect of l e g i s l a t i v e psychology: the introduction of a new B i l l i n the 
Indian parliament would be followed by a p a r a l l e l one i n the Pakistan 
House, This was very t r u e of B i l l s covering refugee and developmental 
a f f a i r s . Dr. Qureshi would be w i l l i n g to withdraw a Pakistan measure 
114. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 21 A p r i l , 1952, p.1551. 
115. I b i d . . Vol.1, 1 March, 1948, p .54. 
116. I b i d . . Vol.11, 14 October, 1953, p.1127. 
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on Evaouee Property provided India "agrees t o withdraw the Evacuee 
117 
l e g i s l a t i o n " . I n p i l o t i n g the P.I.F.C. B i l l , the Minister i n oharge& 
compared i t favourably w i t h that of the Indian one passed i n 1948, 
while another member thought that the Pakistan B i l l was "an improvement 
119 
on the Indian Act", ' An undeclared competition i n l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h 
I n d i a , perhaps, was a spur t o Pakistan l e g i s l a t o r s , 
Mr, Ahmed opined t h a t o r i g i n a l B i l l s and the amending ones were 
120 
whisked i n t o the Statute Book e f f o r t l e s s l y , This was t r u e . But i n 
understanding t h i s three i n t r i n s i c factors happened to be associated 
w i t h Pakistan l e g i s l a t i o n , need t o be borne i n mind. F i r s t l y , B i l l s 
holding out instant hopes f o r rapid i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , a high standard 
of l i v i n g and everything associated with i t , became symbols w i t h Pakis-
t a n i s of what Adlai Stevenson would c a l l the 'revolution of r i s i n g 
expectations', and had the concurrence of the l e g i s l a t o r s almost by 
r e f l e x . There was unanimity of opinion i n regard to the p r i n c i p l e . The 
best example would be the moving of the P.I.D.C. B i l l . A l l members 
were agreed upon the p r i n c i p l e , but the opposition was i n s i s t e n t upon 
sending the B i l l t o the Select Committee. The Minister having c o r r e c t l y 
assessed the trends of the House negatived the opposition "that the 
121 
weight i s more on the side of urgency than on the other side", 
117. Dawn. 27 November, 1952, 
118. CAD (Le&) Vol. I , 16 February, 1949, P.28. 
119. I b i d . . 17 February, 1949» P»50. 
120. Mustaq, op.oit.. p .102, 
121. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 11 A p r i l , 1950, p .799« 
Secondly, there were a good many pre-independence Acts extant, l i k e 
the Prisoners Act, The E x t r a d i t i o n Act, The L i m i t a t i o n Act, The European 
Vagrancy Act, The Penal Servitude Act, e t c , etc., whioh were i r r i t a t i n g 
t o a l l the members. This was also t r u e of the Penal Code and the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, So the s w i f t passing of Amendment B i l l s was to 
the members a p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of t h e i r n a t i o n a l i s t i c goals. I n the* 
words of a member i t was "incumbent on the government of Pakistan t o do 
away w i t h a l l discriminatory p r i v i l e g e s that are being enjoyed by 
122 
Europeans and Americans under various Aots i n force i n Pakistan," 
I n a parliamentary system, regardless of oountries, controversial Bill» 
are not j u s t "rubber stamped" by the Parliament, An element of acquies-
cence, however, grudging, on the part of the members i s what i s called 
f o r . I n the Pakistan i s t u a t i o n whether i t was an active acquiescence 
or passive adherence of the members vis-a-vis l e g i s l a t i o n cannot be 
assessed absolutely. An approach of r e l a t i v i t y helps appreciate the 
s i t u a t i o n . For one t h i n g the parliamentary time earmarked was notoriously 
incommensurate w i t h the jobs t o be done. That f e e l i n g was echoed and 
re-echoed by a l l members tha t "a B i l l i s introduced one day and i t i s 
123 
passed on the day f o l l o w i n g " , 
T h i r d l y , the members o v e r a l l , did not suf f e r from the u n f a m i l i -
a r i t y of the t i t l e s of the B i l l s introduced. As a matter of f a c t , a 
substa n t i a l p o r t i o n of the Acts were the holdovers of the B r i t i s h 
a d m inistration - a f a c t o r hardly emphasized. Vast numbers of laws f o r 
122, I b i d , . Vol.11, 28 December, 1949» p.146. Also. Statesman, 
29 December, 1949. 
123. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 17 February, 1949, P»57» 
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the governance of the vast subcontinent were l e g i s l a t e d upon, l e t alone 
the reforming l e g i s l a t i o n of a soc i a l and economic nature. Some of the 
Pakistan l e g i s l a t o r s had also a share i n i t . Those laws were not a l l 
retrograde. A l l they had to do was t o amend the e x i s t i n g Aots to s u i t 
the new s i t u a t i o n . The skeleton of laws was there and the Pakistan 
l e g i s l a t o r s breathed new l i f e i n i t - rather frequently and surely 
without proper discussions. 
N o n - o f f i c i a l business 
Theo r e t i c a l l y speaking, every member of the parliament i s e n t i t l e d , 
as a democratic r i g h t , t o i n i t i a t e any number of l e g i s l a t i v e proposals. 
I n r e a l i t y , i t has often beoome a q u a l i f i e d p r i v i l g e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
under the B r i t i s h form of government. F i r s t l y , the n o n - o f f i c i a l B i l l s 
are deprived of the tec h n i c a l guidance which require not only "the 
creative imagination of a p o l i t i c a l brain but the combined knowledge 
124 
of an economist and a s p e c i a l i s t i n a whole series of cognate sciences". 
Secondly, under the party system of government - the underlying p r i n c i p l e 
of which i n that the m a j o r i t y of the members give support t o the government 
i n poifer, express or implied - the members are not at l i b e r t y t o have 
B i l l s pushed through. So, i t i s a f a l l i n g i n the t r a p of t h e i r own 
making. T h i r d l y , parliamentary time i s hard-pressed to aocommodate 
much of n o n - o f f i c i a l business. 
Of the Private B i l l s introduced i n the House most of them were 
* I n the U.S.A. and continental countries, p r i v a t e members' i n i t i a t i v e 
i n respeot of l e g i s l a t i o n i s i n the ascendancy. 
124»Hansard Society ed., op.oit.. p.128. 
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imbued w i t h reforming and p u r i f y i n g zeal. The Public Address and 
Entertaining Regulation B i l l , The Pakistan Indecent Advertisement 
Prevention B i l l , The Public Subscription (Prevention and Abuses) B i l l , 
among others, were to be mentioned. The faot t h a t Private B i l l s usually 
emanate from interested quarters could not be f u l l y applied t o Pakistan 
because of her less sooial cohesion. The absence of strong in t e r e s t 
groups discouraged seotional or l o c a l issues t o be factors of primary 
cause of Private B i l l s . Hence, those B i l l s , generally speaking, were 
of all-pervasive a p p l i c a b i l i t y . For instance, the B i l l on the Public 
Subscription would cover the e n t i r e country} f o r , i n everywhere the 
"same person i s approached by several persons. Sometimes the D.M. w i l l 
come; sometimes sub-divisional Magistrate w i l l come} and then the 
President ... the Ohawkider ... and then c e r t a i n other o f f i c e r s w i l l 
come f o r c o l l e c t i o n s of subscriptions, and everybody must be p r o p i t i a t e d 
125 
otherwise the man i s harassed." Thus common problems gave common 
ground f o r introducing B i l l s . 
Though pressure groups were not pronounced i n i n s t i g a t i n g l e g i s -
l a t i o n , i t oannot be maintained t h a t a l l B i l l s were born of members' 
s e l f - i n i t i a t i o n immune from outside influence. B i l l s such as the Pakistan 
P r a o t i t i o n e r s of Homeopathic Systems of Medicine Regulation and the 
Pakistan P r a c t i t i o n e r s o f Indigenous Systems of Medicine, were the 
expressions both of one members* own cumulative f a i t h i n them plus 
* The w r i t e r i s aware th a t many an eminent man westernized i n edu-
ca t i o n , has a precious l i t t l e fancy bo* containing indigenous medi-
cine, would pour a p i l l or a drop of medicine i n a gaping mouth of 
a f r i e n d , saying t h a t i t d i d cure another person miraculously. 
The 'Sadhana* has branches a l l over the world. Prof.Mathur Baboo 
had immense p o l i t i c a l influence i n East Pakistan. 
125. CAD(Leg.) Vol. I , 21 February, 1949, P .83. 
environmental influenoe. There were large number of f l o u r i s h i n g 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n Unani and Ayurvedic raedioine a l l over the country* 
How involved the introducer of the B i l l was, oould be seen when he con-
jured up a s i t u a t i o n where the Unani system, long associated with the 
Moghal regime, and the Ayurvedic l i n k e d with old Hindu c u l t u r e , were 
being replaced by the Alapathic, a foreign growth, though advanced* 
One member even suggested " t o get r i d of Allopathic system gradually", 
127 
i f possible, 1 
The passing of the Karachi Port Trust (Amendment) B i l l i n 1949 
was, by a l l i n d i c a t i o n s , the f u l f i l m e n t of an i n t e r e s t of a l o c a l autho-
r i t y . During the B r i t i s h period the Karachi Port Trust was comprised 
of 14 members among whom the Karachi Buyers and Shippers Chamber repre-
senting a majority of i n d u s t r i a l and commercial concerns were dominant* 
The Muslim t r a d i n g community had only one member t h e r e i n , t o look a f t e r 
i t s i n t e r e s t * The advent' of Pakistan turned things t o the memberfe 
favour who was " a g i t a t i n g f o r g i v i n g representation t o Muslim merchants? 
f o r a long time"* Another B i l l namely the Port Haj Committees 
(Amendment), introduced i n the same session, was i n d i r e c t l y b enefitted 
i n t hat i t got the r i g h t of representation i n the Karachi Port Trust, 
the absence of which had been a discomfort to the intending p i l g r i m s ^ 
S i m i l a r l y , some other l e g i s l a t i v e proposals w i t h a touch of localism -
126. GAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 1 A p r i l , 1950, p .588. 
127* I b i d . , p*590* 
128. GAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 21 February, 1949, p . 8 l . 
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they were never passed - such as the Karachi Rent B i l l , and the Fo r f e i t u r e 
and Prevention I l l e g a l l y Acquired Properties B i l l , were pressed f o r 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
There were two "Personal B i l l s " of highest social significance. 
One such B i l l , The Pakistan Mussalman Wakf (Amendment), has a hi s t o r y 
of which goes back to 1871 and also finds i l l u s t r a t i o n i n S i r William 
Hunter's r e p o r t . The Wakf was a t r u s t i n Mohammedan law which would 
proteot i t s b e n e f i c i a r i e s from misuse by the Mutavallis ( t r u s t e e s ) . 
Mr. Jinnah himself made h i s l e g i s l a t i v e debut i n the Indian central 
l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1913 i n having passed the 'Wakf B i l l ' as a private member, 
which, according to Miss Naidu, "won him ... the appreciation of his 
colleagues (and) ... coreligionists".'*' 2'* Despite f u r t h e r elaborations 
on the Act i n 1923» nothing could stop incomes of the t r u s t from being 
"misappropriated, abused and misapplied".'^ The B i l l was introduced 
i n 30th December 1948, a f t e r which i t was tossed back and f o r t h from 
the House t o the Select Committee, but to no purpose. 
The second one, the Pakistan Marriage Expenditure B i l l , was 
introduced i n 11 May, 1948, to regulate expenditure i n respect of marriage. 
I t aimed at stopping the non-productive habit of investment i n social 
f u n c t i o n s . As f a r back i n 1920 both the Central Banking Enquiry and 
Pr o v i n c i a l Banking Enquiry Committees reported t h a t poor and middle 
class people were i n debt t o the tune of crores of rupees, on account 
of "Fazool Kharacha" (unnecessary expenditure) incurred i n the marriages 
129. H. B o l i t h o , Jinnah (Karachi :1966) , p.54* 
130. GAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 3 A p r i l , 1953, P.1203. 
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131 of t h e i r daughters and sons. I n spite of members' willingness 
t o celebrate marriages on a mere "Sharbat ka p i a l a " , the B i l l o r b i t t e d 
around the country four times and the Select Committee three times f o r 
publio opinion and agreement. I t survived the technical clash with the 
section 298 of the India Act, 1935. Pressure was brought t o bear 
upon the House from a l l over the country, as the member himself admitted 
133 
t h a t " l e t t e r s are being sent t o expedite enaotment of the B i l l " . 
With a l l the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and differences removed, the B i l l came f o r 
consideration i n the House, when i t was adjourned. The unhappy member 
heard the M i n i s t e r of Parliamentary A f f a i r s saying that "you can discuss 
i t l a t e r on 1'. 1*^ That was the end of i t . 
P rivate Members' B i l l s had t o persevere w i t h some procedural 
hurdles. One month's notice was required f o r leave t o introduce B i l l s 
whose p r i o r i t y was t o be arranged by l o t . They could be taken i n t o 
consideration straightway, referred t o the Select Committee, or c i r c u -
135 
l a t e d f o r e l i c i t i n g p u b l i c opinion. • One day i n a week, preferably 
a Friday, was devoted t o n o n - o f f i c i a l business. Given the short duration 
of sessions, the place occupied by the n o n - o f f i c i a l day was anybody's 
guess. 
Of the 111 Private B i l l s reoeived by the Assembly Secretariat, 
* A glass of syrup 
131. I b i d . . Vol .11 . 2 October, 1950, p.117. 
132. I b i d . . V o l . I , 1 A p r i l , 1950, p.590. 
133. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 24 l a y , 1954, p.1333. 
134. I b i d . , p.1333. 
135» Pakistan Constituent Assembly (Leg.) Standing Orders, 1948, 
Order Mos. 7a, 38(a) (b) and ( c ) . 
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28 were introduced of which three were passed. Mr. N, Ahmed topped 
the l i s t f o r h i s enthusiasm f o r i n i t i a t i n g B i l l s . There was one s t r i k i n g 
aspect of n o n - o f f i c i a l a c t i v i t y , namely that the Congress d i d not 
i n i t i a t e any B i l l s , although they d i d p a r t i c i p a t e i n the debates, selec-
t i v e l y . Usually, i t i s the practice and p r i v i l e g e of the minority group 
t o b r i n g forward B i l l s i n parliament- an opportunity seized by the 
min o r i t y t o exert i t s e l f i n the l e g i s l a t i v e domain. This lukewarm a t t i -
tude of the Congress towards n o n - o f f i c i a l business might be the r e s u l t 
more ofapprehension of i t s diminutive size i n the House than sheer 
apathy. This non-serious a t t i t u d e of the Congress hardened i t s leader 
137 
i n t o a comment i . e . " I do not care f o r n o n - o f f i c i a l day". 1 As a r e s u l t 
the p a t t e r n worked i n a d i f f e r e n t way i n that the government supporters 
got some leeways from the treasury benches. 
There were two overriding reasons as t o why so many Private 
Members' B i l l s could not be passed. One was the f a c t that they a l l 
emanated from the government party. Members d i d not press hard - because 
of party l o y a l t y - knowing that the government would sponsor B i l l s 
i f they were worth being l e g i s l a t e d upon. Secondly, the government had 
t o weigh o a r e f u l l y the i m p l i c a t i o n of the •proposals 1 as contemplated 
t h e r e i n so t h a t public and pr i v a t e interests were i n proper balance. 
This consideration prompted the Minister to observe that government 
* The w r i t e r f i n d s 4 B i l l s t h a t were passed e.g. The Karachi Port 
Trust (passed 1949); The Pakistan Indecent Advertisement Prevention 
B i l l (passed 1951); The Pakistan Indigenous System of Medicine 
(passed 1951)» and She Lunacy (passed, 1951)• 
136. Ahmed, op.oit., p . l04» 
137• CAD (Leg.) Vol. 1, 27 Maroh, 1954, p. 702. 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y lay not only i n s a t i s f y i n g p a r t i c u l a r groups of people 
but i n looking in t o the i n t e r e s t s "of a l l classes of people". But 
t h i s reason was not always v a l i d . There were cases where the government 
looked askance at the B i l l s and pigeonholed others f o r fear of being 
lashed by powerful groups of people. For example, the Pakistan Mussal-
man Wakf (Amendment) B i l l could not be passed despite i t s noble s e n t i -
ment. 
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There were 82,000 ^ wakfs registered i n undivided Bengal. Some 
of them were r e a l l y b i g t r u s t s . The passing of the B i l l would have 
meant tha t some of the leading p o l i t i c i a n s , who happened to be trustees 
of the wakfs, were t o be accountable t o the law. The Pakistan Marriage 
B i l l , had i t been passed, would have wiped out the so-called s o c i a l l y 
prestigious custom of s e l l i n g sons and daughters i n the matrimonial 
market i n the garb of dowry and soc i a l manoeuvrings. S i m i l a r l y , a 
nervous government supporter h u r r i e d l y withdrew the Public Address and 
Entertainment Regulation B i l l t o save embarrassing the government, only 
t o be followed by an opposition gibe that "the Chief Whip i s running 
about disturbed and the M i n i s t e r s , one and a l l , are eagerly wishful 
t o r aise points of order t h a t discussion over i t may not begin so that 
t h e i r dinners, t h e i r presents may continue.""^ 0 
I n short, the n o n - o f f i c i a l business d i d serve three d i s t i n c t 
* The w r i t e r i s aware of some l i t i g a t i o n s regarding wakfs against 
some i n f l u e n t i a l p o l i t i c i a n s . 
138. I b i d . . Vol. I , 1 A p r i l , 1950, p.587. 
139. CAD (Leg.) Vol .11 , 15 November, 1953, p.1336. 
140. I b i d . , Vol. I , 2 A p r i l , 1952, p.966. 
purposes. F i r s t l y , the B i l l s raised some subjects of public interest 
i n the House which otherwise would not have been discussed. Secondly, 
i t kept the backbenchers happily occupied w i t h some B i l l s . T h i r d l y , 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of some of the B i l l s i n d i r e c t l y helped the Government 
what, i n the words of Prof. Bromhead, might have been " i m p o l i t i c f o r the 
Government t o introduce" B i l l s "on i t s own account",'''^ Thus, the 
Karachi Port Trust B i l l rescued the government from an embarrassment} 
f o r , the Act inoreased Muslim mercantile representations i n the t r u s t 
at the expense of the Hindus. The sponsor, Mr. Gazder, himself shrewdly 
paved the way f o r f u l l East Pakistan support to his proposal by having 
supported e a r l i e r an East Pakistan member's motion f o r developing 
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Chittagong Port Trust ^" - an example of e f f e c t i v e l o g - r o l l i n g . 
Resolutions 
Resolutions i n a parliament sometimes act as an a u x i l i a r y t o 
f u t u r e l e g i s l a t i o n . I n B r i t a i n the parliament B i l l s of 1910 and 1911 
were cases i n point The Standing Order No. 2 of the Constituent 
Assembly (Leg.) allowed resolutions t o be discussed. They were selected 
through b a l l o t , and speeches on them not exceeding 15 minutes by each 
member, subject t o the Speaker's permission, were a l l o w e d i ^ The 
general d r i f t of the resolutions, the a t t i t u d e of the government shown 
t o them, and the i n t e r e s t taken by the members, were, t o a great extent, 
141. P.A. Bromhead. Private Members' B i l l s i n the B r i t i s h Parliament. 
(London* 1956), p.172. 
142. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 5 l a r c h , 1948, p.223. 
143. Jennings, 'Parliament*, o p . o i t . . p.248. 
144. Rules of Procedure, CAD (Leg.) Rule No. 62. 
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s i m i l a r t o the pattern of the Private B i l l s . The keynote was reformatory. 
But there was one s t r i k i n g contrast i n that the opposition - Congress -
though author of a few resolutions, took an active part i n them<>^  
Why d i d they prefer resolutions t o Private Members* B i l l s ? 
Presumably because they could not, i n the f i r s t place, foresee the type 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n the oountry was going to have, i n the absence of which 
i n i t i a t i o n of personal laws - as a form of Private B i l l - would be 
anything but sanguine. Whereas the majority party belonging to the M.X. 
had a strong hunch as to the f u t u r e nature of the country's c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
The sample of resolutions moved by them would speak volume i n that 
d i r e c t i o n . Secondly, by bringing i n resolutions - an easier process 
compared t o that of the Private B i l l s - the Congress was able to commit 
the parliament t o debate on issues i n whioh they had a greater stake. 
I n the f i r s t session of 1949» notice had been given of 22 resolu-
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t i o n s of whioh two were selected by b a l l o t . y A f o r c e f u l debate marked 
the proceedings of the House . "when i t discussed a Congress r e s o l u t i o n , 
namely t h a t the "Communal organisations engaged i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s " 
should be discouraged by the ! government i n the i n t e r e s t of the State. 
Now, t h i s r e s o l u t i o n was, at once, pregnant w i t h controversy. I t s 
ul t i m a t e aim was to change the essential nature of the ft»L-*, the party 
i n power. The mover himself was not feigning when he &sked the govern-
ment to 'change the name of the Muslim League i n t o t h a t of the Pakistan 
National League, throwing i t s doors wide open t o people of a l l communi-
x . 146 t i e s . . . 
145* Statesman. February 9, 1949 • 
146. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 22 February, 1949, p . l l l . 
The government, aware of the existence of the A k a l i Panth, R.S.S.S. 
i n I n d i a , c l e v e r l y gave out to the House that the resolution anticipated 
a s i t u a t i o n where a p a r t i c u l a r people embracing d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o n would 
not be able t o form i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l l y , so the resolu t i o n should be 
withdrawn i n the i n t e r e s t of the opposition party. I n respect of what 
the government should do w i t h the nomenclature of the M.L., i t s answer 
was i n the best t r a d i t i o n of Delphian oracle i . e . "Alexander never did 
what he said and Caesar never said what he d i d . " ' ^ 
The seoond Congress r e s o l u t i o n asked the government t o assure the 
people th a t c r i t i c i s m of the Cabinet or i n d i v i d u a l Ministers would not 
be construed as d i s l o y a l t y t o the State. The mover wanted opportunity 
f o r f a i r c r i t i c i s m ; f o r , " i f a Muslim league committee o r i t i c i z e the 
government, such a c r i t i c i s m i s t o l e r a t e d , but i f a minority voices 
genuine c r i t i c i s m , i t i s accused of anti-Pakistan a c t i v i t y " . " ^ But t o 
the government i t was not an innocent motion, rather a mask to castigate 
149 
the Safety Act. ^  The t h i r d r e s o l u t i o n wanted t o discuss government 
150 
f a i l u r e t o "secure reasonable p r i c e " ' f o r the Bast Pakistan j u t e 
growers, a fa v o u r i t e subject of the Congress. 
The purport of the resolutions indicates that the opposition 
was more eager t o censure the government than t o discuss. This does 
* Rastriya Sebok Swamyuke Sangha. 
147 • CAD (Leg.), Vol . 1 , 22 February, 1949, p.119. 
148. Statesman. 5 January, 1950. 
149. CAD (Leg.) Vol .11 , 4 January, 1950. p.303. 
150. Statesman. October 3, 1950. 
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v i o l a t e an important point that the House should not raise issue i n the 
form of resolutions when a decision cannot be resolved upon. Then, whose 
resolutions and what type of resolutions got through the House? 
Obviously, i t was the government's and i t s following's. 
The government resolutions were of a formal kind v i z . seeking 
extension of 12 months, every year, t o the India (Central Government 
and Legislature) Act, 1946 t o have power t o control the production and 
151 
supply of various essential commodities; y or seeking amendments t o 
the Schedule of the P.I.D.C. Act, from time t o time, t o b r i n g more 
152 
ind u s t r i e s under i t s i n i t i a t i v e . An important resol u t i o n seeking 
support of the government *s condemnation of the North Korean attack 
on the South and o f f e r i n g of 5,000 tons of wheat to the South Korean 
153 
Republic, i n pursuanoe of the Seourity Council decision, J was seriously 
debated and passed, the Congress siding w i t h the government. I t gave 
an opportunity t o members t o throw a searchlight on the f o r e i g n p o l i c y , 
a subject t h a t had not been formally discussed. 
Resolutions of a controversial nature could be sent t o the 
Select Committee to d i s t i l out disagreement before they are introduced 
t o the House. But the government f o i s t e d a resolut i o n on an I n d u s t r i a l 
Tribunals Award on an uneasy House, without having i t r e f e r r e d to the 
Select Committee. The re s o l u t i o n r e l a t e d to an award given by a Tribunal, 
which held out a judgment on the a f f a i r s of the East Bengal Railways 
151. GAD (Leg.), Vol.1, 30 March, 1954, P.1055. 
1 5 2 » Vol. I , 17 A p r i l , 1952, p.1428. 
153. I b i d . . Vol.11, 11 October, 1950, p.507. 
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Employees committing the government t o cer t a i n obligations which the 
government wanted t o be r i d of. The opposition accused the government 
of rushing through an important r e s o l u t i o n a f t e r having f a i l e d to make 
the government agree "that the award of the t r i b u n a l should also be 
binding upon the government, as i t i s binding upon other employers"."^ 
The resolutions of the government backbenchers, on the other 
hand, dealt w i t h r e l i g i o u s a f f a i r s , education, corruption and sports. 
The Secretariat received 476 notices of resolutions of which 388Cwere 
admitted by the Speaker. Only 39 resolutions were taken up by the 
parliament Of a l l the f i v e resolutions moved - they aimed at making 
the teaching of the Quran compulsory to Muslims} establishing an 
I n s t i t u t e of Islamic Research j observing the Prophet *s birthday as 
State function? s e t t i n g Fridays as a holiday instead of Sundays; and 
eradicating of corruption and redtapism from the administration - a l l 
but the one desiring Fridays as holidays were adopted. One such 
r e s o l u t i o n i . e . Establishment of an Islamic Researoh I n s t i t u t e , f i n a l l y 
156 
succeeded i n having i t s place i n the country's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provisions. 
The adopted resolutions, however, had an Islamic savour. But on balance, 
they served as a " t r i a l balloon" f o r future enactments. The pr o v i n c i a l 
l e g i s l a t u r e s took recourse, also, t o resolutions as the prelude t o 
f u t u r e s o l u t i o n of issues. Nevertheless, they offered opportunities 
i i i 
* Calculated by the w r i t e r . 
154. I b i d . . Vol. I , 28 August, 1954, p.1654. 
155. Munir Ahmed. Legislatures i n Pakistan (Lahor#$ 1957)> p .82. 
156. "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan", 
(Karachi: 1956), p. 143, part X I I . 
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f o r debates. Seventeen members joined" a two-day debate on the resolu-
t i o n , "Eradication of i n e f f i c i e n c y , corruption and red-tapism i n 
services", which took place on d i f f e r e n t dates between which a Ministry 
f e l l . The resolutions on Education and Sports found eloquent expressions 
i n the House. The House witnessed a sincerely well-devoted debate on 
a r e s o l u t i o n , "East Bengal Floods"- a matter of great magnitude a f f e o t i n g 
l i v e s , properties and crops every year - moved by a Congress member. 
Twenty seven members, both East and West Pakistani members, par t i c i p a t e d 
i n a 4-day debate, spending over 10 hours, s h u f f l i n g across views among 
themselves as to the causes and remedies of the routine yearly f l o o d . 
This r e s o l u t i o n , though a p r o v i n c i a l concern, brought about a meeting 
of minds among the members regardless of party hues - a departure caused 
by a common i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of national issues. No doubt, the Prime 
Minister had to appreciate the constructive c r i t i c i s m coming "from the 
members on the government side as w e l l as from the members of the 
157 
opposition". 
The f u t i l i t y or f e r t i l i t y of Private Members* time i s not to 
be judged, alone, by the yardstick of l e g i s l a t i v e reoord, or f o r that 
matter the quantum of motions adopted, but also, by the consideration 
t h a t , t o what extent, i t has been spent to raise issues of both Private 
and Public i n t e r e s t s . The motions of whioh notices had been served, 
admitted, and f i n a l l y adopted by the Pakistan parliament were an 
expression more of members' l e g i s l a t i v e g a r r u l i t y than of reticence. 
157. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 8 September, 1954, p.1735. 
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Commitees 
I t i s said that "a l e g i s l a t u r e may he known by the Committees i t 
158 
keeps'* • "* This keeping of committees may have been due to the practice 
that evolved through ages or, the r e f l e x i o n of a country's given 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l struoture. The system does serve three major functions© 
F i r s t l y , i t enables members to have a olose view of the 'goings' of 
the State business by p u t t i n g *Whys' t o the people concerned with 
p o l i c y and administration. Secondly, a l l the benefit of d i v i s i o n of 
labour i n l e g i s l a t i o n i s associated with i t , i n that i t can feed the 
•subject' under ^ l e g i s l a t i o n w i t h the fodder of new knowledge gained 
through p u b l i c evidence or expertise. Added to i t was the congeniality 
159 
i n the absence of a "Party p o l i t i c a l atmosphere". J 7 T h i r d l y , i t 
serves as a t r a i n i n g ground f o r would-be Ministers, what i n the 
lo*0 
opinion of Prof. Laski might be an aspect of the "selective function" 
of the parliamentary system. The countries coming under the B r i t i s h 
parliamentary t r a d i t i o n , regard, unlike continental countries or the 
U.S., committees as i n c i d e n t a l developments, though important, t o the 
parliamentary system. The moot point i s that the oommittee system 
must not be indulged t o a point when i t i s l i a b l e t o be harmful t o 
parliamentary a u t h o r i t y i t s e l f and f o r that matter, t o Cabinet respon-
s i b i l i t y . 
Two types of committees, namely Ad hoc and Standing, were set up 
i n Pakistan. The former was aa useful as the Select Committees i n 
158. Morris-Jones, o p . o i t . . p.279* 
159. I b i d . . p.278. 
160. H.J. Laski, Parliamentary Government i n England (London:1950), 
p.170. 
dealing w i t h p a r t i c u l a r B i l l s , d r a f t i n g rules of procedure or doing 
s p e c i f i c things as assigned t o them hy the Speaker, but would wind up 
the moment the job was over. The l a t t e r type was r e l a t i v e l y permanent, 
i n that i t was appointed i n the beginning of each session f o r a f i x e d 
term. The Committees on Public Accounts, Standing Advisory assigned 
t o each M i n i s t r y , Privileges, House, Library, etc., were of the l a t t e r 
category. The Committees* proceedings were treated as con f i d e n t i a l 
t i l l t h e i r reports were submitted t o the House. 
The Public Accounts Committee 
# 
The appointment of t h i s committee was designed not t o go into 
the f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y of the State, but to probe i n t o public expenditure? 
as sanctioned by the parliament i n the form of estimates f o r demands 
f o r grants, based on the audited report of the Auditor-General of 
Pakistan. The idea was t o put on a check upon the government to discover 
whether post-Budget expenditure was i n accord w i t h the parliamentary 
sanction or not. Besides, the Constitution Act, under Section 169 
required the accounts of the federation to be audited and placed before 
the House. 
The Publio Accounts Committee was duly appointed i n the f i r s t 
Budget session of 1948, but the Committee was s t i l l awaiting early 
3.(5X 
i n 1950 "the "reports of the Auditor General" t o work upon. The members 
had been a l e r t t o remind the government that the House was being deprived 
162 
"of c o n t r o l l i n g the finances of Pakistan", since the report of the 
Auditor-General was not forthcoming. At long l a s t , the outstanding 
161, CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 28 March, 1950, p.466. 
162, I b i d . . Vol . 1 , 25 March, 1953, p.692. 
reports of the Public Accounts Committee' on the Appropriation Accounts 
f o r the year 1947-48, 1948-49 and 1949-50 were submitted to the House 
i n 1953* They were debated upon, w i t h p a r t i c u l a r stress on the 1947-48 
report. The c o n t r i b u t i o n of the Public Accounts Committee as a watchdog 
of the House on public expenditure was v i s i b l e , i n that they revealed 
four d i s t i n c t patterns of f o l l i e s i n the ledger book of expenditure. 
(,l) Granted t h a t budgetary estimates do not precisely t a l l y with the 
amount f i n a l l y spent, but i t i s the bulk of the figures of savings 
and expenditure of the post-budget period that should matter. The 
government of Pakistan had two opportunities f o r straightening estimates, 
one when the Budget was t o be submitted,the other when the revised 
budget was prepared. Despite t h i s f a c t , the Budgets of 1947-48, 1948-49 
and 1949-50 witnessed an excess expenditure of rupees 2 orores, 10 crores 
and 20 crores respectively. (2) Over u t i l i s a t i o n and u n d e r - u t i l i -
sation of the fund voted by the House. I n the former category the expen-
d i t u r e was r a t i o n a l i s e d f o r the proper nourishment of the Defence and 
Foreign A f f a i r s departments; whereas i n the l a t t e r oase, savings were 
shown only t o r e s u l t i n the undernourishment of the nation-building 
department. The Committee was p a r t i c u l a r l y shocked to see t h i s tendency 
" t o occur under ... departments, e.g. education, medical, public health, 
e t c . ..." (3) The mutual cooperation of the government, the Auditor-
General and the Public Accounts Committee i s prerequisite t o have an 
163. GAD (Leg.) Vol. I I , 13 November, 1953, p.1508. 
164. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 11 November, 1953j P.1491* 
16*5 "honest and i n c o r r u p t i b l e system of f i n a n c i a l administration". J 
Relevant department documents and top o f f i c i a l s , i f need be, must be 
accessible t o the Committee. I n the deliberations of the Committee, 
secretaries (usually represented by the Joint Secretaries) were not 
very responsive. Perhaps they dismissed the Committee as a concourse 
of laymen ivulnerable t o accounting dots and decimals. This might suggest 
tha t the Ministers were e i t h e r lax-r i n d i r e c t i n g o f f i c i a l s or just they 
l e t i t go by as a matter of course. An offended member hinted to the 
166 
government th a t i t was time t o "say goodbye t o your bureaucracy". 
F i n a l l y , i t was the i r r e g u l a r i t y of ledger keeping which resulted 
i n some cases of "embezzlement, defalcation and l o s s e s " . " ^ I t happened 
mainly i n the Defence Department where things were shrouded i n mystery* 
I n short, the ledger balances d i d not correspond with the actual stock 
available i n some departments, not t o apeak of 'fund lapses* due to 
delay i n payment of government b i l l s . 
The Committee gave a good account of i t s e l f having worked on a 
belated audit report. I t remained i n continuous session f o r a f o r t n i g h t 
s c r u t i n i z i n g appropriation accounts, examining witnesses of the various 
departments of the government and. discussing a l l important items per-
168 
t a i n i n g t o defence, c i v i l , railways, and post and telegraph. The 
Committee evolved an i n t e r e s t i n g procedure i n dealing w i t h the government, 
165» Jennings, op . o i t . . p.337« 
166. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I I , 13 November, 1953, p.1514. 
l 6 7 » I b i d . , p.1509. 
168. Dawn, 20 September, 1952. 
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i n what were termed "oomplianoe reports"* I n each year the Committee 
would check w i t h the compliance report to see whether the recommendations 
th a t had been made previously t o the departments! and mi n i s t r i e s were 
f u l f i l l e d . The manner i n which the Committee conducted i t s business 
compelled the Finance M i n i s t e r t o characterise i t as " v i g i l a n t and a l e r t " i ^ 
Was amenability of the government compatible with the Committee's 
recommendations? Evidently not. Though a few suggestions were heeded 
so f a r as the government commercial departments were concerned. The 
main defect l a y i n the delay of, submission of the Auditor-General's 
report without which the Committee was motionless. An allowance f o r 
delay i n compilation of the Appropriation Accounts was made i n the early 
period, when the Finance Minister thought that unless they "received 
accounts of some months before p a r t i t i o n our f i n a n c i a l acoounts cannot 
170 
be complete". Added t o t h i s the absence of tr a i n e d s t a f f , reference 
books, accounting^nachines, etc., etc. But these causes were repeated 
every year, t i l l the parliament was f i n a l l y dissolved. Even before 
the demise could take place a Congress member had managed a cut motion 
on t h i s a f f a i r only t o harp on the same point t h a t the f i n a n c i a l g r i p 
of the House on government expenditure was weak and the "labours of 
171 
the Public Accounts Committee" were "of no a v a i l " • 
* Some s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the Committee on Assurance i n Indian House 
as mentioned by Prof. Morris-Jones 0 
169. CAD (Lego) V o l o I I , 13 November, 1953, p.1516. 
170. I b i d . . Vol. I , 29 March, 1950, p. 507» 
171. I b i d . . Vol. I , 26 M&rflh, 1954, P e628. 
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The Standing Advisory Committees 
Pakistan retained t h i s t r a d i t i o n from the old central l e g i s l a t u r e 
of I n d i a . These Committees d i f f e r e d from t h e i r prototypes i n the House 
of Commons, i n that t h e i r terms of references were less d i f f u s e . 
They were 'attached' t o each M i n i s t e r i a l department. The Law Minister 
l a i d down the p r i n c i p l e s t h a t the Committees would evaluate the l e g i s -
l a t i v e proposals, or discuss matters of public importance, subject to 
the Minister's consent, r e l a t i n g t o the M i n i s t r y concerned and tender 
advice on the general p o l i c y of the department when asked by the 
172 
M i n i s t e r , The very nature of these Committees d i d not encourage 
outside p u b l i c i t y . But the caustic references i n the House made by the; 
members proved that meetings d i d not take place as they should, though 
a new set of committees, as a r u l e , were announced each session. 
173 
Mr. J a f f a r thought them t o be "Sleeping Committees" l J than "Standing", 
P a r t i c u l a r l y the members of the Defenoe and Foreign A f f a i r s Advisory 
Committees were genuinely eager t o c a l l meetings; f o r , they thought 
a l o t of bungling was going on i n those departments. The best example 
of the a t t i t u d e of the government was given by the Prime Mi n i s t e r 
himself, i n answer t o a question t h a t "there was nol matter which could 
174 
be r e f e r r e d t o t h i s Committee", 
Of a l l the Committees, the Advisory Committee to the M i n i s t r y 
of Finance (apparently, the B r i t i s h type of Committee on Estimates) 
x 72. I b i d . . Vol. I , 8 March, 1948, p .36l , 
173, I b i d . . V ol. I I , 26 September, 1953, p.369. 
174. Pawn. March 13, 1952. 
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was most a c t i v e . I t met r e g u l a r l y every year, went i n t o new items of 
expenditure, including those oft1 Defence and Railways, examined them 
thoroughly and placed reports before the House. 1^ I n 1952, i t had 
schemes f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a School Health Service i n Karachi, the? 
s e t t i n g up of a Pakistan Medical Research Association and the Insurance 
Promotion Corporation approved."^ The Committee met 6 times i n 1948-49, 
3 times i n 1949-50, twice i n 1950-51, 10 times i n 1951-52 and 4 times 
177 
i n 1952-53? although Rule No. 9 of the House's Rules and Procedure 
only required the Committee t o be summoned not less than twice a year* 
One c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature was tha t the Committee's meetings almost 
conveniently coincided w i t h that of the presentation of the Budget. 
For instance, the Committees on Food and Agr i c u l t u r e and Finance 
M i n i s t r i e s met on the 13th March, 1952, j u s t two days p r i o r t o the 
Budget submission. I t was a whitewash on the government's part or 
an attempt t o take some s t i n g out of the opposition attach, which did 
not work; f o r , a f t e r a l l , the demands of the opposition were complementary. 
Government in d i f f e r e n c e aside, the success of a Committee system, 
a f t e r a l l , r e l i e s on the 'understood* s p i r i t of give and take among i t s 
components - a s p i r i t t h a t was yet t o be c u l t i v a t e d i n Pakistan. 
Besides, the effectiveness of Committees depends a good deal on the 
way they are appointed. I n Pakistan party views were represented i n the 
175. CAD, (Leg.), V o l . I , 6 October, 1953, p.809« 
176. I b i d . . V ol. I , 18 March, 1953, p.306. 
177. I b i d . . Vol. I , 29 March, 1950, p. 529. 
178. Dawn. March 13, 1952. 
Committees through proportional representation by means of the single 
transferable vote, which resulted i n the monopoly of the majority party 
on the Committees. What was more, the Committees regardless of types 
were to be chaired by the Ministers of the departments concerned."^* 
I n other words, the Speaker had no free hand i n choosing Chairmen f o r 
Committees l i k e h i s counterpart i n neighbouring I n d i a . This v i o l a t e d 
a p r i n c i p l e of g i v i n g f a i r representation t o the opposition i n order 
t o o f f s e t the preponderance of the majority party. Also, the fact that 
these Committees were not entrusted with l e g i s l a t i v e powers made them 
more prone t o c r i t i c i z e the government. They were, by r u l e , precluded 
from meeting any time other than during the sessions of the parliament. 
The p r i n c i p l e t h a t Committees must not assume powers at the expense of 
the parliament, was a f a c t o r that had never been jeopardized i n Pakistan. 
The Committees were formed with b u i l t - i n safety valves ensuring execu-
t i v e a u t h o r i t y , i f not parliamentary prerogatives. 
The Select Committees 
B i l l s f i l t e r e d through the Select Committees to the House, are 
ch i s e l l e d t o l e g i s l a t i v e manageability on which the members at large can 
react . I n a l l 15 B i l l s were processed through the Select Committees. 
* I n B r i t a i n the Public Accounts Committee i s chaired by an 
opposition member. I n the United States accent i s on s e n i o r i t y 
to become Chairmen of Committees. 
** The P.I.F.C.; The Karaohi Port 3?rust; The Bombay Prevention of 
P r o s t i t u t i o n (Karach); The Estate Duty, The A.D.F.C.; Employment; 
Pakistan Array; The Hon-Allopathic P r a c t i t i o n e r ; The Cinematograph; 
The Criminal Law; The Merchant Shipping; The T a r i f f ; The Unani, 
Ayurvedi & Homeopathic P r a c t i t i o n e r s ; The P.C.I.C, and Hoarding and 
Black Marketing. 
179. Rules of Procedure and Standing Orders, (CA.Leg.) Rule 100, 5 2(l) ( b ) . 
180. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 29 March, 1950, p. 550. 
The ineff i c ienoy of the Members of the Committees d i d not appear to 
have been the cause of non-reference of B i l l s t o them. The Minister 
was a l l praise f o r the members of the Committee who brought about valuable 
amendments t o the d r a f t B i l l on Hoarding and Black Market, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n making "a d i s t i n c t i o n both i n the offences and the punishment to be 
given t o persons who are hoarding not f o r gain". But the main nub< 
of the issue was the government fs desire f o r haste and unwillingness 
* 
t o be buttonholed by the Committees i n the l e g i s l a t i v e process. The 
idea was "government knoweth b e t t e r " . The purposes of the Committees 
might not always appear neutral t o the Members themselves; f o r , they 
could be instruments of delay i n l e g i s l a t i o n . One such oase was the 
Karachi Hotels and Lodging Houses B i l l introduced by the government. 
One group of members (those who had an interest i n house rent) wished 
the B i l l had been r e f e r r e d to the Committee; while the second one (who 
had i n t e r e s t s , probably t o h i r e houses at low rent) did not want to go 
t o the Committee. Compared t o t h i s , the Committees on the Private 
Members* B i l l s fared b e t t e r , i n th a t they presided over ^  B i l l s and 
sent 6 of them f o r e l i c i t i n g public opinion and i n one case t h r i c e * 
Whereas, i n the e n t i r e h i s t o r y of government sponsored B i l l s public 
opinion was sought only twice. 
Three more committees, p o t e n t i a l l y important, are t o be mentioned. 
# # # 
They were Committees on Administration, Iconomy and Zakat. The AdmlM-
* The w r i t e r gets t h i s impression from the Hansard. 
** Pakistan Marriage Expenditure B i l l . 
*** A system i n MieLira law by which a portion of a person's income i s 
given to the Publio Treasury t o be doled out to the poor. 
181. GAD (Leg.), Vol . 11 , 30 December, 1948, p.556. 
182. CAD (Leg.), Vol . 11 , 11 October, 1950, p.475» 
199-
s t r a t i v e I n q u i r y Committee was appointed i n 1948 t o evaluate the organi-
sation, structure and l e v e l of expenditure i n departments of the govern-
ment. The government r e a d i l y implemented one of the v i t a l recommen-
dations of the Committee i . e . establishment of an organization and 
methods service t o "examine the set up and methods of works of the various 
government organisations i n order t o improve e f f i c i e n c y of administration 
3 a 
I84 
183 
consistent w i t h economy". The res t of the recommendations, save a 
few minor ones, had been consistently put o f f f o r some futur e date. 
The Economy Committee was appointed i n 1950 "fro help various organisations 
of the government achieve f r u g a l i t y . I t produced four reports but t o 
no purpose. The earnestness was there when the Committee sent a two-
man sub-committee abroad, which having surveyed the Far Eastern and 
Middle Eastern Embassies was suddenly prevented by the M i n i s t r y of 
Foreign A f f a i r s from v i s i t i n g e i t h e r the Pakistan London High Commission 
or the Washington Embassy. The members could v a i n l y protest against the 
government's obstruction by saying t h a t , a f t e r a l l , "they have been 
185 
elected by t h i s august House"* J S i m i l a r l y , the Zakat Committee report 
186 
was "plaoed i n cold storage", which otherwise would have f a c i l i t a t e d 
s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , the way the "Bhoodan Movement" d i d i n Ind i a . Apart 
from t h i s , members also served i n some other Committees of various 
subjects such as education, pilgrimage, sports, national anthem, etc. 
4- Hindu. June 2, 1950. 
183. I b i d . . V ol. I , 15 March, 1952, p. 22. 
184. I b i d . . V ol. I , 25 March, 1954, p.555 
185. CAD (Leg.) Vol . 1 , 26 March, 1954, p.631. 
186. I b i d . . Vol. I , 25 March, 1954, p.563. 
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P o s i t i v e l y speaking, -the presence of Committees, however i n e f f e c t u a l 
they might l i e , at l e a s t , allowed the members to get to know the process 
and levers of parliamentary democracy. Disenchantments indeed, - as 
there were many - followed not from the inherent unworkability of the 
system hut from the i n a b i l i t y t o remove the obstacles hindering smooth 
fu n c t i o n i n g . Evidently the members had a sense of involvement i n the 
governance of the nation, by being present there. They took advantage 
of what was of worth i n the system. They fought and f i n a l l y extracted 
a promise from the government th a t the Committees " w i l l be meeting i n 
off-session days'* 
On the negative side, the n o n - o f f i c i a l a c t i v i t i e s , i n general, 
were re s t r a i n e d by stringent r u l e s . Members wondered that during B r i t i s h 
r u l e they were taken around the m i l i t a r y s i t e s of the country, but the 
home-alade Rule No. 7 governing the Procedure of the Standing Committees 
188 
reversed t h a t course. The weakness of the Committees was not the 
r e s u l t of the awareness of the House as a whole that i t s a u t h o r i t y was 
being challenged by the miniature l e g i s l a t u r e i . e . the Committees, but 
due t o the p o l i c y of a well-entrenohed section of the Hbuse, the 
government. 
Question Time 
Posing questions t o Ministers does not consist merely i n pumping 
out information from the government or the a i r i n g of grievances of con-
187. I b i d . . Vol. I , 26 March, 1954* p.632. 
188. GAD (Leg.) Vol .11 , 13 November, 1953, p.1495. 
261. 
s t i t u e n o i e s . Question time i s one of the l a s t bastions of the r i g h t 
of p r i v a t e members to exercise p o l i t i c a l control over the government. 
This questioning device evolved i n B r i t a i n through a long bargaining 
process as the use of the r i g h t s of dealing w i t h the public p e t i t i o n s , 
p r i v a t e b i l l s and questioning the order of the day's business p r i o r t o 
governmental ones, had gradually f a l l e n i n t o dissuetude. So, an hour's 
time or so t h a t precedes the public business of the House tends t o be 
intensely used by the members i n the b r e v i t y of time. 
The observance of Question time had been the redeeming feature, 
of Pakistan parliament. The questions, both starred and unstarred -
occupied, chronologically, a sizeable spaoe of the Pakistan Hansard. 
The rules required members t o give f i v e days* notice before answers to 
the question could be obtained. The provision f o r supplementaries to 
189 
the o r i g i n a l questions was also envisaged. ' I n the glamour and fu r y 
of the f i r s t parliamentary session the rules were evidently l i b e r a l . ^ 
The Speaker f o r the time being, deviated from the e a r l i e r praotice of 
the Indian ce n t r a l l e g i s l a t u r e , i n that he allowed an absentee member's? 
190 
questions t o be put by another, provided the answers were ready, ' 
The f i r s t session of the parliament augured we l l with the Question hour. 
The pattern of questions, such as the seeking of innocent information 
equally matched by motivated one which succeeded i n f o r c i n g some fao$s 
* Starred questions require the Ministers t o answer questions o r a l l y 
before the House making provision f o r supplementaries, whereas 
unstarred questions do not. 
189. Rules of Procedure, l o o . c i t . . No. 8A ( i i ) and 8A ( v ) . 
190. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , March 8, 1948, p.314. 
202. 
on the cost of "Operation P a k i s t a n " , f r o m the government, set mostly 
by the government backbenchers at the outset was a pointer t o the futu r e 
trends. The comparative ease and composure of the government i n dealing 
wi t h the questions could not be a guide i n the f u t u r e . I n the f i r s t 
session l a s t i n g only 12 days the House disposed of 67 o r a l and 151 w r i t t e n 
192 
questions. ' 
The immediate second session began wi t h a l i v e l y question hour 
t h a t brought a f f a i r s of the Lahore Plying Club t o the fore i n the d i s -
193 
appearance of money and plane. ' So, the members, by and large, we're 
interested i n the questions whose numbers gradually burgeoned and 
remained f a i r l y steady during the whole period. And, that "the system 
194 
provides ... a searchlight upon every corner of the public service", y 
was i n p r i n o i p l e , adhered t o by the Pakistan parliamentarians with 
considerable p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t . 
Members* i n t e r e s t s knew no bounds i n that they s p i l l e d over a 
vast range of subjeots under the sun. Prom one extreme, the members 
would search f o r *Boro' seeds f o r plantations i n looal areas, while, 
t o the other, they would put meandering questions i n search of the 
h i s t o r i c "Kohinoor Diamond" i n Great B r i t a i n . However, the subsequent 
developments v i s - a - v i s the rate of questions, though, i n no way alarming 
by B r i t i s h standards received by the parliament secretariat - the tab l e 
of which i s given below - j o l t e d the government i n t o p u t t i n g some 
191. I b i d . . Vol I , March 10, 1948, p.406. 
192. Statesman. 12 March, 1948. * 
193. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 10 May, 1948, p.507« 
194. D.N. Chester & N. Bowring, Questions i n Parliament (Oxford: 1962), 
p.269. 
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r e s t r i c t i o n s on the flow of the questions. On t h i s score, however, 
the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e s slumped due to "both t h e i r inadequate 
Year Starred Unstarred Short Notioe 0, 
1948 642 509 38 
1949 706 361 29 
1950 867 523 29 
1951 959 330 29 
1952 1,462 442 48 
1953 2,474 724 69 
1954 812 410 241 
* Total 11,704. 
s i t t i n g s and occasional d i s s o l u t i o n s . Rules p u t t i n g some r e s t r a i n t 
on the haphazard onrush of question were l a i d down by the Speaker. He 
forbade members t o ask f o r huge s t a t i s t i c a l information through the media 
196 
of s tarred questions - a r u l i n g which succeeded i n t r a n s f e r r i n g very 
many questions to the unstarred category. The p u t t i n g o f f questions 
( o r a l ) i n case of question hour having been dispensed w i t h or postponment 
of parliamentary s i t t i n g s , f o r the next s i t t i n g was discouraged; and 
the starred questions of that day, by convention, would be treated as 
* The East Pakistan l e g i s l a t u r e , a good user of supplementaries, fared 
less i n the volume of o r a l and w r i t t e n questions. I n 1949, s i t t i n g 
over f o r more than a month i t answered 145 out of 189 questions. 
Source; Statesman. December 19, 1949* ^he N.W.P.P., by chanpe, i n 
the absence of f i x e d r u l e on the Question Time, was the greatest 
user of questions. For instance, i n the 10-day autumn session i t 
dealt w i t h 400 questions leaving another hundred outstanding. Also, 
i n the f o l l o w i n g year 6f the same session of 7 days, i t disposed 
of 500 questions; whereas i n the same year the Punjab l e g i s l a t u r e 
i n an 11-day session took care of only 255 questions and the f o l l o w -
i n g year i n a 14-day session disposed of 252 questions only. 
See Dawn dated 23/11/52; 20/11/53 and 11/12/54 respectively. 
195* M. Ahmed, o p . c i t . . p. 133» 
196. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 26 February, 1949, P. 177 
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'unstarred' and "be l a i d on the t a b l e . Again, an animated disoussion 
took place i n the parliament when a Minister, r e f e r r i n g t o the large number 
of questions, asked the Speaker f o r a r u l i n g t h a t each member should be 
permitted t o put down only 5 questions. Another Minister added that the 
approximate cost incurred i n c o l l e c t i n g information f o r the questions 
was wel l over Rs.240 and hoped t h a t public money oould be saved by res-
t r a i n i n g the number of q u e s t i o n s . T h e Speaker, i n t u r n , having 
asked the questioner t o give notice both t o the Minister and to the House 
secre t a r i a t i n d i c a t i n g which p a r t i c u l a r 5 questions out of t u r n he was 
going t o ask, f a i l i n g which would mean his adherence to the day's order 
198 
paper as i t would appear normally. ' This could only diminish some 
uncer t a i n t i e s attached t o supplementary questions vis-a-vis the Mi n i s t e r s . 
F i n a l l y , the M.L. Parliamentary Party, as was t o be expected, decided 
t h a t M.L. members must not send more than f i v e questions each day. The 
iron y was t h a t the prodigal questioner, whose d a i l y average of sending 
questions was more than 50, who happened t o be present at the meeting, 
could not objeot t o the decision as he was p a r t i a l l y deaf 
Erskine May's dictum t h a t "the purpose of a question i s to obtain 
information or press f o r a c t i o n " 5 ^ was followed i n the Pakistan p a r l i a -
ment, but the d i r e c t i o n of i t s question pattern went, very of tea, o f f 
at a tangent. Information asked f o r could be e i t h e r of value t o the 
197• Dawn. 25 September, 1953* 
198. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I I , 28 September, 1953, p. 396. 
199. Pawn. October 1, 1953* 
200. Quoted i n Bowring & Chester, op.cit.^ P t iQf9 
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questioners, or be reduoed t o bootlessness. For example, questions 
e l i c i t i n g information i n respect of the percentage of population and 
201 202 l i t e r a c y province-wide, national and per oapita income, and the 
amount of money earned, spent and saved "by the Departments of Railways 
203 
and Post and Telegraph i n l a t e 1947 and early 1948, were meaningful 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the context of the i n i t i a l period. The members could 
make an i n c i s i v e attack on the government and f r y the f i s h of i t s p o l i c y 
w i t h the o i l of s t a t i s t i c s as had been supplied t o thera. S i m i l a r l y , 
questions of a f a c t u a l nature were asked, such as to why Pakistan got 
2$ of the e n t i r e exports of c a p i t a l goods from the U.K. while India got 
17$ contrary t o Anglo-Pakistan A g r e e m e n t , L o r d Boyd-Orr A g r i c u l t u r a l 
Enquiry Committee^ recommendations were p a r t i a l l y implemented, to the 
205 
neglect of h i s main one, agrarian reforms, ^ and why the government 
d i d not take proper aotion when the Chief Special Off i c e r of the Central 
Police had reported the government's losing 6 lakhs of rupees a month 
due t o corruption i n the s t a f f of the Railways, Telegraph, Excise and 
n * 206 Customs. 
But at the same time, unprofitable questions were i n even greater 
numbers. For instance, the value of questions seeking to know the 
t o t a l number of Pakistanis arrested, convicted or sent back to Pakistan 
201. CAD (Leg.), Vol I , 2 A p r i l , 1951, p. 736. 
202. Pakistan Hews. 1 December, 1951* 
203. CAD (Leg.), V o l . I I , 3 January, 1950, p.242. 
204. I b i d . . Vol . 1 1 , . 3 January, 1950, p.205. 
205. I b i d . , 20 November, 1952, p.410. 
206. I b i d . , V ol. I , 2 March, 1949, P. 245. 
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207 by India and vice versa, 1 and the number of o f f i c e r s of Pakistan 
government drawing salary of Rs.500/-, between Rs.25o/- and Es. 500/-
and below Rs.250/- per mensem respectively, w i t h t h e i r names, q u a l i f i -
cations and places of b i r t h , would not have been commensurate with the 
time and labour involved i n c o l l e c t i n g the information. Some of the 
questions i n s i s t e d on knowing the c o n f i d e n t i a l proceedings of the Common-
wealth Prime Ministers* Conference and stopping the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
m i l i t a n t Hindu Mahasabha i n India t r y i n g to undo Pakistan, 2 0^ were, 
no doubt, specimens^of members* l i m i t e d awareness of the functioning 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s and pr o t o c o l . 
Pressing f o r actions on matters ranged from national to l o c a l , 
on the one hand, and sectional t o p a r t i c u l a r , on the other. Questions 
urging the government t o recast the syllabus and c u r r i c u l a of education 
h i :. from the primary l e v e l t o the u n i v e r s i t y i n the l i g h t of Islamic 
210 
ideology, t o appoint a Commercial Attache at Singapore and Malaya, 
beoause of the preponderance of Muslims and India*s gaining trade f a o i -
211 
l i t i e s t h e r e , t o reassure m i n o r i t i e s of East Pakistan by stopping 
Hindu exodus, or to grant more scheduled caste scholarship, and to 
212 
b u i l d a s a t e l l i t e town i n the suburbs of Jessore, were oases i n p o i n t . 
Organised questionings f o r the f u l f i l m e n t of group or p a r t i c u l a r 
207. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 18 March, 1954, p.130. 
208. I b i d . . V ol. I , 25 March, 1951, p. 287. 
209. I b i d . . V ol. I , 9 A p r i l , 1952, p.1189. 
210. I b i d . . V o l . I , 16 February, 1949, p.22. 
211. I b i d . . Vol .11 , 3 January, 1950, p.207. 
212. I b i d . . V ol. I , 24 March, 1953, p.601. 
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i n t e r e s t s were n e g l i g i b l e . But, a greater number of lopsided patterns 
of questions v i s - a - v i s refugees was suggestive of the presence of regugee 
sympathisers i n the House, whose concern f o r the 'refugees* might be 
213 
genuine or "professional", as Prof. Tinker has sucoinctly put i t . 
I n the case of Mr. B.H. J a f f e r , never a s i t t i n g passed without his 
questioning the government i n respect of refugee a f f a i r s . His dogged 
pressing f o r the a b o l i t i o n of the d i s t i n c t i o n of refugees between "agreed" 
* P I A 
and'non-agreed" areas, was, at length, succesful. ^ S i m i l a r l y , 
Mr. Gazdar's incessant arrows of questions, probably pierced the government 
i n t o a l l o t t i n g 2 orores of rupees f o r Sind i n the Budget of 1953 - a 
p a r t i a l compensatory amount due t o Karachi's being taken over by the 
215 i Federal government. J 
The wordy duel between the questioner and the questioned, on 
balance, had been both formal and prosaic, r a r e l y enlivened by flashes 
of wits p u t t i n g each other at h i s w i t ' s end. Allusions made during 
question hour were more often of a personal nature. For example, 
the buzzing sound of the telephones s i g n a l l i n g out of order might 
P I fi 
be compared w i t h the shoring sound of the Communications Minister, 
or a lean and t h i n member, i n view of the Pakistan Film Industries' 
unattraotiveness might propose t o a corpulent Minister i f they could 
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s t a r t together i n Pakistan f i l m s playing the roles of Laurel and Hardy. 
* "Agreed areas" were the areas where communal r i o t s had taken place; 
the contrary was the case with the non-agreed areas. This was the 
mutual agreement between the Indian and Pakistan Government to 
tack l e mass migration f o l l o w i n g the independence. 
213. H. Tinker, India and Pakistan (London: 196?), P«78. 
214* CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 12 A p r i l , 1954, p.1207; See also Dawn. 
September 24, 1953* 
215. I b i d . . Vol. I , 14 March, 1953, p.149* , 
Footnote /Contd. over. 
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4 large number of questions were couched i n a language which resulted 
i n the Minister's saying e i t h e r 'yes* or 'no' thus pre-empting the 
scope of supplementaries. There were instances, when both 'starred* and 
'unstarredS questions were hardly distinguishable. For instance, 
starred question No. 8 and unstarred 6, i n the same s i t t i n g , asked f o r 
the s e t t i n g up of a M i l i t a r y Academy, an Ordinance Factory and a Naval 
218 
Sohool i n l a s t Pakistan. I t was the qu a n t i t a t i v e value of the 
questions t h a t got the b e t t e r of the q u a l i t a t i v e . Arguably, t h i s was 
the concomitant r e s u l t of parliament being apportioned the shortest 
possible time and the government's unwillingness t o have many an a f f a i r 
debated i n the House. The increasing number of questions answered -
the chart of which i s given ovbelowC- < as the years r o l l e d by, involved 
issues which normally should have taken place under d i f f e r e n t p a r l i a -
mentary procedure. The contents d i s t o r t e d the r e a l framework of the 
questions. Starred Unstarred Short Notice Average 0.. Time 
1948 579 459 26 23.12 25 
1949 603 328 11 19.45 31 
1950 736 480 5 23.74 31 
1951 864 310 15 34.56 25 
1952 1,258 372 9 41.93 30 
1953 2,085 626 18 63.18 33 
1954 . 634 306 39.62 16 
6,759 2,881 177 191 
» Total 9,817 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
216. I b i d . . V o l . I , 4 March, 1949, P.359 
217. I b i d . , Vol. I , 31 July, i 9 5 4 > p.1571. 
Footnote /Gontd. over. 
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I f questions may be considered a barometer showing the trends of 
a country's p o l i t i c s , the above chart i s i n d i c a t i v e of the gradual r i s e 
of Pakistan p o l i t i c a l mercury. The r e l a t i v e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the rate 
of questions was more pronounced i n the periods of 1951, 1952 and 1953. 
T r u l y , these were the periods which catalogued the great events of 
assassination, dismissal of M i n i s t r i e s , r e l i g i o u s r i o t s , so and so 
f o r t h . The increased number of short notice questions i n 1954, meant 
f o r r e l a t i v e l y urgent matters, was due mainly t o the Speaker*s allowing 
them i n the presence of f l u i d parliamentary programme.^1'* As the 
dimension of public p o l i c y widened so i t s mode of application resulted 
i n a vast increase of administrative establishments, on the one hand, 
and a corresponding decrease i n the quantum of e f f e c t i v e control on 
them by the members, on the other. The Question hour wi t h a l l i t s 
attendent i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , oould, at least, r u f f l e that process. Question 
time, on average, lasted f o r 45 minutes t o one hour per day. The 
average number of questions per day compared favourable with that of 
220 
the Indian parliament, whose average was 20-25 questions a day. 
The majority of the questioning members belonged to the government 
backbenchers rather than to the opposition party. Three backbenchers 
used 'questions' throughout the l i f e of the parliament to t h e i r utmost. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
*.. Calculated by the w r i t e r from the Hansard. 
218. I b i d . . V ol. I , 17 March, 1954, PP«38 and 47. 
219. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 18 September, 1954, p. 1782. 
220. Morris-Jones, o p . c i t . . p.225. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y , the indefatigable Nur Ahmed, who asked questions good, 
bad and i n d i f f e r e n t , i n each s i t t i n g , could v i e f o r the world record 
221 
w i t h Col. Harry Day of the B r i t i s h House of Commons i n the 1930s. 
Of the 1200 questions put during the f i r s t session of 1953, Mr. Nur 
Ahmed raced f i r s t i n p u t t i n g 545 questions, followed by Mr, Zaffer with 
222 
478 and Mr. Monera Khan 91 respectively. Even the Whips of the party 
could not r e s t r a i n Mr. Zaffer from reducing the number of questions t o 
5 t o be put downj f o r , h i s ingenuity could induce another 9 members 
to send h i s questions i n t h e i r names, so that his average of 50 could 
223 
be maintained. J This was alarming t o the Ministers} f o r , they had t o 
braoe themselves f o r supplementaries, as well as the o r a l answering of 
the o r i g i n a l questions. This l e d the Prime Minister to say that "We 
224 
Ministers are not walking encyclopaedias." * 
The Congressites were more i n c l i n e d t o ask supplementaries/ than 
t o send i n formal questions. Perhaps t h i s was more convenient t o them 
or t h e i r leaders may have been preoooupied w i t h major speeches. For 
one t h i n g , some questioning areas appeared to be 'taboo* t o them. The 
Congress members' p u t t i n g down a touchy question asking whether the 
defence expenditure of Kashmir was separate from that of the main defence 
225 
estimates earmarked i n the Budget, ^ predioatably evoked no answer, 
on grounds of "public i n t e r e s t " . However, t h e i r tenor of questions 
221. Bowring & Chester, o p . c i t * . p»195» 
222. CAD (Leg.) Vol.11, 24 September, 1953, p.137. 
223. Dawn, op.b i t . . p.225* 
224. Dawn, A p r i l 6, 1953. 
225. CAD (Leg.), Vol.11, 20 December, 1948, p.180. 
a n . 
rambled l e s s , i n -that they would ask questions of a spe c i f i c nature 
r e l a t i n g t o constituency a f f a i r s , p r o v i n c i a l or the so-called 'underctogs* 
i . e . the 17 Class employees of the d i f f e r e n t branches of the government. 
A, shrewd Congressite question could induce Muslim leaguers t o suspend 
pa r t y l o y a l t y f o r the time being. One such question on food prices 
i n l a s t Pakistan developed i n t o a regular debate, i n which the K.L. 
Premier of East Pakistan r e l i s h e d the vain e f f o r t s of s h i f t i n g the blame 
f o r the prevalent unsatisfactory food s i t u a t i o n i n his province t o the 
226 
M.L. cen t r a l government, through the use of supplementaries. 
The framing of supplementaries acted strenuously upon the impromptu 
common sense resources of the members, i n that seldom were the occasions 
where members were found overwhelming the Ministers with t o r r e n t s of 
t r i p p l i n g questions and the Ministers parrying them. Members were not 
shown questions one day e a r l i e r , as was prevalent i n some Indian State 227 * l e g i s l a t u r e s , t o get ready f o r the supplementaries. At least one 
zealous questioner somehow managed t o have a l i s t of supplementaries 
228 
typed out e a r l i e r f o r h i s guide. Supplementaries were usually long-
winded, argumentative, hypothetical and opinionated i n nature, s t a r t i n g 
w i t h the words "Ife i t not ... ?" " W i l l the M i n i s t e r agree ... i f ...?" 
"Does the M i n i s t e r believe ...?" etc., etc. What S i r Ivor Jennings 
* The best part of the parliamentary time devoted i n the N.W.F.P. 
l e g i s l a t u r e was occupied by the questions. A convention grevj where 
supplementary debates and explanations i n resply t o questions were 
held u s u a l l y . Dawn.i 20 November, 1953. 
226. I b i d . . Vol. I , 2 l iFebruary, 1949, pp.102-108. 
227. Morris-Jones, o p . o i t . . p.225. 
228. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 23 March, 1953, p. 519. 
2%2 . 
"thought of questions o f t e n serving "as pegs on which to hang a more 
229 
insiduous 'supplementary*", ' ocourred i n the Pakistan parliament, t o o . 
A question apparently intended to know i f the members of the House were 
immune from the Arms License Act, resulted i n the questioner's drawing 
the a t t e n t i o n of the M i n i s t e r t o the fact that h i s gun had been seized. 2"^ 0 
S i m i l a r l y , an innocent-looking question querying the government's 
awareness of the formation of the "Pakistan People's Organisation" with 
a non-communal and s o c i a l i s t i c bias, was followed by t r i p p i n g questions 
231 
l i n k i n g Gaffar Khan*s a r r e s t with his association with the organisation, 
Sttpplementaries could create a 'row* i n the e f f o r t to know the exact 
232 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n of an o f f i c e r , or the names and addresses of firms which 
233 
were granted loans by the P.I.F.C., from an evasive Minis t e r . I t 
appeared th a t the M i n i s t e r s * tone i n answering supplementaries was 
rela,ted t o the members* respective locus i n the scale of prestige. 
But occasionally, an obscure but v i g i l a n t member's question seeking 
explanation from the government as to why a secret document, Economic 
Appraisal Committee's Report, was put up f o r sale by the government 
234 
p u b l i c a t i o n branch, could put a complacent Minister i n bad shape; 
since, he had t o answer a crop of h o s t i l e supplementaries, as to the 
235 
alleged leakages of government import policy ^ and trade p o l i c y of 1952* 
229• Jennings, o p . o i t p . 1 0 6 . 
230. GAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 12 March, 1948, p.499» 
231. I b i d . . Vol .11 , 29 December, 1948, p.428. 
232. I b i d . . Vol .11 , 12 November, 1952, pp.7-9. 
233. I b i d . . Vol. I , 30 March, 1951, pp. 644-646. 
234. I b i d . . Vol .11 , 6 October, 1953, p.749. 
235. Dawn. 7 October, 1953. 
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In short, the Question Time was a silver line i n the procedure 
of the Pakistan parliament. The Speaker's encouragement,2^ coupled 
with the members' unwillingness f o r making a "scapegoat of the Question 
237 
Hour", helped, at least, to maintain a steadying surveillanoe over 
the vast area of governmental a c t i v i t i e s and ministerial answerability, 
which acted "as a safety valve for the public and for Hon. Members 
themselves". 
Adjournment Motions 
The use of the adjournment motion, the watered down version of 
the continental 'interpellation', as a parliamentary prerogative to 
hold the executive to accountability i s prevalent i n most Commonwealth 
countries' legislatures. But to l i m i t i t s use the scope of the motion 
had been reduced to only 'definite matters of urgency' and 'public 
importance* i n Pakistan parliament. Of the 69 adjournment motions 2^ 
of which the Secretariat had been given notice only 41 were introduced 
i n the House.! k t 
According to the Standing Order No. 23» the Speaker was to 
determine i f a particular matter proposed to be discussed was i n order; 
and, then, i n the case of opposition to the motion's being granted 
leave by the House the support of 12 members i n favour of discussion 
would sanction i t s a d m i s s i b i l i t y . 2 ^ Given the limited number of parlia-
* Required number i n the East Pakistan Assembly was 35» "tbe N.W.F.P. 
12 and Sind 22 respectively. Dawn. November 1, 1951 i Sta-tesman. 
11 A p r i l , 1948; Dawn. March 5, 1954• 
236. CAD (Leg.) Vol.11, 29 December, 1948, p.419 and Vol.1, 27 A p r i l , 
1954, p.1241. 
237. I b i d . , Vol. I , 17 March, 1954, p.170. 
Footnote /Contd. over 
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mentary s i t t i n g s , the Speaker, i n order to curb the plethora of 
# 
adjournment motions every day, said that "only i n exceptional oircum-
241 
stances" ^ should adjournment motions be brought i n the House. As 
many as 2^ motions f e l l foul of the severe rules governing adjournment 
motions* The government opposition to thosemotions usually oonsisted 
i n finding f a u l t with the prooedure and tenor of the subject proposed 
to be discussed. These are some i l l u s t r a t i o n s : (a) indefiniteness 
(economio c r i s i s ) } (b) more than one subject (abnormal rise i n prices 
of essential commodities)} (c) earlier opportunity not taken (disturbed 
conditions i n the Punjab); (d) provincial j u r i s d i c t i o n (shortage of 
ri c e i n East Pakistan); (e) protocol (ambassador's interference); 
( f ) already discussed (prices of cotton); (g) continuing policy of 
government (refugee re h a b i l i t a t i o n ) ; (hj routine administration authorized 
under law (Section 144 i n Karachi). Of a l l the motions moved 8 were 
debated i n the House, 2 thrown out by the House, 4 withdrawn on 
assurances and the rest were dismissed on some such grounds quoted 
ea r l i e r . 
What were the main messages the adjournment motions purported to 
convey? I f a l l the motions were broadly categorized i n terms of their 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
238. Bowring & Chester, op.qit., p.43. 
239. M. Ahmed, op.oit., p.137* 
240. CAD (Leg.), Vol.11, 23 September, 1953, PP.55-56. 
* Among the provincial legislatures, the Punjab's record of adjourn-
ment motions was the highest. In the very f i r s t day of autumn 
session of 1953 i t had 34 adjournment motions to be disposed of 
i n a span of 3 days. And the following session 60 motions were 
tabled. Dawn, 20 December, 1953 and 12st November, 1954* 
241. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 28 August, I954, p.1640. 
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natural aims, at least 15 of them would be found bordering on foreign 
policy, 6 on national economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , 14 on provincial problems 
of p o l i t i c s , economy and natural calamities respectively, 3 on individual 
p o l i t i c a l and civic rights and 3 on Karachi^ chronic troubles with 
refugees, administration and p o l i t i c s . Controversial contexts apart, 
a large number of motions implied or express, sought to debate 
Pakistan foreign policy i n the context of international p o l i t i c s - a 
parliamentary right which was being allowed to lapse by default. Granted 
that foreign polioy thrives well i f l e f t to the executive, t h i s should 
not preclude the parliament from discussing i t , or for that matter, out-
l i n i n g the general principles. By and large, the foreign policy became 
the exclusive province of the Pakistan executive. Never had foreign 
policy been formally debated i n the 7-year l i f e of the parliament, save 
on one fortuitous occasion when the Foreign Minister - who had hardly 
stayed home or attended parliament - bandied words on foreign policy i n 
support of the demand fo r a grant for his Ministry and to refute some 
242 
of the invectives hurled at him. No doubt, t h i s hiatus of parliament • 
tary rights vis-a-vis foreign policy contributed more strains to Pakistan 
p o l i t i c s , l a t e r on. I t appeared that government supporters were 
dragooned on foreign policy matters, since on a l l occasions the House 
did not support the adjournment motions touching on foreign policy, 
243 
when enquired into by the Speaker. I t was, however, on t h i s ground 
that the meaning of those motions could be r e a l i s t i c a l l y read. 
242. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 27 March, 1952, pp.615-624. 
243. I b i d . . Vol. I , 27 A p r i l , 1954, p.1247. 
\ He 
The eight adjournment motions that were debated - not unusual -
i n some form or other, were subjects comprising both national and pro-
v i n c i a l issues which cut across party lines. Similarly, members* affa-
b i l i t y on 'Kashmir a f f a i r 1 was a by-word i n Pakistan parliament; for, 
to the members i t was more of an 'emotion' than a problem. Again, the 
adjournment motion on Dutoh mil i t a r y action on Indonesia could be safely 
debated by the members with binoculars on t h e i r eyes. For, i t provided 
a rhetorical opportunity both f o r the Congressites' asking for the 
abolition of "alien rule" and unity of "Asiatics", and government back-
benchers* tinkering on the t h i r d world concept, since "weaker nations 
are no longer confined to Asia ••#"^^ In other words, the government 
adroitly screened under some pretext, adjournment motions which otherwise, 
had they been debated, would have censured the government's omraissions 
and commissions. Conspicuously, motions on c i v i l rights were not allowed 
## 
to be debated. On one solitary occasion the government was circum-
s t a n t i a l l y forced to allow a debate on the imposition of Section 
which froze the popularly elected government of East Pakistan. A Sub-
stantive debate on the constitutionality or the unconstitutionality of 
* In the 12 years from 1945 the House of Commons discussed only 
8 out of 73» See Peter G, Richards, Honourable Members (London: 
1959)» p.122; Also, same scarce use was made i n Indian parlia-
ment, Bee Morris-Jones, o p . o i t p . 2 2 8 . 
** The East Pakistan legislature suoceeded i n debating police 
excesses i n Sylhet d i s t r i c t on an adjournment motion. ' See 
Statesman. 19 November, 1949* 
244. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I I , 23 December, 1948, pp.333-334. 
21?. 
•the suspension of popular government continued for four days. 
The mode of allowance and disallowance of adjournment motions i n 
the parliament had similar echoes i n the provincial legislatures with 
a slight difference i n that the l a t t e r presumably had wished the former 
to set example. For instanoe, the rejection of 9 motions on the a n t i -
Ahmadya r i o t s i n the Punjab Assembly was preceded by similar rejection 
245 
m the parliament. ^  Similarly, a discussion on the food c r i s i s was 
followed by the same held earlier i n the parliament Again, a Con-
gressmen negatived motion of 1948 i n the parliament seeking release 
of Gaffar Khan was s t i l l found inadmissible i n the N.W.F.P. legislature 
247 
xn 1952. This was,however, indicative of the extent the M«L. govern-
ment held sway. 
Although the majority of the adjournment motions could not survive 
the rigour of the rules, there was no development of the mitigating 
convention - one that i s found i n the House of Commons or i n the neigh-
bouring India where the House does adjourn for half an hour at the end 
of day's business to discuss various matters. Nor did the House have 
a chance to debate the speech of the Head of the State** where i t could 
bring the entire administration into the focus of debate - a regular feature 
i n Britain and India. The Speaker though i n almost every oase, while 
* 28th June, 3rd July, 10th July and 17th July, 1954. 
** Only once an impressive debate took place following the address 
to the parliament by the Governor General i n August, 19#9. s©e 
Pakistan News. 19 August, 1949* 
245. Pawn. 17 March, 1953. 
246. I b i d . . 14 December, 1952 
247. I b i d . . 8 March, 1952. 
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hearing -the Minister's "objection on the ground of i t s admissibility", 4 
afforded the House some information, At the same time he would suggest 
a member to pick up the topics under an appropriate cut motion. Finally, 
there i s an interesting aspect i n regard to the authors of adjournment 
motions and th e i r subjects. The Congress did not move any motions 
touohing foreign policy. I t s subjects comprised only c i v i l rights, 
local and provincial matters. I t was the A.P.P. who was the sole author 
of foreign policy motions. And the government backbenchers contented 
themselves with the harmless subjects of Dutch-Indonesian and Kashmir 
a f f a i r s . 
Debates 
The quintessence of parliamentary procedure i s debate, whioh 
enshrines valuable information to be passed on to later generations as 
a h i s t o r i c a l guide. Despite the division of responsibilities of the 
Constituent Assembly, "the Assembly f e l l into the error of confusing 
249 
constitutional with ordinary law". ^ As a result, some of the important 
debates on subjects took place on the wrong floo r of the House, and were 
catalogued under a different heading. Besides, the Federal legislature 
was impoverished of major speeches, since the cream of the debates on 
country's substantive issues were skimmed off into a different channel 
i . e . the Constituent Assembly as a constitution-making body. 
248. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I I , 24 November, 1952, p.5&U 
249• The Guardian. 20 November, 1953, e d i t o r i a l . 
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The tone of the debate i n parliament fluctuated with the relative 
importance of the subjects under discussion. In the i n i t i a l periods the 
debates were characterised by tedious sombreness devoid of flashing 
repartees. But i n the oourse of time debates assumed some poignancy^,, 
not without a few gems of wits studded i n them. While the members of 
the provincial legislatures were usually/ on the wings of rhetoric when 
* 
provincial norms were involved, the parliament comparatively was at 
i t s best debating form when dealing with subjeots on individual c i v i l 
and p o l i t i c a l rights. On t h i s plane, a l l legislatures i n Pakistan were 
a f o r t i o r i alike i n reactions both i n the level of debates and vocabu-
l a r i e s . For instance, the Pakistan Safety Act of any form had always 
250 
been greeted with almost same expressions, e.g. "monstrous", "fascist", 251 252 "black legislation", "immoral", J "anarchist" and " n i h i l i s t " , J no 
matter i f i t was to be debated either in the legislatures of East Pakistan, 
the Punjab or the parliament. Similarly, the government supported i n 
i t s wisdom by numerical strength would make the Act appear non-malignant 
i n the debates. The common features of debates between the parliament 
and provincial legislatures, however, were not to be stressed too rauchj 
f o r , the former conduoted i t s debates in an atmosphere of comparative 
t r a n q u i l i t y , dignity and unity i n procedural matter, while the l a t t e r 
The issues of Pakhtoonistan, transfer of Karachi to Sind, language 
issue i n East Pakistan; and agrarian reforms i n the Punjab. See: 
Dawn, March 8, 1952; 17 September, 1953; Statesman. 8 A p r i l , 1948 
and Dawn, September 19» 1953» 
Dawn. November 5, 1951* 
Dawn, March 8, 1952. 
CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 24 A p r i l , 1952, p.1650. 
turned increasingly aggressive to the point of playing f i l i b u s t e r tactics 
and boycotting debates, from which the parliament was remarkably free* 
The most str i k i n g thing about debate i n the parliament was the 
uses of similes, metaphors and allegories grounded i n what might be 
described as the Islamic cultural m i l i e u i - a drive towards Pakistani-
zation. And for t h i s , Br. Iqbal or Galib was not enough, the l . L . 
members had to invoke the s p i r i t s of the Muslim mystic scholar poets 
of the bygone ages, outside the subcontinent. Seldom was a speech made 
without some exoerpts from the Qhuiyuras, fiumis or Saadis having been 
quoted. They were the 'wafers* i n the cream of debates which helped 
members to elucidate points. For instance, the Quranio excerpt i.e. 
"Wa man yuhajir f i s a b i l l a h , y a j i d f i l arze murggh aman kathiran wusata**2*^ 
gave a new meaning to the urgency of refugee rehabilitation; a couplet 
from Iqbal i . e . "Ai lair- e - l a h o o l i us rizq se maut a chchi; j i s rizq se 
atx ho parwazman kotahi", J articulated a member*s b i t t e r opposition 
to the acceptance of American wheat; and a touch of Sasdi i.e . "Gah 
4-255 
Bashad Keh Kodark-e nadan; Az galat bar hadaf Zahad Teeray", -^revealed 
* The Punjab speaker had to warn f i l i b u s t e r s that obstructions to 
the debates could make them liable for being named. See Dawn. 
December 9, 1952> In East Pakistan the government onoe applied 
closure motion to obviate obstructionism only to be followed 
by boycott. See Statesman. A p r i l 9, 1949* 
** He who forsakes his home i n the cause of good finds i n the earth 
many refuge, wide and spacious, against the wishes of his enemy. 
*** 0 Celestial Bird, Death is preferable to that food, which clips 
your wings i n f l i g h t . 
+ Sometimes a boy not versed i n archery, erroneously shoots the target. 
253. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 20 May, 1948, p.712. 
254. I b i d . . Vol. I , 18 March, 1954. 
255. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 24 A p r i l , 1952, p.1651. 
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a member's anxiety for r i s i n g bureaucratic power. Similarly, western 
authors were quoted profusely by a few members. For instance, Kant 
and Hegel were surprisingly quoted to determine the moral aspeot of a 
256 
Finance B i l l , J when Dostoyevsky,s portrayal i n the novel "The Brothers 
Kararaazov" of "man i s tormented by ... g i f t of freedom", 2^ gave the 
member an extra foroe to speak against the Security B i l l . Of course, 
the Congressmen had t h e i r Mahabharata and Kalidasas to f a l l back upon.2"^ 
A Sanskrit metaphor i . e . "Balanang rothonong balang,"* 2-^ would make an 
aggrieved provincial Chief Minister asking for more central government 
aid, a l i t t l e bashful. But did a l l these produce incantation or enrich 
debates, alone? Beneath the layer of semantics lay members* Weltan-
schauung with the majority t r y i n g to dye Pakistan vrith the varnish of 
Islamic culture, and the minority relying more on i t s own cultural frame-
work - apparently a barrier f o r mutual communication. 
I t i s assumed that debates of high quality are produced when oast 
i n the mould of vigorous attack and counter attaok, and for t h i s , the 
onus of responsibility l i e s mainly with the opposition. Seen from this 
angle, the opposition f e l l short of expectations i n that the potentiality 
of the opposition was not f u l l y exploited. The average tone of the 
debates was rather more g l i t t e r i n g than businesslike punctilio. Wot 
* A wife weeping before the husband for more ornaments. 
256. I b i d . . Vol. I , 30 March, 1953, p.947. 
257. I b i d . . Vol. I , 24 A p r i l , 1952, p. I652. 
258. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 13 May, 1948, p.599. 
259. I b i d . . Vol. I , 24 March, 1951, P.225. 
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infrequently, the Speaker had to remind the members that they were far 
off the subject under debate. In some cases members oommitted convenient 
mistakes by discussing the devaluation of currenoy on a motion of the 
non-availability of commodities.^^ So far as the approach towards the 
technique of debates was concerned the Congress clearly stood apart 
from the rest of the members of the House. The mealy-mouthed Congressites 
indulged i n parliamentary niceties. They would oppose the government i n 
the debates with some such words depending on the subject at issue e.g. 
" I do not see eye to eye with the Minister on ... and I join issue with 
261 26? him on t h i s " , or " I oppose i t with f u l l sense of responsibilities". 
Butthe A.P.P. group was always i n a combatative mood i n the same way as 
the House of Commons had experienced i n the presence of I r i s h members, 
earlier . Perhaps, an A.P.P. member's remark on the commerce Ministry that 
i t s achievements were " a l l 'crashes?^ namely the cotton crash, the jute 
crash, the wool crash and the gold crash", was of i t s mildest sample* 
Really, some of the unparliamentary expressions e.g. " l i e " , "damned l i e " , 
or " h e l l " ^ - though very insignificant i n t h e i r numbers - which were 
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expunged from the debates, J mostly originated from th i s group. I t was, 
however, i n both manner, s p i r i t and objectivity of i t s speeches, that 
the Congress Party stood clearly apart from i t s opposition colleagues. 
260. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 25 September, 1953, p.325. 
261. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 13 October, 1950, p.592. 
262. I b i d . . Vol. I , 10 March, 1948, p.457. 
263. Dawn. March 26, 1952., 
264. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 17 March, 1950, p.103. 
265. I b i d . , Vol. I , 3 A p r i l , 1952, p.1016. 
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No doubt, the treasury benches could not just eschew the Congress as an 
opposition challenge which, indeed, they had admitted on many an occasion 
and had to j o i n debates well equipped* 
The vehicle of communication i n the House was mainly English, 
a l b e i t , provisions e n t i t l e d members to speak either i n Bengali or Urdu 
i f they did not know English. Slogan values apart, i t appeared that most 
of the members, in practice, preferred English to any other languages. 
On one occasion the Speaker stopped a member from speaking i n Bengali 
• 266 
on the ground that the member was quite familiar with English'. The 
English language, however, provided a modus operandi i n an otherwise 
irreconcilable situation. For instance, the Congress while trying i n 
vain to amend Rule No. 2$ to ensure that Bengali also should be used i n 
wr i t i n g the proceedings of the House, grudged that even Bengali had 
become unpreferable to English -'a souvenir of slavery". 2^ The use of 
English i n provincial legislatures, save East Pakistan, was less. 
Lively parliamentary speeches endear members to the public, and 
f o r that matter draw the House closer to them. Erudite speeches alone 
do not sustain public interest unless they are bathed i n wit and humour. 
* In 1954, the Punjab Assembly appointed a Select Committee to con-
sider amendment of the Rules of Procedure seeking that a l l proceed-
ings of the Assembly be conducted in Urdu. In East Pakistan pro-
ceedings were conducted i n both the English and Bengali languages. 
The extreme was the N.W.F.P., contrary to the Speaker's suggestion, 
a member spoke i n English on the Budget of 1953 only to be followed 
by members walking out of the House, and the same thing was repeated 
the following year. See Dawn. 22 November, 1954; March 18, 1953 
and March 20, 1954. 
266. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 10 March, 1948, p. 462. 
267. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 2 February, 1948, p. 19. 
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Here again, the witty snubs i n which the Congress members indulged i n 
were soft but pointed. For instanoe, the leader of the opposition was 
having a fri e n d l y 'dig* at the Minister of State, who came up with a B i l l 
f o r increasing Ministers' salaries, by enquiring why had the House re-
sounded with Islamic ideals earlier and now been found wanting when Mini-
s t e r i a l salaries were on the increase. Appreciative of the joke the 
Minister replied "But I do not draw salary under that B i l l " (laughter). 
As a contrast, an A.P.P. member while speaking on the Coconut B i l l , had 
the baldness of the Prime Minister uppermost i n his mind, when he obliquely 
remarked that "... i n the research of coconuts ... a man of the eminence 
of the Prime Minister ... would l i k e to know how i s i t that coconuts are 
269 
so hairy and how is i t that some nuts are altogether bald". * Wits 
were no respecter of party loyalties but became bolder when provincial 
interests were involved. A provincial Chief Minister did not hesitate 
to subject the central government to a bizarre comparison where the 
ugliest woman's automatic iden t i f i c a t i o n with the f a i r sex was equated 
with the government*^ l e t t i n g each statement on provincial allocation 
pass as a l l true. "Shylock ! take your pound of flesh, but do not shed 
270 
a drop of blood" ' retorted the central government having explained the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n matters of allocation. 
In a l l , the public interest i n the debates, on balance, had never 
been at low ebb. Neither the temperature of 116° could prevent the 
268. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 10 March, 1949, p.636. 
269. I b i d . . Vol. I I , 11 January, 1950, p.448. 
270. I b i d . . Vol. I , 24 March, 1951, P« 281. 
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public gallery from being packed to capacity, including purdah-clad 
271 
ladies i n 1948, nor did the watching of the jammed public galleries 
with foreign v i s i t o r s i n i t dwindled, when as late as 1953 the pressmenu 
were found "feverishly" covering the debates "to meet the deman of 43 
272 
vernacular and 3 English newspapers". ' 
Parliamentary Time 
The judicious allocation of precious parliamentary time i n the 
conduct of the business of the House i n order of p r i o r i t y i s an expression 
of the efficiency and seriousness with which a country*s given parliamentary 
system i s nurtured. Emphasis on p r i o r i t i e s may vary with individual 
countries, but, since the presentation of the yearly Budget contains a l l -
embracing issues of the State, a l l countries view thi s occasion as a 
common denominator of importance. Hence, a large share of parliamentary 
time i s earmarked for i t . 
I t was a p i t y that a nation of over 80 million people was governed 
with the benefit of minimum time spent i n the parliament for a maximum 
period of s l i g h t l y over seven years. Prom February 23rd, 1948 up to 21st 
September, 1954, "tbe parliament sat for 244 days i n a series of 13 sessions. 
The highest number of days i n a single session was 35 i n "the f i r s t and 
the lowest number i n the seoond session, was 7 only. The Budgets during 
t h i s period could claim only J6 days, though not exclusively? f o r , the 
question hour had i t s share. The Rules of Procedure approved of discussion 
271. Statesman. 1$ May, 1948. 
272. New York Times. November 1, 1953. 
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on the demands for Grants alone for 15 days, ' J but this was inoperative 
i n the face of the Budgets being presented at the eleventh hour. I t 
started with a 15 minutes' speech l i m i t for each member i n general 
discussion on the Budget, and a t o t a l of half an hour on each demand for 
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grants, ' but ended up i n slight recognition of el a s t i o i t y of demands 
for more time. Members, later on, were entitled to speak for 20 to 30 
minutes on general discussion and 10 minutes on each demand for grants 
which could be discussed for ife hours, on the basis of importance, 2^ 
The t o t a l time spent on the demands for grants throughout the l i f e of 
the parliament was as follows: Year Hours Minutes 
1948 10 35 
1949 7 0 
1950 12 20 
1951 13 35 
1952 14 0 
1953 15 30 
1954 9 20 2 7 6 
Members became more c r i t i c a l of the meagre allotment of time on the 
Budget, They looked back to those prepartition days of the Indian 
* Days al l o t t e d for the discussion of supply i n the House of Commons 
is 26, Burma 12 and i n India general discussion lasts 4 to 5 days, 
Hansard, op.oit,. pp.231-232, 
273, The Rules of Procedure C.A. (Leg,), Rule No, 47, 
274, CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 1 March, 1948, p. 51. 
275, I b i d . . Vol. I , 22 March, 1954, P* 354, 
276, I b i d . . Vol. I , 2 February, 1957, p.90 
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government - a period when "many more days were given and members had 
the opportunity, each and every member, to speak i n quite a detail on c 
277 
questions of policy". During the whole period an average of 10-§- days 
were spent i n disposing of the whole paraphernalia of the Budget,' 
The situation i n the provincial legislatures was no better. The Budget 
of the N.W.F.P. for the year 1949-50 was passed i n a few minutes' time 
i n the absence of the opposition. 2*^ In the East Pakistan Budget session 
of 1950-51* 18 demands f o r grants were passed i n less than 3 hours, i n 
which the larges demand i.e . ' c i v i l works' amounted to Rs.3g- crores. 2*^ 
In one instance, the members of the parliament volunteered to forgo thei r 
•non-official' day, so that they could do justice to the Budget demands, 
but the g u i l l o t i n e - whioh must be applied on the last day of the Budget 
at 5 o'clock 2^ - made short s h r i f t of everything. 
The time spent i n passing B i l l s was variable. But a quick dis-
posal of B i l l s was the by-word of the House. One of the determining 
factors was obviously, how deeply the members f e l t about particular B i l l s . 
For instanoe, during i t s 12 s i t t i n g s of the autumn session of 1952, the 
House took care of 24 O f f i c i a l B i l l s , spending a t o t a l of 31 hours on 
them, i n which the B i l l to amend the Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 
1944 was debated for 7 hours i n three continuous sittings - the longest 
ever. Also, the B i l l to control entry of Bharati people into Pakistan 
28l 
took 5 hours to be passed. Conversely, the House enacted 7 B i l l s i n 
277. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 29 March, 1951, P.589* 
278. Statesman. larch 15, 1949• 
279. I b i d . . 11 March, 1950. 
280. "Procedure", l o c . c i t . , Rusle No.20 (b) ( i i i ) . 
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1953 within :90 minutes of which 4 did not require any discussion what-
282 
ever* The pattern of provincial legislatures was of course, more 
# 
or less the same. For one thing, the parliament did not have to waste 
•St* 
time on some parliamentary procedural fuss. 
The lions share of the time went to the government, A t o t a l of 
28 days belonged to the private members1 business. Ordinarily, the 
Ministers were allowed to take more time during the course of the debate, 
so the r a t i o of non-official consumption of time was less. The yearly 
days of s i t t i n g s of the House averaged 35 days and the hours of time 
OPkA 
spent was 3i§-» During the whole period the House could neither evolve 
a convention as to i t s appropriate time of commencement, nor adjournment. 
The timetable had always' been subjected to immediate need. 
The Government and Opposition i n the Parliament 
Parliament i s the people's w i l l incarnate, under the Westminster 
system. The parties sent into the House through periodic electoral choice 
id e n t i f y i n themselves, i n the name of practical p o l i t i c s , the de facto 
• w i l l * of the people. The ' w i l l * of the majority of the people residing 
i n the majority party i n the parliament rules the country, while the 
minority awaits i t s turn. Hence, the dichotomy e.g. the majority forming 
* S i t t i n g over a month the East Pakistan legislature passed only 
3 B i l l s and 35 -out of 124 Glauses of the State Acquisition B i l l } 
whereas the N.W.F.P. passed 7 B i l l s without discussion. Statesman. 
December 19, 1949 and January 5» 1950. 
** The Punjab legislature i n 1952 recorded 94 points of order which took 
120 minutes of the parliamentary time. Dawn, December 5» 1952• 
282. I b i d . . A p r i l 2, 1953. 
283. M. Ahmed, op.oit., p.82. 
284. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 28 March, 1953, j». 893. 
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the government and the minority opposing i s r e l a t i v e and temporary. 
What i s permanent i s the determining f a c t o r of e l e c t o r a l choice of parties 
which clinches the issues i . e . the r u l i n g and opposing p a r t i e s . I n other 
words, the opposition has the p o t e n t i a l i t y of transforming i t s e l f i n t o 
the r u l i n g party provided the former carries the people w i t h i t i n the 
next eleotion - a system that helps opposition party ( i e s ) "approximate 
t o o f f i c e " . 2 8 5 
S t r i c t l y speaking, the i n s t i t u t i o n s of government and opposition 
t h a t obtained i n Pakistan immediately a f t e r independence were not i n 
conformity w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s we have adumbrated above. Once t h i s 
point i s understood, our appreciation of the s i t u a t i o n w i l l be more 
r e a l i s t i c . The party t h a t formed the government of Pakistan i n 1947 
was not placed there by the elect o r a t e . The people voted v i r t u a l l y on 
a p l e b i s c i t e determining the p o s s i b i l i t y of the oreation of a new state, 
Pakistan. The party - M.t. - having been the midwife to the b i r t h of 
a new state, became ipso f a c t o , i t s governing organ. Neither t h i s govern-
ing body nor the Prime M i n i s t e r had ever been subjected to proper 
parliamentary e l e c t i o n s . S i m i l a r l y , the Congress opposition i n Pakistan 
parliament was the by-product of the p a r t i t i o n plan. I n short, neither 
the government nor the opposition emerged out of proper e l e c t o r a l environ-
ment as understood i n the B r i t i s h sense. Their respective purposes 
were l i m i t e d . How t h a t the main purpose had been aohieved, the M.L. 
party was not i n a p o s i t i o n t o go to the people f o r l e g i t i m i s i n g i t s 
holding of governmental r e i n , nor was the opposition, i n the beginning, 
285. Laski, o p . o i t . , p.176. 
230. 
i n c l i n e d t o force the M.L. t o do so. As a r e s u l t , the formation both 
of government and opposition was synthesized. T i l l 1954, a l l the p a r l i a -
mentary paraphernalia were performed on t h i s synthetic p o l i t i c a l plane 0 
I n seven years* span the r u l i n g party witnessed some vi c i s s i t u d e s 
i n the parliament, namely new M i n i s t r i e s and memberships. But changes 
had no o v e r a l l impact upon the basic character of tthe M.L.j f o r they were 
brought about by a small number of leaders i n what Ostogorski and Miohels 
might view as "the r i s e of an oligarchy, i n the system of the p o l i t i c a l 
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p a r t y " . We f i n d Pareto*s notion of " c i r c u l a t i o n of e l i t e s " more appro-
p r i a t e i n the Pakistan s i t u a t i o n , since the governing leaders were i n a 
rapi d cycle of decadence and renewal, l o s t of the M.L. members, at one 
time or another, were r e c r u i t e d t o be commissioned f o r governmental jobs 
- a process t h a t helped members i n the art of government but also brought 
about d e v i t a l i s a t i o n among backbenchers. The boundary l i n e between the 
government f r o n t and back benchers was made meaningless} f o r , the clever 
backbenchers f e l t tempted to angle f o r jobs. The occasional vacancies 
caused by deaths or resignations were f i l l e d i n by the leaders, whose 
c r i t e r i o n was r e l i a b i l i t y . The membership pattern of the M.L. party i n 
the House, when analysed, would reveal how members* main a t t e n t i o n was 
being weaned away from t h e i r parliamentary duties. I n 1949, 20 M.L. 
members were serving as Ministers e i t h e r i n the central or p r o v i n c i a l 
287 
governments leaving 24 M.L. n o n - o f f i c i a l members i n the House. 1 I n 1952, 
286» Eizoski Tsuji-, "Pressure Group i n Japan" i n H.W. Ehrmann ed. 
I n t e r e s t Groups on Pour Continents (University of Pitssburgh: 1964)? 
P*145« 
287. GAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 2 March, 1949* p.284. 
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out of 54 members, 30 were i n government employment with the rest repre-
senting the 80 m i l l i o n people of Pakistan, Among the 60 M.L. members 
s i t t i n g i n 1953, 10 were holding jobs outside the House as Governors and 
Ambassadors* More than h a l f of the rest were the M i n i s t e r i a l positions 
leaving the re s t t r y i n g f o r j o b s . 2 ^ By 1954, a new pattern developed: 
of a l l the 12 central Ministers 8 were o r i g i n a l l y not members of the 
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House ' - a r e s u l t of the new " c i r c u l a t i o n of e l i t e s " . However, i n spite 
of a l l permutations and combinations that went i n t o shaping the M.L. 
parliamentary party, i t managed to stay i n power t i l l October 1954* But 
i t s well-entrenched p o s i t i o n was dwindling every year before the electorate 
and the opposition was no less responsible f o r t h a t . 
Compared t o the governing party, the chief opposition party, the 
Congress",was w e l l - k n i t and compact. I t did not incorporate any change 
i n the rank and f i l e of the party, by design. I t s verve remained un-
abated throughout. I f we bear i n mind the unorthodox o r i g i n of both 
"government" and "opposition", the missing l i n k i n the system th a t opposition 
was not i n a p o s i t i o n t o o f f e r "an a l t e r n a t i v e government", 2^ can be 
explained. Besides i n i t s o r i g i n a l function the Constituent Assembly 
had no place f o r e i t h e r government or opposition. The stop-gap arrange-
ments were adhered t o , when i t sat as the l e g i s l a t u r e of the country. 
We do not know as to why the term 'opposition' couldi not be, i n the past, 
288. Dawn, 30 March, 1952. 
289. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 28 l a r c h , 1953, p.900. 
290. I b i d . . Vol. I , 25 March, 1954, p.565» 
291» Gallard, o p . c i t . , p.84. 
euphemised by B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l ingenuity i n t o some more a t t r a c t i v e 
words, as i t apparently p a l l s upon the senses of laymen. The opposition, 
a f t e r a l l , does not operate i n a plane of sheer dissension. On the 
contrary, there i s a "basic u n i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e between the government 
and opposition! f o r commentators on "the nature of p o l i t i c a l orders con~ 
elude that an underlying consensus i s a prerequisite to the existence 
292 
of representative government", 7 This implies that there exists w i t h i n 
a p o l i t y a general acceptance of fundamental values, agreement on basic 
goals or common concurrence on the nature of things; and these help 
p a r t i e s "disagree because they had a basis of agreement upon the c o n s t i -
293 
t u t i o n " , x the one t h a t was yet t o be hammered out i n Pakistan. Surely, 
both the government and opposition i n Pakistan was handicapped by the 
absence of consensus. The fa c t o r of too much of executive powerfulness 
and too l i t t l e opposition powerlessness was determined more by extra-
parliamentary forces, pending drawing up of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . 
However, while spearheading the main opposition, the Congress 
whose number i n the beginning was 10, suffered a psychological setback 
i n the defection of i t s leader, Mr. K. Roy, who became an Indian c i t i z e n 
and joined the West Bengal Cabinet. The newly elected leader, Mr. S.C. 
Chakravarty, a veteran freedom f i g h t e r , r eadily offered h i s "cooperation 
t o the Pakistan government", and pronounced i n the Parliament that the 
* The Congress also formed the main opposition i n the East Pakistan 
l e g i s l a t i v e assembly. The aftermath of p a r t i t i o n reduced the number 
of Congress members to almost n i l i n the le g i s l a t u r e s of the Punjab 
and Sindo See Hindu, March 26, 1951* The N.W.F.P. l e g i s l a t u r e had 
12 Congress members at the time of p a r t i t i o n . By 1949 > 6 went to 
j a i l , 3 t o India and the rest sat i n the opposition benches of the 
l e g i s l a t u r e . Statesman. March 15> 1949. 
292. V.O. Key, j r . , Public Opinion and American Democracy, (New Yorkf 1963), 
p * 2 7 * "Footnote /Contd. over. 
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Congress "have no mind or design anyway to harm the Pakistan state 
(hear h e a r ) " . 2 ^ Whereas, the leader of the House, Mr. Liaquat A l i , apart 
from h i s having committed the faux pas of l i k e n i n g Pakistan t o "a laboratory 
where" they"could experiment upon the p r i n c i p l e of Isl a m " , 2 ^ 5 proved 
himself, l a t e r on, more accommodating to the Congress. He d i d not lag 
behind i n complimenting the Congress "as a responsible opposition", 2"^ 
f o r i t s "sobriety", " d i g n i t y " , and mode of " c r i t i c i s m " . But platitudes 
gave way t o the h i s t o r i c heritage of hatred and suspicion. I t was the 
one-time mutual memories of the Congress and M.L. which acted as an 
incubus i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . What the M.L. ought to have been oblivious 
t o - the nourishing of the opposition - was conveniently recalled to 
memory. The Congress was a party s t i l l consisting of Hindus and owing 
297 
i t s allegiance to an A l l - I n d i a body. So a t t r i b u t i o n of motives to 
the opposition worked negatively, as a silencer. No less a person than 
the Prime M i n i s t e r himself would hold out an i m p l i c i t threat t o the 
Congress by saying t h a t " I f you keep your eyes across the borders ... 
298 
i f you place your feet i n two boats, you know the f a t e of stich people". 
What was more>: when an opposition member enquired about the l e v e l of 
unemployment "since" p a r t i t i o n , the Prime Minister himself couched his 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
293. K.C. Wheare, op . o i t . , p.120. 
* The same insinuation would be found i n the speech of the p r o v i n c i a l 
Premier of East Bengal when he said i n the House that "there i s a 
section of thought t h a t have not yet been reconciled i t s e l f t o Pakistan." 
See Sawn. November 2, 1951* 
294. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 2 March, 1948, p.129. 
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296. I b i d . , V ol. I , 4 March, 1949, P.371 
Footnote /Gontd. over. 
234o 
feelings i n a play upon words, v i z * " i s i t since p a r t i t i o n or sins of 
299 
p a r t i t i o n ? " No wonder tha t a Pakistan p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t could f i n d 
t h i s p o l i t i c a l party as of a "dubious complexion and doubtful allegiance".^ 1 
I t was, no doubt, very d i f f i c u l t t o avoid inh a l i n g the a i r of suspicion 
th a t gripped the whole of the subcontinent. But the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
d i s l o y a l t y was determined by one f a c t o r , e.g. who were we l l placed on 
the continuum of- power s t r u c t u r e . For example, i f Pakistan l o y a l t y 
oould be defined mainly as severance of a l l sorts of connections with 
I n d i a , then i t would be very d i f f i c u l t to save some of the i l l u s t r i o u s 
leaders, who crossed the border i n 1947 °r afterwards, from being termed 
carpetbaggers. As a matter of f a c t , a question was asked i n the p a r l i a -
ment as to ascertain the number of Pakistan Ambassadors and High Oommisf s 
sioners i n f o r e i g n countries having property or trade i n t e r e s t s i n India 
301 
and, at the same time, r e t a i n i n g Indian c i t i z e n s h i p . Mr. C. Khaliq-
uz-zaman, who l a t e r on became the President of the M.L., the party behind 
the government, had taken the oath of allegiance, e a r l i e r , t o the 
302 
Indian union. These anomalies were the r e s u l t of the aftermath of 
p a r t i t i o n of the country. The issues of d i s t r u s t or hatredhad t o be 
f o s s i l i z e d ; f o r , the p a r t i e s had axes t o g r i n d . The greatest healing 
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297. Statesman. 20 March, 1948. 
298. Dawn, March 30, 1952. 
299. GAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 30 March, 1953, p.938. 
300. G.W. Chowdhury, Democracy i n Pakistan (Dacca:1963), P»51» 
301. Dawn, November 20, 1951. 
302. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I l l , 18 May, 1948, p.33. 
233. 
"balm -to t h i s national wound would he the r o l l i n g of time accompanied 
by proper " i n s t i t u t i o n b u i l d i n g " . We w i l l , however, now analyse what 
the opposition communicated to whom, through what channels and with what 
e f f e c t ? 
As f a r as the Congress was concerned, the keynote of opposition 
was "responsive cooperation", J as l a i d down by i t s leader. In other 
words, the 'cooperation* of Congress was contingent upon one f a c t o r , 
namely government 'responsiveness'. I t boycotted the Constituent Assembly 
meetings when i t s secular appeals were not responded t o . But i t always 
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n parliamentary business save once when the communal r i o t s ' 
of 1950 overwhelmed the members and the opposition leader "decided not 
t o move any cut motion during t h i s s e s s i o n " , a s a protest. However, 
the contents of opposition communications were based mainly on two issues 
e.g. the secularisation of the Pakistan body p o l i t i c and establishment 
of good r e l a t i o n s with I n d i a . I n the very f i r s t session of the parliament 
Mr. Chakravarty apprehended what might be i n the words of a lawyer con-
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s t i t u t i o n a l i s t , the State car "going downhill", J He urged the govern-
ment to do away with the d i s t i n c t i o n of "non-Muslim" and "Muslim",, 
"Refugee" and "Scheduled Castes"; f o r , they wanted "to be known as the 
c i t i z e n s of Pakistan", alone. He went on saying that the protection of 
mi n o r i t i e s by the Muslims was against t h e i r " s e l f respect", f o r they would 
want to stand on t h e i r "own r i g h t s " , a s equal c i t i z e n s . The Congress 
* The leader of the opposition i n East Pakistan Assembly said, "We are 
here to serve the people, and not to obstruct". See Statesman. 
A p r i l 9, 1949; also Statesman. February 28, 1950. 
303. I b i d . . Vol. I , 27 March, 1954f p.723. 
304. I b i d . . V o l . I , 20 March, 1950, p.199. „ , 
Footnote /Contd. over. 
wanted to r e o r i e n t the country's p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I t did not 
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enjoy being "a communal opposition". ' On the contrary i t fought vigo-
rously t o b r i n g about a non-communal and non-theocratic atmosphere i n 
the country through the i n s t i t u t i o n of a j o i n t electorate. 
Equally strongly, the Congress thought that Pakistan's well-being, 
both p o l i t i c a l and economic, was bound up wit h t h a t of India and vice 
versa. They wanted both the countries to develop friendship between 
each other, since the c o n s t i t u t i n g populace i . e . Hindus and Muslims, 
of those states were "brethren". On an emotionally charged issue l i k e 
Kashmir, the leader of the opposition would f i r s t address himself t o 
the " a u t h o r i t i e s of both the States t o lay t h e i r hands together.. , " 3 ° 9 
The Deputy leader of the opposition i n East Pakistan Assembly, Mr. D.N. 
Dutta, a f t e r having asked the government i n the House to have good trades 
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r e l a t i o n s w i t h Bharat, since she was the biggest buyer of Pakistan j u t e , 
came t o attend the parliament and repeated the same th i n g w i t h t h i s addi-
t i o n t h a t i n the economic f i e l d Bharat and Pakistan were "one economic 
u n i t " . 3 1 1 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
305* Jennings, op.oit.. p.167. 
306. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 2 l a r c h , 1948, p.130. 
* B.K. Das, leader of the opposition i n East Pakistan l e g i s l a t u r e 
voiced the same f e e l i n g s . Seet Dawn. March 27, 1952• 
307. I b i d . . Vol. I , 30 March, 1954, p.1028. 
308. I b i d . . V o l . I , 3 March, 1949, P.309 
309. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I I , 19 January, 1950, p.590. 
310. Dawn, 3 Maroh, 1953. 
311. I b i d . . 19 March, 1953. 
I n a d d i t i o n t o these two fundamental burdens of communication 
the Congress was no less g l i b on issues such as parliamentary prerogatives 
and the fundamental r i g h t s of a l l c i t i z e n r y . The Congress would challenge 
any type of delegated l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t might make an inroad on p a r l i a -
mentary j u r i s d i c t i o n . I n these f o l l o w i n g cases v i z . g i v i n g the Governor 
General power t o make necessary provisions f o r making the Indian Indepen-
312 
dence Act e f f e c t i v e ; providing the o f f i c i a l s w i t h extra power to 
313 
administer the Pakistan Safety Act; authorizing the Governor General 
i n the a l l o c a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l r e v e n u e s a n d furn i s h i n g the Governor 
315 
General w i t h the powers of the Letters of Patent t o create High Courts; ^ 
the Congress argued f o r c e f u l l y that the cardinal p r i n c i p l e of l e g i s l a t i o n 
was tramelled. S i m i l a r l y , on the measures such as the Public Safety 
Ordinance, the Security B i l l , and the R e s t r i c t i o n and Detention B i l l , 
attempting t o i n f r i n g e p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s , the Congress forced the govern-
ment on four occasions, though i n v a i n , to go to the Division lobbies. 
On the economic side they had no well-enunciated polioy t o o f f e r , save 
occasional observations. Sketchy evidences would suggest th a t they were 
i n favour of less state p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n economy; as on one occasion 
317 
a prominent member said t h a t he was " p o s i t i v e l y opposed" ' t o the jut e 
industry being nationalised. Truly, t h e i r economic parlance was narrowed 
312. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I l l , 2 March, 1949, P»43» 
313. I b i d . , V o l . I , 8 A p r i l , 1950, p . 7 U . 
314. Dawn, March 22, 1952. 
315. I b i d . . March 27, 1953. 
316. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , 24 March, 1952, p.422. 
317. I b i d . , Vol .11 , 9 October, 1953, p.1044. 
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t o a few subjects namely, the decontrol of a l l essential commodities, the 
scrapping of a l l taxes or duties on s a l t , betel nut, tobacco, kerosene, 
o i l ^ etc. - an arena of home economics of the masses. And, on three 
occasions, the Congress sent the House into the lobbies f o r the above 
mentioned subjects. 
When analysed, however, we come across a b i g contradiction i n 
the Congress p o l i o y j f o r , a l l i t s communications were lopsided. While 
mouthing l i b e r a l creeds, i t maintained a well-studied silence, throughout, 
on agrarian reform. Perhaps the Congress prestige or popularity would 
have been catapulted l e t t i n g o l d stigmas to wane, had the party's eloquence 
been waxed on land reform regardless of wings, as w e l l . On the contrary, 
i t became obscurantist i n the people's eyes, when i t fought tooth and n a i l 
w i t h a l l the parliamentary armoury, i n the East Bengal l e g i s l a t u r e to 
oppose the passing of the State Acquisition and Tenancy B i l l s , A c quisition 
of Waste Lands B i l l , and Transfer of A g r i c u l t u r a l Land Bill,^*® which, 
i n t e r a l i a , intended t o l i q u i d a t e the 200,000 rent receiving estates 
based on the 150-year o l d B r i t i s h Permanent Settlement Act i n ten years' 
time and r e d i s t r i b u t e them equitably among the landless peasants. No 
less a person than Mr. D.N, Datta - also an M.C.A. - would say i n the 
East Pakistan l e g i s l a t u r e that t h i s was an encroachment on the r i g h t 
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of p r i v a t e ownership. ^ I t was disconcerting that the valiantpropounder 
of l i b e r a l ideas had t o seek protection f o r zaminders, who j u s t happened 
318. Statesman. December 19, 1949; February 8, 9, 16, 1950} 
October 24, 1951. 
319. Dawn. 22 October, 1951. 
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t o be Hindus, on grounds of fundamental r i g h t s . Viewed from t h i s angle, 
the main opposition party had some common grounds with the central M.L. 
government, who always kept "Chup" ( S i l e n t ) on agrarian reforms. Simi-
l a r l y , the Congress views on Palestine and Korea were i n l i n e with the 
320 
M.L. government which, perhaps acted as a counterpoise to the former 
being on the opposition side. 
Coming next i n l i n e of opposition was the A.P.P. Undaunted by 
the i n f i n i t e s i m a l size of i t s party, i t d e f i n i t e l y succeeded i n drawing 
the a t t e n t i o n of the House, nay of people outside, t o i t s dogged perseve-
rence i n opposition and r a d i c a l l y affected ideas. What should have been 
a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l method so f a r as opposition was concerned "became a 
321 
second nature", t o i t s members. I t s main contents of communications 
were the s o c i a l i s t i c p a t tern of economy, a neutral foreign p o l i c y and 
xenophobia. On the economic f r o n t they wanted the government to "adopt 
322 
the road of socialised economy", which, among others, should consist 
i n n a t i o n a l i s i n g a l l important i n d u s t r i e s , the stopping of the i n f i l t r a t i o n 
of f o r e i g n investments, the a b o l i t i o n of feudalism and c o n t r o l l i n g of 
323 
p r o f i t s i n trade and commerce. On foreign polioy they thought that 
the Pakistan M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s was an agency of " B r i t i s h Imper-
* The A.P.P. consists of two M.L. renegades and one independent who 
joined i n i t l a t e r on. I t s number by 1954 dwindled to one (leader 
along) as one of them rejoined the M.L. and the other again preferred 
to be an independent. 
320. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 26 May, 1948, p.892 and Vol .11, 11 October, 
1950, p.485. 
321. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 29 March, 1950, p.494. 
322. I b i d . . V o l . I , 18 March, 1950, p.139. 
323. Dawn, March 25, 1952. 
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i a l i s t Foreign Policy", but was about to be passed "from B r i t i s h hold i n t o 
324 
the American t r a p " . The Pakistan Foreign Policy, according t o them, 
should be steered clear of the western bloc and become a u x i l i a r y t o 
freedom movements anywhere under the sun. That they were not f a r from 
the founder of the nation, Mr* Jinnah, i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h i n k i n g may 
be i l l u s t r a t e d by one examples Mr. Jinnah reoognized and received the 
representatives of Ho Chi Minn, who was f i g h t i n g f o r freedom i n Indo-
325 
China, during the Asian Relations Conference held i n Delhi i n 1946. 
Their xenophobia was d e r i v a t i v e of past h i s t o r y ; f o r , the ghost of 
imperialism was s t i l l haunting them. That "a fo r e i g n jew i s smugly 
seated ... at the establishment of Pakistan 'Cabinet Secretariat* and 
another o f f i c e r from the same country who ru l e d the subcontinent " f o r 
200" years, i n the M i n i s t r y of Commerce, was a source of i r r i t a t i o n 
t o the party. 
On a l l these matters the Congress d i d not side w i t h the A.P.P., 
whereas the l a t t e r joined the former i n d i v i s i o n lobbies i n support of 
the democratisation of the Pakistan p o l i t y . Ho wonder, the Congress 
were termed "reactionaries" by the A.P.P.; f o r , they "agree w i t h the 
327 
people s i t t i n g on the treasury benches on matters of p o l i c y " . A l b e i t , 
the party was i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y small and i t s members could be s a r c a s t i c a l l y 
324. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 26 A p r i l , 1953, pp.751-753. 
325. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 27 March, 1951, p.439. 
326. I b i d . . Vol. 1,26 Maroh, 1951, PP. 397-401. 
327. I b i d . , Vol. I , 29 March, 1951, p .59L 
characterised by the Prime Minister as "the three Tailors of Tooley 
Street ... who used t o address p e t i t i o n s t o parliament and used to say: 
•We the people of B r i t a i n * . Laughter"} but the f a c t remained i t was 
the only opposition group which d i d not spare the government on the f l o o r 
o f the House on any issue whatever. And t h i s t i n y group, l a t e r on snow-
ba l l e d i n t o a recognizable force both withinj.and without the legislatures 
of Pakistan. 
There was an i n t e r e s t i n g feature i n the parliamentary attack, 
i n t h a t the government backbenchers, on matters of central-provincial 
r e l a t i o n s , would i n v a r i a b l y j o i n the opposition i n taking the federal 
government t o task. Two scheduled caste members - also associate 
members of the M.L. - took the same view as the Congress i n many an issue. 
They abstained from two di v i s i o n s and joined i n the t h i r d w i t h the 
opposition. S i m i l a r l y , a f u l l - f l e d g e d M.L. member Begum Ikramullah 
abstained from a d i v i s i o n on an amendment i . e . "there should be no deten-
329 
t i o n without t r i a l " , moved by the Congress. However, when the contents 
of opposition communications are examined i t would reveal that despite 
substantial differences w i t h the government the Congress had areas of 
* I n some way i t helped the government. The w r i t e r was t o l d by a 
veteran Pakistan p o l i t i c i a n , Mr. Mumtaz Daultana, that the Prime 
Min i s t e r Liaquat A l i on many an occasion sent f o r Mian Sb., the 
leader of the A.P.P., and requested him t o c r i t i c i s e some areas of 
Pakistan Foreign Policy; f o r , i t would help the Prime Minister 
i n t a l k s w i t h U.K. and the U.S.A. 
** A.K. Dutta and Dhananjoy Roy. 
*** 1954, 22 March, on Central Excise and Salt and 1950, 8 A p r i l on 
Public Safety Ordinance. 
328. I b i d . . Vol. I , 26 March, 1952, p.526. 
329. Times. 30 October, 1953* 
1 
241* 
temperamental s i m i l a r i t i e s on some issues with i t , whereas the A.P.P. 
had some common grounds w i t h i t s colleagues, the Congress, but none at 
a l l w i t h the M.L. government. 
To whom di d the opposition speak and through what channels? I t 
i s said t h a t opposition communications " i s directed not so much towards 
a fundamental modification of the government's p o l i c y as towards the 
education of public o p i n i o n " . I n d e e d , t h i s was the keynote of the 
Congress's attitude? f o r , f i g h t i n g as they d i d f o r secular statehood 
they never thought of converting the M.L. government t o i t s views without 
having, f i r s t , created a popular scaffolding behind i t . While asking 
the government to ohahge the M.L. i n t o a Pakistan National League, the 
member candidly addressed himself t o "the a t t e n t i o n of the leaders of 
331 
the State and the country t o the present and also the f u t u r e of Pakistan? 
f o r consideration. The ideas of the opposition were radiated from the 
parliament t o the opinion leaders, who, i n t u r n , passed on what they 
read and heard t o t h e i r f e l l o w beings f o r over whom they were i n f l u e n t i a l . 
Apart from the parliamentary channels which we have examined 
e a r l i e r , the communications were f u r t h e r reinforoed by the public media, 
mainly newspapers. For example, the Congress's o i r t i c i s m of the non-
devaluation p o l i c y found an echo i n the e d i t o r i a l of a rig h t i s t news-
332 
paper which aooused the government of lacking a "planned economy". 
330. I v o r Jennings, Cabinet government (Cambridge; 1959), P»472. 
331. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 22 February, 1949, p.110. 
332. Morning News. 19 November, 1952* 
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S i m i l a r l y , a famous M.L. paper vindicated the opposition view on the 
int r o d u c t i o n of the passport cum vi s a system by saying that i t deprived 
"thousands of Pakistan labourers" l i v i n g on the borders of India of a 
"source of l i v e l i h o o d " . J The Morning News e d i t o r i a l i.e.Govern or Get 
Gut, 3 3^ i n r e l a t i o n t o s a l t was i n keeping wi t h the opposition views. 
Thus, the process i . e . "the two step flow of communications",^ channelised 
parliamentary a c t i v i t i e s . I t was made a l l the more communicable to the 
unsophisticated masses as the Congress indulged i n the manipulation of 
symbols. The uses of the loaded words "Noon Bhat" andVDal Bhat" by 
the Congress members i n the parliament drew them and the parliament 
closer t o the masses of the people. The symbolic s a l t whioh happened 
t o be associated w i t h the e a r l i e r freedom struggle oould be used as 
stimulant t o the dormant p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the people the response 
of whom would be automatic. The continuous moving of cut motions on 
s a l t kept the issue a l i v e and i t s n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y together w i t h high 
prices no less responsible f o r making the M.L. p o l i t i c i a n s - the sa l t of 
the Pakistan earth - unpopular i n the general elections of 1954 i n East 
Pakistan. What was the effe&t of the opposition? Well, no doubt, the 
opposition could not put enough te e t h i n i t s attack. With Mr. Suhrawardy 
* The opposition leader of the N.W.F.P. l e g i s l a t u r e thanked the Press 
f o r having presented the opposition point of view f a i t h f u l l y . 
See: Dawn, 18 November, 1953* 
** Salt and Rice; L e n t i l and Rice. 
333* A.iad. 12 January, 1953 
334• Quoted i n Dawn. October 31, 1951* 
335» Dr* E. Katz, "The two step flow of communication", Mass Communication, 
ed. Wilbur Sehramm (U.S.A.s 1960), p.346*. 
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d i s q u a l i f i e d , Mr. Gaffar Khan gaoled and Mr. P. Haq engrossed i n mass 
336 
p o l i t i c s , much of the wind i n the s a i l s of parliamentary opposition 
was taken o f f . The Congress - alone i n the breeze - was s t i l l i n need 
of mental r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . Even the defected leaders of the opposition 
could not f i n d solace i n India? f o r , while on his deathbed he would s t i l l 
wonder i f he could "go back to h i s homeland",^ East Pakistan. S t i l l 
then, i t was the only party which fought, though i n a l i m i t e d area, 
g a l l a n t l y t o the end. For one t h i n g , i t s cooperation was predicated 
upon the assumption of government responsiveness, which r e a l l y meant 
sec u l a r i s a t i o n of the State. A crack i n the government opposition 
r e l a t i o n s h i p had always been there, but i t became f a t a l l y pronounced 
when framing of Islamic c o n s t i t u t i o n was i n e v i t a b l e . Added t o t h i s was 
an atmosphere of mutual mistrust which resulted i n the Congress's not 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g seriously on the subjects l i k e Defence, Kashmir and foreign 
>^ Q 
a f f a i r s . And t h i s gap i n the opposition attack was made up by the 
A,P.P. and government backbenchers who intended t o "bark" not t o " b i t e " , ^ 
The government, on the other hand, was e n t i t l e d t o have i t s show 
since i t was the majority party i n the House. But i t would be wrong t o 
say that i t d i d not respond t o the opposition c r i t i c i s m . Caught i n the 
forensic t r a p of the Congressites, the government had to concede the 
336. Hindu. June 4, 1948. 
337. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 23 February, 1949, P.150. 
338. I b i d . . Vol. I , 28 March, 1953, p.916. 
339. I b i d . , Vol. I I , 29 Deoember, 1948, p.440. 
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postponement of consideration of two B i l l s on Income and the Business 
Pro f i t Tax and Estate Duty, 1^ Also, the opposition won the privilege 
of having t h e i r "amendments drafted" by the Ministry of Law, to "put them 
i n proper o r d e r " . T h e effect of opposition saw the levying of Sales 
Tax at "one stage and not at multiple stages"."^2 The opposition demand 
343 
f o r a "detailed Budget"-^ was implemented, as the "Explanatory Memo-
randum", "Economic Survey" and " S t a t i s t i c a l Tables" were incorporated 
i n the B u d g e t . A n already declared 'division* on a B i l l was averted, 
when f i n a l l y the government accepted "a reasonable amendment" There 
were other instances when the opposition could obtain responsiveness 
from the government* And t h i s responsiveness was also responsible for 
the occasional identioal approach on issues by both the government and 
the opposition. This tendency was mentioned to have existed i n the pro-
v i n c i a l legislatures, as well. Also, i n the beginning of each session 
the government would lay on the table important documents, Statements of 
the Directors and accounts of the Statutory Corporations - even though 
they might be explained as an eyewash. We do not, of course, say that the 
effectiveness of the opposition c i r i t i c i s m on the government had been a 
regular feature, but we do imply that symptoms were observed i n the 
positive direction as the years r o l l e d by. 
340. Statesman, December 25, 1949* 
341. CAD (Leg.), Vol.11, 24 December, 1949, P«72. 
342. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 2 A p r i l , 1951, P.748. 
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2G December, 1953. 
True, the opposition was not i n a position to make the M.L. 
government behave properly, either i n the centre or i n the provinces. 
But t h i s premise holds water up to a point. A •drip by drip* opposition 
campaign had been a continuing process. The opposition made the best 
of a bad bargain i n the parliamentary forum. I t , at least, could 
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"sustain public interest" ^' - a parliamentary desideratum. The position 
of the parliament i n the people ,s attention was made more conspicuous 
because of i t s s t i l l greater function as a constitution-making body. 
Issues were discussed i n the House the reverberations of which criss-crossed 
the entire country. Dr. E.B. Sayeed thought, and r i g h t l y so, that i n a 
parliamentary democracy the opposition should either defeat the government 
i n the House or educate and persuade the electorate to return i t to power 
i n the next election. But his second proposition e.g. the immediate 
unlikelihood "of t h i s pattern of p o l i t i c s being developed i n Pakistan", 
could be challenged on the basis of the subsequent electoral events of 
1954> i n East Pakistan. I f the opposition had fa i l e d i n putting the 
government i n the dock of the House, i t did succeed i n persuading the 
electorate to do so. A set formula may not work out the complex equation 
of an underdeveloped p o l i t y . 
How could one aocount for the defeat of the ruling party i n an 
election without an opposition role? Could a "greater awareness among 
347. La-ski, op.oit., p.l44» 
348. K.B. Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative Phase. (Karachi: 1960), p.328. 
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overwhelming sections of the in t e l l i g e n t s i a of what i s f e l t to he the 
contribution p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , rights and needs ... agitation over the 
B.P.C.'s report with i t s demands for maximum autonomy",have been an 
easier process, had there been no such educative i n s t i t u t i o n as the 
parliamentary opposition. One oould easily visualise the greater confi-
dence and condescending tone of the opposition as gained through the 
dishing out of the M.L. i n general election of last Pakistan i n 1954. 
The opposition leader who once t o l d the M.L. government with a self-
deprecating voice that he was<iMnot very far from" his "eternal rest", 
and was w i l l i n g to forget " a l l i n j u r i e s " , J J hurled at him, could, later 
on, ask the M.L* government to leave everything for "the coming Prime 
Minister ... Mr. Shaheed Suhrawardy", who according to him was "cleverer 
than a l l of the " Muslim leaguers "put together" The effect of the 
opposition was "the smouldering f i r e of p o l i t i c a l consciousness "that 
352 
was burning" J i n the country, against which background even a Congres-
s i t e could now see that "the difference between economic aid and military 
353 
aid" was more than "the difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee" -
a subject that was not touched by the Congress earlier. That a few 
opposition members i n the House could see the poss i b i l i t y of t h e i r kind 
of number bulked into too many among the people was, no doubt, one of 
the main causes of parliamentary cr i t i c i s m . 
349* Statesman. December. 31, 1951* 
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An evaluation 
Me have seen the dehit side of the workings of the parliament. 
The parliament could neither s i t f o r an adequate number of days nor even 
354 
u t i l i s e the fund earmarked f o r i t . ^ I t suffered from the dual member-
ship of i t s members, i n that some of the M.C.A.s were also members of 
the provincial legislatures. In every year the parliament either coin-
cided with s i t t i n g s of some provincial legislatures or had to s i t for 
a short period to enable i t s members to attend the provincial ones. 
355 
Besides i t had to s i t 116 days J J as constitution-maker, and attend 
various functions when broken into committees, i n respect to the same. 
As a natural corollary, the milch cow of parliament was reduced to a 
draught one by situation of which particularly, i t s inner constitution 
was no less responsible. 
On the credit side of the parliamentary balance sheet i t could 
be avowed that i t palpably contributed towards establishing a p o l i t i c a l 
infrastructure on which further improvements could be envisaged. There 
were the posts of Deputy Ministers, Minister of State, Whips and Parlia-
mentary Secretaries whose existence, no doubt, served as a training 
ground f o r future parliamentary leadership. Then, i n matters of legislation 
and handling parliamentary procedures, the members irrespective plucked 
some positive experience. Besides, the members who were too shy to speak 
i n the parliament could open th e i r minds i n the informal meetings of t h e i r 354. CAD, Vol. I I , 13 November, 1953, p. 1502. 
355» Callard, p p . o i t p . 8 0 . 
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respective parliamentary parties, 
The parliament had some valuable pieces of legislations to i t s 
credit, particularly i n the economic f i e l d . The building of economic 
ins t i t u t i o n s e.g. the P.I.D.G., A.DiF.C, P.C.I.D.C. and P.I.F.O., whose 
importance was of the highest magnitude vis-a-vis country's economic 
development owed their origins i n the parliament. What the Ayub regime 
observed as the decade of development i n 1968, had i t s foundations l a i d 
down i n the parliamentary period. The scientific and technical research 
i n s t i t u t i o n s on Public Health, Malaria, Leprosy, Jute, Cotton, Forest, 
356 
River, and Animal Husbandry, J which are s t i l l extant today, had been 
consistently sustained by the parliament. Similarly, provincial legis-
latures enacted some worthy laws. The smashing land reform, and com-
357 
pulsory free primary eduoation of East Pakistan, the mild reform 
of the Punjab Tenanoy Act of I887, free primary education and separation 
358 
of the judiciary from the Executive u of the Punjab, and the H.W.F.P. 
359 
Tenancy B i l l giving f u l l proprietory rights to the occupancy tenants 
and abolition of the Begar system, were cases i n point. The greatest 
v i r t u e , however, of the parliament was i t s being present i n a c r i s i s -
ridden society exerting c i v i l i z i n g and sobering effects. I t helped 
356. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , 25 March, 1954, p.557* 
357. Dawn. 23 1952. 
358. Dawn, March 7, 1952. 
359. Hindu. January 9, 1950. 
* Rendering of service to landlords without pay. 
Ceylon to maintain "a modicum of s t a b i l i t y and c o n t i n u i t y " V i e w e d 
from t h i s angle of p o l i t i c s together with i t s achievements as d i s t i l l e d 
out from i t s f a i l u r e s , the Pakistan parliament could claim to have made 
a f a i r beginning. 
360. H. Tinker, Ballot and Bayonet (London: 1966), p.58 
THE UNITS 
I t has been remarked that "India was moving steadily towards 
a Federal structure already before independence",1 but the post-
independence cultivation i n the f i e l d of federalism had the effect of 
diminishing returns i n Pakistan. In modern times, there has been a 
general tendency of central governments i n federations (such as the 
U.S., Canada, Australia, Switzerland) to exercise more powers than 
were contemplated earlier by the federating units. The measuring 
scale, whether federal powers are to be, at a l l times, kept down to 
minimum, no matter i f circumstances demand that t h i s minimum be high 
or that i t be low, has been a country's given internal and external 
situation. Hew needs have brought f l e x i b i l i t y to the otherwise a i r -
t i g h t structures of a federal p o l i t y - a trend to what are i n the 
words of Prof. K.C. Wheare, "quasi-federal" systems. 
The federation of Pakistan was made up of units which were at 
once varied and disconcerting i n their make-ups, resources and potent-
i a l i t i e s . During the honeymoon period of independence the provinces 
were, re l a t i v e l y speaking, charitably disposed towards the growth 
of central leadership, the institutions of which had to be 
# 
created de novo. The maiden session of the parliament recorded views 
* India obtained Delhi i.e. the whole central structure, i n t a c t . 
Pakistan had to found one. Only three provinces e.g. the 
Punjab, Sind and N.W.F.P. found t h e i r headquarters, ready made. 
1. W. H. Morris-Jones, " S t a b i l i t y and Change i n Indian P o l i t i c s " , 
i n Saul Rose (ed.), P o l i t i c s i n Southern Asia. (London: 1963), 
p. 13« 
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that were germane to the future federal structure of the country. Apart 
from the r i t u a l i s t i o charge levelled by the regional leaders against 
the federal government f o r encroaching upon provincial subjects three 
distinct lines of approaches crystallised. The Premier of East Pakistan, 
Nazimuddin, categorically asserted that "the s t a b i l i t y of the centre i s 
a condition precedent to the development of the provinces". Obviously, 
his mind was not operating i n a unitary direction. He invented the 
image of the Pakistan provinces as 'horses' drawing the 'carriage* of 
the central government. But his accent was on the balanced nourishing 
of the provincial horses without the central government's l e t t i n g any 
p 
one turn "lean and t h i n " . That was the trigger-release of the whole 
arguments about federalism. After a l l , federalism is a sentiment that 
lives on equality, fairplay and justice whose dispensation remains at 
the hands of the centre. 
Representing the federal government's point of view, the Prime 
Minister, Liaquat, was equally smooth i n his utterances when he observed 
that the central government was "working as agents of the provincial 
governments of a l l the provinces that compose the State of Pakistan". 
In the discharge of duties i f the central government faltered, he con-
tinued, the parliament could always throw the Ministry overboard. 
With a l l these mottoes i n front, the process of centralisation began. 
I t could not however, be maintained that Pakistan started from a smooth 
federal base. On the contrary, she had a l l the elements what according 
2. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 2, 1948, pp.127-149. 
3. I b i d . , p.140. 
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to Prof. K.C. Wheare should be prejudicial to federal oause e.g. 
"war, or power p o l i t i c s , and economic c r i s i s , or depression p o l i t i c s " . ^ 
Soon after p a r t i t i o n the Pakistan Army collided with Indian 
forces i n Kashmir. But the "march of a f f l i c t i o n " witnessed i n the cata-
ract of refugees pouring into the country from India was one of the 
biggest tests that awaited the new government. I t was not only the 
question of,rehabilitating them physically. They had to be integrated 
into the economic and social pattern of the country, since the immigrat-
ing refugees mostly differed with the migrating ones i n matters of 
complexions. By 1953, there were as many as 80 lakhs of refugee popu-
l a t i o n of whioh 33.42 lakh Muslims entered East Pakistan, and the rest, 
5 
the different provinces of West Pakistan. In short, the country was 
faced with overwhelming problems which contributed considerably to 
the growth of power at the centre. 
The p o l i t i c a l and economic powers of the central government 
were already outlined i n the Act of 1935, during B r i t i s h rule. Yet, 
the division of responsibilities between the general and unit govern-
mente were well delineated i n the three l i s t s , e.g. the federal, pro-
v i n c i a l and concurrent. In the reorientation process the central govern-
* The number of refugees rose, lat e r on, as high as 12 m i l l i o n . 
The people who l e f t Pakistan were mostly of middle-class persuasion. 
Those who replenished the gap were mostly artisans and peasants 
with exceptions to quite a good number of top-class people. Seei 
W. Norman Brown (ed.), India 1 Pakistan and Oe.ylon (University 
of Pennsylvania Press: 1960), p»171» 
4. K.O. Wheare, Federal Government (London: 1951), P»254» 
5« "Economic Appraisal Committee", loo.cit.% p.131. 
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ment of Pakistan f e l t impelled "to ask for a revision of a l l these 
things",** i n i t s effort to form financial resources. Thus, the central 
government took the responsibility of collecting the proceeds of the 
Sales Tax from the provincial governments for a period of two years, 
( i t was renewed again.) The proceeds of estate duties on both agri-
cultural and non-agricultural estates were l e f t to the charge of the 
central government.' The provinces were denied, at the outset, the 
income tax receipts so that central credit might be b u i l t up quickly. 
What was more, the advisability of taking over the tax-accruing areas 
of provinces such as e l e c t r i c i t y , i r r i g a t i o n , land revenue, water rates, 
business tax, a l l excises, was also emphasised i n the very f i r s t session 
of the parliament. Likewise, the provincial responsibilities i n the 
industrial f i e l d were qualified by the passing of the Development of 
Industries (Federal Control) B i l l , i n that the subject 'industries*, 
unlike the previous arrangements of the India Act, leapt from the pro-
Q 
v i n c i a l into the concurrent j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Another major controlling arm of the central government was 
the planning organization. In recent discussions of economic develop-
ment i n the emerging countries i t has become the trend of the day to 
entrust the oentral government - the possessor of finance, capital 
goods and technioal resources - with bringing about an integrated 
6. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 2, 1948, p.146. 
7. I b i d . . Vol.11, January 3, 1950> p. 271. 
8. I b i d . . Vol. I , March 1, 1948, p.57. 
9. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 10, 1949* P.635. 
economic development of the country. In Pakistan, l i k e India, the 
execution of national economic programmes were l e f t to the care of the 
provinces as f a r as practicable, hut the main decision-making mechanism 
lay with the centre. Having evaluated the country's economic position 
the Economic Appraisal Committee maintained that "planning and regulation 
of development should be made a central responsibility".*^ 
Even i n the areas where the provinces were entitled to work on 
small projects, f i n a l approval had to be obtained from the centre. An 
East Pakistani Chief Minister has committed his b i t t e r experiences to 
* 
a book: " I t i s not f a r to seek the reason as to why East Pakistan has 
remained underdeveloped. The Secret gets unsecreted as soon as one 
goes into the f i l e s lying i n the chest of drawers of the Secretariat. 
A good many number of plans and decisions have ended i n fiasco. Why? 
Development plans are financed from the central coffer - as loans, or 
grants-in-aid. Schemes have to be drawn up i n prescribed 'forms'1 and 
sent to Karachi for approval. As many as seventy fi v e duplicates of 
eaoh scheme have to be sent to various departments for scrutiny ... 
By the time the f i n a l order i s released from the cobwebs of central 
machineries the financial year i s at i t s fag end ••• so projects die a 
premature death."'1'''' By and large, the central government, through 
* "Administration of two years". This was a book written i n Bengali. 
10. "Economic Appraisal Committee", loo.oit.. p.177* 
11. Ataur Rahman Khan, Ozaratir Dui Bashar (Standard Publishers' Ltd.: 
Dacca), n.d. pp.141-142. 
f i s c a l policy and taxing powers, assumed an almighty stature l i k e 
that of other federal governments say the U.S., Canada and Australia 
that the provinces were reduced to a position of sunflowers of whose 
blossomings were conditioned to the sunrays of the central government. 
But then, there was a good deal of difference between the olimate i n 
which the federal leviathans grew i n the U.S., Canada and Australia and 
that of Pakistan's. In the former case, the federal growth occured i n 
a climate of necessity and spontaneity. The federating units were 
interested i n the growth of the general government. Through time 
honoured experience, usage, convention and mandatory methods they evolved 
some mechanisms and formulae so that co-operation between the centre and 
the u n i t , and preoisely, the federal government's presiding over the 
allocation (or reallocation) of national wealth were held i n the best 
12 
t r a d i t i o n of federalism, b The constant prooess of readjustment kept 
the balance of interests even - a federal requirement. To t h i s end, the; 
13 
system of j u d i c i a l review acted as a steadying factor. 
* The main source of central revenues are: oustoms, central excise 
duties, income tax and corporation tax, sales tax, s a l t , capital 
gains tax, suroharge, etc., etc., import duties on s p i r i t , liquors, 
spices, tea, tobacco, o i l , motor s p i r i t , machinery so and so 
f o r t h . Export duties on raw jute, cotton seeds, skins, hides, 
jute manufactures, r i c e , tea, f i s h , wool, etc., etc. 
** "Sir, I plead g u i l t y to that charge ... the centre did ... encroach 
on the provincial f i e l d . " The Finance Minister admitted on the 
f l o o r of the House. See: CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 24, 1951, p.271* 
12. K.C. Wheare, op.oit., p. 135» 
13. J.D.B. M i l l e r , Australian government and Pol i t i c s . (London: 1959), 
p.141* 
In the Pakistan situation the lurch towards centralisation, 
with inadequate bridle, on the balance, harmed the cause of federal 
democracy. In the realm of inter-zonal financial relations, the 
judioiary had no tangible role to i t s oredit. The judiciary, perhaps, 
was looking forward to an emerging constitution to work upon i t . 
Serving as the provisional constitution, as i t did, the Act of 1935 
did not have to stand the rigour of a d i f f i c u l t amending prooess, i n 
that a simple majority of members i n the Constituent Assembly was a l l 
that was required. 
During the B r i t i s h time the centre had a fixed grant earmarked 
fo r the provinces on various heads. This position was reversed. The 
provinces - they were a l l i n def i o i t save Sind - were not only deprived 
# 
of t h e i r shares of the income tax proceeds but also the usual grants 
whose dispensation depended on the w i l l of the centre. Assuming 
control over certain items of taxeB for instance, Sales Tax or Estate 
Duty, was, no doubt, productive; f o r , i t helped to bring about a 
rationalised and uniform tax structure throughout the oountry. Tax 
yields were equally enoouraging. But the bone of contention was the 
di s t r i b u t i n g mechanism of the central government not i t s accumulative 
capacity. 
Although agricultural income tax was under provincial j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Regarding personal income tax i t was decided i n 1947 that the 
centre would not make any allocation of income tax share to the 
provinces so long as the defence expenditure remained heavy. 
There was a convention of holding annual conferences i n whioh 
Premiers and Finance Ministers of respective units sat with the general 
government to thrash out the distributive tangle of national wealth. 
But then, i t s efficacy was fleet i n g as the p o l i t i c s of economics got the 
better of i t . Provincial shares i n the central tax revenues, of course, 
had statutory sanction, but the basis of shares was determined by the 
centre. Although an independent body, namely the National Finance Com-
mission, came into being later on to look into the matter, yet i t s role 
was purely advisory. Not that the Central government was particularly 
callous. The servioes of Sir Jeremy Raisman were employed to determine 
the provincial share of central revenues. The Raisman award was the 
basis of allocation - though East Pakistan thought the award was harm-
f u l to her economy**"^  - but the government despite the opposition's 
resentment handed the power to the Governor General, instead of the 
15 
parliament, to decide on the Raisman award. J 
Unfettered, the central government handled i t s economic resources 
i n a way that resulted i n making some units beautiful while others 
ugly. No doubt, some native factors of some units i n no small way 
influenced the indexes of development. But on federal reckoning, the 
central government f a i l e d i n that i t could not creat a climate of con-
* Some taxes e.g. Corporation Tax, Export Duties, Excise Duties, 
Personal Income Tax, etc., e t c > 
14» Mahbul ul-Haq, The Strategy of Economic Planning, (Dacca: Oxford 
University Press, 1963)> P»98» 
!5» Dawn. March 19, 1952; larch 21, 1952. 
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fidenoe among the units. A regional leader remarked that the centre 
was building " i t s castle on the oarcasses of the provinces". 
Besides the Central government was not exempt from the oharge of 
p a r t i a l i t y i n i t s dealings with the units. For instance, oentral loans 
advanced to provinoes since p a r t i t i o n t i l l 1952 had no East Pakistani 
and Sindhi shares. 
Description Date of floatation Amount outstanding 
Rs. 
1. 3 # Punjab loan, 1963 27.11.51. 3,92,16,406 
2. 3 ^ K.W.P.P. loan, I964 30. 8.52. 75,00,000 
3. 3i# Punjab loan, 1964 30 . 8.52 . 4,11,94,700 1 7 
When the East Pakistani premier was unhappy at receiving only 30$ of 
the Sales Tax proceeds against a population of 50>» "the Sindhi premier 
thought that the basis of distributing finances should be the * incidence 
of taxation* not population. For, he continued, " i n Sind the incidence 
of taxation per capita i s no less than 14, i n the Punjab i t i s 10, and 
i n Bengal i t i s hardly one-fourth of that, about 2^ per cent." A l l 
these contentions were never r e a l i s t i c a l l y dealt with by building 
impartial in s t i t u t i o n s capable of resolving con f l i c t s . 
No doubt, the central government i n each f i s c a l year allotted 
* Under the Permanent Settlement' Aot land revenue i n Bengal was fixed, 
whereas i n West Pakistan taxation was f l e x i b l e . 
16. See Amin's speeoh. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March21, 1951, p.54« 
17. "Eoonomic Appraisal Committee", loo.oit.. p.163. 
18. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 23, 1951, p. 115J Vol . 1 , March 21, 1951, 
PP»54-55"» 
/ 
260. 
funds on social development projects such as education, health, housing, 
refugee re h a b i l i t a t i o n , but i n matters of grants-in-aid - a v i t a l factor 
to provincial needs - i t supposedly played p o l i t i c s . To contain the 
Pakhtoonistan movement i n the N.W.F.P. and enhance the c r e d i b i l i t y of 
the M.L. Ministry there, the central government, apart from fixed yearly 
subvention, poured i n huge grants. The central doles were s k i l l f u l l y 
made to appear as genuine revenue incomes of the province i n the budget* 
The 1953 budget of the province displayed a 70$ revenue increase over 
19 
the revenues of 1947* This was designed only to divert people*s 
attention and silence the opposition. Whereas i n the same year, both 
the government and opposition i n the Sind legislature, while debating on 
a "communication" addressed to the Governor, oonoluded that Sind was 
20 
meted out a "stepmotherly treatment" by the centre i n money matters. 
Even, a centre-oriented provincial governor of Gen. Mirza*s persuasion 
governing i n a S t i l l oentrally administered province under 92A of the 
Constitution Act was resentful of the central government *s wily parsi-
mony and wrote a complaining letters " I would beg the oentre not to 
give more money than absolutely neoessary. This system of doles w i l l 
make th i s nation a nation of "Shukrana Khors* and th i s must be avoided 
21 
at a l l costs." 
* In B r i t i s h time, the N.W.F.P. heavily relied on the oentral grant 
of subvention as i t s revenue-yielding capacity was low. 
** Those who l i v e on other*s mercy and s t i l l remain grateful. 
19. Dawn. March 12, 1953 (Editorial) "N.W.P.P. Budget" Also,March 18, 1953. 
20. I b i d . . September 18, 1953. 
21. Governor's l e t t e r to the Governor General. DO No. l6l/PS, dated 
16th August, 1954 (Top Secret/Personal). 
261. 
However, there was another loophole i n the centralising process viz, 
the absence of a clear d e f i n i t i o n of functional responsibility for the 
development of resources between the general and units governments. 
This i r r e g u l a r i t y was surely caused by the existence of one-party rule 
throughout the country, which acted as a silencer. Although, a timely 
warning was given by an expert to t h i s end that "when the day comes on 
which different parties are i n power at the centre and i n the provinces, 
any weakness i n the d e f i n i t i o n of responsibilities w i l l undoubtedly be 
2? 
exploited p o l i t i c a l l y , and development w i l l suffer". 
I t was not, however, economic control alone that the oentre had 
over the units; p o l i t i c a l means were also used. The Indian Independence 
Act of 1947 bestowed powers to the Governor General under Section 9 
" f o r bringing the provisions of t h i s Act into effective operation". 
Mr. Jinnah incorporated i n the Constitution Act a new version of the 
early Section 93 of India Act of 1935 which had been sparingly used 
during the B r i t i s h regime to enable the oentral government to assume the 
administration of the provinces i n case of emergenoy. This was the 
Section 92A - an emergency weapon of the Governor General relying on 
which he could ask the provincial exeoutive head i . e . the Governor to 
* Although the preceding section i . e . 8 stipulated that the Governor 
General, i n his exercise of the powers, must oonsult the Con-
stituent Assembly to which the oentral government was responsible. 
22. R.G.A. Jackson, Development i n Pakistan. (Government Press, Karachi: 
1953), p. 6. 
23. "Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan", 
l o o . o i t . . p. 8. 
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take charge of the governance of the province by suspending the pro-
vi n c i a l constitution. The black and white position had i t that the 
provincial governors were to be aided by a Council of Ministers whose 
appointment and dismissal rested on the gubernotorial pleasure. And 
the offices of the Governors, i n t h e i r turn, appeared as assessing 
posts of the central government and particularly of the Governor General 
whose l i n e of communications with the provincial heads had always been 
alive . Under Section 51(5) of the India Act 1935, as amended by the 
Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order of 1947, a provincial governor 
i n fulfilment of the Governor General's Order could dismiss any Provin-
c i a l Ministry. This oocured i n the N.W.P.P. i n August; 1947, Sind April 
1948, the Punjab January, 1949, Sind December, 1951 and East Pakistan 
24 
May 1954. I t was not, however, the question of imposing 92A i n the 
province whioh was so imperative from a pragmatic point of view i n some 
cases, but the question of "getting out of i t " , 2 - * as was maintained by 
Sir Francis Mudie, the Punjab Governor. Because there was always a 
danger of the centre's forming a habit. 
* The position of a constitutional head has an euphemistic bias i n 
a l l the parliamentary governments of the Commonwealth. But on 
the functional level Ministers hold office so long they enjoy 
confidence of the legislature. This was the s p i r i t i n which Pakistan 
governments both of the centre and the units were i n i t i a t e d into. 
Powers that were there i n theory were used i n Pakistan i n practioe 
pending constitution making to uphold both warrantable and un-
warrantable causes. 
24. New Ohroniole, August 23, 1947} Manchester Guardian, A p r i l 27, 1948; 
Statesman, January 25, 1949? 
2 5 . Statesman. February 1, 1949* 
26<3. 
Then, the pcwer of the Governor General regarding issuance of 
Ordinances was provided i n the Section 102 of the India Act of 1935 
as adapted. I n no small way were the provinoes themselves responsible 
f o r provoking the Governor General's reserve power. Mr. Jinnah was 
compelled to issue a proclamation (August 27, 1948) of a State of 
Emergency i n Pakistan, since Mthe mass movement of population from and 
into Pakistan" had already threatened "the economic l i f e of Pakistan", 
Now, on the basis of the Proclamation Sind was to absorb 200,000 
refugees; The N.W.F.P, 100,000} Bahawalpur, Khairpur and the Baluchi-
Stan Agency 100,000 and the Punjab a further 100,000. 
I t has been the practice of the B r i t i s h system of government 
and i t s emulators that the Ministers suspected of gross raisconduot are 
dealt with through appropriate party machineries. Besides, t h i s process 
i s farther reinforced by public opinion strong enough to make a corrupt 
p o l i t i c i a n to seek his oblivion. But the central government of Pakistan 
i n an ingenuous frenzy placed the PRODA on the Statute Book to purge 
corrupt public office-holders. The ideal which inspired the production 
of the Aot could not long survive the test of Pakistan p o l i t i c s . Soon, 
the Act was to hang as the sword of Damocles over the necks of the 
provincial leaders who would turn nonconformists to the central estab-
lishment. The Constituent Assembly empowered the Governor General to 
disqualify a person under the PRODA, The worst part of i t was that the 
public were kept i n the dark i n regard to the findings of the 
26, Chowdhury Mohammad A l l , The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York* 196?)» 
p.267. 
26$. 
tribunal "which are produced at so much expense of taxpayers' money, 
27 
energy and time", ' No doubt, some of the PRODA-struck politicians 
had a legend of notoriety, but the bizarre side of i t was that the 
central government stood on the way of public opinion and parliamentary 
mechanism on the one hand and the due process of law on the other. 
Besides, the central government i n i t s process of drowning the provin-
c i a l leaders also l e f t a few subtle straws to catch at i.e. submission 
to the central leadership was the price of f i n a l rescue. 
Leaders who had all-Pakistan status - though a very few - spoke 
from the pedestal of the oentral government. Furthermore, the Prime 
Minister was also the President of the K.L. The Central Executive 
Committee of the M.L. had sway over a l l the provincial organisations. 
By virtue of the Presidential authority vested i n the Prime Minister, 
he could direct the provincial M.L. to move i n a particular direction 
i n matters of policy or choosing parliamentary leaders. There was, 
however, too much bickering about the centred making provincial premiers 
high-handedly. When Nazimuddin was commissioned as the Governor General, 
he, as the departing Premier of East Pakistan, used his privilege to 
* A case having been instituted the Governor General would appoint 
a tri b u n a l to enquire into the matter. The Governor General's 
award followed the recommendations of the tribunal. Interestingly 
enough, when parliamentary government was effaced i n 1958» the 
Martial Law Administrators - the hater of parliamentary government 
and po l i t i c i a n s - followed the footsteps of the very politicians 
and hatohed a measure called EBDO (Elective Bodies Disqualification 
Order) to condemn po l i t i c i a n s , selectively. 
** The PRODA-oulprits suoh as Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, M.A.. Khuhr©, 
K. Fazlullah, etc., etc., a l l staged successful come-backs with the 
help of the centre. 
27• Dawn. October 9, 1951. 
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suggest his successor, knowing that the Parliamentary Board would 
approve of i t . (Eden's Prime Ministership owed i t s origin to 
Churchill's advice.) The case of the Punjab (1953) was somewhat 
unusual. Martial law was already i n force. Noon, the then Governor 
of East Pakistan, was made the Premier of the Punjab at the oentral 
government's direction. Surely, Noon had a better claim to the 
Premiership so fa r as the Punjab was concerned. And the Punjab 
28 
parliamentary body approved of i t , later on. When the N.W.F.P. 
Chief Minister was to j o i n the oentral government (1953) he was 
authorised by the Provincial Parliamentary Board - not the centre -
29 
to nominate his successor. ' But i n any case, the central government 
through the party machinery could make i t s powers f e l t by the 
provinces. 
Services also accounted for the centralisation process, p a r t i -
cularly, the cadre, namely central services of Pakistan whose control 
lay with the Establishment Department of the Central Secretariat. 
The C.S.P. o f f i c i a l s were placed at the key area of provincial adminis-
t r a t i o n which resulted i n the centre's having more grip on the provin-
c i a l government. Similarly, the organisation of the judiciary starting 
from the lowest base of courts at subdivisional and d i s t r i c t level and 
extending to the zenith i . e . the Federal Court ( l a t e r named the Supreme 
Court) had strong centralising characteristics. The cumulative effects 
of a l l these impelled the ship of the Pakistan state into a quasi-
28. Dawn. March 25, 1953. 
29. Times. A p r i l 25, 1953. 
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federal direction, and the federal mottoes with which the leaders had 
started earlier f a i l e d i n t h e i r proper manifestation. 
But was t h i s growth of centripetal forces of pressures that 
might paradoxically originate from the units themselves? The oddity 
was that provincial fears of centralisation were not consistently 
expressed, i n that they were dissipated as soon as a particular unit 
or a c o a l i t i o n of units secured a position of dominance over the centre. 
The provincial leaders while crying for more autonomy, also acted as 
a pressure group to render central authority amenable to provincial 
causes. Successes or failures i n that direction determined the force 
of centre-unit relations. What was distinct i n the ebb and flow of 
centre-unit relations was that at no period of time was there a federal 
government which could claim immunity from a l l sorts of p a r t i a l i t y , 
any more than the units oould show an honest record that they did not 
sabotage the federal government to feather t h e i r own nests. I t was 
an issue of shared f o l l i e s . We now examine the parliamentary record 
of the provinces. 
East Pakistan 
The sequel of the p a r t i t i o n of Bengal had i t s bearings on the 
formation of the East Pakistan cabinet, i n that Hazirauddin became the 
Chief Minister i n place of Suhrawardy who was defeated by the former i n 
his bid to secure the leadership of the M.L. parliamentary p a r t y . ^ 
30* Times. August 5, 1947* 
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Mr. Suhrawardy's commitment - Suhrawardy was already the M.L. Premier 
of undivided Bengal, 1946-47 - to "an independent, undivided, sovereign 
Bengal i n a divided I n d i a " , ^ was used as a hostage "by his p o l i t i c a l 
adversary i . e . Nazimuddin who successfully lobbied among the M.L. 
leaders, including Jinnah against Suhrawardy's anti-M.L. stand vis-a-
vis the p a r t i t i o n of Bengal. A dedicated l o y a l i s t , Nazimuddin enjoyed 
the affection of the M.L. High Command with whose help he secured the 
Premiership of East Pakistan and pitched his camp at Dacoa — the place; 
of his b i r t h and huge Zamindari.4" Nazimuddin's selections as the Chief 
Minister of East Pakistan appeared to be tendentious and symptomatic 
to future p o l i t i c a l trends. On the one hand, i t f u l f i l l e d the gre-
garious urge of the r u l i n g ooterie - the Prime Minister himself and the 
Chief Ministers of the Punjab, Sind were a l l of feudal stook*"4" - and 
deprived the progressive mass leaders i n the share of powers, on the 
other. For, judging Suhrawardy's later leadership pattern, would not 
* And his lieutenants Messrs. Nurul Amin, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, 
Fazlur Rahman, Youssauf A l i Chowdhury, etc. 
** From an extremely reliable quarter the writer has come to know 
that Suhrawardy's demand for an undivided Bengal had Jinnah's 
blessings. Jinnah dared not support Suhrawardy publicly, and 
Suhrawardy never chose to discredit his one-time leader by 
divulgence. Nazimuddin himself maintained that "parti t i o n of 
Bengal f a t a l to interests of i t s people". See: Statesman. Apr i l 22, 
1947. 
+ Nazirauddin himself hailed from the Nawab family. Gen. Mirza -
another desoendent of the Murshidabad Nawab family - t o l d the 
writer that Nazirauddin made i t a point to see that Murshidabad 
(now i n India) did not form part of East Pakistan? f o r , that would 
have meant a challenge to his 'Nawabi' by the more famous 'Nawabs* 
of Murshidabad. The writer wonders i f Gen. Mirza's personal 
vendetta had made any contribution towards Nazimuddin's dismissal 
as the Prime Minister. 
++ The Premier of the N.W.F.P, was no landlord, but he had no 
clannish t i e s with the province either. 
31. Statesman. A p r i l 27, 1947* 
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Pakistan p o l i t i c a l history have been gone into different directions, 
had he been selected as the Premier of East Pakistan? Nazimuddin was 
no mass leader. His hold on people was judged when i n the 1936 election 
(under India Act of 1935)» being the Nawab and member of the Governor's 
Executive Council oould not win the elections i n his own estate-
constituency against Fazlul Haq. But, after necessary deductions, 
what remained was Nazimuddin's f a i r l y long experiences as administrator 
and parliamentarian on which he could count. The Provincial Governor, 
Sir A. Frederick Bourne thought himself to be fortunate to have Nazi-
muddin as the Chief Minister and "was most agreeably surprised to f i n d 
•jo 
no l i t t l e ohange from what" he "regarded as normal" i n a parliamen-
tary sense. Unlike other Pakistan provinces, East Pakistan had a small 
but compact group of opposition members which numbered 72 i n a legis-
lature of 237 seats. 
At the st a r t , the opposition i n the House or at large was not 
i n a oombatative mood particularly i n a situation when i n the wake of 
the p a r t i t i o n of Bengal East Pakistan inherited a debt of Rs.14 crores, 
an inadequate "police force, a few Exeoutive Officers" and an economic 
l i f e "paralysed by the migration of non-Muslim businessmen who held ... 
the f i e l d of trade and oommeroe i n the province".^ So well-entrenched 
* "An all-out figh t ensues;: from today between the Zamindars and the 
peasants. By the grace of God I shall abolish zaraindary within the 
shortest possible time .•• But God forbid i f I am defeated, th i s 
defeat w i l l be more glorious than the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo". 
Fazlul Haq's statement. See: A.S.M. Abdur Rab, A.K. Fazlul Haq: 
Life and Achievements. (Lahore:1966) p.88. 
** Mainly the Congress Party supported by a few members of the 
Christian and Buddhist group. 
Footnote /Gontd. over. 
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was -the position of the government and the cohesion of the M.L. party i n 
East Pakistan i n the beginning that Jinnah, oontrary to his usual 
practice, allowed the province to steer i t s own course. The Governor 
categorically observed that "Mr. Jinnah never interfered so far as I 
was concerned i n provincial a f f a i r s . He no doubt kept i n touch with 
our proceedings, but my direct contacts with him were minimal ."^ 
But as the early d i f f i c u l t i e s were reduced to a state of toleration, 
the government having f e l t the power of the statecraft inaa few years' 
time of existence grew arrogant only to be matched by ever-increasing 
opposition. Nazimuddin before he became the Governor General of Pakistan 
i n 1948 had already set the pattern of intolerance towards the growth 
of opposition. Suhrawardy was at that time a full-time devotee to the 
cause of Hindu-Muslim unity between the two Dominions, India and Pakistan. 
Nazimuddin thought t h i s to be 'mere eyewash' and detained Suhrawardy 
f o r a few hours under Section 10 of the East Bengal Publio Safety Order, 
1948, so that he could no longer hold public meetings i n East Pakistan 
and o r i t i c i s e the government. At the part i t i o n of Bengal, West Bengal 
had 5 m i l l i o n Muslims out of a t o t a l of 21 million people. But out of 
42 m i l l i o n people East Bengal (East Pakistan) had 12 million Hindus who 
Footnote oontinued from previous page. 
32. Quoted from the l e t t e r written to the writer by Sir A, Frederick 
Bourne, dated 19.2.1969 
33• New York Times. January 18, 1954* 
34. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I I , December 16, 1948, p. 4. 
35. Governor's l e t t e r to the writer, loo.cit. 
36. Statesman. June 3» 1948. 
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were psychologically "less reconciled to thei r l o t " . ' Suhrawardy 
urged the r u l i n g leaders to take Hindus into the Cabinets both i n 
the centre and provinoes to create confidence among the m i n o r i t i e s . ^ 
A sore point with the Hindus was that their houses were being requisi-
tioned - the reason they possessed the largest number of houses whereas 
there was scarcity of accommodation. The East Pakistan government had 
one crucial choice before them i.e . whether or not they were going to 
play parliamentary p o l i t i c s with the Hindus, the i n t e l l i g e n t and vocal 
section of the whole community. T i l l 1949 - a period of relative 
39 
"peaoe and quiet" ' - the government had no concrete answer to t h i s . 
Then oame the communal r i o t s i n early 1950. " I t was not at a l l 
the anger of one community against another" maintained by a Congressite -
"that found expression ... i n East Bengal",^0 but, surely, i t was the 
result of the inadequacy of leadership that was found both i n India and 
Pakistan to suppress the communal extremists. And, as far as the East 
Pakistan government was oonoerned, the remark of a Congress member i n 
the parliament that "... minorities ... were held there as hostages for 
the good conduct of the majority i n another s t a t e " , ^ could not be easily 
dismissed. There was no doubt that i n the early flush of independence 
* Prom a s t r i c t parliamentary point i t i s the party having a majority 
i n the legislature forms the Cabinet. But the situation i n Pakistan 
was d i f f e r e n t . Although the central and the East Pakistan Cabinets 
each had one scheduled caste Minister but thei r representative 
character was questioned by the largest sections of minorities. 
See: Statesman. May 17, 1948. 
37. Times. July 25, 1948. 
38. CAD (Leg.) Vol. I , March 6, 1948, p.262. 
39* Statesman, December 31, 1950. 
40. CAD (Leg.), Vol. I , March 16, 1950, p.63. 
41. I b i d . 
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the ruling party (the M.L.) displayed an element of Islamic jingoism 
which through the ensuing years did much to annoy and alarm the minori-
t i e s . A veteran Congress leader, and one-time finance Minister of 
East Pakistan, Mr. P.O. Lahiry, compared the dual policy of the M.L. 
vis-a-vis minority i n his book (proscribed i n Pakistan) with that of 
the two sets of teeth of a rogue elephant - "one set was for show of 
beauty, and the other was for the real purpose of mastication".^ 
So, i n circumstances l i k e these the Congress and other minority groups 
i n the legislature could not beguile themselves into thinking that they 
were t r u l y parliamentary opposition groups. Hence, they looked for a 
fundamental change i n the scheme of things. 
Similarly, the M.L. government in East Pakistan became alien-
ated from i t s own party and the majority community at large because of 
i t s dogged following of the oentral government - the symbol of monolithic 
unifying power. I t did not thwart the centre i n i t s determination to 
impose 'Urdu* on East Pakistanis. I t did not arrest the growth of the 
centralisation process which was contrary to the Lahore resolution, 
the basis of Pakistan. I t f a i l e d to secure the benefit of the non-
* "Pakistan designs to show a beacon light to the world, which has 
been caught i n the vortex of materialism ... atheism and agnos-
ticism ..." a part of a speech made i n the Constituent Assembly 
by Moulana Shabbir Ahmed Osmand, known as the Archbishop of 
Pakistan. See: CAD, Vol. V, March 9> 1949» p.44. 
** Gobindalal (Congress) acoused the government during budget dis-
cussion of having "mortgaged" the entire province "somewhere" 
outside. See: Statesman. February 26, 1951* 
42. Pravash Chandra Lahiry, India Partitioned and Minorities i n 
Pakistan (Writers' Forum Private Limited, Calcutta:1964), p . l l . 
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devaluation policy to the jute-growers of East Pakistan, and created 
an organisation i.e. Jute Board to look into the plight of the jute-
growers which had no East Pakistan member at a l l . ^ Having fa i l e d 
to win a bye-eleotion i n Tangail, the government postponed as many as 
t h i r t y four bye-elections.^ In 1950, the array was used to suppress 
ruthlessly the so-called 'Te-bhaga' movement (claiming a two-thirds 
share of the crop by the actual t i l l e r s of the s o i l ) among the Sontals 
45 
and Adibafeis of Mymensingh D i s t r i c t . J Hunger-strikes were resorted to 
by the security prisoners as a protest against the government's supp-
ression policy. Nurul Amin, the Chief Minister, replying to an oppos-
i t i o n resolution asking f o r the release of a l l p o l i t i c a l prisoners t o l d 
the House that there were as many as 300 p o l i t i c a l detainees.^ Prominent 
leaders, workers of p o l i t i c a l parties and leading people of social and 
academic areas came within the purview of the government's public safety 
Act as they f a i l e d to subscribe to the o f f i c i a l f i a t s on issues. A 
good many parliamentary Secretaries, and members of the Legislative 
Assembly resigned from the M.L. parliamentary party saying that they oould 
no longer "record a silent v o te",^ when issues were being mishandled 
and c i v i l l i b e r t i e s eroded. Although the Chief Minister had no d i f f i c u l t y 
43. Dawn. October 25, 1952. 
44. Keith Callard, "The P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y of Pakistan", Pacific 
A f f a i r s . (March: 1956), p. 11. 
45. Times. December 29, 1954* (The unfortunate part of i t that the 
leader of the movement was found to be a oommunist - Miss I l a Mitra). 
46. Dawn. Ootober 19, 1952. 
47. I b i d . . November 11, 1951. See also: May 15, and 20, 1953. 
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i n maintaining the confidence of the East Pakistan M.L. Parliamentary 
Board as was t a c t f u l l y manipulated on the 9th May, 1953. But the cost 
was high i n that the General Secretary of the East Pakistan M.L. had to 
be expelled from the party along with other i n f l u e n t i a l members.^ 
Similarly, newspapers showing independence of outlook could not esoape 
the soourge of the government as was the case of the English Daily, The 
Pakistan Observer1, which was banned at one time and on another oocasion 
i t s editor was arrested for publishing an a r t i c l e which was according 
to the government, "calculated to offend the religious sentiment of 
the people". 
In the overall pursuit of policy the East Pakistan government 
was so much id e n t i f i e d with the centre, that the l a t t e r , instead of 
asking the former to t r i m i t s s a i l s , sought the negative posture of 
extending the l i f e of the East Pakistan legislature which was supposed 
to be dissolved i n 1952 to make room for a newly-elected legislature,^ 0 
Dr, Chowdhury's contention that " p o l i t i c a l agitation i n East Pakistan 
* 
was largely due to .,, economic discontent " which caused the "defeat 
51 
of the Muslim league ••• i n the provincial elections of 1954% did. 
not take into account the s t i l l larger areas of gloom i.e. the people 
had a growing sense of losing i t s 'identity*, and i t s grip of parlia-
mentary democracy. As a matter of fact, the economic discontent of 
East against West did not feature i n the 21-point programme of the U.P. 
* Writer's i t a l i c s . 
48. I b i d . . May 16, 1953. 
49* I b i d . . March 6, 1952. 
50, Dawn, A p r i l 7, 1952 ( E d i t o r i a l ) , "East Pakistan Assembly". 
51. G,W, Chowdhury, op.eit.. p.57« 
To the opposition the economic situation was not particularly funda-
mental. Interestingly enough, i t was the Chief Minister himself and his 
colleagues who both i n the provincial legislature and parliament 
drummed the economic misery of East Pakistan and i t s causes. That did 
not save him from the electoral wrath. Why? Because, people were more 
indignant about the centre's obscurantist, unprogressive and regimented 
policies, whose major interpreter happened to be the government of East 
Pakistan, the largest province of Pakistan. 
True, gloomy aspect of the East Pakistan economy was very 
apparent i n 1954, as i t was i n 1958. (And i s s t i l l i n existence and 
w i l l be so f o r a considerable time,) But the issue was that the a r t i -
culate group of East Pakistanis were p o l i t i o a l animals, as well as 
talking ones« And so long they oould exeroise t h e i r p o l i t i o a l rights 
as enjoined i n a parliamentary democracy with an iota of pride, even 
an acute economic grievance against the centre, and for that matter, 
the West which was to be aired periodically, never took place beyond 
the parliamentary confines. A number of bye-elections were won by 
the A.L. government i n East Pakistan i n the late f i f t i e s and people 
did not cast t h e i r votes against the party i n power as the province 
had not recovered from economic i l l s . So, i t was mainly a question of 
a clog to democratic channels for whose removal opposition stood. 
* The events of 1969 i n Pakistan have undoubtedly proved that people's 
regional grievances real or imaginary, were liable to be notor-
iously forceful, i f t h e i r basic democratic rights were denied. 
Also, the opposition efforts were not negative, namely "to prevent the 
52 
Muslim league from regaining power",^ hut were proved positive i n i t s 
victory i n the elections which signalled "the f i r s t opportunity to show 
that democracy i n Pakistan was strong enough to allow different parties 
to control oentral and provincial governments without disrupting the 
s t a t e " . 5 3 
The important thing about East Pakistan was that i t s people 
did not suffer from p o l i t i c a l apathy due to any i n t r i n s i c factor of 
social structure. East Pakistan had zaminders who were already •absent* 
on the spot. Among the zaminders were mostly Hindus whose numbers were 
further thinned out as they went to West Bengal simultaneously with the 
par t i t i o n i n g of Bengal. The East Pakistan Land Acquisitions Act - a 
substantial piece of legislation - which entered the Statute Book i n 
February 1950, further enhanced the tenants* rights to the land. The 
cumulative effect of a l l these produced an impetus towards a genuine 
social revolution. As a natural corollary, parties had claims to grass-
root support?1 This was a plane where protracted undemocratic govern-
ment was not feasible, i f elections were to take place. And i n fact, 
the 1954 election was the case i n point. Although i t was a different 
but cruel point when the governor of the province under 92A t o l d the 
oentre i n a secret despatch: " I t i s my considered opinion that the 
1 
United Front leaders are the enemies of Pakistan and cannot be trusted." 
52. Chowdhury, op.cit., p.57» 
53. Keith Callard, op.cit.. p . l 6 l . 
54. Governor's l e t t e r , l o o . c i t . . DO No. lOl/PS 21st June, 1954 
(Top Secret: Personal)• 
However, there i s one last point to be made about the M.L. 
Ministry i n East Pakistan: i t did succeed i n maintaining parliamentary 
55 
s t a b i l i t y u n t i l i t s departure from the soene^ - a solitary example 
when compared to other provinces of Pakistan. Also, most of the issues 
were debated i n the legislature, as the Congress was not prepared to 
allow matters to be settled by default. 
Punjab 
On the 5"fck August, 1947 the Pakistan sector of the Punjab 
(Western) elected i t s parliamentary leader without a contest, as Sir 
Firoz Khan Noon chivalrously withdrew his candidature i n favour of the 
K g 
Khan of Mamdot. The new premier and the Finance Minister, Mr. Murataz: 
Daultana hailed from the Eastern sector of the Punjab (now i n India), 
and the holding of t h e i r key positions in the Cabinet was a boost to 
the morale of the refugees. 
The Ministry thus formed was from the very start wobbly i n 
that the prominent Ministers particularly the Khan of Mamdot, Murataz 
Daultana, Mian Iftikheruddin, Shaukat Hayat Khan were ranged against 
each other both 6n personal and policy grounds. Their predilictions 
oould be broadly grouped as r i g h t i s t , centre-left and l e f t i s t . For 
instance, the Premier evolved a programme of Islamic Shariat for 
55. Constitution Commission, loo.orb,, p.66 
56. Statesman. August 6, 1947* In deference to the wishes of 53 out 
of the 59 M.L. members of the West Punjab section of the Pro-
vi n c i a l Assembly, Noon agreed to serve as th e i r parliamentary 
leader, subject to Jinnah's wishes. Whereas, the Eastern section 
had 22 M.L. members. Noon obviously showed good sense. 
See: Statesman. July 4, 1947* 
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enforcement. At an annual r e c u r r i n g loss of Rs.50,00,000 the govern-
ment decided t o enforce p r o h i b i t i o n . The f i r s t step was taken i n 
A p r i l 1948. But i n the f o l l o w i n g year the High Court held i t i n v a l i d 
on t e c h n i c a l grounds and readjustments were made wit h the pr o v i n c i a l 
57 
Excise Act. ' This measure was shrewdly employed to r a l l y the conser-
v a t i v e elements t o his side. S i m i l a r l y , the •ambitious Finance Minister* 
leaned towards the l e f t of centre as he proposed t o tax a g r i c u l t u r a l 
income on a scale r i s i n g from 50 per cent t o 500 per oent of the land 
revenue. This move was "both revolutionary and courageous", but also 
had the force of l i q u i d a t i n g the Finanoe Minister's adversaries - "The 
58 
Noons, Tiwanas and I f t i k h a r - u d - d i n s " . Mian I f t i k h e r u d d i n , on the 
other hand, sinoe h i s ear l y Congress association had always been thought 
t o be a crypto-communist. His was the most important p o r t f o l i o namely, 
refugee r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . At a time when mil l i o n s of refugees were t o be 
socio-economically integrated i n t o the society, Mian Sb. emphasised 
th a t agrarian reforms were the sine qua non of refugee r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . 
He wanted t o b u i l d up ,People ,s Pakistan 1 under 'a People's Government*. 
Furthermore, a c r i E i s of m i n i s t e r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n was also i n 
evidence, i n t h a t whether allotment of forsaken f a c t o r i e s and commercial 
shops to Muslim refugees from East Punjab was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
the M i n i s t e r f o r Finance and Industries (Daultana) or the Minister f o r 
Refugees (Mian S b . ) . ^ This was, though temporarily averted by Jinnah. 
57. The Punjab Review, 1947-1953 (Information Directorate of the 
Punjab Government, n.d.) p» 79* 
58. K. L. Gauba, Inside Pakistan. ( D e l h i : 1948), p.151. 
59* Statesman. November 2, 1947* 
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But u l t i m a t e l y 3 out of 5 Ministers, including Mian Sb. resigned from 
the o f f i c e as a protest against the centre's interference i n pr o v i n c i a l 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n matters.^ 0 Mian Sb. free of M i n i s t e r i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
and helped by his enormous wealth and two self-owned newspapers 
(Pakistan Times and Imrose), and the Presidency of the p r o v i n c i a l M.L., 
j u s t seized, was now i n the drive f o r p o l i t i c a l recruitment t o his 
l e f t i s t camp only t o be expelled from the M.L. sh o r t l y afterwards. 
Now, w i t h the l e f t i s t Mian Sb. gone, the new d i f f i c u l t i e s 
cropped up i n the expansion of the Cabinet. The p r i n c i p a l leaders were 
summoned before Jinnah as the tussle between the r i g h t i s t Chief Minister 
(Mamdot) and "progressive" Finance Minister (Daultana) became pro-
nounced. Jinnah f a i l e d i n his mediation. Daultana and Shawkat Hyat 
resigned. The formation of the Second Mi n i s t r y could not l a s t long as 
the centre promulgated 92A on the province i n January 1949. 
The Cabinet was prone to d i s u n i t y . The Ministers could not 
give parliamentary account t o the l e g i s l a t u r e , e i t h e r c o l l e c t i v e l y or 
severally. One major reason, however, was the t o t a l absence of any 
* 
opposition i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . As a result there developed f a c t i o n a l 
opposition w i t h i n the r u l i n g party. Added to t h i s , the time-honoured 
r i v a l r i e s among the so-called noble fa m i l i e s such as Tiwanas, Noons, 
* A couple of Anglo-Indians or scheduled oaste members could not be 
st y l e d as (.opposition. I t was a l l M. L. 
60. Times. November 10, 1947* 
61. Manchester Guardian. A p r i l 27, 1948* 
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Qizilbashes, Mamdots, Daultanas, Mians, etc*, etc., which had always 
been, as suggested by many c r i t i o s , the determining f a c t o r of the Punjabi 
p o l i t i c s since the B r i t i s h time. I t * was always the clannish balance 
of power t h a t r u l e d the roost of parliamentary p o l i t i c s . 
I n a s i t u a t i o n l i k e t h i s when the M i n i s t r y had t o f o l l o w , f o r 
many reasons, 'the a t t i t u d e of the o s t r i c h * , the only stable o f f i c e was 
62 
the Governor's. Sir Francis Mudie (Governor) was "a keen Pakistani", 
who provided guidance t o the new administration and Jinnah w i t h p r o v i n c i a l 
t i d i n g s * But a f t e r the passing of Jinnah zenophobic pressure was 
mounted against the Governor by a section of the M.L. (Bari group) 
t h a t l e d t o the Governor's resignation. 
An innovation was added to the 92A r u l e , i n that under the new 
governor, Sardar Nishter f i v e advisers were taken from the M.L. party 
t o a i d the governor i n the discharge of duties. 4 A modicum of p a r l i a -
i 
mentary government was oreatedj f o r , i n the absence of l e g i s l a t u r e 
and M i n i s t r y , the Governor's advisers and M.L. Council became the 
de facto Ministers and l e g i s l a t u r e respectively. That the advisers 
t o the Governor were responsible t o the M.L. party was evident from the 
f a c t that the Chief Adviser had to go when adverse votes were recorded 
* I t appeared that S i r Francis had rapport i n his r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
Jinnah. I n his l e t t e r he addressed the Governor General as "Dear 
Mr. Jinnah" not your excellency. See: K.L, Gauba, op.eit.. 
"Appendix A." A rumour was also confined w i t h i n the top c i r c l e t h a t 
Jinnah wanted S i r Francis t o succeed him. 
62 . S r i Psrakash, Pakistani B i r t h and Early Days (Meerat: 1965) , p . 2 9 . 
6 3 . Manchester Guardian. July 10, 1949* (Lack of support f o r the 
Governor from the centre was also alleged.) 
64 . Statesman. November 5» 1949* 
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65 against hint i n the M.L, Council meeting. ^  Two things, however, 
o r y s t a l l i z e d amid the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the Punjab p o l i t i c s during the 
period of 92A, namely, the M.L. party was r e l a t i v e l y f i l t e r e d of f a c t -
i o n a l elements, and e l e c t o r a l r o l l s were prepared f o r the general 
e l e c t i o n t o be held i n March 10, 1951 based on universal adult suffrage, 
f i r s t of i t s k i n d anywhere i n Pakistan. 
The Punjab was t o Pakistan what Prussia had been to Germany. 
So, the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s had more than p r o v i n c i a l significance. There 
were 197 seats i n the Assembly, of which 40 were reserved f o r refugees 
who f l e d t o Pakistan from India since 1947* 5 were reserved f o r women, 
4 f o r Christians, 1 f o r other minority groups, and one earmarked f o r 
66 
the graduates of the Punjab u n i v e r s i t y . The e l e c t o r a l r o l l s had 
about 9 m i l l i o n voters of which 34,00,000 were women, i'/most of whom would 
be i n t h e i r Burqas. The M.L. party apart, there were f i v e contesting 
4* 
p a r t i e s i n the f i e l d v i z . J.A.M.L., A.P.P., Jamate-e-Islami, the 
Islam league (Allam Mushriqui) and the Communist. 
That the M.L. d i d not look askanoe to the opposition was 
i n d i c a t i v e of i t s * s t a k e ~ a l l ' d i r e c t i v e to the centre and provinces 
* The groups such as Bari and Mamdot i n the league gave way to the 
large r group, Daultana. 
** A sort of v e i l that surrounds women from being seen, 
+ Jinnah Awami Muslim league. The ex-premier, Mamdot coalesced 
w i t h Suhrawardy's A.M.L. t o f i g h t the Punjab elections. The 
party thus formed was named J.A.M.L. See:Statesman, January 25, 
1951. 
6 5 . I b i d . , July 27, 1950 
6 6 . Times. March 12, 1951. 
67* Hindu. January 29 , 1951. 
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f o r marshalling t h e i r resources f o r the M.L. v i c t o r y . The oentral 
M.L. parliamentary board sat with the p r o v i n c i a l one to deoide nomi-
nations f o r the candidates. The M.L. working committee considered i t s 
50,000 word e l e c t i o n manifesto which contained, i n t e r a l i a , the pro-
mise of the f u l f i l m e n t of agrarian reforms - the watered down version 
of the d r a s t i c agrarian reforms recommended e a r l i e r (1949) by the 
M.L. Agrarian Reforms Committee. But essenti a l l y the manifesto suffered 
from g e n e r a l i t i e s v i z . "The Muslim league d i d not f a i l i n 1945 when 
i t promised Pakistan. I t d i d not f a i l i n 1947 when i t claimed to sta-
b i l i z e Pakistan. I t w i l l not f a i l now i n 1951 when i t plans t o reshape 
fift 
Pakistan. The task of the Muslim league i s not yet done." Ranged 
against i t were the opposition planks of the J.A.M.L. and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
of A.P.P. whioh envisaged, among others, dr a s t i c agrarian reforms and 
severance of commonwealth t i e s . So the issues on which the campaigns 
were fought were both l o c a l and nat i o n a l . Since the M.L. could not 
•ft* 
stress l o c a l issues beyond a c e r t a i n point, i t placed emphasis on 
the federal issues. The Prime Mi n i s t e r himself undertook a marathon 
electioneering tour i n theprovinoe, defending Pakistan*s membership 
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of Commonwealth. ' The Prime Minister did not h a l t there; f o r he set 
* A l l p r o v i n c i a l Chief Ministers and M.L. leaders gave a good 
account of t h e i r lungs. 
** That would mean the e x t i n c t i o n of the landlords who comprised 
the M.L. 
60. Quoted i n Statesman. March 6, 1951* 
6 9 . Manchester Guardian. March 9» 1951* i^e election prospects f o r 
the M.L. candidates were f u r t h e r improved as India accepted the 
value of Pakistan currency.) 
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i n t o motion outside pressures t o plough a harvest of votes f o r the 
M.L., as Chancellor Dr. Adenaur d i d i n the 'Land* elections of West 
Germany during the time of the Second Bundestag. However, the reve-
l a t i o n of the sensational news of the communist inspired abortive coup 
(discussed elsewhere) f u r t h e r helped the M.L. and produced an "adverse 
e f f e c t on the e l e c t o r a l chances of the l e f t i s t s " , ' ' 0 as i t d i s t r a c t e d 
a t t e n t i o n from the issues which came up i n the general elections. 
The 10-day e l e c t o r a l exercise was f i n i s h e d w i t h an epitaph from 
Suhrawardy t h a t the Punjab elections were "fraud and farce". The Times* 
correspondent characterised the elections as "less disorderly, on the 
whole", but also noted t h a t only "one-third" of the voters "exercised 
71 
t h e i r r i g h t s " . The f i n a l party p o s i t i o n r e s u l t i n g from the eleotions 
was: M.L. 141, J.A.M.L. 32, Independents 17, Jamat-e-Islam 1, A.P.P. 1, 
M i n o r i t i e s 5* Among the members elected 30 had been members of the 
72 
previous l e g i s l a t u r e dissolved i n 1949. 
An analysis of the e l e c t i o n results reveals f i r s t l y t hat a 
considerable share of the t o t a l votes cast went t o the opposition side. 
Secondly, the voting had been extremely close and the opposition group 
fare d b e t t e r i n urban constituencies. (An i n t e r e s t i n g s i m i l a r i t y w i t h 
* Gen. Mirza t o l d the w r i t e r t h a t the Prime Minister (Lia;quat) 
i n f r o n t of him asked the Inspector General of Police - who 
also happened t o be the uncle of Daultana - t o see that the 
elections were won f o r the M.L. 
70 . Hindu. March 11, 1951 ( E d i t o r i a l ) , "Pakistan's f i r s t e l e c t i o n " . 
71* Times. March 27, 1951. See Also: Hindu. 23 March 1951 ( E d i t o r i a l ) 
"A Plea f o r Free Eleotions". 
7 1 . Statesman. A p r i l 1, 1951. 
7 3 . Manchester Guardian. March 18, 1951* 
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•that of the Indian Congress which has "been more successful i n the 
r u r a l constituencies*) The people's reactions t o adult franchise as 
manifested i n t h e i r v o t i n g apathy were not encouraging. There was 
no doubt much t r u t h i n the comment i n a leading a r t i c l e of the States-
man that i t was a "not wholly unexpected r e s u l t of extending novel 
p o l i t i o a l r i g h t s t o the masses".*^ But the crux of the question lay 
elsewhere. The Punjab was a landlord-infested agrarian province. 
Land was the measure of power, prestige and a deterrent against insecu-
r i t y . This 'golden earth' was i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y monopolised by a s t r i n g 
of zaminders. As f a r as c u l t i v a b l e lands were concerned, about "80$ 
of the owners owned less than one t h i r d of the c u l t i v a b l e area about 
0 .6$ of them owned more than o n e - f i f t h of the area".*^ The tenure 
system harboured the " o l d r u l i n g oligarchy w i t h i t s roots i n b i g estates", 
f h i s had an adverse e f f e c t on the p o l i t i c a l freedom of i n d i v i d u a l s , as 
w e l l as the country's p o l i t i o a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . And the opinion that 
" p o l i t i c a l independence without a social r e v o l u t i o n i s a mere sub-
77 
s t i t u t i o n of 'brown capitalism* f o r white",' 1 had i t s relevance i n 
Pakistan. The apathy was l a r g e l y formed out of the peasants* stoicism 
and fear of feudal wrath. That was why parties could not root deep 
i n t o the masses as i t d i d i n East Pakistan's case. On that point East 
* As a matter of f a c t , the whole of West Pakistan had a feudal 
s t r u c t u r e . Indeed, i t i s s t i l l there. 
74 . Statesman. A p r i l 3 , 1951 ( E d i t o r i a l ) "Punjab (P) Election". 
75• Report of the Land Reforms Commission f o r West Pakistan (Lahore: 
1959) , P. 13 . 
76 . I b i d . , p. 19 . 
7 7 . S i r Iv o r Jennings, The Commonwealth i n ABia, (Oxford: 1951), p.53. 
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and West Pakistan t o l d the 'tale of two c i t i e s ' . 
However, the most compensating aspect was that a group of about 
40 (out of 197 members) obtained the r i g h t to dissent and formed the 
nucleus of a p o t e n t i a l l y l i v e l y opposition i n a h i t h e r t o oppositionless 
l e g i s l a t u r e . No less important was the c i r c u l a t i o n of new blood i n 
the l e g i s l a t u r e i n that 167>?Members made t h e i r parliamentary debut. 
The new parliamentary opposition d i d not l e t the new M.L. government 
practioe i n a way f a r short of i t s election-professions, nor the 
Cabinet at the head of Daultana f e l l back upon i t s pledge t o bring through 
agrarian reforms. Faced w i t h an anti-reform group w i t h i n the M.Lo 
Assembly p a r t y , who thought agrarian reforms "unislamic, uncalled f o r 
and ruinous f o r the ... well-being of the Punjab", Daultana took 
umbrage and threatened t o dissolve the l e g i s l a t u r e and face the elec-
t o r a t e . A mountain of tedious and f a t i g u i n g discussions on reforms 
produced a mouse of mi l d programme. The d r a f t b i l l which had e a r l i e r 
allowed landlords t o possess 25 acres of i r r i g a t e d land and 50 u n i r r i -
gated, and the share of produce between the tenant and landlord to be 
divided at the rate of 66$ f o r the former and 34$ the l a t t e r was revised, 
and instead a much more moderate measure was proposed which to the Prem-
79 
i e r himself was "not revolutionary". 
Instant r e l i g i o u s deorees (Fatwa) against reforms were made 
a v a i l a b l e . 
Some members l i t e r a l l y f e l l i n a swoon. Sees Dawn.October 2 , 1951* 
Dawn, October?1 9 1951. 
Dawn. October 6, 1951* 
7 8 . 
7 9 . 
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Suddenly, the p u f f s of the Qadiani movement and the breath 
of federal p o l i t i c s produced a wind that swept Feroze Khan Noon i n t o 
the Premier's o f f i c e i n e a r l y 1953 marking the end of Daultana's f a i r l y 
productive parliamentary years. Noon was an apostle of feudalism who 
thought h i s predessorte agrarian l e g i s l a t i o n was based on "precepts 
from books of progressivism ...with u t t e r disregard of hard f a c t s 
80 * of our national l i f e " , and with the help of b e l l , book and candle 
and extant anti-reform groups rushed to the scrapping of the Daultana 
reforms* Noon, however, oould not make any f u r t h e r headway as the 
ma j o r i t y members of the M.L. Assembly party served notice of no-
confidence against Noon, who saved hi s skin by agreeing to the status 
quo.**1 
I n sum, the period 1951-54 i . e . a f t e r the general e l e c t i o n , was 
a d e f i n i t e improvement upon the previous ones i n that some social 
l e g i s l a t i o n was enacted, the opposition played i t s r o l e i n the House, 
on balance, quite loudly but more vigorously than i t s number should 
have permitted, and regular party int r i g u e s d i d not fol l o w regular 
change of governments. 
Sind 
The Sind governments were h i s t o r i c a l l y notorious f o r i n s t a b i l i t y * 
The ready made answer could be traced, l i k e that of the Punjab, i n 
* He also argued t h a t Islam was on his side i n the r e t e n t i o n of 
Zaraindari. 
** P a r t i c u l a r l y , the Punjab Children Act which held the state 
responsibile f o r undertaking the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of those c h i l d -
ren who had no one t o look a f t e r them. See: Dawn, December 9 , 
1952. 
80 . I b i d . . May 17, 1953. 
81o I b i d . . December 1, 1 9 5 3 ( E d i t o r i a l ) , "Quo vadis?". 
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an i n t r i g u i n g p u b l i c a t i o n , namely the Biographical Encyclopedia of 
Pakistan which described the relationships of in d i v i d u a l s i n a oountry 
82 
of Jagirdars and zamindars. The landscape of barony i n Sind was 
hig h l y pronounced where noble f a m i l i e s such as P i r s , Mirs, Talpurs, 
Khuros, Sayeeds and Kazis were i n a state of corrosive co-existence* 
These f a m i l i e s owned 87$ of the e n t i r e c u l t i v a b l e land of S i n d o ^ 
Among them there were b i g ja g i r d a r f a m i l i e s "descendants of marauding 
clans or mercenary s o l d i e r s " 4 - who were e a r l i e r given the r i g h t , by 
the s t a t e , of c o l l e c t i n g and appropriating a share of the produce of 
land. Hence, p o l i t i c s i n Sind were dominated by n o b i l i t y . 
At independence the number of members i n the l e g i s l a t u r e was 
s i x t y which afterwards dwindled to less than f o r t y , as the Hindu members 
went t o I n d i a . A couple or more of Hindu members (Congress and scheduled 
caste) who were s t i l l Pakistanis pending soluti o n of t h e i r properties 
could not f i l l i n the gap of parliamentary opposition. I n other words, 
a l l the prominent clans were i n con t r o l of the M.L. - the governing 
part y . The members of the Sind M.L. parliamentary board considered 
themselves a l l chiefs not Indians. And among the chiefs, there was a 
s i n i s t e r f i g u r e , namely Ayub Khuhro whose major contribution t o Sind 
p o l i t i c s i n the words of Suhrawardy was 'khuhroism 1 i . e . s t r i k i n g 
t e r r o r i n the hearts of h i s p o l i t i c a l opponents. He was chosen t o be 
82 . Sees Donald N. Wilbur, Pakistan. Yesterday and Today. (New York: 
1964) , p. 126. 
83* Chowdhury Mohammad A l i , o p .oit.. p.346. 
84« G r e n f e l l Rudduok, Towns and Villages of Pakistan.(Karachi: 1957), 
p . 138 . 
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the f i r s t Premier of Sind i n place of S i r Hidayattullah who was 
promoted t o the Governorship, The formation of Khuhro*s Cabinet 
was s i g n i f i c a n t i n one respect, i n that G.M. Syeed - himself a 
la n d l o r d of no mean stature hut always championed the oause of the 
peasants and downtrodden Haris - and h i s f o l l o w i n g were l e f t out 
of the government, A Hindu j o u r n a l i s t of repute who thought G.M. 
Syed representing "Sind's eternal soul ... Sind without ... Syed i s 
l i k e playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark",^ The G.M. Syed 
group 1s exclusion from the government meant that i n the Cabinet 
there would be no progressive elements who would challenge the social 
status quo. The Cabinet having been formed with like-rainded people, 
however reactionary they might appear, created the basis of teamwork. 
Biit t h i s d i d not work out as cabals flourished on the personal ambi-
t i o n s of the Cabinet members and members of the parliamentary body. 
As a r e s u l t , M.L. M i n i s t r i e s from August 1947 t i l l December 1951 
followed one another w i t h amazing frequency v i z . those of Khuhro, 
P i r E l l a h i Bux, Yussouf Haroon, Eazi Pazlullah, Khuhro. The p a r l i a -
mentary m a j o r i t y f o r each succeeding group could be managed through 
* G.M. Syed was the President of the Sind Muslim league 1943-45* 
But he could not continue i n h i s o f f i c e f u r t h e r due t o h i s 
independence of mind and ideas that were not appreciated by the 
top o i r c l e of the M.L. 
** People who were s i t t i n g on the lowest rung of social arrange-
ments. See G.M. Syed* Struggle f o r Mew Sind. (Karachi:1949) 
wh>re he pleaded f o r the a b o l i t i o n of j a g i r d a r i and zamindari 
systems. 
85 . M.S.M. Sharma, Peeps i n t o Pakistan. (Calcutta: 1954), p . 102 . 
86 . See: Manchester Guardian, 27 A p r i l , 1948} Statesman. February 4* 
1949; May 5 , 1950j Hindu. January 11, 1951; Statesman. December 19» 
1951. 
28.fr, 
"a mixture of patronage and c o e r o i o n " T h e n followed a 17-month 
Governor's r u l e from December 1951 t o early 1953. A new parliamentary 
phase was i n i t i a t e d a f t e r the general elections of 1953. 
However, the Cabinet inconstancy was not a l l the f a u l t of the 
Sind p o l i t i c i a n s ; f o r , the centre! had i t s subtle hands played i n i t # 
On two issues the successive Sind governments turned r e c a l c i t r a n t 
e.g. Karachi and refugees. Sind was v i r t u a l l y generous enough to 
play host t o the federal government which l a t e r took away Karachi -
Sind's former c a p i t a l - t o make i t s own c a p i t a l . Sind was equally 
f e a r f u l of an u n r e s t r i c t e d flow of refugees i n t o i t s t e r r i t o r y . The 
Sindhi sentiments on both these issues found expression i n G.M. 
Syeed's speech i n the l e g i s l a t u r e who said amid thunderous applause 
t h a t " I t was Sind which i n v i t e d Pakistan government to have sojourn 
under her roof ... I t was again Sind which opened her doors f o r the 
* 88 
armies of p o l i t i c a l refugees from I n d i a " . The federal government, 
** 
no doubt, f e l t a f f r o n t e d . Whenever the Sind government f a i l e d to 
toe the l i n e of the centre i t s Chief Minister came w i t h i n the j u r i s -
d i c t i o n of t h a t famous PRODA or election t r i b u n a l f o r gross public 
* Writer's i t a l i c s . 
** The w r i t e r heard from a knowledgeable quarter that when Khuhro 
s h i l l y - s h a l l i e d about moving h i s p r o v i n c i a l headquarters from 
Karachi t o Hyderabad, Jinnah summoned Khuhro and oharged him as 
a d i c t a t o r . Khuhro exclaimed, "Quaid-e-Azam, you t e l l i n g me a 
d i o t a t o r . " Khuhro was duly dismissed by him, l a t e r on, on charges 
of maladministration, corruption, etc., e t c . 
8 7 , Callard, "The P o l i t i c a l S t a b i l i t y of Pakistan", l o c . o i t . . p . 1 0 . 
88 . Quoted i n Dawn. September 17> 1953. 
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conduct* Most of the prominent ministers, one time or another, 
were PRODA-struck. True, p o l i t i c a n s suoh as Khuhro, Fazlullah, 
P i r I l l a h i Bux and Golam A l i Talpur were found unscrupulous, hut 
the v i t a l point was th a t the oentre acting through the Governor 
chose i t s own p a r t i c u l a r time to bring the p o l i t i c i a n s t o book. 
And the c r i t e r i o n was the extent of the p r o v i n c i a l government's 
subservienoe to the centre. The o f f i c i a l memory of the central 
government was so short t h a t i t f e l t no scruple i n emancipating 
those very convicted p o l i t i c i a n s t o assist the federal cause. Khuhro 
offered an extraordinary example of i t when h© was ransomed by the 
Governor General t o b o l s t e r the cause of the one-unit. 
However, the b r i g h t spots during the whole of Sind parlimentary 
l i f e were the holding of general elections and t h e i r resultant 
b e n e f i t s . Eleotoral r o l l s were prepared based on universal adult 
franchise. There were 17 lakhs of voters of whom 5 lakhs were f e -
males. The women were not only t o vote f o r the f i r s t time but were 
registe r e d by t h e i r names abandoning the age-old system of t h e i r 
89 
being regis t e r e d as 'wives* and 'daughters'. ^  The government 
made elaborate arrangements f o r f a c i l i t a t i n g v o t i n g and preventing 
adoption of u n f a i r means. As many as 1,200 p o l l i n g booths were made 
and voters were required t o place t h e i r b a l l o t papers i n the boxes 
* Haroon was made the Premier of Sind, obviously at the beck of 
Liaquat. And when Gulara A l i Tarpur was elected the leader of 
the Sind M.L. Assembly party i n 1951, the Governor d i d not o a l l 
him t o form a Cabinet. See: Statesman. December 26, 1951* 
89. Dawn, March 24, 1953. 
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bearing colours or symbols of t h e i r respective party candidates. 
A number of 540 gazetted o f f i c e r s were entrusted with the counting 
of votes and b a l l o t boxes were required t o be sealed and l a t e r opened 
i n the presence of the candidates or t h e i r agents. I n d e l i b l e ink 
l a s t i n g f o r 24 hours was imported from India - the sole possessor -
f o r the use of v o t e r s 1 thumb impressions so that casting of votes 
90 
could not take place more than once. fhe electio n commissioner 
recognized three p a r t i e s and colours were a l l o t t e d t o them accordingly 
- M.L. (green c o l o u r ) , Sind Awami Mahaz (white) and Sind league 
(a black background w i t h white s t r i p e s ) . Sinoe both the Hari Federation 
and Islam league applied f o r red oolour, no colour was given t o them."^ 
In a l e g i s l a t u r e of 111 seats, there were 101 Muslim seats, f o r 
which there were 378 contestants and f o r the remaining 10 seats 
(m i n o r i t y ) the contestants numbered 46* The M.L. parliamentary party 
put up 100 candidates, Sind Awami Mahazf 51, Khuhro league 55 
The remaining contestants were the sundry independents and minorities 
who d i d not come i n an organized way. A model electio n day was 
observed i n each d i s t r i c t and Taluks headquarters t o educate the 
* 12 symbols were selected: sword, bioycle, scales, elephant, 
plough, umbrella, t i g e r , hand, millstone, sun, tree and horse. 
See Dawn. A p r i l 12 , 1953. 
** The s p l i n t e r group of the Sind M.L. l e d by Khuhro. Usually known 
as Khuhro league. 
+ G.M. Syed's party. 
90• Dawn. A p r i l 5 , 1953. 
9 1 . I b i d . . A p r i l 14, 1953. 
9 2 . I b i d . . A p r i l 6, 1953. 
voting people and e l e c t i o n machinery on the conduct of elections.*^ 
The elections commenced on May 4» 1953* 
Because of Khuhro *s leaving the main M.L, "body and contesting 
elections on a bogus M.L. platform a f t e r h i s name, the oentral M.L. 
parliamentary hoard formed a 5~<nan committee under the supervision 
of the Prime Minister himself t o campaign f o r the Sind M.L. I t s 
16-page e l e c t i o n manifesto contained, i n t e r a l i a , planks such as the 
a b o l i t i o n of j a g i r d a r i , the enjoyment of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s and protection 
94 
of the i n t e r e s t s of m i n o r i t i e s . ^ Khuhro ,s 22-point programme was 
more generous promising t o do everything, even maintenance of "harmony 
95 
between Haris and Zaminders". J The Awami Mahaz stood on 7-point 
programme of which the f i r s t two items, namely ( l ) t o t a l a b o l i t i o n 
of j a g i r d a r i and ( 2 ) l i m i t i t a t i o n of zamindari acreage,^ were prominent. 
The elections were over by 10th May, 1953* According t o the 
Dawn's estimates 52$ of the voters cast t h e i r votes. Among women 
voters, about 35$ went t o the p o l i s h a bett e r record than t h a t of 
other provinces of West Pakistan. The M.L, party - o l d and organized 
- swept the eleotions. The M.L. won 88 seats, Awami Mahaz 4 ( l a t e r 
\ 98 beoame 7 ) » Khuhro league 4» and the rest independents. Obviously, 
the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s contained a message. Though the M.L. won the 
elections overwhelmingly, i t only obtained 53$ of the votes polled i n 
9 3 . I b i d . . A p r i l 14, 1953. 
94 . Hindu. A p r i l 16, 1953. 
95. • Dawn. A p r i l 12, 1953. 
9 6 . I b i d . . A p r i l 9 , 1953. 
9 7 . I b i d . . May 15, 1953. 
9 8 . Hindu May 12, 1953. 
292. 
Upper Sind, the stronghold of landlords r ? Secondly, the elections 
proved that only well-organized parties could make any el e c t o r a l 
impact• A powerful opponent "worth his powder and shot* Khuhro 
was of no a v a i l before an organized party, the M.L. And the most 
important r e v e l a t i o n acoording t o the Guardian was "that i t was a 
f a i r f i g h t - no extraordinary powers were invoked by the administration. 
Even the disappointed opposition leaders, by some miracle, agree that 
the elections were completely f a i r . This i s an unheard of verdict 
i n Sind, where corruption and improper influence have always tended 
t o reduce e l e c t i o n ... t o a faroe. I t also shows - and there were many 
who had begun to doubt t h i s - tha t demooraoy r e a l l y can be a working 
and workable system i n Pakistan."*'' 0 0 
Since May 1953 > "the Sind government under the new Premiership 
of Pirzada Abdus Satter hadi a d e f i n i t e veneer of s t a b i l i t y t i l l early 
1955* Only the larger issue of the consolidation of a l l West Pakistan 
u n i t s i n t o one province produced a r u f f l e i n the eourse and the l e g i s -
l a t u r e had t o be dissolved i n l a t e 1955* A f©w pieces of soc i a l 
# 
l e g i s l a t i o n were enacted. Although the opposition was impoverished 
of numbers - only 7 Awami Mahaz and a few independents - nevertheless, 
i t contributed i n a "positive manner* to the business of the House. 
* For example the Sind V i l l a g e Sanitation Act, Children Act, The 
Sind Tenanoy Act, 1950, etc., etc. I n 1954* J a g i r d a r i was 
abolished but could not be enforced due t o legal complications. 
5-year plan, o p . c i t . . pp.314-15• 
9 9 . Dawn, May 17, 1953. 
100. Manchester Guardian. May 20, 1953. See Also: Dawn. May 6, 1953? 
May 7 , 1953. 
I t was observed by Dr. Muneer tha t "the standard of debates and the 
general l e v e l of proceedings registered an improvement a f t e r the 
e l e c t i o n . " 
N.W.F.P. 
The N.W.F.P. M i n i s t r y was the f i r s t t o have been dismissed on 
22nd August 1947 at the behest of the Governor General* Dr. Sayeed's 
observation - indeed, a we l l meaning one - that "the precedent of 
dismissing a M i n i s t r y which had a majority ... was bound to lead t o 
102 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n the provinces," was steeped more i n the 
m o r a l i s t i c - l e g a l i s t i c aspect of parliamentarianism than i n the psych-
ology of p o l i t i c a l surroundings. Back i n the mid 1920s the Simon 
Commission wrote: "The N.W.P. i s not only the f r o n t i e r of India; i t 
i s an i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r of f i r s t importance from the m i l i t a r y 
point of view f o r the whole empire."* 0^ And the new s i t u a t i o n did 
not a l t e r the geographical and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s , The Congress 
M i n i s t r y i n the N.W.F.P. was formed a f t e r the el e c t o r a l v e r d i c t of 
1946. But when the referendum was held i n July 1947 i n the Province, 
i n pursuance of June 3rd plan of the B r i t i s h government, on the 
question whether the province should j o i n the Pakistan Constituent 
Assembly or the Hindustan Constituent Assembly, the province decided 
i n favour of P a k i s t a n . T h e v e r d i c t of the referendum was also, 
by i m p l i c a t i o n , anti-Congress i . e . the M i n i s t r y , which had been con-
s i s t e n t l y opposed t o the idea of Pakistan and threw hundreds of M.L. 
101. Muneer Ahmed, o p . o i t p . 2 2 . 
102. Khalid-bin-Sayeed, o p . c i t . . p.295« 
103. Quoted i n New Zealand Herald. January 2, 1948. 
104. Statesman. July 20, 1947• 
leaders and workers i n t o prisoru The s i t u a t i o n was f u r t h e r compli-
cated when the Fr o n t i e r Congress i n a res o l u t i o n demanded Pakhtooni-
stan, a fr e e Pathan State, and a f t e r the Congress defeat i n the re f e -
rendum the Congress f l a g was t o t a l l y abandoned and i t s place given to 
the New Zalme Pakhtoon red f l a g w i t h two blaok crossed swords on it«^^ 
Perhaps the Pakistan government could show i t s q u a l i t i e s of 
magnanimity and foresightedness v i s - a - v i s the Congress M i n i s t r y , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a s i t u a t i o n when Afghanistan which was occupying the 
same s t r a t e g i o p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o the subcontinent as Armania 
d i d i n the days of the Flavian Emperors, when Parthian imperialism 
was the major m i l i t a r y problem of Rome, showed her>interests i n the 
Pathans. Khan Abdul Oaf f a r Khan, a venerable leader of the Frontier 
avowed h i s l o y a l t y t o Pakistan but i n s i s t e d on having ,Paktoonistan* 
w i t h i n the p o l i t y of Pakistan, The central government elected t o use 
i t s reserve powers and dismissed the Congress government f o r i t s 
sponsoring a scheme considered t o be anti-Pakistan. 
Khan Abdul Qayum, the M.L. leader became the Chief M i n i s t e r . 
Jinnah himself t r i e d t o make Gaffar Khan agree to a p o l i t i c a l truce, 
and form a c o a l i t i o n government w i t h his Red S h i r t ( o r Khudai Khid-
matgar ) but to no purpose. The *Idea of March 1 of 1948 
* Including Qayum Khan, the l a t e r M.L. Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. 
For Congress persecution on the Muslim leaguers see: Times, 
A p r i l 20, 1947» Statesman. May 25, 1947. 
** Gaffar Khan was brother of Dr. Khan Shahib, the dismissed Chief 
M i n i s t e r . 
*** Meaning servants of God. The predecessor of the M.L. government 
was v i r t u a l l y the c o a l i t i o n of Congress and Red Shirt p&rty. 
105. Statesman. June 29, 1947? August 2, 1947, 
106. I b i d . . A p r i l 19, 1948, 
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f a l s i f i e d the p o l i t i c a l soothsaying i n that the Frontier budget of 
the M.L. M i n i s t r y was duly passed. In a l e g i s l a t u r e of 50 members 
there were 38 Muslims of whom the M.L. had the allegianoe of 25 
members incl u d i n g 3 members who were elected i n the recent by-elections* 
Among the 12 Hindu members 11 l e f t f o r India leaving one (Lala Koth 
Ram) who found i t more convenient t o support the M.L. government 
This depleted Assembly of 39 members continued t o function u n t i l the 
general elections of December, 1951 brought f o r t h a new and enlarged 
l e g i s l a t u r e . 
The F r o n t i e r province was also not devoid of landlords. One-
eighth of the t o t a l area i n l o t s of more than 500 acres each was owned 
by 0.1$ of the people. But feudal dominance could not get upper 
hand as the Khan brothers p a r t i c u l a r l y Gaffar Khan ( a f f e c t i o n a t e l y 
c a l l e d the Fro n t i e r Gandhi) always kept some sort of e g a l i t a r i a n 
movement i n motion. So, the accents of Fron t i e r p o l i t i o s were mainly 
on the Pakhtoonistan movement strug g l i n g t o oome out on the surface, 
on the one hand, and the governments autocratic antidotes against 
the very movement what i t considered to be e v i l , on the other. That 
the r i s e of opposition pa r t i e s was not a welcome proposition t o the 
* The w r i t e r was t o l d by Qayum Khan himself that 8 Congressmen 
orossed the f l o o r t o j o i n the M.L. bandwagon. 
** They themselves were landlords too. Qayum Khan himself made 
f l a t t e r i n g references t o Khan brothers i n h i s book, *Butter and 
guns'. 
107. Statesman. A p r i l 11, 1948. 
108. Land Reforms Commission, l o o . o i t . . p»13» 
29$. 
Premier was made clear by him i n the f i r s t session of the l e g i s l a t u r e 
v i z . "Our new State ••• i s at present surrounded by enemies. We 
should give up our differences f o r at least f i v e y e a r s . n ^ Q ^ Gaffar 
Khan became a security prisoner t o the central government, and his 
brother Dr. Khan was put under house arre s t . Large number of the 
followings of Red Shir t and Congress f e l l v i c t i m e i t h e r t o the F r o n t i e r s 
crime r e g u l a t i o n or the Security Act. There was room f o r personal 
vendettasj f o r , i n the days of Congress-Red Shi r t r u l e people were 
f i n e d f o r j u s t being Muslim leaguers and those f i n e s were refunded from 
the public exchequer. Extraneous factors such as c e r t a i n Indian 
leaders* occasional outburst of sympathies f o r the Khan brothers 
which rather dramatically oulminated i n the F r o n t i e r government's 
unearthing of the so-called "heinous p l o t " " 1 1 0 which showed that the 
Red S h i r t s were i n c o l l u s i o n w i t h some Indian leaders, influenced 
governmental p o l i c y . Then the Fakir of I p i , a r e l i g i o u s zealot par 
excellence - he had declared a crusade against the B r i t i s h r u l e i n 
the m i d - t h i r t i e s - despite his being forgiven by the government f o r 
h i s e a r l i e r r o l e , involved himself i n a n t i s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s i n Waziri-
stan before he made a clean p a i r of heels to Afghanistan. Toughness, 
no doubt, was required of the government up to a point, but i t s 
excessiveaess, perhaps, was the r e f l e c t i o n of Qayum's penchant f o r 
p o l i t i c a l masochism. 
* The w r i t e r was t o l d by Qayum Khan, the Chief Minister* 
109. Quoted i n Statesman, March 24, 1948. 
110. Hindu, March 14, 1949. 
Qayum % myopia was evidenced by his brandishing the b i g s t i c k 
a l l the time without holding out an o l i v e branch to dissentients, 
as he would not " l e t o f f d i s l o y a l persons, come what may", despite 
the opposition's plea f o r a general amnesty, f o r prisoners who declared 
111 
" u n f l i n c h i n g l o y a l t y t o Pakistan"* Qayum*s was the p o l i c y of 
gradual release. His p o l i c y alienated some of the i n f l u e n t i a l Muslim 
leaguers such as B i r of Manki Sharif, Zakori Sharif, Khan of Lundker, 
who u l t i m a t e l y came out of the M .L. a f t e r the centre had f a i l e d t o 
bridge up the schism and started operating under the new party, A.M.L. 
The A.M.L. a c t i v i t i e s were hamstrung a B t h e i r leaders, by r o t a t i o n , 
suffered e i t h e r expulsion from the province or imprisonment. However, 
the clouds of repression started l i f t i n g a b i t as the sunrays of the 
general elections t o be held i n November 1951 were breaking i n . 
Compared t o other p r o v i n c i a l elections, the Frontier electioneering 
atmosphere tended t o be a cramped one. Though campaigning started 
i n A p r i l (the l e g i s l a t u r e was dissolved at the end of March) so f a r 
as the M.Lo was concerned, the opposition p a r t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
r i s i n g one, A.M.L. - the Red Shir t was banned when i t s leader Gaffar 
Khan went t o prison - could not function properly as i t s leaders and 
workers were allowed t o electioneer only s h o r t l y before the elections. 
Even i t s President, P i r of Manki Sharif, and Convenor, Suhrawardy 
were not allowed t o enter the province u n t i l November 15 - twelve days 
111. Hindu. March 12. 1949* 
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before p o l l i n g . I n s p i t e of the opposition p a r t i e s ' t h r e a t that 
they would boycott elections " t i l l f u l l c i v i l l i b e r t i e s are restored 
112 
i n the Province", they, at length, chose the po s i t i v e method of 
contesting the e l e c t i o n s . 
The Eleotoral Rolls published on November 6, 1951 showed an 
electorate of 15*16,347 o f which 44,777 were f o r the two reserved 
seats f o r women and 5,618 f o r the general constituency (Hindu). 
The basis of a l l o c a t i o n of seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e was one repre-
sentative f o r every 40,000 people. As many as 396 candidates were 
contesting the eleotions i n a l e g i s l a t u r e of 85 seats of which 84 
were Muslim seats, i n c l u d i n g 2 women and 1 m i n o r i t y . The M.L. 
Parliamentary Board nominated candidates f o r a l l the seats, the 
A.M.L. 44 (due t o i n s u f f i c i e n t party propaganda), and the remaining 
contestants hailed from the Independents and other p a r t i e s . " ^ The 
common denominator of the opposition plank was the r e s t o r a t i o n of 
f u l l c i v i l r i g h t s i n the province. Whereas a l l the M.L. promises 
b o i l e d down t o , as usual, one t h i n g i . e . the M.L. " i s j u s t l i k e a 
mother t o Pakistan and as a mother i t has a special love f o r i t s c h i l d 
* Qayum: "After h i s (Suhrawardy) speech i n East Pakistan applauding 
the Red S h i r t s , how could we take the r i s k of allowing him i n 
the province and t r y i n g t o revive a banned organization." 
See: Dawn. November 17, 1951* 
** M.L.j A.M.L.; A.P.P., the Islam league and Jamat-i-Islami. 
+ 5 women oontested f o r the two seats reserved f o r women. Sees 
Pakistan News. November 17, 1951• 
112• Statesman. November 25, 1951* 
113. Year Book of the North West Frontier Province, 1954. (information 
Department: Peshawar: 1954), p. 30. 
114. Dawn. November 24, 1951. 
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t h a t no other p o l i t i o a l party could have" *' - said the campaigning 
Chief M i n i s t e r , The 17-day p o l l i n g results (November 26 - December 
12, 1951) brought f o r t h the follouring party positions M.L. 67; 
116 ' 
Independent Muslims 13? Non-Muslim 1 and A.M.L.4. Apart from 
# 
the opposition's a l l e g a t i o n t h a t the elections were not f a i r and 
i t s quick r e f u t a t i o n by the government that they were, the p o l l had 
some p o s i t i v e i n d i c e s The Pathan (people of the N.W.F.P,) reaotions 
t o adult franchise, f i r s t of i t s kind was quite favourable. The per-
117 
oentage of votes cast was 48:72 9 members returned unopposed. The 
inc u l c a t i o n of the democratic idea made through the vehicle of general 
e l e c t i o n brought about, evidently, a suspension of f r a t r i c i d a l v i l l a g e 
feuds and r i v a l r i e s f o r whioh the Pathans had been h i s t o r i c a l l y con-
demned. Instead of r i f l e s i n t h e i r hands Pathans clasped loudspeakers 
and trudged around v i l l a g e s of r o l l i n g surface t o electioneer. 
* The p o s s i b i l i t y of some i r r e g u l a r i t i e s could not be ruled out 
altogether. But i t s r e a l i t y was magnified by the disgruntled 
Muslim leaguers themselves, l e t alone the defeated p a r t i e s . The 
re - e l e c t i o n of the Chief Minister as President of the Frontier 
M.L, was opposed by Khan of Jhagra who l e d the dissidents 
supported by Youssouf Khatak, the General Secretary of the A l l -
Pakistan M.L, The Jhagra-Khatak group could not defeat Qayum 
(66:48 votes). As a r e s u l t , t h i s group was deprived of M.L, 
nominations i n the elections. Though the central parliamentary 
board - the f i n a l hearing a u t h o r i t y - cancelled some of the 
nominations of the p r o v i n c i a l board i n favour of the Jhagra-
Khatiak group. But the group was f a r from s a t i s f i e d . See: 
Dawn, October 22, 1951? November 4, 1951? November 5> 1951 a»d 
December 14, 1951* 
115, Dawn, November 26, 1951* 
Statesman, 13 December, 1951* 
117• "Year Book", l o o . o i t . , p,31. "The p o l l i n g was heavy, considering 
the enlarged franchise and i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y of many regions of 
the Province, "Times. December 13, 1951* 
118, Pakistan News. December 15, 1951* 
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A hig h l y p a t r i a r c h a l sooiety l i k e the N.W.F.P. where women could 
scarcely have a glimpse of the sun, nor the ohance of exercising 
v o t i n g r i g h t s i n an environment where orthodox Pathans scrupled t o 
eat the humble pie of winning a seat on woman's vote, had t o i t s cre d i t 
two women elected by the women votes f o r the f i r s t time - a phenomenon 
which "would have been inconceivable i n the North-West Fro n t i e r Pro-
vince only a short time ago"."^ 
The p o l l was also i n d i c a t i v e of the Fron t i e r people's l o y a l t y 
to the Pakistan government as the M.L. "has buried the myth of Pakh-
120 
toonistan". I f the Pathans were so keen on the creation of Pakh-
toonistan, they would have voted the M.L. government out, no matter 
th a t the protagonists were interned. And the charge th a t Pathans 
were goaded i n t o v o t i n g i n favour of the M.L. was not convincing t o 
those who knew that Pathans were f i e r c e l y independent and t h e i r t r a -
d i t i o n a l love f o r freedom was more than enough to stave o f f outside 
i n t e r v e n t i o n . Surely, the opposition parties oould have fared b e t t e r 
had they been provided enough p o l i t i c a l leeway. A f t e r a l l they were 
new t o people's eyes. The abstract stand f o r ' c i v i l l i b e r t i e s ' 
a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n of the electorate less from the tangible 
achievements made by the M.L. government i n nation«»building areas} 
f o r , "strong leadership and enterprise are often acoepted as adequate 
121 
excuse f o r rough and ready methods". 
119. Times, December 18, 1951 ( E d i t o r i a l ) , "Pakistan and the F r o n t i e r " . 
1 2 0 • JkiSLi* December 13, 1951. 
121. Statesman. December 17, 1951 ( E d i t o r i a l ) , "N.W.F.P. P o l i t i o s " . 
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The second phase of parliamentary government registered a 
change of a t t i t u d e v i s - a - v i s opposition, p a r t i c u l a r l y when Qayum 
joined the oentral Cabinet i n A p r i l 1953 and Sardar Abdur Rashid 
became the Chief M i n i s t e r . Meanwhile, P i r of Manki Sharif - he did 
not contest the general elections - won a by-election and became the 
opposition leader of the p a l t r y group of Members. The Chief Minister 
i n i t i a t e d , t o the d e l i g h t of the opposition, a resolut i o n i n the 
House t o the ef f e c t t h a t Standing Committees be appointed consisting 
of members from both sides t o advise the government on measures of 
public i n t e r e s t , law and order, t a x a t i o n , j a i l s , education, a g r i c u l -
122 
t u r e , etc., etc. Over and above t h i s , the Chief Minister granted 
a general p o l i t i c a l amnesty and released Red S h i r t leaders including 
123 
Gaffar Khan and Dr. Khan. Suhrawardy recorded h i s comment e.g. 
" I am extremely happy ... at the news that the N.W.F.P. Mi n i s t r y have 
124 
released a l l p o l i t i c a l prisoners." ^ However, i t would appear from 
the records that the M.L. M i n i s t r y , during the period 1947-1954 had 
the d i s t i n c t i o n of achieving s t a b i l i t y through harsh measures which 
were however gradually relaxed. 
The Prinoely States and c e n t r a l l y administered areas 
The t a c t and toughness w i t h which Sardar Patel of India brought 
about the process of democratisation i n the Princely States and 
122. Dawn. November 18, 1953. 
123. New York Times, January 5* 1954. 
124. Hindu, January 7» 1954. 
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t h e i r accession t o India could not he followed i n Pakistan. One 
b i g reason was that the M.L. leaders, p r i o r t o independence^ always 
hobnobbed w i t h the Princes t o enhance the cause of Pakistan and thwart 
the Congress which stood f o r a united Ind i a . The States - f a l l i n g 
under Pakistan - acceded t o Pakistan at the eleventh hour. They 
were v e r i t a b l e islands of medieval autocracy. The central government 
found i t rather too d e l i c a t e t o steamroller the States - the e r s t -
while a l l i e s of the M.L. - in t o accepting p a r i t y with other provinces 
having responsible governments. Besides, the central government 
was i n t r i n s i c a l l y i n h i b i t e d i . e . a wholesale reformation i n the p r i n c i -
p a l i t i e s would u l t i m a t e l y bind the central government p a r i passu t o 
abolish the feudal system i n the provinces. I n a s i t u a t i o n l i k e 
t h i s , the road t o reforms, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or otherwise, was bound 
125 
t o be "dangerously long one". ^ 
Although, a f t e r dawdling i n i t i a l l y the biggest s t a t e , Bahawalpur, 
set a remarkable example i n that the Ruler transferred the State's 
administrative powers to the Cabinet responsible t o the M a j l i s 
( l e g i s l a t u r e ) of 49 members elected on adult franohise.* Addressing 
people he urged them to be worthyof the "new and great opportunities" 
* The Ruler was so enlightened that i n response to the opposition 
complaints of racketing i n the elections held i n A p r i l 1952 he 
ordered r e - e l e c t i o n i n May i n which the M.L. won 35 seats i n a 
l e g i s l a t u r e of 49• The opposition (A.M.L.) won 14 seats - a 
rare feat compared to other regular provinces. Sees Dawn. 
A p r i l 27, 1952: May 27 and May 29, 1952. 
125. Dawn, A p r i l 10, 1952 ( E d i t o r i a l ) "Reforms i n States". 
which provided the "majority r u l e " and also "an opposition w i t h i n 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t s " . The Central M i n i s t r y of States and Frontier 
Regions persuaded four States of Baluohistan (Kalat, Mekhran, Lasbela 
and Kharan) t o merge i n t o one union with a oommon executive, l e g i s -
l a t u r e and j u d i c i a r y and introduce some reforms towards responsible 
government. The F r o n t i e r States ( C h i t r a l , M r , Swat and Amb) had 
anthropological d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way of progress as the t r i b a l 
habits and customs rendered the people d e f e r e n t i a l t o t h e i r respective 
leaders. 
Next t o Bahawalpur was the Khairpur State which maintained 
parliamentary machinery and had i t s State l e g i s l a t u r e elected on an 
adult franchise. I t was the only State which enacted a B i l l guarantee-
ing f ree compulsory education (excluding g i r l s ) up to matriculation. " ^ 
Baluchistan was the stronghold of feudalism. The 55 t r i b a l chiefs 
who constituted the Shahi Jirga (Royal Council) influenced the 
destinies of the nomadic people of Baluchistan. The Indian Central 
Assembly of the B r i t i s h period urged f o r i t s reform. But nothing 
new was added'to the then e x i s t i n g system by which t h i s area was 
governed v i z . the agent t o the Governor General, the Chief Commissioner, 
* A "Council of Rulers" w i t h "Khan-e-Azam" ( s o r t of Prime Minister) 
at the head was i n charge of the administration. But the 
greatest drawback of the scheme was that i n a l e g i s l a t u r e of 
40 members 30$ of the membership belonged to the category of 
nomination. See: Dawn, A p r i l 14, 1952 ( E d i t o r i a l ) "Baluchistan 
States Union". 
126. Dawn. March 10, 1952 (Editorial)"Bahawalpur". 
127. I b i d . . March 11, 1953 ( E d i t o r i a l ) "Khairpur Budget". 
30ft. 
and the J i r g a system. One "big obstacle, though, was Baluchistan's 
"being a " p o l i t i c a l l y heterogenous" area. The only improvement 
made under the Pakistan government was the forming of a 15-man 
advisory council representative of the Baluchis - who would enjoy 
the same p r i v i l e g e s as the members of a l e g i s l a t u r e - to assist the 
centre i n admi n i s t r a t i o n . Some association between administration and 
people was made by attaching the council t o the Agent to the Governor 
General i n Baluchistan rather than t o the Governor General at Karachi. 
This c o n s t i t u t i o n a l advance was f u r t h e r supplemented by the extension 
of l o c a l self-government t o deal w i t h education, health and economic 
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development. ' The N.W.F. agencies were the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the 
central M i n i s t e r of States and Fron t i e r Regions. And, representative 
t r i b a l c h iefs were associated w i t h the Frontier administration. 
The metropolis, Karachi l i k e Baluchistan and the N.W.F. Agencies-
was w i t h i n the sphere of the c e n t r a l government which operated through 
the Chief Commissioner. Karachi had nearly 40 years of experience 
i n l o c a l government t o i t s c r e d i t . The refugees who f i l l e d i n the 
gap caused by Hindu migration pressed, under the leadership of Hussain 
Imam, f o r an elected l e g i s l a t u r e and responsible ministry t o look 
le-af t e r Karachi, on the grounds of i t s increasing population, higher 
l i t e r a c y r a t e , number of newspapers and commercial s u p e r i o r i t y . 
* Central and p r o v i n c i a l governments coexisted i n Calcutta t i l l 
1911, Simla t i l l 1939» Besides, the Indian example of gi v i n g 
smaller u n i t s l i k e Ajmer, Bhopal, Delhi, e t c elected l e g i s -
l a t u r e s and responsible m i n i s t r i e s gave some impetus to the 
demand. 
1 2 8 * Statesman, February 27, I948. 
1 2 9 » I b i d . . February 25, 1949. 
Lobbying t o t h i s end was a c t i v e l y carried on by the Karachi Chapter 
of the M.L. which ostensibly behaved as though i t had the de jure 
status of a p r o v i n c i a l u n i t . 1 ^ 0 But the centre was apprehensive of the 
Karaohites who had a l l the symptoms of the proverbial 'Roman mob1. 
Besides, the oentre had p o l i t i c a l grounds f o r not envisaging a separate 
status f o r Karachi. For example, the Bast Pakistanis might object 
(as i n f a c t they did) t o Karachi's sudden ohange of status a f t e r so 
much federal money had already been invested t h e r e i n . However, the 
Karachi Municipal Corporation - which was already i n existence -
w i t h i t s 82 councillors and a Mayor at the head which were f r e s h l y 
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elected i n 1953 by a 4-lakh voters continued t o function w i t h i n 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of l o c a l subjects. 
The r e l a t i o n between the centre and the Princely States and the 
o e n t r a l l y administered area was not uniform. States were duly repre-
sented i n the Constituent Assembly. The terms of the Instrument of 
Accession e n t i t l e d the States to conduct t h e i r respective governments 
independently of the Pakistan government", provided they had f u l l 
allegianoe t o the Pakistan c o n s t i t u t i o n . The main p o l i c y of the 
centre was one of persuasion through which i t wanted t o bring about 
a uniform l e v e l of democratic development among d i f f e r e n t States. 
* Subjects l i k e Foreign A f f a i r s , Defence, Currency, etc., etc., 
though were Pakistan government's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
1 30» Dawn. May 27, 1952. 
1 3 1 « I b i d . . A p r i l 24, 1953. 
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The degree of success was not commensurate wi t h i t s i n t e n t i o n * The 
States, at bottom, were feudal e d i f i c e s . The noble heads could have 
been severed from t h e i r necks, French s t y l e or, l e f t i n t a c t , B r i t i s h 
s t y l e , t o be assimilated i n t o the society through evolution. The 
c e n t r a l government chose the path of gradualism and persuasion vis-a-
v i s the Princely States. And i t s r e l a t i o n t o c e n t r a l l y administered 
areas was rather d i r e c t and temporary, as w e l l . 
I n the foregoing pages we have analysed the r e l a t i o n between the 
centre and the u n i t s . We have also seen how the parliamentary govern-
ments functioned i n various u n i t s . The quick r i s e and f a l l of Cabinets, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Sind was, no doubt, a disturbing phenomenon. Inte r n a l 
causes apart, some dyarchic arrangements of governmental powers 
between the centre and u n i t s operated to the detriment of the growth 
of parliamentarianism i n the l a t t e r . But what was discernible was 
the c o n t i n u i t y of p o l i c y which d i d not change along with the permu-
t a t i o n and combination of Cabinet personnel i n the provinces. That 
p o l i c y , however, was not progressive, p a r t i c u l a r l y when only the 
fringes of agrarian reforms were touohed. But, we emphasise, that 
there was p o s i t i v e improvement registered by a l l u nits from a broad 
parliamentary standpoint, a f t e r each general e l e c t i o n held i n each 
u n i t . 
For instance, some p o r t i o n of the excluded areas of the Frontier 
region, according t o the centre's decision, oame under the execu-
t i v e a u t h o r i t y of the p r o v i n c i a l government of the N.W.F.P. See: 
Times, September 27, 1950. 
Mis 
Considering that "the p o l i t i c a l system of democracy i s ... 
i t s e l f a system of choices" and "voters are the p o l i t i c a l equivalents 
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of consumers i n ... a f r e e economy", J the el e c t i o n s held i n the 
provinces and some States i n Pakistan were a landmark. Mr. Sydney 
D. B a i l e y , a Hansard Society man, having enormous i n t e r e s t and know-
ledge i n the a f f a i r s of South Asian governments, thought that the 
very conduct of e l e c t i o n s based on adult franchise among a marginally 
eduoated populace " i s a remarkable achievement". S t i l l , one can 
pause on the f r u i t f u l n e s s of having elections i n an i l l i t e r a t e e l e c -
t o r a t e . Perhaps Bryce's dictum i . e . 'the t o o l w i l l give the workman 
the s k i l l * has more force i n the 20th century world of today than the 
more d e s i r a b l e one held out by J.S. M i l l , 'universal teaching must 
precede u n i v e r s a l enfranchisement'• The Pakistan E l e c t o r a l Reforms 
Commission of 1955 struck a note of cynioism that eleotions were 
"a f a r c e , a mockery"*^ upon the people. This was so due to the 
existence of the feudal system and so-called 'pocket constituencies' 
that resembled the 18th century 'rotten boroughs' of England. But 
the impediments were bound to be removed, gradually, as the elections 
* During t h i s period 1947-1954* a l l and sundry l o c a l s e l f -
governing bodies had t h e i r e l e c t i o n s held, too. 
132. D.E. Apter, "Comparative P o l i t i c s " , op.oit., p.331. 
133. Sydney D. Bail e y , Parliamentary Government i n Southern A s i a . 
(London: 1953), p. 59• 
134. Quoted i n Report of the Franchise Commission. 1963. (Ministry 
of Law, Pakistan: 1964), p. 44. 
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would give the electorate a sense of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government, 
a degree of p o l i t i c a l education and new p o l i t i c a l parties committed 
t o e l e c t o r a l emancipation through reforms. 
1 
Even under the q u a s i - d i c t a t o r i a l regime of Ayub born of highly 
q u a l i f i e d e l e c t o r a l system, the Franchise Commission of 1963 
i n i t s majority report strongly recommended the universal adult 
franchise. 
310. 
INTERREGNUM 
True, the Governor General f u l f i l l e d one of the demands of the 
U.S. /by dissolving the Constituent Assembly which was reduced to the 
position of an unrepresentative rump, but i n doing so he was no less 
actuated by the desire of creating one unit i n West Pakistan. While 
the U.P. victory i n East Pakistan gave a facade of unity to the central 
government of the M.L., curiously enough the U.F.'s victory also "gave 
a leg-up to the dissidence i n the West",'1' i.e. the Punjabi group's 
dissatisfaction with constitutional proposals of the East Pakistan-
dominated Constituent Assembly produoed a deep r i f t i n the rank and 
f i l e of the West Pakistan H.L. And i t happened that the Punjabi group, 
of l a t e , came to look forward to the end of the Constituent Assembly 
l i k e that of the U.P., though obviously for different reasons. 
Nov/ the question was one of means as to how best the present 
unusual p o l i t i c a l situation could be exploited for the realisation 
of the designs for which the Governor General performed the f i n a l 
coup de grace on the M.L. I t was possible for the Governor General 
i n his moments of pent-up rage oaused by the p o l i t i c i a n ^ snatohing 
away his powers by an Act of the Constituent Assembly, to suggest to 
Gen. Ayub (p.-in-G.) the taking over the government of the oountry. 
* Begum Taz, wife of the A.D.C. to the Governor General (also 
daughter of Gen. Mirza) who had the opportunity of seeing the 
Governor General at a close range, t o l d the writer that during 
the lat e r part of 1954 "fch© Governor General was almost half-
mad and running a temperature of 102 or 103 on occasion. 
1. Hindu, October 27, 1954 (Editorial) "Crisis i n Pakistan". 
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For he knew Gen, Ayub was mentally committed to the one-unit project. 
Whether Ayub was formally approached to assume the reigns of the country 
or given a casual hint by the Governor General there i s no definite 
proof. But on hindsight i t can be maintained that i t was but natural 
for the governor General to have the support of the army i n the person 
of Ayub i n the reconstructed Cabinet. For, after a l l , a Cabinet 
orphaned by the absence of a parliament, responsible only to the 
Governor General, and committed to undertake country's major issues, 
to be successful needed the support of those who represented the 
i n f l u e n t i a l sections or groups of people i n Pakistan. And as far as 
Ayub's alleged magnanimity reflected in his "No" to the hypothetical 
offer of the Governor General was concerned i t was, no doubt, dictated 
more by the native unpreparedness of the M i l i t a r y Establishment to 
seize power than Ayub*s deep sense of parliamentary p o l i t i c s . The 
Army was yet to be adequately fed with the fodder of American Mili t a r y 
Aid before i t could f l e x i t s muscle decisively. The Prime Minister 
himself regretted the delay of the U.S. mil i t a r y aid before the M.L. 
* See his book* Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters. (Oxford 
University Press: I967), pp.186-191. 
** Gen, Mirza t o l d the writer that when the Prime Minister's retinue 
assembled at the London Airport to depart for Pakistan i n response 
to the Governor General's o a l l , Ayub took Mirza aside and t o l d 
hims "Kichiko Ma'at Koha Karo, Golam Mohammad Hukumat Ham Logo 
Kb De Denge", meaning 'Don't t e l l anybody the Governor General 
had t o l d me that he would hand over administration to us'. 
According to Gen* Mirza Ayub's later references to the Governor 
General's proposals, both written and spoken were a l l ' l i e s ' , 
f or he had been no less close to the Governor General than Ayub. 
2» A devoted lieutenant of Ayub magnified t h i s aspect of Ayub's 
saying 'no* to the offer. See M. Ahmed, My Chief (Karachi: 196o)« 
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central parliamentary party which, according to him "should have been 
faster".^ However, the situation was tempting for a man of ambi-
tions and Ayub could only •look into the seeds of time* and await his 
grains of ambitions to grow into maturity} f o r , he read things sugges-
ti v e to his inner ambition, f i r s t as Macbeth picked up the message of 
the witbhes that he had the potentiality of a king. The Governor 
General willed *let there be a constituted cabinet with the same 
Mohammed A l i at i t s head*. And there was one. The retention of 
Mohammed A l i as Prime Minister - the Governor General*s erstwhile 
tormentor — was perhaps motivated by reasons. Pakistan could not 
afford to alarm her a l l i e s who had just poured into the country #105 
m i l l i o n i n aid.^ A non-party Cabinet of 9 members was sworn i n on 
October.25, 1954. I t was a broad-based Cabinet i n which the services, 
business interests and the country's p o l i t i c s were represented viz., 
Gen. Ayub (m i l i t a r y ) } Gen. Mirza ( p o l i t i c a l service)} Ghowdhury 
Mohammed A l i (Audit and Accounts)} the Governor General (Audit and 
Accounts); Ispahani (Business)} and the Prime Minister, Dr. Khan, 
G» Pathan and G.A. Talpur (country's p o l i t i c s ) . 
When the Governor General came to preside over the new Cabinet 
on October 27, i t looked as though the new arrangements were reminiscent 
* Lately Governor of East Pakistan. 
** Lately High Commissioner of Pakistan to U.K. 
3. Pawn, June 1955* 
4. Observer, October 31, 1954, "Tough Politios i n Pakistan" by 
Philip Deane. "Army needed him (Mohammad A l i ) to remain as 
recipient of much needed American aid." See Daily Express, 
October 25, 1954. 
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of the Viceroy's Council of B r i t i s h India where since the time of 
Kitchener the C.-in-C. alxrays sat i n that Council as a military 
5 
member. The Governor General who was not much of a p o l i t i c i a n h i t 
upon a strategy by which he wanted to shoot the target of his pro-
grammes by placing his gun on the shoulders of poli t i c i a n s . That was 
why he brought polit i c i a n s into the Cabinet and particularly Dr. Khan, 
of whose inclusion i n the Cabinet acted as a salve to the Redshirt 
opposition to the creation of one unit. He sent an emissary to 
Zurich to sound Suhrawardy and 'feelers* to other prominent leaders 
of p o l i t i c a l parties to f i l l i n the remaining numbers of Cabinet 
ministers.** But side by side, he also institutionalised an implicit 
threat i n the Cabinet i n the shape of Ayub, who chose to have his 
ministerial' duties performed from his military headquarters of Rawal-
7 
pindi' - a step that gave him an a i r of non-involvement i n p o l i t i c s 
on the one hand, and saved him from being alienated from the army's 
affection, on the other. Gen. Mirza, who i n his recent tide of 
fortune found a suitable base for olimbing the rungs of upper echelon 
of powers continued l i a i s o n , as an ex-defence Secretary, between the 
o i v i l i a n government and the army. Here the Governor General dug 
i n the oanal of the so-oalled "Cabinet of talents" to bring i n the 
crocodile of mili t a r y threat of take-over. Although, i n matters of 
* Brother of Abdul Gaffar Khan. 
5. Times. October 28, 1954. 
6» See Manchester Guardian. October 28, 1954? 
Statesman. October 30, 1954$ Dawn. October 28, 1954. 
7* Dawn. November 1, 1954* 
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Cabinet recruitment the Prime Minister had no other alternative 
than to play second fiddle to the Governor General; hut, supposing 
tfee Prime Minister had a free hand i n the selection of Cabinet members, 
i t was doubtful i f Mohammad A l i would have dropped Gen. Mirza after 
having written i n longhand a testimonial extolling Mirza's "...high 
sense of patriotism ... our country i s safe, so long as we can count 
on such selfless devotion to duty ... and loyalty to an offi c e r 
8 
l i k e the Def. Secretary". True, there could be no two opinions about 
Gen. Mirza's efficiency as an o f f i c e r , but commissioning his services 
for a p o l i t i c a l job was equivalent to putting a square peg i n a 
round hole. And, precisely t h i s was the way i n which top o f f i c i a l s 
of different cadres by dint of t h e i r past services were catapulted 
to higher p o l i t i c a l jobs by the unsuspecting politicians - an extra-
parliamentary recruitment process that was not always i n f a l l i b l e . 
Among the in f l u e n t i a l s i n the Cabinet three persons, e.g. 
Ayub, Mirza and Chowdhury Mohammad A l i (Finance Minister) were i n 
the higher brackets. But Chowdhury's frame of mind was more i n 
harmony with his other colleagues representing the oountry's p o l i t i c s 
* Since the beginning of Pakistan's arms deal with the U.S. 
Gen. Mirza had beoome very close to Mohammad A l i . 
** Gen. Mirza, for the benefit of the writer, jocularly idefined 
the role of an Inter i o r Minister i n the Pakistan situation as 
'to break heads'. He said i n October 1954 " I don't expect 
trouble ... But i f anybody wants i t they w i l l have i t from me." 
See: Hews Chronicle. October 29, 1954* 
8. See Appendix VI. 
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i n that he wanted to have things done at least with the varnish of 
available democratic procedui'e. While these elements remained quiet 
* 
and reticent, Gen. Mirza t o l d the Pakistanis for the f i r s t time i n 
his reckless and shattering candour that they were not worthy of 
enjoying deraocraoy, muoh less the Westminster system. He opined 
Pakistan needed "controlled democracy" — an irreconcilable contra-
diction of words - since politicians were "scallywags" - perhaps, 
except those to whom he owed his new l i f e . He oanvassed for one-man 
rule "to prevent people from destroying themselves" - suggestive of 
a strong presidential form of government. "None can stop formation of 
one unit. Have you seen a steam-roller being stopped by small pebbles 
9 
on road?" he said i n a Press Conference implying the threat of 
army intervention. In sum, Gen. Mirza, the aggressive member of the 
council of the Cromwellian Governor General reoited before the public 
with full-throated ease that outrageous rhyme of Alexander Pope e.g. 
ex,- b&4-
"For forms of Government l e t fools oontestj what is jadministered 
v.. 
b ^ t f ^ s best.* And the substance of i t was found i n the broadcast 
of the almost captive Prime Minister who promised "a vigorous and 
stable administration""^ to the nation. 
The Prime Minister's broadcast to the nation on 22nd November, 
1954 was a prelude to what the government was going to undertake. 
* Gen. Ayub kept a well-studied silence thoughout. He found i t 
more profitable to watch the t r i a l balloons launched by Gen. Mirza. 
9* See Manchester Guardian. October 29, 1954? also Dawn, February 23, 
1955. 
10. Ten Years of Pakistan. 1947-1957. (Government Publications, 
Karachi, 1957)> p.l6» 
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The Prime Minister envisaged two provinces e.g. East and West 
Pakistan. In other words, the existing provinces and states i n West 
Pakistan whose boundaries seemed "to be completely i l l o g i c a l " must 
g o T h e provincial and state legislatures registered t h e i r support 
i n favour of the one unit rather quickly, not taking any time to look 
into the pros and cons of the issue. The Governor General relying 
on the Section 135 of the India Act of 1935 passed an order setting 
up the establishment of a Council for the administration of West 
12 
Pakistan to chalk out immediately a detailed scheme for the project. 
Thus the government devoid of parliament was veritably pushing through 
a major issue of such magnitude by decree. And a government by 
decree presaged the advent of the so-called 'controlled democracy*• 
But soon after Suhrawardy's return to Pakistan after a four-
month stay i n Zurich hospital, the p o l i t i c a l process took a new turn 
and precisely for the better. This was evident i n the huge reception 
given to Suhrawardy on his a r r i v a l at Karachi - t h i s was the second 
one after he had been accorded a similar welcome i n early 1954 for 
the U.F. victory i n East Pakistan elections. On landing he assured 
the nation that government would have "to take people into confidence"! 
The octogenarian Haq was summoned i n Karachi, too, by the Governor 
General. So an atmosphere of talking was ushered i n . 
* The whole reception was organized by non-political reception-
oommittee. See Pawn, November 16, 1954* 
11. Times. November 23, 1954* 
12. Dawn. 14 December, 1954» 
13. Times. 13 December, 1954. 
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The Governor General and his council knew i t would take them 
more time to build up a following i n the country. I f Suhrawardy could 
be tempted inside the Cabinet, the Governor General's purpose would 
be served; f o r , he was the only man who had the instant popular 
support and a b i l i t y to deliver the goods. Suhrawardy was on the 
other hand placed between the two horns of a dilemma. While he 
associated himself with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly 
he had enough reasons to dissociate himself from the autocratic 
pattern of the government. His was the concern for drawing up the 
Constitution and ca l l i n g elections for a new parliament to which the 
government ought to hand over power, eventually. I t was a crucial 
moment both for Suhrawardy and for the country i . e . how best and 
quickly parliamentary p o l i t i c s could be restored. Evidently, Suhra-
* 
wardy was smarting under an implied threat of a military take-over? 
and f i n a l l y he elected to jo i n the Governor General's Council 
(20th December, 1954) to fight from within. He said his sole object 
i n joining the Cabinet was to establish democracy in Pakistan, and 
hela. up Gen. Mirza's concept of "controlled democracy" to ridicule 
i n a rejoinder and added that "true democracy controls i t s e l f " . " ^ 
His becoming the Law Minister entrusted with the task of framing 
country's constitution was also a recognition of opposition triumph 
* Suhrawardy "...We are making every possible effort to avoid t h i s 
(martial law) alternative ... that we are appealing to the people 
to cooperate ... ,§o as to avoid such a dreadful contingency". 
See Dawn. Ap r i l 23, 1955» 
14. Manchester Guardian. December 21, 1954. 
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after years of l i v i n g i n the doldrums. Soon Abu Hassain Sarkar as 
the representative of the U.F. of East Pakistan, joined the Cabinet. 
In short, Suhrawardy's entry gave the Cabinet the semblance of a 
p o l i t i c a l body to what otherwise was operating "simply as a committee 
15 
of administrators". ^ But the fact remained, the Governor General was 
s t i l l i n effective control of the p o l i t i c a l situation holding a l l 
trumps; f o r , the p o l i t i c a l leaders got into his council from a weak 
bargaining base. I t was, however, the institutionalised countervailing 
power i.e . the judioiary which challenged the Governor General's 
constitutional rashness and insisted on his following the due prooess 
of law. 
A robust judi o i a l foundation ensures a healthy growth of a 
p o l i t i c a l society as the l a t t e r i s always i n a process of being 
jogged into i t s conscience by the former. In his analysis of the 
English i n s t i t u t i o n s , the late Professor Gneist found the judiciary 
16 
contributing to "the success of the parliamentary system". In th i s 
context, a word of reference to Pakistan j u d i c i a l t r a d i t i o n appears 
warranted. When the B r i t i s h came to India they also brought along 
with them not only guns but also the trad i t i o n of Anglo-Saxon law. 
The B r i t i s h importation of Anglo-Saxon legal paraphernalia and the 
concept of rule of law into the subcontinent was one of the hallmarks 
15. I b i d . . December 29, 1954* 
16. Quoted i n A. Lawrence Lowell, Government and Parties i n Contin 
ental Europe. Vol. 1, (Longmans, London: 1896), p. 68. 
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of B r i t i s h rule i n India, and exactly on that point Great Britain 
as a colonial power stood apart from her other European colleagues. 
A century-old j u d i c i a l system had established deep roots i n Indian 
society, and there were abundant cases of the judiciary's putting 
checks on executive excess. In the resolution of conflicts the 
judiciary always acted as one of the 'intermediaries' an " i n s t i t u t i o n 
which was b u i l t up i n imperial India and became part of the legaoy 
17 
handed over i n 1947" "to the succeeding states e.g. India and Pakistan. 
I f we are to hypothesize that religion does influence human behaviour 
then the predominantly Muslim population of Pakistan whose Quran 
18 
enjoins them e.g. "Wa-etha hakamtom bayn a l nasi ann tahkomu bel-adel" 
(You have to be just between people) are s p i r i t u a l l y closer to the 
essence of Angla-Saxon law. Besides, the s p i r i t of Montesquian 
separation of governmental powers was practised during the period of 
Delhi Sultanate i n India, i n that the Abbaside traditions of sub-
mitting the a f f a i r s of canon law to the care of the Kajis (judges) 
were adhered t o . The independence of the Kajis restrained much of 
19 
the autocracy of the Kings. 7 And a people having a t r a d i t i o n of 
respect f o r justice however crude, 
* A King of Bengal found g u i l t y by the court remarked " I have 
i n ray dominions a judge who acknowledges no authority superior 
to the law", i b i d . , p.371. 
17 • W.H. Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of India 
(Hutchinson University Library,f^ondon: I964) , p. 41. 
18. Koran Karim (Shamarli Co., Cairo: 1964), p. 72. 
19 • See H.K. Sinha, op.oit.. p. 340. 
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primitive and inadequate from modern viewpoints were psycho logically-
more receptive to B r i t i s h legal system. Hence, Sir Ivor's remark 
that "the B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n for the Rule of law has been firmly 
20 
established i n Pakistan", was not an exaggeration. 
The j u d i c i a l leadership and role as an 'intermediate i n s t i t u t i o n ' 
during the post independence period i n Pakistan were a great s t a b i l i z -
ing factor i n the oountry's p o l i t i c s . The judiciary held the anohor 
of the ship of the State from being marooned. For instance, the 
Federal Court declared the Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance of the 
Governor General u l t r a vires i n response to an habeas corpus appli-
cation and ordered the release of the appellant, Sobo Gianchandani. 
I t cautioned the central government that "A legislature cannot dele-
gate i t s powers of making, modifying or repealing any law to an 
external authority. I f i t does so, i t would be creating a parallel 
21 
legislature." The Sind High Court defended freedom of p o l i t i o a l 
comment i n the Press and set aside the sedition charges levelled 
by the central government against the editor and cartoonists of the 
Evening Times of Karachi. The judgment clearly made a distinction, 
f o r the benefit of both government and the press, between p o l i t i c a l l y 
f a i r and seditious comment. I t envisaged the scope for legitimate 
criticisms of the government based on a party system and asked the 
20. Sir Ivor Jennings, Constitutional Problems i n Pakistan. 
(Cambridge s 1957)» V* 51• 
21. Judgment quoted i n Dawn, larch 4> 1952. 
321. 
government to amend the laws of sedition i n the l i g h t of the i n d i v i -
22 
dual freedom following independence. The ju d i c i a l concept of 
freedom was, however, not unbridled. The High Court denied Allama 
Mashriqi the freedom of raising a private army for his organization, 
the Khakhsar party, and upheld the government's action i n suppressing 
23 
the mi l i t a n t party* Even the lower courts were to mediate, some-
times, the internecine disputes of p o l i t i c a l parties namely, whether 
a member was r i g h t l y expelled from the party, a meeting legally 
called or a party election for office bearers was held to the l e t t e r 
of the party constitution, etc., etc. I f an epitaph was to be 
written on the demise of the f i r s t Constituent Assembly one would 
have extolled the M.C.A.s for t h e i r ensuring f u l l independence to the 
24. 
Supreme Court i n the proposed constitution. n What was more, they 
conferred unfettered powers, pending the framing of the constitution, 
upon the provincial High Courts to issue writs - what to the M.C.A.s 
were Magna Cartas - i n the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo 
warranto and c e r t i o r a r i . This was done by amending the India Act 
25 
of 1935 and incorporating a new section, 223-A. ' What has been 
said of English constitutional growth, that i t "was marked by a 
26 
close alliance between parliament and the common lawyers", the 
2 2« Times* M a y 6> (Editorial) "Press Liberties i n Pakistan". 
23. Dawn. May 31, 1952. 
24. I b i d . . A p r i l 5, 1954. 
25. I b i d . , July 6, 1954. 
26. Geoffrey Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth.. 
(Oxford: 1957), P«55. 
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developments of which had had t h e i r marks on the constitutional 
plane of Pakistan. Perhaps the alliance was uneven or lopsided, 
i n that a century-long judiciary with a l l i t s accessories produced 
27 
a class of lawyers whose "preponderence ... among top politicans" 1 
was a case of near-notoriety* 
But, on halanoe, they were the standard-bearers of the British 
legal and parliamentary ideals; f o r , to the lawyers the terms 
•parliament•aand •court 1 were not mutually exclusive. In fact, a l l 
the great parliamentarians (or politicans) were at the same time 
great lawyers. They had the greatest commitments to parliamentary 
and legal habits, which, at least, contributed to the growth of 
individual and collective respect for the rule of law among the 
Pakistanis - one of the fundamental requisites of Westminster system* 
And, imbibed with the same habit and with an a i r of Hampden, the 
President (Speaker) of the Constituent Assembly, himself a lawyer, 
went to the Sind High Court i n November 1954 to prove that the Con-
stituent Assembly had been wrongfully and i l l e g a l l y dissolved by 
the Governor General. 
The Sind High Court i n i t s judgment held that the dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly was unconstitutional. The Federal Court 
on appeal from the Federal Government ordered the Sind Court to 
* February 9, 1955* 
27• Morris-Jones, "Government and Politics of India", op.cit.. p»42. 
(Though Prof. Morris-Jones reflected on the Indian situation, 
i t had i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y on Pakistan, as well.) 
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stay i t s w r i t s . This was a situation that raised a v i t a l question 
of j u d i c i a l ethos i.e. whether the judiciary ought to behave mechani-
cally i n applying rules upon cases to the utter disregard of genuine 
demands and needs of a given country. One knows, particularly, how 
the American Supreme Court which gradually managed to fi n d i t s e l f 
i n an important position i n the Federal scheme, could declare the 
so-called "Jim Crow law" (separate but equal rights) legal at one 
stage only to be deolared u l t r a vires of the 14th amendment i n 1954, 
l a t e r on. In other words, the judiciary has become susoeptible, by 
and large, to social foroes and i t s alleged cold and reactionary 
attitude of earlier days i s on the wane. 
However, the Federal Court from the start was aware of the d e l i -
cacy of i t s position Vis-a-vis the struggle for supremacy between 
the unrepresentative Constituent Assembly on the one hand, and the 
Governor General, supported as he was by the weight of informed 
public opinion, on the other. Although the dissolution case was 
focused on a legal matter, i t had non-justiciable aspects, as well. 
The Court, at f i r s t , dropped a hint for a compromise and suggested 
that an appeal to the constituencies would be more graceful solution 
28 
of the dispute than the appeal to the court. I t did not work. 
* No doubt, the court was equally oonscious of an implicit threat 
of m i l i t a r y take-over. Following the verdict of the Sind Court 
Gen. Mirza remarked that the court's ruling would not affect 
the one-unit scheme, for "those neoessary steps w i l l be taken 
i n any case". See Manchester Guardian. February 10, 1955* 
2 8« I b i d . . March 3, 1955. 
324. 
And the legal fight ensued. The p l a i n t i f f argued that the oommon 
law of England did not apply i n Pakistan and should not l i m i t the 
independence of Pakistan. Regarding Section 5 of the Independence 
Act under which the Governor General was to represent Her Majesty 
for purposes of the government of the dominion, the Governor General 
was to be the representative and not the agent of the Crown. I f the 
la t t e r had no powers, the former did not have either. The Governor 
General,-in short, was a symbol of a symbol.2^ 
The defendant established that the Indian Independence Act 
placed Pakistan i n a position of a dominion devoid of (theoretically) 
f u l l independence. The sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly was 
complete with the Governor General, not without. And the royal prero-
gatives were i n existenoe i n oommon law which were "vested i n the 
Governor General" enabling him "to legislate without the ... consent 
of a legislature".^ 0 So, the Governor General exercised his emergency 
powers i n dissolving the Constituent Assembly imbued with the s p i r i t 
of salus populi suprema lax i.e. the publio safety was the main 
c r i t e r i o n . 
The oautious court avoided saying whether the Constituent 
Assembly had been dissolved constitutionally or not, but gave i t s 
judgment on the •unassailable ground' that the Governor General was 
a part of the Constituent Assembly and the laws passed by i t to be 
* On the government side was Sir K. Diplock, Q.C., and D.N. Pritt,Q.C. 
argued for the President of the dissolved Constituent Assembly. 
29. See Court's Proceedings quoted i n Times. December 22, 1954. 
30. Sir Ivor Jennings, "Crown and Commonwealth i n Asia", International 
A f f a i r s ( A p r i l : 1956), p.142. 
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v a l i d required the Governor General's assent to them. And i t just 
happened that 35 Acts out of 44 passed by the Constituent Assembly 
did not bear the signature of the Governor General. In other words, 
the country, as i t were, had been ruled i l l e g a l l y on many a matter. 
The Governor General, however, f e l t encouraged at the judgment and 
issued an ordinance proposing to validate the i l l e g a l acts with retro-
spective effeot and give a constitution to the country. On Apri l 22, 
1955> the court held that the Governor General could neither validate 
laws nor make constitutional provisions by decree. The Chief Justice 
warned the advocate general i n the court: " I f you ride roughshod 
you w i l l bring disaster to th i s country. You don't have a validating 
31 
machinery, nor you intend to create one". In the determination of 
whether or not the Constituent Assembly existed i n law, Sir K. 
Biplock's commendable reply that "the constituent convention i s a 
body inside the Constitution Act" to a rather passionate remark of 
the Chief Justice, namely "The fate of the country depends on the 
32 
statement that you are going to make on this point", further streng-
thened j u d i c i a l pronouncements. The court then suggested to the 
central government " I f Lord Mountbatten could set up a Constituent 
Assembly what prevents.the Governor General of Pakistan from setting 
31* Times. April 13» 1955* See also K. J. Newman, Essays on the 
Constitution of Pakistan, (Dacca: 1956), p, x l v i i i , 
32. Dawn, Ap r i l 27, 1955. 
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up a body, not necessarily on the same l i n e ? " At the same time i t 
warned the government of paoking the convention with syoophants who 
might he t o l d "Here i s a c o n s t i t u t i o n and you endorse i t " . These 
po s i t i v e utterances by the court were f u r t h e r f a c i l i t a t e d when the 
government volunteered i t s e l f t o have an "advisory judgment of the 
Federal Court" the advice of which showed the path and ended the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s . " ^ 
The judgment of the Federal Court was a magnum opus. The 
court prevented the Governor General from s h o r t c i r c u i t i n g democratic 
processes. While j u s t i f y i n g the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Constituent Assembly 
i t made i t s necessity a j u s t i c i a b l e issue. But at the same time 
i t paved the way f o r a new Constituent Assembly with s i m i l a r scope, 
j u r i s d i c t i o n and powers to i t s predecessor. A consequential issue 
l i k e the one-unit was not l e f t t o the Governor General t o stoke but 
t o the country's ensuing Constituent Assembly t o dispose o f . The 
Punjabi group which was being mounted i n t o prominence sinoe the 
dismissal of the Nazimuddin government read i n the j u d i c i a l deoision 
that unholy alliances were vulnerable. The judgment was also an 
implied recognition of what the U.F. had been a g i t a t i n g f o r , since 
i t s e l e c t o r a l triumph of 1954. Lastly, i n essence, the court hurt 
neither the p l a i n t i f f nor the defendant. The Speaker i n h i s heroic 
* S e e s Times. A p r i l 27, 1955 and Daily Telegraph. May 10, 1955. 
** For de t a i l e d disoussion on the judgment, see Sir I . Jennings, 
Const i t u t i o n a l Problems i n Pakistan. (Cambridge, 1957)* 
33• Hindu. A p r i l 28, 1955. 
34. Alan G l e d h i l l , "The Pakistan Constitution", Public Law. 
(Winters 1956), p. 435. 
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struggle f o r the r e s t o r a t i o n of parliamentary sovereignty f a i l e d 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n r e v i v i n g h i s Constituent Assembly, but his p r i n c i p l e 
triumphed i n the r e v i v a l of another Constituent Assembly f a r more 
representative i n character. S i m i l a r l y , the Governor General was 
allowed a graceful r e t r e a t i n t h a t his prerogative r i g h t s t o dissolve 
the Constituent Assembly was Upheld by the court. I n sum, the Federal 
Court i n i t s judgment d i s c r e t e l y r o l l e d legal and p o l i t i o a l aspects 
i n t o one. 
At t h i s point, however, a reference to Suhrawardy i s called f o r . 
No doubt, the Governor General's sudden deference t o the j u d i o i a l 
system was praiseworthy. But t h i s psychological ohange was i n i t i a t e d 
by Suhrawardy, the Law M i n i s t e r , whose ' d i s t i n c t * presence i n the 
Cabinet had the e f f e c t of an i n d o c t r i n a t i o n upon the Governor General. 
When Suhrawardy said t h a t the Governor General would "abide by the 
decisions of the Federal Court and continue steadfastly to uphold 
35 
r u l e of law" ^ without any rejoinder from the Governor General or 
h i s t r u c u l e n t colleagues, i t signalled that the Governor General was 
Maulana Mandoodi t o l d the w r i t e r that the then Chief Justice 
Munir i n h i s speach to Bar Association i n Lahore i n 1960 had 
remarked "Adalat Hookuraat ka Bahar Nehi Rah Sekta", meaning 
th e l c o u r t cannot altogether stay outside of p o l i t i c s . 
Following the Federal Court's judgment even Mirza was very 
watchful. Accused by a f r i e n d l y j o u r n a l i s t that he was not 
bold as he had been a couple of months before, Gen. Mirza 
r e p l i e d " I am not conversant with the contempt laws. You don't 
know what may happen i f you say a t h i n g . " See Dawn. February 23> 
1955. 
35* Hindu, A p r i l 22, 1955. 
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w e l l b r i e f e d about the effioaoy of the r u l e of law. I t was everybody*s 
knowledge that Suhrawardy was i n charge of the d r a f t i n g of the one-unit 
scheme and the country's c o n s t i t u t i o n . The Governor General wanted 
him f o r the implementation of the one-unit plan. While Suhrawardy 
served as a r e s t r a i n t t o the executive rashness i n g i v i n g an opportunity 
t o j u d i c i a l leadership, s i m i l a r l y i t was he who was la r g e l y and 
s i n g u l a r l y responsible f o r g i v i n g a concrete shape to the j u d i c i a l deci-
sion. I t was h i s t i t a n i o endeavour to help people choose between a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n convention proposed by the Governor General i n pursuance 
of the court *s v e r d i c t or a m i l i t a r y rule t h a t was a l l i m p l i c i t 
And p r e c i s e l y , he was s o l e l y instrumental i n weaning East Pakistan 
from an a t t i t u d e of complete non-cooperation w i t h the central govern-
ment and inducing the East Pakistan l e g i s l a t u r e to p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
the elections to the new 80-man Constituent Assembly announced to 
be held i n June 1955 • Now, what emerges from the foregoing d i s -
cussions? One s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t c r y s t a l l i s e d t h a t d i c t a t o r s h i p was 
not at any time v i r t u a l l y established, a l b e i t i t could have been. 
The irrevocable decision t o do away with democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and t o achieve the one-unit plan through executive f i a t s was not 
taken, though i t could have been. The l i t i g a t i o n on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
* A f t e r the demise of Suhrawardy, Mr. A.K. Brohi - a leg a l and an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l luminary i n Pakistan - commented on Suhrawardy's 
passion f o r the r u l e of law saying that i n "mysterious manner 
Suhrawardy i s going t o r u l e the State of Pakistan from h i s grave -
so th a t the coming h i s t o r i a n w i l l see the triumph of what he 
stood f o r i n the act of h i s passing ever." See The Dacca Times 
"Suhrawardy Supplement", May, 1964, p. x x i v . 
36. Sunday Times. A p r i l 23, 1955. 
329. 
issues could have been stopped and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the courts c u r t a i l e d . 
S i m i l a r l y , the convening of the new Constituent Assembly could have 
been brushed aside - but t h i s was not done. The fac t s were indicative 
of t h a t , although the forces of dic t a t o r s h i p d i d rear t h e i r heads 
occasionally - that was also mainly due t o p o l i t i c a n s * becoming 
party t o self-defeating purposes - they f a i l e d t o gain a permanent 
foothold i n Pakistan, so f a r , as the democratic foroes f a r outweighed 
the anti-democratio ones. 
